Office Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office Monopoly
Daniel Eran DilgerOffice Wars 1 - Claris and the Origins of Apple’s iWork Office Wars 2 - Microsoft’s Outrageous Office ProfitsOffice Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office MonopolyMicrosoft’s Office monopoly gives the company more revenues and delivers nearly as much profit as its Windows software. How did it gain such a powerful position in productivity applications? The history of Office is rooted in decisions Apple made in the 80s with the Lisa and Macintosh, and also has an...
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Office Wars 4 - Microsoft's Assault on Lotus & IBM
Daniel Eran DilgerIBM’s announcement of the new Lotus Symphony suite is an interesting turn of events because it signals a revenge strike against Microsoft’s Office hegemony. It is particularly interesting that it is based on OpenOffice, allowing IBM to pair the support of the industry and community backing the open source suite with its own position in the Enterprise with Lotus Notes. Previous articles in the Office Wars series looked at how Microsoft earns fantastical profits from its Office applications, and how Apple handed its early lead in graphical application software to Microsoft. How was it that Microsoft was then able to entrench Office as a monopoly on the PC? Here’s a look at the history of Office related to Lotus and IBM, and how an old war is dialing up into a new battle for the billions of dollars in desktop application revenues Microsoft sits upon.Office Wars 1 - Claris and the Origins of Apple’s iWork Office Wars 2 - Microsoft’s Outrageous Office ProfitsOffice Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office MonopolyOffice Wars 4 - Microsoft’s Assault on Lotus, IBMIn the Beginning, There Was VisiCalc.The market for personal computers exploded in 1979 after the introduction of the VisiCalc spreadsheet for the Apple II; Apple’s hardware sales rose ten fold. After that success, both VisiCorp and Apple raced to develop even more sophisticated computing environments. They were joined in their efforts by IBM and Microsoft.The entire industry was aware of the developments in graphical computing at Xerox PARC, although the resources required to deliver that level of technology remained prohibitively expensive. VisiCorp tried to develop a graphical system for desktop machines starting with the ill-fated Apple III in 1981. After the success of its VisiCalc spreadsheet caught the attention of IBM, resulting in the launch of the IBM PC in 1981, VisiCorp targeted its graphical VisiOn system toward the new PC. The expense of developing the software combined with competitive pressure from new rivals helped to destroy VisiCorp before it could ever deliver a viable product. Shortly before it crashed, a star product manager named Mitch Kapor escaped to form Lotus Development.[Office Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office Monopoly]Lotus Springs from VisiCalc.Founded in 1982, Kapor’s Lotus began selling Lotus 1-2-3 as an integrated spreadsheet, database and graphics program for the PC. It quickly overtook sales of the simpler VisiCalc to become the top spreadsheet product for the PC. Microsoft had created its own clone of VisiCalc called Multiplan, but it could not compete with Lotus 1-2-3.Microsoft’s frustrated efforts to make any headway in PC applications caught the attention of Steve Jobs, who was working to set up third party developers for the new Macintosh. Microsoft agreed to work on a graphical version of Multiplan later renamed Excel for the Mac as a way to enter the difficult applications business. In 1985, Lotus also entered the Mac market with an integrated spreadsheet called Jazz. It flopped badly. Derided as buggy, un-Mac-like, incompatible with existing documents, and too expensive, the $595 program helped to entrench Microsoft’s Excel on the Mac. Microsoft Gains Entry to the PC Applications Market Via the Macintosh.Simply porting 1-2-3 to the Mac would have expanded Lotus’ brand and reputation. Instead, the weak introduction of Lotus Jazz as a unique but unfamiliar product allowed Microsoft to develop strong sales of Excel on the Mac without any real competition. Lotus eventually delivered 1-2-3 for the Mac in 1991, but by then Microsoft had already moved its Mac apps to the PC. In 1988, Microsoft ported Excel to the PC, where it would rival Lotus’ sales of 1-2-3 in spreadsheets as a graphical application. This was a major threat to Lotus, because Microsoft had developed a reputation for using its control of MS-DOS to push users toward its own applications. With Microsoft in control of the DOS PC platform and desiring to expand its application business, Lotus found itself in the position of a hapless tenant facing eviction at the whim of its landlord. A common phrase at the time was “DOS ain’t done till Lotus won’t run,? suggesting that Microsoft had the power to pull the plug on its DOS application partners at any time. Even worse, Microsoft had an intimate position with IBM in developing a future, more sophisticated replacement for DOS called OS/2, which planned to supply a graphical environment for the PC much like Apple’s Macintosh. Microsoft was developing the basis of the desktop environment for OS/2, and was already selling a DOS program called Windows that demonstrated the potential for porting its popular Mac applications to the PC. By expanding its control over the PC environment, Microsoft’s position as a platform landlord to DOS application vendors would only get stronger.Lotus Sprouts Improv: 1988 - 1991.Inspired by an innovative new concept in spreadsheet design released under the name Javelin by a small DOS developer, Lotus began work on a new kind of number crunching apps called Improv. It used variables and smart data modeling rather than just presenting a simple matrix of spreadsheet cells like VisiCalc, 1-2-3, or Excel. After being unable to deliver Improv as planned for IBM’s OS/2, Lotus was approached by Jobs at NeXT to develop Improv for NeXTSTEP. It turned out the innovative Improv did for NeXT what VisiCalc had done for the Apple II; it delivered a unique new way to model data that was obvious and practical, and introduced NeXT into financial markets that could immediately see the value of NeXT over DOS PCs, the slow progress of IBM’s OS/2, and the struggling mess of Microsoft’s Windows.Lotus had trouble transitioning Improv to OS/2, Windows, or the Mac because other platforms lacked the development sophistication of NeXTSTEP. On Windows, Improv competed against Lotus’ more conventional 1-2-3 spreadsheet, which acted as a barrier to innovation because many users didn’t want to have to learn how to use something new and different.While Lotus was struggling to deliver Improv as an improvement over 1-2-3, it was also fighting off rival Borland, which had introduced a 1-2-3 spreadsheet clone cleverly called Quattro Pro. Lotus sued Borland over copying 1-2-3’s menus and commands in a 1990 lawsuit that went all the way to the US Supreme Court. The courts determined that the arrangement of menus in software was not protected by copyright, but again took half a decade to determine that.[History of Improv][Looking Back at Lotus Improv]Microsoft’s Unlikely Windows: 1990.By 1990, Microsoft had released Excel 3.0, Windows 3.0, and the first version of Word for Windows. The vendors of popular DOS software applications--including WordPerfect, Borland, and Lotus--failed to anticipate how rapidly Windows would catch on, giving Microsoft a home field advantage to replace their apps with its own. There were two main reasons why the industry as a whole failed to anticipate the rise of Windows.First, Windows was a laughable product. This factor was the main reason why Apple failed to take it seriously as a competitive threat. It was clumsy and ugly compared to the Macintosh, and technically inferior to both OS/2 and NeXTSTEP. However, everyone missed the important detail that while Windows couldn’t compare to other real products, it was a marginal improvement over DOS. Microsoft’s stranglehold over the DOS PC market allowed it to sell Windows despite its flaws, particularly since Microsoft gave it away for free with copies of the Excel software it ported from the Mac, and distributed it at low cost to PC OEM manufacturers. Microsoft’s contracts prevented other OS vendors from doing the same.Second, Microsoft lied to its DOS application partners about the future of OS/2. While Windows Enthusiasts like to say that all of the DOS developers missed out because they simply didn’t get on the Windows bus, the reality was that Microsoft pointed its own DOS developers to OS/2 long after the company had plotted out plans to abandon them along with IBM.This is similar to the strategy Microsoft more recently used to jettison its PlaysForSure parters when it introduced the Zune. While it continued to insist that PlaysForSure was fully supported and that the Zune--and its slightly tweaked, incompatible version of Windows Media content--would somehow only compete against Apple’s iPod, Microsoft really planned to steal away the entire WMA market for its own. In the case of the Zune however, there was really nothing to steal.[Ten More Myths of Zune: Myth 7: Zune only competes against the iPod, not PlaysForSure Players]Hijacking the Applications Market for Windows: 1990.Back in the late 80s, there was a lot to steal. Lotus, Borland, WordPerfect, and other DOS vendors were making sustainable profits selling DOS application software. They all trusted IBM and Microsoft to deliver ongoing development in PC operating systems. In 1988, the pair introduced OS/2 2.1, which introduced a graphical environment called the Presentation Manager. In the forward of the OS/2 Programers Guide Bill Gates wrote, “I believe OS/2 is destined to be the most important operating system, and possibly program, of all time. As the successor to DOS, which has over 10,000,000 systems in use, it creates incredible opportunities for everyone involved with PCs.?Even in 1990, Steve Ballmer was describing OS/2 as “Windows Plus,? suggesting that Windows was simply a way for it to deliver its Mac applications to PC users, and downplaying it as a temporary product that ostensibly only existed to compete with the Macintosh until the arrival of OS/2 3.0, which Microsoft billed as “OS/2 NT? for New Technology.However, the reality was that Microsoft had brought in a development team from Digital to start its own operating system back in 1988, and had worked for years on a strategy to dump its partnership with IBM and migrate DOS PC users to a Windows machine running Microsoft’s own Windows applications. The release of Windows 3.0 made it clear that Microsoft was not going to deliver its end of OS/2 3.0. It left its own developers stranded in a dead-end alley for supporting OS/2 as Microsoft had encouraged them for years to do. Microsoft had no problem delivering a version of Word and Excel for both OS/2 and Windows, built using internal development tools. It didn’t share those tools with its partners because it wasn’t worried about getting 1-2-3 and WordPerfect running on Windows. After leaving its own software application partners high centered atop the a strangled corpse of OS/2, Microsoft then dropped its own OS/2 applications, leaving Word and Excel for Windows as the default applications for PC users.[1990-1995: Microsoft's Yellow Road to Cairo]Lotus Assembles an Office Suite and Notes: 1994.As Microsoft’s power increased, Lotus worked to assemble a suite of applications to sell against Office, just as Ray Noorda had worked to do at Novell by combining WordPerfect with Borland’s Quattro Pro spreadsheet.Lotus paired 1-2-3 with its Approach database and the acquired Freelance Graphics, Ami Pro word processor, and Organizer calendar to form Lotus SmartSuite, which became popular on the PC because of its low cost of $130 and its interoperability with Office. Lotus sold its SmartSuite application suite for both Microsoft Windows and IBM’s OS/2. In 1994, Lotus also acquired the Notes groupware developed by Ray Ozzie--who had left Lotus ten years earlier to develop the system with investment from Lotus; ten years later in 2005, Ozzie would end up at Microsoft, where he now leads software development. In 1995, IBM bought Lotus to acquire Notes as messaging product. That move gave Microsoft a new reason to attack IBM; not only was it was still trying to sell OS/2, but it was now an application suite vendor, selling a low cost product that prevented Microsoft from being able to raise the price of Office dramatically and monetize its monopoly. [1990-1995: The Rise of Windows NT & Fall of OS/2]Hijacking the Applications Market for Windows Again: 1994 - 1995.By 1994, Microsoft had established a large enough base of Office and Windows users on the PC that it decided it could suspend development for the Mac to focus all attention on its promised new Windows 95 and Office 95. It hoped to syphon users away from the Mac while also taking a second opportunity to shipwreck its own PC developers such as Lotus, which had struggled to catch up after being delayed for years by Microsoft’s fake play with OS/2. In the end of 1995, Microsoft finally released its new versions of Windows and Office, increasing integration and erecting new barriers for third party application developers. Microsoft made major changes to the Windows user interface guidelines that relegated earlier Windows 3.x apps to an inferior position as oddball software that didn’t look correct on the new system.Microsoft--admitting that it was much better at copying than in delivering original ideas--based the new Windows 95 user interface almost entirely upon the Mac OS and NeXTSTEP. It had proven there was little chance of it being stopped by the courts; it could simply drag a lawsuit on for a half decade and delay any resolution until it had pushed its rivals out of business. It would similarly operate above the law in shutting out markets for PC operating systems and applications. Unsurprisingly, the only applications available and optimized for the new Windows 95 were Microsoft’s own Office 95 apps: Word, Excel, and a port of the Powerpoint application it had acquired from a Mac developer. Microsoft also used its OEM licensing agreements to dump Office 95 on the market at a bundled price designed to starve out competitors. Once they were gone, Microsoft would be free to charge whatever it wanted for Office and Windows.Microsoft’s use of its market power to stop IBM’s OS/2 and its Lotus SmartSuite applications was documented in the DoJ monopoly case against Microsoft, where the findings of fact noted that Microsoft “punished the IBM PC Company with higher prices, a late license for Windows 95, and the withholding of technical and marketing support.? The court also noted that Microsoft demanded IBM make no mention of other operating systems in its PC advertising and that it move all its employees to Windows 95--or face paying tens of millions of dollars in extra licensing fees to obtain Windows. [Full text of Judge Jackson's findings of fact - page 23 - CNET News.com]Microsoft Betrays Partnerships for Profit. Microsoft’s systematic betrayal of its partners, including Apple, IBM, its MS-DOS developers, and then its Windows developers, resulted in monopoly ownership of the PC desktop market and the market for office productivity applications. It now makes fantastical profits automatically selling copies of software with every PC sold. It also licenses its applications in bulk to companies, but makes much of its money selling “client access licenses,? which charge fees per user to allow a connection with a server. The lack of competition in both the PC operating system and desktop productivity software markets have stifled any hope for the lower prices and fresh innovation. Microsoft has been found guilty of overcharging customers in states across the US and in other countries. It pays out regular settlements in the hundreds of millions, but its billions in profits from its monopoly position makes those huge payouts a minor business expense.Will there ever be any competition to Office? Office Wars 5, the next installment, will look at the attempts to deliver application suites on other platforms and recent developments to challenge Microsoft’s position on the PC using free and open software, including IBM’s recent move to leverage its Notes business using a version of OpenOffice rebranded under the Lotus name.What do you think? I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? 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Will Google's Android Play DOS to Apple's iPhone?
Daniel Eran Dilger Today's broad array of smartphone operating system contenders are offering lots of potential answers to a problem that only requires one. It appears the market has two options ahead: either pool generic hardware makers behind a single operating system and deliver a smartphone marketplace that resembles the Windows PC market, or watch them fall to a dominant leader and have a smartphone market that resembles Apple's iPod ecosystem. This decision isn't going to be made by a class of intellectual elite, or by government mandate. it's going to be made by the market itself. Here are the factors that will influence the outcome, either marginalizing Apple's iPhone into a niche as the company has twice experienced previously at the hands of DOS in 1981 and Windows in 1991, or positioning it as the dominant leader as Apple has achieved for itself with the iPod since 2001. The third segment in this series looks at Google's Android and the Open Handset Alliance as a possible “DOS-attack” against Apple's iPhone. Subsequent segments will look at Nokia's newly opened Symbian and other mobile contenders challenging the iPhone. Will the iPhone Meet its Match from a Modern Day DOS? Will Windows Mobile Play DOS to Apple’s iPhone? Will Google's Android Play DOS to Apple's iPhone? Will Symbian Play DOS to Apple's iPhone? Google Acquires Android. In 2005, Google purchased a startup named Android, which had been in business for nearly two years. The secretive startup was known only to be working on software for mobile phones. It was being run by a who's who of mobile industry veterans, including Andy Rubin, the founder of Danger. Rubin had earlier worked at WebTV along with Chris White and Andy McFadden, both of whom had also joined Android. Richard Miner of Orange and Nick Sears of Tmobile also brought their mobile provider experience to Android. At the time of the acquisition, Google didn't announce any plans for Android and instead only told BusinessWeek, “We acquired Android because of the talented engineers and great technology. We're thrilled to have them here.” It appeared that Google was only going to be expanding its search services for mobile phone users, along the lines of the Google SMS answer system it had recently released. Google Buys Android for Its Mobile Arsenal - BusinessWeek Windows XP Media Center Edition vs Apple TV: The Fall of WebTV The GPhone Myth. As reports began to leak out about talks between Google and hardware makers throughout 2007, rumors began to fly about “the GPhone,” a competitive offering that was supposed to take on the iPhone. Some phone enthusiasts hoped Google would jump in to rescue the struggling OpenMoko project and turn it into a viable project that could attack Apple's new smartphone. In October 2007, I printed the Great Google GPhone Myth, taking apart the idea that Google would be directly competing against the iPhone, and describing that Google was really working on a free alternative to Windows Mobile as a conduit for getting its search and related services on a broader variety of mobiles. Google's services were already on the iPhone. In November, Google played its hand: it had organized a consortium of companies called the Open Handset Alliance to develop open standards for mobiles. The first product from the group would be Android, a mobile operating system built on the Linux kernel. Google wasn't getting into the phone handset business at all; it was only making sure that its mobile search products would not risk being marginalized by the threat of Windows Mobile on phones in the same way Microsoft had been working to leverage its PC monopoly to push Google search off the Windows desktop. The Great Google gPhone Myth Introducing Android: Leader of Linux. Two weeks later, Google released an early version of the Android software. On top of a Linux kernel, Android uses a specialized version of a Java Virtual Machine that takes Java language code and turns it into what Google calls “Dalvik bytecode” rather than Java bytecode as a standard JVM would. This allows Google to leverage existing and familiar Java language tools without paying Sun for a Java license. Like Mac OS X and its fraternal iPhone OS, Android includes a variety of open source libraries, including SQLite and WebKit. On top of that, Google developed a series of frameworks that handle the tasks Cocoa Touch does on the iPhone. Android also bundles a set of applications. While Apple adapted its existing Mac OS X to work in a mobile environment to create the iPhone OS, Android is more like a customized Java environment running on a specialized mobile Linux variant: elements of maturity in an otherwise experimental new platform. What is Android? -Google Android was by no means the first mobile OS using Linux. Both Palm and its amputated ACCESS software arm have Linux-based mobile platforms. Nokia has Maemo, which it uses in its Internet Tablets, and also recently acquired Trolltech and its Qtopia mobile Linux platform. Motorola has teamed up with MontaVista Software to use its Mobilinux. Intel created the Moblin project for mobile Linux, aimed at Internet devices. Google's OHA also isn't the first consortium to attempt to standardize a mobile Linux platform. The OSDL started the Mobile Linux Initiative to define requirements for hardware; the Consumer Electronics Linux Forum (CELF) then worked to define various phone profiles aimed at the Japanese market; the Linux Phone Standard (LiPS) Forum tried to do the same thing in Europe. In 2007, LiPS was folded into the new LiMo Foundation, along with the OSDL. All of these committees have had some overlap and some complementary features. Several of Google's OHA partners are also LiMo members, including NTT DoCoMo, Wind River, and Motorola. So why didn't Google just join LiMo? “LiMo, very candidly, wasn't moving fast enough,” OHA board member John Bruggeman told CNET. Google hopes to herd the Linux cats into a progressive, structured platform that can battle against Symbian and Windows Mobile to succeed as the new DOS of smartphones. Will Google fracture or unify mobile Linux? The Presumption of the Necessity of DOS. The previous segment examining Windows Mobile pointed out how the PC industry as a whole assumed that Microsoft's desktop Windows monopoly would easily take over dominance in the MP3 player market, pushing Apple into a niche position. This was expected because DOS had pushed Apple's early computers into a reduced role starting in 1981, and Microsoft had repeated this again in 1991 when the DOS world migrated to Windows, effectively pruning Apple's Macintosh into a Bonsai platform. The inability of one company to dominate any product category has been frequently repeated by PC industry pundits as a given, despite the fact that history is full of examples of this happening. Sony dominated personal music players for two decades under the Walkman brand even while equally large competitors tried to push it from this position; Nintendo has similarly owned handheld gaming despite ill-fated efforts to grab a piece of its pie by products running a generic platform such as Microsoft's WinCE (Gizmondo), Linux (GP32), and Symbian (N-Gage). In fact, outside of the Windows/DOS PC, there are actually few examples of a generic platform taking over an industry. Nearly every other consumer-facing product uses proprietary platforms: car makers, stereo equipment, appliances and so on typically all use designs custom to their maker. The paradox of the Windows PC market has been that Microsoft's broadly licensed software supposedly saves hardware makers from investing in software development while ensuring compatibility, when in reality it adds significant costs to PC makers while limiting their ability to differentiate themselves. That explains why PC makers have been perpetually merging together and going out of business while Microosft has rolled in money over the last two decades. Parallel efforts to copy Microsoft in broadly licensing an operating system have regularly failed: IBM's OS/2, Apple's Mac OS, Palm's PDA OS, even Microsoft's own efforts to duplicate Windows dominance in other markets, from copy machines to PDAs to smartphones to SPOT watches to music players. The closest copy may be Symbian, but its customers are partners, not simply consumers of a generic third party's operating system as Windows licensees are. That indicates it is not necessary to duplicate the dominance exercised by Microsoft over the PC industry in the smartphone market. Google's Android and Symbian exist more as technology sharing pacts among manufacturers, but both aspire to take Microsoft's DOS role among smartphones. However, the idea that Apple's iPhone must be dethroned by a modern-day DOS, whether Windows Mobile, Android, or Symbian, is not just debatable, but does not sync with the reality of more recent events. Apple's recent history of the iPod further refutes the idea that a software analog to Microsoft is needed. The iPod Emergence: Apple & Pixo vs IBM & Microsoft. Apple's iPod in 2001 made no effort to clone the DOS business model; it actually did the opposite. When Apple entered the market, there were a number of existing MP3 devices using custom software, hardware designs, and DRM codecs. The iPod used off the shelf components to deliver a custom MP3 player using third party software, but Apple also added its own technologies: easy to use sync with iTunes, a fast Firewire interface that made uploading music far faster than the prevailing USB 1.0, and an attractive industrial design. With the iPod, Apple played the role of IBM in 1981, using Pixo's embedded operating system to enter the market quickly, just as IBM had used DOS. The difference was that Apple didn't direct any market attention toward Pixo and added a lot of value on top of that core embedded OS. A modern day Compaq couldn't simply clone the hardware and license Pixo to run on it in order to compete against the iPod, because the iPod was much more than just generic hardware running Pixo software. As the iPod developed, Pixo's role diminished and was eventually displaced. Just like IBM, Apple jumped into a new market just as demand was beginning to explode. Apple made MP3 players far more attractive to a general audience by delivering greater playback capacity than most entry level devices offered, along with an ease of use that encouraged buyers to jump in at the higher end of the market. That left Apple with not only the lion's share of the market, but also by far the most profitable segments of the market. Two decades prior, IBM badly fumbled its play with the early PC and ended up irrelevant in the PC world by the late 80s, sideswiped by Microsoft's DOS and the cloners who were licensing it in parallel, notably Compaq and later HP and Dell. Steve Jobs had witnessed that happen, and was determined to not let it happen again to Apple. Rather than being manipulated by a software middleware vendor as IBM had, Apple worked to incrementally develop the iPod market itself. After consuming the hard drive-based player market, Apple took on the Flash RAM-based market with a tiny hard drive system used in the iPod Mini, and followed up with Flash-based devices of its own in the Nano and Shuffle. This allowed Apple to progressively serve an increasingly wider market, incrementally growing upon an established foundation. With the iPod, Apple became, in effect, an IBM with its own internal Microsoft. Microsoft's Failure Despite Features. In contrast, Microsoft entered the music player market by promoting music player hardware reference designs around WinCE. However, it was unable to ship a finished design until the iPod had become firmly established around 2005. Later branded as PlaysForSure, the devices were sold by various hardware makers and all purported to support the same DRM and the same music subscription services while also offering a broader array of hardware that presented video before the iPod did, supported wireless before the iPod, and so on. Despite these unique features, all of those PFS designs still failed. Microsoft blamed the failure of PFS upon its music store and hardware partners and decided to take Apple on itself in 2006. It relaunched a Toshiba PFS player as its own device under the Zune brand, adding WiFi music sharing features and a larger display than the current Pods had. It failed dramatically as well. Did Microsoft's attempts to float a new DOS among music players fail because of Apple's success, or due to Microsoft's own problems? The failure of the Zune, which followed the iPod model rather than the DOS model, seems to suggest that Microsoft itself was to blame. Consider too that Microsoft's Windows Mobile phones, which use the same underlying operating system as its failed PlaysForSure music players and the Zune, had similarly flopped even before Apple could release a charismatic phone equivalent to the iPod. Of course, when the iPhone was released, it hit Windows Mobile hardest. The iPhone made Windows Mobile Smartphones look ridiculous and underpowered, and made Windows Mobile Pocket PC phones look clumsy and awkward, despite the fact that they both supported a variety of features the iPhone didn't, including the ability to edit documents, capture video, send MMS, and so on. Simply adding on features did not enable Microsoft to compete against Apple. The only conclusion that can be drawn from all this is that competing against Apple requires more than just having a feature arsenal. Microsoft's failures in themselves do not necessarily mean that Google's Android will fail in its attempts to float its own smartphone platform. Why Microsoft’s Zune is Still Failing Microsoft’s Zune, Vista, and Windows Mobile 7 Strategy vs the iPhone Will Google Succeed where Microsoft Failed? Microsoft's demonstrated inability to successfully enter consumer markets for MP3 players and smartphones has given observers little faith that the company will somehow turn things around in late 2009 when its next generation of devices are expected to be released. However, prior to that the first fruits of Google's efforts to build its own smartphone operating environment will arrive. Will Google's Android take over Microsoft's crown as the “DOS vendor” among smartphones? Supporters of Google's Android project point to some parallels between Android for smartphones and Windows on the PC: Android will allow hardware makers to differentiate in ways that can offer features Apple can't (or doesn't want to); it should allow software developers to offer features Apple does not allow on the iPhone; it embraces open, hobbyist experimentation in ways that Apple currently isn't; and it opens the potential for content providers that Apple is not interested in allowing. Openness is Android's key competitive feature. Will all this openness allow Google to unseat the iPhone to become the primary platform developers want to participate in, and subsequently soak up the market for third party hardware makers that Windows Mobile serves? While Google currently has no market share due to the fact that no Android phones have yet shipped, it does have broad vocal support from a variety of the same kinds of hardware manufacturers that supported DOS and Windows and helped to make those platforms successful in the desktop PC market. HTC and Android. The first Android phone is expected to be the HTC Dream; Taiwan's HTC (High Tech Computer) also manufactures Palm's Treo Pro phone as well as many of the most visible Windows Mobile devices. In addition to models produced under its own name, HTC also sells Windows Mobile devices under the Dopod brand, as well as no-name phones branded by providers, such as AT&T, Orange, Sprint, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless, Vodafone, and others. HTC will also be building the XPERIA X1 Windows Mobile phone for Sony Ericsson. HTC was quick to throw its support behind Android despite its long term alliance with Windows Mobile. Why would it so enthusiastically support an unproven platform from a company that has no experience in consumer hardware platforms? One can only assume that HTC is not happy with the current state of Windows Mobile, and desperately wants another “DOS” to succeed where Microsoft's has so spectacularly failed. As an Original Design Manufacturer for Palm, HTC watched as Palm adopted Windows Mobile in place of the Palm OS and subsequently fell even deeper into crisis. Palm's only successful phone since has been its Palm OS-based Centro. HTC undoubtedly sees Android as its ticket to becoming the next Dell, but without a similar dependance upon Microsoft. Android for mobile phones is essentially playing the role of Linux for PCs, except that it has the backing of a major company behind it. Can Android Take on the iPhone with Openness as its Feature? As great as this sounds, it's important to consider that Linux on the desktop has made no significant progress in eating into Windows dominance after a decade of trying. Being open, free, flexible, and decentralized hasn't been enough of an advantage to get consumers to migrate from Windows to Linux in any fraction of significance. Similarly, in the music business, Linux-based MP3 players have had no impact on the iPod, despite offering more features, flexibility, support for additional codecs, and so on. In the mobile phone area, Linux enjoys a sizable portion of the smartphone market, but this is almost entirely due to phones sold by Motorola in China, where the advantages of Linux' openness are void. Motorola's Linux phones offer nothing to users in terms of openness or flexibility, and are really no different in terms of features than other appliance 'feature phones' based upon closed operating systems. And again, a key problem with assaulting Apple in a feature war is that neither the iPod nor the iPhone became popular by being “highly featured.” They both delivered perhaps 80% of the functionality found in all other devices in the market. Rather than trying to match every feature and cater to every niche as Microsoft had with Windows Mobile, Apple's devices did a few things very well at launch, and incrementally developed into full featured devices that still lack some of the more unique features of their competitors. Further, in terms of openness, the demographic that embraces Linux' characteristic freedoms is not the same as the demographic that buys smartphones in quantity and then pays for data service. This is a critical fact to consider because a big part of the iPhone's success stems from the fact that it is being pushed by mobile providers who want to capture the cream of the market willing to pay a premium for data services. The Frankenphone. Combining the fractured aesthetic of HTC's Windows Mobile phone hardware with Android's software, based upon Linux' perpetually unfinished DIY openness and Google's Java-like development platform, will not result in a product similar to the iPhone. Instead, it will look a lot like phones that have already failed in the market. Apple's advantage comes from slick hardware designs with a close attention to detail, combined with software that purposely does less so that it can do what it does better. Even Apple's own conservative attempts to broaden its software capabilities with iPhone 2.0 have resulted in instability problems that can be blamed upon both Apple's early releases of its phone operating system and software from inexperienced third party developers new to the platform. Would the current frustrations with iPhone 2.0 be somehow mitigated by additional openness that also embraced all kinds of variables from different hardware makers with less quality control than Apple, a loose committee of additional cooks working to serve up operating system features targeted at every possible conceived need, and a wider third party software group with fewer constraints on illegal behaviors? The Failure of Open. While it is politically unpopular to criticize the well meaning efforts of open source contributors, the failure of Linux on the desktop, the failure of the vaporware Indrema game console, and the failure of the OpenMoko project to deliver a workable phone within a year of its deadline all underline the serious problems open development faces in the world of consumer oriented devices. Open has simply failed to deliver on its promises in the world of consumer hardware. OpenMoko was supposed to release its first mobile phone to consumers for $250 several months in advance of the iPhone. When the iPhone shipped, the group then announced new plans to get its phone out by the end of 2007. Instead, this spring the group announced new plans to move to an entirely different development platform, and ship its phone mid year for $400 with limited functionality and incomplete software outside of basic GSM phone features. Linux's notable successes, from Motorola's Linux phones to the Tivo DVR to Linksys Routers, have often come without any associated openness or freedom, and were instead delivered simply to provide their manufacturer with a free kernel to build upon. This indicates that while Linux may find its way into an increasing number of smartphones, it will likely not be accompanied by the glorious freedom of an open development environment Google has said it would offer with Android. Apple iPhone vs the FIC Neo1973 OpenMoko Linux Smartphone Can Google Succeed Where Open Has Previously Failed? Despite “openness” being Android's strongest competitive feature compared to Apple's iPhone, Google recently revealed that its wide-open development model is intentionally gravitating towards a closed association of top tier partners due to practical considerations. In July, Google accidentally sent out a notice that revealed that it had been seeding private SDK updates to only a subset of its contributors, angering those who believed that Android would be as open as Linux on the desktop or the OpenMoko project. Further, Google has restricted initial development to higher level APIs just as Apple did, further indicating that Google itself realizes that being wildly open to impress a minority of hobbyists will not result in the commercial success of its new platform. That serves to neuter Android's primary advantage over the iPhone. Without delivering on the premise of being wide open, Android is really just a less mature set of Java libraries used to create a specialized binary that runs on a Linux foundation. Unlike Apple's iPhone, Android phones won't have a slick user interface developed by professional artists, nor the iPhone's legacy of mature software development frameworks crafted over the last thirty years, nor the iPhone's tightly integrated hardware with award winning industrial design, nor its marketing power tied into the iPod and Apple's retail stores. Android won't be an open iPhone, it will only be a Windows Mobile phone with a better kernel that runs specialized Java software instead of Win32 or .NET code. Don't expect consumers to be impressed by that. The Biggest Missing Feature. There is one remaining factor that strangles to death any last remaining hope that Android might assassinate the iPhone and assume the crown of the “DOS of smartphones.” That is: Android delivers zero price advantage to consumers. In 1981 and 1991, consumers who wanted Apple computers faced the sticker shock of a somewhat arrogant price tag. Apple sold its computers, as it still does, at the higher end of the market, but there was simply far more range in prices available. In 1981, that meant the Apple II was $2600 and the new Apple III was $3500, even before you added a monitor. On the low end, Commodore sold its far less powerful, but “still a computer” Vic-20 for $300, while IBM entered the market with the IBM PC at $3000. Over the next few years, Apple focused on delivering additional sophistication at the same price, releasing the $10,000 Lisa and then the $2,500 Macintosh. IBM continued selling PCs in the same $3,000 to $10,000 range, but other DOS PC vendors began selling machines at prices that ranged as low as $1500. That left Apple with a roughly $1000 price premium over low end PCs. The products weren't really comparable, but consumers only saw the huge price difference. In 1991, Apple was still selling moderate to high-end Macintoshes for $3,800 to $10,000; the crippled Mac LC was $2500, and obsolete-at-birth Mac Classic ranged from $999 to $1500. Windows allowed PC makers to ship a functional $1500 PC and claim a rough approximation to Apple's $2500 entry level system, maintaining that apparent $1000 price premium. Today, pundits are lucky to find a Dell or HP system that is even a couple hundred dollars less than a comparable Mac. However, in the smartphone business, the iPhone 3G is now the same price, if not less, than generic competing phones on the market. Even more significant is the fact that the price of the phone hardware is nearly nothing compared to the cost of the service plan. This fact simply eases any price premium that could cause buyers to flock to a smartphone running a generic operating system over buying the iPhone 3G, regardless of whether it runs Windows Mobile or Android. 1990-1995: Planting Software Seeds Android Partners Have Already Failed. That same pricing principle similarly prevented buyers from considering many of the alternatives to the iPod. While Apple's original iPod models were more expensive than many of the first MP3 players on the market, they were price competitive with models offering similar features. By 2004, it was Apple who was undercutting MP3 competitors on price. Microsoft offered zero price advantage when it began selling the Zune, a major factor in its failure, but Microsoft simply couldn't out-price the iPod; it was already losing money offering the Zune at the same price as the iPod. Apple now has tremendous market power in buying RAM and other components that will prevent any competitors from being able to offer a huge discount over the iPhone's $199 price tag. Even if competitors were to give their phones away, they would only offer a $200 discount to users who would then still need to pay the same mobile fees to use the phone. Android's other partners, including Samsung and LG, have already failed to capture any significant market share in the music player market. Are they going to maintain their position as smartphone makers now that they face similar competition from Apple, its iPod ecosystem, its iTunes Music and Apps Store, Apple's retail store experience, and other factors that are pushing the iPhone? If they can, it is not obvious how partnering with Android will help. Other Problems for Android. Android was announced in early November 2007 and was followed with an early preview SDK within a couple weeks, a month ahead of Apple's initial announcement of the iPhone 2.0 SDK. However, between March and July 2008, Apple delivered nine progressive releases of its SDK, opened its App Store, and sold 60 million apps, raising $30 million to support iPhone software development in just the first month. It has since released three more SDK updates to developers related to iPhone 2.1, which is expected next month. Android just published its first open SDK beta update earlier this week, warning developers that “applications developed with it may not quite be compatible with devices running the final Android 1.0.” Additionally, Android still has no phones available. By the time the HTC Dream is expected to launch, Apple will have an installed base of around ten million iPhone (and iPod touch) users supporting software development through iTunes. The business model for selling Android apps is no better than that for selling jailbreak iPhone apps: there is no iTunes Apps Store to promote them, so users will have to track them down on their own. Android developers also have no real freedom that jailbreak iPhone developers lack. The only difference is that there are ten million iPhones to sell jailbreak apps to, and currently zero Android phones. If selling a jailbreak iPhone app sounds like more trouble than its worth, imagine trying to sell Android apps to a non-existant audience. Now add the official iPhone App Store into the mix, where publicity, promotion and profits are booming. What platform is going to have the most applications? How many users will flock to a smartphone platform with no apps? The wisdom of releasing a desirable phone and achieving a significant installed base before releasing an SDK makes a lot more sense in retrospect. Additionally, while Apple has a decade of experience in shipping regular updates to Mac OS X and its Xcode developer tools, Google has only shipped a random assortment of web-oriented SDKs (a number of which have been abandoned) as a tangent to its core business of selling advertisements. When the Android SDK 1.0 is finished later this year, developers will not only lack an installed base to sell their apps to, but will also have no high profile market for selling their apps in, and subsequently no financial incentive to develop applications that add value to the Android platform, just like Linux on the PC desktop. Around the same time, possibly within the next month, Apple will be shipping its second major OS release: iPhone 2.1. Apple will also be upgrading its entire user base to the new software so that developers will have a cohesive platform to target. This mirrors the efforts Apple has taken to upgrade its Mac OS X users to the same reference release. Mobile developers will be seeing money pouring in via iTunes while crickets chirp in the Android section of various mobile online stores. Apple’s iPhone Vs. Other Mobile Hardware Makers: 5 Revenue Engines Same Same, But Different: DOS Model Problems. Android developers will also have a series of other problems to manage. Like Windows Mobile, Android is intended to support everything, from BlackBerry-style keypad phones with a small touchscreen to the simple Windows Mobile Smartphone form factor lacking a touch screen to iPhone-like full size touch screens. Also like Windows Mobile, Android phone makers will have the option to leave off Bluetooth, WiFi, GPS location services, graphics hardware acceleration, and so on. Each Android phone will also have unique camera hardware, support for different video and audio codecs, and varied support for other differentiating proprietary services demanded by mobile operators. This will force developers to to make complex decisions regarding the lowest common denominator they choose to support. So while the iPhone will have a cohesive feature set, a managed software environment, and a functional market, Android will be a loose federation of hardware makers selling the same random features found on Windows Mobile today, with a chaotic development environment that lacks any central market for users or developers. And it will be run as an experiment by a company with no experience in consumer hardware or platform development. The Missing Tap. One specific example of the “DOS model problem” is that Android currently does not support multitouch. It's not touched on in the API, and Google quietly tap dances around its omission. Why no multitouch? Because multitouch screens are expensive, and most OHA hardware members are more interested in making a profit in a competitive phone market rather than impressing consumers as Apple did with the iPhone. Most existing smartphones, even those trying to directly rival the iPhone, use a stylus driven, pressure sensitive tap screen or a simpler, cheaper touch technology that lacks support for sensing multitouch. The iPhone's screen can actually sense up to five fingers at once, but the primary feature multitouch offers on the iPhone is the two fingered tapping and the pinching effects everyone associates with it. Android could certainly support multitouch if there were a demand for it, but that's the point: Google knows that its hardware partners are cheap and unlikely to put out hardware that actually competes with the iPhone. Instead of using expensive technologies that deliver clever yet largely invisible functionality, OHA members, just like PC makers, are far more likely to add flashy, impractical gadgety fluff that's cheap to tack on, such as slide out keyboards, neon tubes, and scratch and sniff stickers. That's how you impress gullible nerds on the cheap. Google itself is blowing smoke and erecting mirrors to distract from the reality that it being a “DOS vendor” means supporting bargain basement hardware from penny pinching duplicators. Android has been demonstrating some “wow” features such as a Street Maps app that pans around based on an internal compass in the demonstration phone. The problem is that that kind of thing only makes for a fun demo. Nobody needs to twirl around their phone in the air to see a view of the other side of the street, but everyone who has used an iPhone will wonder why they can't pinch to zoom out. Even worse, most Android phones aren't going to have a compass built into them, so Google is demonstrating features most Android users won't be able to use. That Sounds Like Microsoft… Google's design decisions are beginning to look a lot like Windows Vista; rather than actually working to make laptops boot faster, Microsoft came up with the idea of adding a small screen to the back of Vista laptops so users could check their email without having to wake the system up. But this was a stupid idea for a number of reasons, the most obvious being that most users just want a laptop that boots up quickly. Few laptops got the mini screen, but every user who tries Vista on their laptop will wonder why it doesn't boot up as fast as Mac OS X Leopard. In the same way, Google is advertising features for Android that most users won't ever see in their actual phones while ignoring things people will expect based on their exposure to the iPhone. Android is simply selecting the wrong features. Android will offer the advantages of supporting MMS, recording video, and the list of other features Windows Mobile already supplies. Those features didn't stop Apple from firing past Microsoft in the smartphone arena however, just as the Zune's highly touted WiFi and screen didn't phase iPod buyers. Incidentally, just months after the Zune, Apple had not only demonstrated a larger display but a higher definition multitouch screen, and not only WiFi, but functional WiFi that could be used to browse the web or check email. This suggests that Apple, with its faster release schedule, won't stay behind any of the leading features potentially offered by Android for very long. Android partners, however, will find it as difficult to catch up with Apple's unique features, just as Microsoft has been stymied to keep up with Mac OS X, the iPod, and the iPhone. The underlying reason: both Google and Microosft are tasked with maintaing support for a huge variety of hardware options demanded by all their partners. Apple has the unique circumstances to do only what it needs to do itself. Android in Windows Mobile's Shoes. Like Windows Mobile, Android faces a difficult market. In the US, it competes against the popular BlackBerry in corporate markets and the iPhone among consumers. Worldwide, it competes against entrenched market leader Nokia. The difference is that Google, unlike Microsoft, has no in. Windows Mobile was adopted by Windows-bound IT shops despite its weaknesses. Nobody has any preexisting reason to try an Android phone apart from hobbyists and open software enthusiasts, a demographic that has done little to move Linux on the PC desktop. Google also lacks Microsoft's installed base; it's starting from zero. The smartphone industry initially doubted Apple's chances of making much progress with the iPhone, despite the company having the Mac platform, the iPod, retail stores, platform development experience, marketing savvy, industrial design prowess, and so on. Google doesn't have any of those things. Mobile Providers vs Android. Apple also started with an exclusive partnership with AT&T, a three legged race that demanded effort from both. Google is hoping that hardware makers handle the hardware details and that mobile providers will be excited to sell its Android phones. While hardware makers such as HTC clearly appreciate having found a free alternative to Windows Mobile, it's not obvious why providers would be excited about Android, as it promises an openness that most mobile providers strongly oppose. AT&T took a big risk in getting behind the iPhone, as the phone encouraged users to use email rather than fee-based SMS and MMS, it supported WiFi for data access, and it bypassed AT&T's MEdia Net services to plug into iTunes instead. Verizon refused to parter with Apple and grant it those kinds of concessions. Is AT&T going to take a similar risk to partner with a phone that is not exclusive to it, and is Verizon now going to open its arms to support phones that do not exclusively support BREW, VCast and its other proprietary services? While Android may well eat into Microsoft's Windows Mobile business by stealing away its hardware makers, it seems unlikely that Android will ever serve as more than free alternative to Windows Mobile in a market where Windows Mobile is increasingly irrelevant. Android may have the dubious distinction of swallowing Microsoft's mobile business the same way Microsoft ate up the Palm OS, but even if it accomplishes that goal, Google will likely find itself unsustainably hungry immediately afterward. It will also find itself swimming in a shark tank of hungry rivals, including Nokia's Symbian, RIM's BlackBerry, and Apple's iPhone. Symbian is the final generic platform vying for the opportunity to play DOS in the smartphone market. The next article will examine Nokia's chances in its bid to match Microsoft's PC dominance in the mobile market while setting out in a new venture to copy Android's open software model. Did you like this article? Let me know. Comment here, in the Forum, or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It's also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!
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Six Reasons Why Apple May Never Open the iPhone
Daniel Eran DilgerThe history of the Office Wars provides interesting context for Apple’s software strategy with the iPhone today. While third party software development offers all kinds of tantalizing potential for the new mobile, there are a half dozen reasons why Apple may not ever deliver the iPhone fully open to third party development, following the model of gaming consoles.Office Wars 1 - Claris and the Origins of Apple’s iWork Office Wars 2 - Microsoft’s Outrageous Office ProfitsOffice Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office MonopolySoftware Lessons For the iPhone: 1997 - 2007.When Steve Jobs gained the opportunity to retake control of Apple in 1997, he immediately set out to build and assemble a software business for the Mac platform. Apple restarted serious development of QuickTime, much to the chagrin of Microsoft, which had targeted its sights on quickly destroying it to make way for monopolistic expansion of its Windows Media. [Microsoft's Plot to Kill QuickTime][How Microsoft Pushed QuickTime's Final Cut][Why Apple Failed][How CPR Saved Apple][Why Apple Bounced Back]In addition to repurposing NEXTSTEP as Mac OS X and buying and building a series of professional and consumer software suites, the new Apple also developed the iPod platform. The iPod used intuitive software to differentiate Apple’s hardware, launching the computer maker into a new market for sophisticated, data-driven consumer devices. Microsoft’s own efforts in consumer electronics have flopped miserably with the failures of its Handheld PC, Pocket PC, UMPC, Windows Mobile, Media2Go, Mira, SPOT, and Personal Media Center initiatives, among many others.[Apple’s NeXT Server Offensive on Microsoft][The Spectacular Failure of WinCE and Windows Mobile][Windows XP Media Center Edition vs Apple TV]Microsoft Outgunned in Software by a Hardware Maker.Microsoft was late to realize the software threat posed by the new Apple. Five major revisions and over thirty free updates to Mac OS X have ran circles around Microsoft’s capacity to deliver one desktop operating system software update and a couple service packs since 2001.[Leopard, Vista and the iPhone OS X Architecture]Apple also introduced three generations of iWork as an expanding productivity suite during the four year hibernation period Microsoft left since its last version of Office for Mac. Apple delivered support for Microsoft’s own proprietary OOXML file format on the Mac even before Microsoft itself could. At $79, iWork will eviscerate sales of the $400 Office for Mac, which has until now been a cash cow lazily ruminating for years between releases.This year, Apple also targeted and destroyed Microsoft’s fledgeling efforts to repurpose WinCE as a smartphone platform, seemingly overnight. That has given Apple a significant new platform in the iPhone, soon to be joined by the new iPod Touch. [What’s New in iWork 08][Apple's Secret iPhone Application Business Model][Curious Stuff About the New iPods]Six Reasons the iPhone Will Stay Closed.Will Apple give third party developers the keys to its new vehicle and allow them to drive off with the value it has created? It hasn’t yet, and there are a number of reasons to think that Apple won’t. Note that I am not expressing an opinion that the iPhone should be left closed, but rather simply presenting why I think it is unlikely Apple will ever open it up in the same way the Mac is open to any and all development.First, the company has lined up a suitable outlet for third party expansion via the standards based web platform available within Safari. That’s not enough to do everything developers want to do--it has serious constraints for creating games, for example--but it offers a good enough alternative to serve more than 80% of most developers’ needs. [Mobile Disruption: Apple's iPhone and Third Party Software] [iPhone Gremlins: Crashing, Security, and Network Collapse!] Second, the company has developed and begun production testing of online software sales through iTunes, currently limited to 5G iPod games. This mechanism appears too sophisticated to simply be designed for a half dozen $5 games. Apple is quite obviously going to distribute other software through iTunes for the iPhone. If it were going to be open, there would be no need for such a secure software distribution system. [Apple's New Dual Processor Game Console] [Hacking iPod Games: How Apple's DRM Works] Third, historical perspective suggests that once a solid platform has been established, a vendor can sell software as fast as it can deliver it without even trying very hard. Apple’s Claris, Microsoft’s Windows, and the game consoles from Sony and Nintendo all provide examples of this. The iPod’s success suggests Apple can establish a viable mobile platform without the need for software partners. It can handle software transactions as fast as it can sell iTunes songs. That’s big. [Office Wars 1 - Claris and the Origins of Apple’s iWork] [Office Wars 2 - Microsoft’s Outrageous Office Profits] [Office Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office Monopoly] [Nintendo Wii vs Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony PlayStation 3] Fourth, depending upon large third party developers has caused Apple--and Steve Jobs--some severe headaches. Microsoft's late 80s betrayal of the Macintosh led to Apple’s enslavement to Office, and induced CEO John Sculley to sign away broad intellectual property rights to Microsoft, which Microsoft then immediately used as a weapon against Apple. In the mid 90s, Microsoft led Adobe, Macromedia and other large companies to abandon the Mac platform. In the late 90s, those same companies refused to support Apple’s new Rhapsody plans following the company’s acquisition of NeXT, forcing Apple to spend half a decade retooling the Mac OS, primarily so those developers could sell their existing apps to Mac users without much effort, even while they were earning fantastic software profits and delivering minimal innovation. In other words, Apple’s technology game plan was delayed for a half decade so that Microsoft could sell its $400 copies of Office and Adobe could sell suites of its $500 and up creative applications, all while Apple did all the work in adapting its $99 operating system to run their Classic Mac OS code with minimal effort. Prior to returning to Apple, Jobs experienced his own betrayal and abandonment at the hands of partners--including IBM, HP, Digital, Data General, and Sun--related to NeXT and OpenStep. In all of these cases, the third parties were simply acting in their own best interests. With the iPhone, Apple will act in its own best interests. It will carve out a phenomenally powerful software platform for itself. [Why OS X is on the iPhone, but not the PC: The History of NeXT] [Office Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office Monopoly] [Cocoa and the Death of Yellow Box and Rhapsody] Fifth, open Application Programming Interfaces involve complex management and maintenance. This is not a problem unique to Apple; it exists for Microsoft and every other company that offers an API for developers to build upon. An API is an interfacing boundary between the software supplied by a vendor and the software supplied by third parties. Ideally, an API allows third parties to do everything they need very cleanly. That allows the vendor to make changes on their side of the API curtain without causing any compatibility problems for software on the other side. In reality, nearly every change and update has significant impacts for third party developers. The more complex and low level of an API being exposed, the more difficult it is to manage significant changes without introducing problems for third party partners. Apple has worked to develop objective APIs that are stable and resilient to internal changes, but if developers are unsatisfied with the level of performance or portability provided, they will work around the API boundary, almost guaranteeing that any significant changes made on Apple’s side will break their applications in the future. Microsoft has often accommodated such “bad programming? by expanding APIs and creating new ones, and lugging around a legacy of old APIs to retain broad compatibility with existing applications. The result is that it is very difficult for Microsoft to actually innovate, or to offer OS level enhancements that upgrade existing applications. This is particularly a problem for Windows Vista, which is hamstrung between the problem of providing entirely new hardware driver APIs on one hand while also maintaining a boatload of crufty legacy APIs on the other. It is absolutely the worst of both worlds. [Five Windows Flaws] [Leopard vs Vista 5: Development Challenges] Sixth, as is the case with software APIs, closed hardware platforms offer a vendor open flexibility for future expansion, portability, and upgrades. With the Xbox, Microsoft didn’t provide a wide open set of APIs for developers, only a subset for building very similar types of games. This closed API allowed Microsoft to move the console from Intel to PowerPC hardware in the Xbox 360 without extreme problems, something the company was unable to maintain earlier when it tried to deliver Windows NT for various hardware platforms in the late 90s. Apple has already benefitted from the flexibility of a closed hardware platform on the iPod. Had Apple allowed developers to write applications for the iPod, it would have to string along support for those old applications across every new generation of the iPod. Having to do that would complicate Apple’s own efforts to deliver new iPods. Additionally, customers would be upset with Apple’s iPod if the apps they downloaded crashed, installed spyware, or caused performance problems. While a rogue Mac app isn’t likely to drain a laptop battery down dead, power management is far more critical on handheld mobile devices like the 11 mm thick iPhone. Given that many consumers are already flummoxed by the reality that batteries wear out after a few years, imagine their rage at finding out that Apple allowed them to install a some worthless Tamagotchi pet that destroyed their battery early. Similar problems plague Palm OS and Windows Mobile devices. In particular, Microsoft’s attempts to provide a “one size fits all? solution and broadly license it to hardware developers results in API constraints that limit supported screen size resolutions, break compatibility with existing versions of applications, and severely limit the power management performance of those devices and their ability to deliver acceptable battery life. If there were any meaningful installed base of Windows Mobile phones, it would also be plagued with spyware and viruses, just as Windows is on the desktop. [Inside the iPhone: UI, Stability, and Software] [Device Problems In Search of a Solution] [David Sessions Tries to Milk iPhone Battery Panic in Slate]A Safe API Boundary for Third Party Development.The simple solution to all these issues is to not offer a custom, wide open API at all, and instead leave third party developers to build applications that make use of open web standards. Nothing new to learn, no barriers to adoption, no proprietary development tools to maintain, no pleading with developers to support a new platform that remains unproven in the marketplace, and no third party crisis to manage when the hardware and software are significantly upgraded.No API, no problem! Hackers can discover how to install tools and handy mini-apps, but Apple’s next software update or hardware revision won't have to figure out how to maintain compatibility with those hacks. That allows the hackers to hack without holding things back. Meanwhile, Apple can reserve the right to offer highly integrated applications of its own that take full advantage of the underlying system without revealing or sharing its intellectual property secrets with third parties that may choose to use those secrets against it--just as Microsoft did to Apple with Windows in the late 80s, or as Sony did to Nintendo with the original PlayStation just a few years afterward.[Mobile Disruption: Apple's iPhone and Third Party Software]Closed Development Involving Third Parties is Not Open.Incidentally, this is the same closed model that resulted in great success for Microsoft and Sony after they betrayed and then supplanted their former partners. Microsoft set up the illusion of an open, developer-friendly platform with Windows, but then used its home field advantage to plot out the assassinations of any and all of the potential rivals it didn’t want to compete against: WordPerfect, Lotus, Ashton-Tate, Borland, Netscape, Sun, and today’s targets such as Google and Symantec.The unsurprising result was that Windows users ended up using Microsoft’s Word, Excel, Access, Fox Pro, language tools, web browser, media software, desktop search, anti-virus, spyware management, etc ad nauseam. With Windows users completely enslaved to Microsoft’s own applications, it was easy to erect significant barriers to prevent the emergence of any new competitive applications from rivals. Clearly, Windows is only an “open platform? in areas where it suits Microsoft. Further, Microsoft’s idea of who a “competitor? is can change. For example, Windows desktop search wasn’t a rival feature for Microsoft to kill until it decided it wanted Google’s business.[Office Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office Monopoly]Windows Enthusiasts’ Slavery to a Vicious Master. Whether Microsoft’s closed Windows platform is a bad thing is a matter of debate; Windows Enthusiasts celebrate their enslavement. It is my opinion that Microsoft’s closed Windows platform isn’t bad simply because it is closed, but rather because Microsoft’s insatiable greed is holding back innovation that would otherwise flourish. One example is Microsoft’s Internet Explorer browser, which rapidly advanced until Microsoft destroyed Netscape. After that, it went into maintenance mode hibernation and didn’t budge until Firefox began to threaten Microsoft’s position years later. That’s anti-consumer; Microsoft won’t do anything for its enslaved users until a would-be savior threatens to set them free. Microsoft isn’t bad because it is closed; it is bad because it is disgustingly greedy. Windows Enthusiasts need to stop deluding themselves into thinking that they live in a free world of an open platform. They are slaves, and their master is not only vicious, but also incompetent and has no taste. [Safari on Windows? Apple and the Origins of the Web][Apple in the Web Browser Wars: Netscape vs Internet Explorer][The Web Browser Renaissance: Firefox and Safari]Closed Without Pretense.At the same time, it is possible to voluntarily join a closed platform and benefit from its advantages. Nintendo carved out a closed video gaming empire that required third party developers to pay it licensing fees in order to develop any games to sell for its system. Nintendo’s closed business model worked better than Atari’s with the 2600, which had earlier allowed third party games developers to glut the market with bad games, resulting in the video game crash of 1983. Consumers were left thinking that home video games were done to death and would never recover.Sega, Sony, and Microsoft’s Xbox group have all similarly managed closed gaming platforms to deliver high quality expectations, even subsidizing game consoles to establish user interest. The only differences for Apple’s closed iPhone may be that:Apple’s iPhone hardware sells at a sustainable profit without a desperate subsidy, removing risk and allowing for regular feature upgrades. Apple is likely to use software downloads as a way to integrate the iPhone into Mac hardware sales and its online services, rather than simply trying to make a killing selling $50 to $75 game software titles as the console makers do.[Mac OS X vs Linux: Third Party Software and Security]Software as a Great Differentiator.By offering free or low cost software in the model of $5 iPod games, Apple will be able to use its closed platform to deliver software designed to:attract more iPhone and iPod Touch hardware buyers.earn iPhone mobile service revenue fees.earn commissions from WiFi iTunes sales and related deals. direct new iPhone users to iTunes and Apple TV.draw attention to the Mac, which will offer iPhone integrated features Windows does not. Microsoft does some of the same things with Windows Mobile, which ties into the company’s Windows Server products--including Exchange Server--and is also deeply integrated with the desktop sync services of Windows and its Office applications. The problem for Microsoft is that it does not sell phones or make money on service revenues as Apple does. Microsoft charges expensive client access and software licensing fees, but still can’t make a sustainable profit on its Windows Mobile business. It’s also stuck with lame vendors such as HTC, which make poorly integrated hardware that is embarrassing to use. Microsoft could make its own phone, but like the Zune it would alienate its existing hardware partners; further, the Zune disaster indicated that hardware sales isn’t a core competency of the company anyway. [Phone Wars: iPhone vs TyTN, Treo, Pearl, E62, P990, Q][iPhone Sales vs Zune, Palm, RIM, Symbian, Windows Mobile]Selling Hardware with Software vs Selling Software Licenses.Using software to sell hardware fits in with Apple’s past and present use of free or low cost software to differentiate the Mac. In the distant past, that included HyperCard and QuickTime; today it includes the shareware-priced but highly regarded iLife and iWork apps. The full version of Mac OS X costs $129, while Microsoft’s Ultimate Windows Vista is an absurd $400, the same price as an iPhone!Apple’s strategy of using low cost, high quality software to differentiate its hardware plays well against the fact that consumers simply don’t want to pay for software, while they think nothing of paying big money for desirable hardware. Nobody would pay much for an iPod “OS? or a software music player, but millions of people have paid hundreds of dollars for an iPod.That principle has worked in Microsoft’s favor in the past, as it hides the cost of Windows by invisibly bundling it into PC sales. However, its recent fantasy that consumers will widely upgrade their PCs to more expensive versions of Vista indicates Microsoft is highly delusional. Pro-Microsoft wags can chart out their predictions of “impressive Vista adoption? based entirely upon OEM bundled copies, but consumers don’t want it, and no significant number of people are going to pay big money to upgrade to the $400 Vista Ultimatum. [Windows 95 and Vista: Why 2007 Won't Be Like 1995]The Commodity Future of PC Software.What will happen instead is an increasing commoditization of the consumer PC and its software, driven towards standards by an industry that demands interoperability. Microsoft couldn’t hold back the web with its proprietary MSN a decade ago, and companies that once pushed Windows are now behind Linux, including Novell and IBM. PC OEMs are also rethinking their unilateral relationship with Microsoft as they struggle to survive in the shadow of Microsoft’s vast profits. Rather than paying $400 for a PC with a $50 OEM copy of Windows running IE and Outlook, nagging you to verify your software as Genuine and to upgrade to the $400 version of Vista and to hand your credit card number to the dancing paperclip recommending a subscription to Windows Live OneCare terrorism protection, the $250 PC of the near future will come with a standards based web browser and email client. It will be called an iPhone, and it won’t run Microsoft Office.What do you think? I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast! Submit to Reddit or Slashdot, or consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!
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Myths of Snow Leopard 8: It's Just An OS.
Daniel Eran Dilger Apple's limited comments on Snow Leopard, the next version of Mac OS X due in about a year, have opened the playing field for rampant speculation. Here's a look at a series of myths that have developed around the upcoming release. The eighth myth of Snow Leopard: Snow Leopard is Just an Operating System Stretching the Meaning of OS. The definition of “operating system? has grown dramatically throughout the history of personal computing. In the 70s, CP/M was little more than a boot loader. In the 80s, Apple's SOS, the “Sophisticated Operating System? developed for the ill-fated Apple III, introduced the novel idea of a modular driver architecture for printers, disks, and files systems. After the company returned to making Apple II models, much of SOS was salvaged in ProDOS. Apple's parallel development of the Lisa not only delivered an operating system, but also a full suite of productivity apps as part of the included Lisa 7/7 Office System software, the first consumer office suite. It would be another half decade before Microsoft bundled its Word and Excel apps with its newly acquired PowerPoint to release Microsoft Office for the Macintosh, followed by a Windows version. In a 1987 interview with Dave Ottalini, Andy Hertzfeld said, “I did the Macintosh Operating System and I was very familiar with the Apple /// and especially in the I/O system of the Macintosh, I was influenced by the Apple /// [SOS] operating system.? The Mac's System Software in 1984 added in the concept of developer Toolbox that enabled applications to share one set of code for drawing window controls, managing print and file dialogs, and later dealing with multimedia. Apple bundled fewer apps with the Mac than the Lisa due to complaints from third party developers. Instead, the company partnered with Microsoft to deliver the Mac's key productivity apps, a move that turned out to be Apple's worst decision ever. In the late 80s, NeXTSTEP built upon the idea of the Mac Toolbox; NeXT delivered high level, object oriented frameworks and visual developer tools for rapidly building applications on top of a Unix foundation. Steve Jobs' new operating system went well beyond just booting up the machine. It included speech-enabled email messaging, DSP audio processing, PostScript color and transparency, a documentation reference library, dictionary, and even the complete works of Shakespeare. Apple III FAQ File Lisa GUI Prototypes Office Wars 1 - Claris and the Origins of Apple iWork Office Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office Monopoly The Expanding OS at Microsoft. Throughout the 80s and into the 90s, Microsoft continued to sell the simplistic DOS, largely based upon the 1970s CP/M. The company started to bundle DOS with a Mac-like environment it called Windows, which started to become popular with Windows 3.1 in 1991. Microsoft shipped Windows primarily to port its Macintosh apps to the IBM PC in order to abandon its software partnership with Apple on the Mac. After similarly backing out of efforts to work with IBM on a DOS replacement called OS/2, Microsoft next attempted to deliver Windows NT as an entirely new operating system for PC users, based loosely upon concepts from AT&T Unix-rival VMS, after Microsoft acquired Digital's VMS developer team in the late 80s. Despite touting NT in the early 90s as the next Windows, Microsoft was unable to ship NT as a replacement to DOS for mainstream users until Windows XP 2001. However, Microsoft's greatest contribution in expanding the definition of the OS came from its efforts to tie products together to leverage its monopoly DOS position in order to advance its applications business. Prior to transitioning DOS users to Windows, it told developers to target OS/2. That left a vacuum for Microsoft's own new Windows Office apps, which had not been wildly popular until then. By 1995, Microsoft was licensing Windows and Office together to PC makers as tightly integrated products, cutting out competition from third party apps. Starting in 1996, as the Windows platform began to face the threat of the Netscape Navigator web browser paired with Sun's Java, Microsoft began to insist that its acquired Internet Explorer was an integrated part of the OS, enabling it to expand its monopoly and stifle any competitive pressure. It has since tied in the Windows Media DRM architecture, and has also tightly integrated Office and the Outlook Exchange client. While sold separately, both have become very close to being an extension of Windows. The company is now working to sell Windows, Office, and the requisite OneCare security software updates as a $70 per year subscription package called “Equipt,? basically making all consumer Microsoft software an über-OS for Windows PC users, and again shutting out the third party developers who have been flourishing in the vibrant niche of servicing Windows' malware, viruses, and other security problems. 1990-1995: Microsoft's Yellow Road to Cairo Microsoft’s Outrageous Office Profits The Unavoidable Malware Myth: Why Apple Won’t Inherit Microsoft’s Malware Crown Five Factors Shifting the Future of Malware and Platform Security Enter Mac OS X. By the time the Mac OS X beta emerged in 2000, a desktop operating system was expected to include everything from an email and web client to audio/video playback and Office functionality. In order to compete against Windows, Apple had needed to partner with Microsoft to deliver Internet Explorer, Outlook Express, and Office on the Mac. As Mac OS X began reaching a mainstream audience in 2002, Microsoft pulled the plug on Mac development, putting Internet Explorer and Outlook Express into maintenance mode and making minimal advancement to the Mac version of Office apps. For Apple to keep up with Microsoft, it would need to develop its own applications. Mac OS X's NeXSTEP legacy gave it a leg up on putting together an application portfolio. Apple had already adapted NeXTMail, a pioneering email client, into a decent email program simply called Mail, and shipped a central Address Book and later iCal scheduling client with Mac OS X. In 2003, Apple shipped Safari as its own standards-based web client. It later shipped iChat instant messaging and other supporting applications that rounded out the OS. At the same time, Apple also began assembling a suite of multimedia apps in iLife: iTunes, iPhoto, iMovie, iDVD, and GarageBand. It has also put together an alternative to Office in iWork: Pages, Numbers, and Keynote. While both are sold separately from the OS, iLife ships for free on new Macs and iWork comes bundled as a trial that can be ordered online. Why Apple Bounced Back AppleInsider | Road to Mac OS X Leopard: Mail 3.0 The Future of the Web: Safari, Firefox and Internet Explorer Mac OS X vs Mac Office? The expansion of Mac OS X means something particularly interesting for Microsoft Office. Apple is describing Snow Leopard's key feature as being support for Exchange Server messaging, a role formerly delegated to Microsoft. That makes it the next step in the company's incremental independence from Microsoft's software on the Mac, following its banishment of IE, Outlook Express, Windows Media Player, and MSN. Snow Leopard promises to obsolesce Entourage. That being the case, it would make sense for Apple to bundle its Exchange savvy, Snow Leopard version of Mail, iCal, and Address Book into the next version of iWork for sale to PowerPC Mac users and others who don't meet the minimum requirements for Snow Leopard. That move would also directly position iWork against Office and expand iWork's user base on the Mac platform. Current Office users sometimes argue that Apple needs to allow Microsoft to maintain its monopoly position in Office to prevent Macs from being shut out of the corporate world. Businesses do prefer to train employees in one set of software; iWork does not work like Microsoft Office, forcing companies to settle on one or double their user training efforts. However, Microsoft has already began work to ensure that Office on Windows does not work or look the same as its Mac version. The Windows edition was given a Ribbon UI for marketing reasons, with a Start Button-style user interface branding to tie it into Vista. That wouldn't work on the Mac side, so Microsoft gave Mac users an oddball, clownish user interface that is neither Mac-like nor immediately familiar to Office users. Because iWork works like the rest of Mac OS X and is both consistent and intuitive, users will pick it up faster than having to learn the quirky, lipsticked pig that is Office 2008 for Mac. Even Windows users are likely to find iWork easier to figure out than Microsoft's Mac version of Office. Apple's iWork still has a ways to go in matching every feature of Office, but it offers a much stronger foundation to build upon than the current version of Mac Office. Safari on Windows? Apple and the Origins of the Web The Web Browser Renaissance: Firefox and Safari Microsoft's Scorched Earth Office Policy. Microsoft is radically changing the Office user interface on the Windows side to force companies to adopt Vista while also attempting to stave off the advance of the free OpenOffice productivity software, which is also sold by Sun as StarOffice and by IBM as Lotus Symphony. OpenOffice (and other competing suites, including some online productivity offerings) have worked hard to copy the look and feel of Microsoft's Office to facilitate adoption by companies while requiring minimal new training. Microsoft's response is to take Office 2008 in a patented new direction that competitors can't follow, a trick it used to kill competition in the DOS market when it released Windows as a product that only appeared to work with MS-DOS, and subsequently Windows 95, a product that integrated MS-DOS. With iWork, Apple didn't try to copy the old Office look and feel, which has made little progress since the late 90s. Instead, it has fleshed out its own productivity software interface with direct feedback Inspector panels; Mac OS X-native, customizable toolbars; and close integration with other OS features from advanced graphics compositing to media library browsing to native font and color selection panels. Office Wars 4 - Microsoft’s Assault on Lotus and IBM This All Happened Before. While Microsoft's strategy of driving Office into a unique, proprietary direction makes sense as a way to disrupt compatibility and familiarity with open software, it is also leaving the door wide open for Apple to enter. This is exactly what happened five years ago when Microsoft dropped Internet Explorer on the Mac, creating a vacuum that resulted in Safari, which is now teamed up with Firefox in an effort to eat into IE market share and break open Microsoft's proprietary hold over web development. With advances in Javascript and HTML5-style sophisticated web applications, Safari is now helping to erode not only IE's control over the web, but also break up Windows' hegemony in application development. MobileMe demonstrates how rich, open web applications can provide familiar email, calendar, contacts, and other features using the cross platform web rather than a proprietary development platform. While Apple hasn't announced plans to to deliver iWork apps on MobileMe yet, their current availability for the Mac not only makes up for the weaknesses of Microsoft's Mac Office 2008, but also directs attention to the Mac platform and its unique set of productivity apps. By offering Snow Leopard and “iWork 2009? with Exchange 2007 support as well as integration with MobileMe and Snow Leopard Server's push messaging services, Apple will be able to aggressively push Mac OS X and the Mac into new territory long held hostage by Microsoft. Myths of Snow Leopard 4: Exchange is the Only New Feature Apple’s Mobile Me Takes On Exchange, Mobile Mesh Snow Leopard Server Takes on Exchange, SharePoint Cocoa for Windows + Flash Killer = SproutCore WWDC 2008: New in Mac OS X Snow Leopard Myths of Snow Leopard 1: PowerPC Support — RoughlyDrafted Magazine Myths of Snow Leopard 2: 32-bit Support Myths of Snow Leopard 3: Mac Sidelined for iPhone Myths of Snow Leopard 4: Exchange is the Only New Feature! Myths of Snow Leopard 5: No Carbon! Myths of Snow Leopard 6: Apple is Out of Ideas! Myths of Snow Leopard 7: Free?! Myths of Snow Leopard 8: It's Just An OS. Cocoa for Windows + Flash Killer = SproutCore Apple’s other open secret: the LLVM Complier Ten Big New Features in Mac OS X Snow Leopard I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast! 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The Complete History of the Macworld Expo
For anyone who attended the very first Macworld San Francisco and then skipped the next 24, this year’s event might seem awfully similar to that very first show. Hot on the heels of the runaway success of the Mac and its own successful launch, Macworld magazine tapped event coordinator Peggy Kilburn in 1985 to develop a conference that “will bring (attendees) in contact with the people who best understand the far-reaching effects the Macintosh will have in business, schools and at home.” It was held in Feb. 21-23 and Steve Jobs didn’t even step foot in Brooks Hall, let alone address the crowd. Similarly, this year’s event won’t take place until February--abandoning its traditional January time slot held since 1986--and Jobs won’t be attending. But there’s something fitting about Macworld returning to its roots for its 25th anniversary. Before Steve turned it into his personal showcase and the Apple booth had to be draped in black curtains, Macworld was a place for fans and professionals to share ideas free from the prying eyes of PC users, where product announcements were welcome but not necessary, and the keynote was the least interesting part of the show. Macworld Expo the 1980s - The decade of the Mac Macworld Expo San Francisco 1985: When the doors closed on the first Macworld, which shared exhibit space with a boat show double-booked for the same weekend, more than 10,000 attendees had walked through its doors, and the bad taste from the Super Bowl XIX “Lemmings” ad was all but washed away. Hot items for the fledgling Macintosh included the Lotus Jazz office suite (but surprisingly, not Macintosh Office), MacPrompter for scrolling text, and a slew of video and imaging apps that leveraged the Mac’s powerful graphics capabilities. Macworld Expo Boston 1985-86: While Apple kept a decidedly muted presence at the first two Macworld Boston Expos, the east-coast show quickly became cemented on the calendar of Apple fans and developers. With more than 500,000 Macs in circulation and the resignation of Steve Jobs fresh on their minds, attendees had more than enough to talk about at that first event, held Aug. 21-23, 1985, at the Bayside Exposition Center, and touted as a chance to see “all of the elements of the Macintosh Office. ... The 512K Macintosh, the LaserWriter, and AppleTalk, as well as Jazz from Lotus, are just a few of the products you’ll get to see.” MWE SF 1986: After observing such a successful inaugural show, Apple CEO John Sculley--who reportedly credited Macworld for reinvigorating Apple after a disappointing end to 1984--took full advantage of the second annual expo, which expanded to the Civic Auditorium to accommodate larger crowds. While not quite worthy of Stevenote status, Apple’s less-than-charismatic leader unveiled the SCSI-equipped, 8MHz Macintosh Plus and pricey LaserWriter Plus during his keynote presentation. MWE SF 1987: A heavy focus on desktop communications and networking brought the long-awaited AppleShare file server software and AppleTalk PC Card, and delivered effortless, cross-platform file sharing long before IBM developed its own solution. A major component of the floundering Macintosh Office, AppleShare survived long after Apple’s desktop publishing suite was sent to the junkyard. MWE Boston 1987: Apple landed in Boston ready to show off HyperCard and script language HyperTalk, one of the first apps to utilize the hotlinking hypermedia concept that would become the cornerstone of the World Wide Web. Also making their debut were MultiFinder 5.0, the AppleFax modem and ImageWriter LQ.MWE SF 1988: With some 350 exhibitors and 25,000 attendees, MacWorld kicked off its fourth annual San Francisco show with an emphasis on the Mac’s business capabilities. In his keynote speech, Sculley stressed Apple's commitment to networking and connectivity advancements, and introduced the zippy Laserwriter II family, with up to 8 pages per minute of printing power. MWE Boston 1988: Apple CEO John Sculley may have landed in Boston to show off the Apple Scanner, but the buzz on the trade floor was all about the Macintosh II, as developers showed off an array of drawing, writing and CAD tools to leverage the power of Apple’s newest Mac.MWE SF 1989: Breaking a pattern of adding an “X” to Macs fitted with a Motorola 68030 processor (maybe Sculley didn’t want to announce the Mac SEx to a raucous convention crowd), Apple used its biggest stage to release the SE/30 upgrade, a Mac that would be as popular as it was long-lasting. Among the show favorites was the streamlined Claris MacWrite II, one of the last times a Claris product would be among the show favorites. MWE Boston 1989: For the fifth anniversary of the Macworld Expo, Sculley opted to keep the anticipated Macintosh Portable (which would make its debut a month later, on Sept. 20) under wraps, and instead showcased the Mac’s educational possibilities with the Visual Almanac, an interactive multimedia demonstration kit for the classroom that utilized Apple’s groundbreaking HyperCard.NEXT: Macworld Expo: The 1990's Macworld Expo the 1990's - On the brink MWE SF 1990: The 40MHz Macintosh IIfx made a big splash at the first Macworld of the 90s, despite its six-figure price tag. One of the reasons for all that speed was the launch of a Mac-only graphics-editing program by a little company named Adobe, which generated quite a bit of interest on its own. MWE Boston 1990: HyperCard 2.0 was all the rage at the subdued summer Macworld, but even Apple’s own booth had a hard time competing with the DTS’ dogcow buttons inscribed with her famous catchphrase, “Moof!” MWE SF 1991: Developed to optimize the 68000 line of Macs, the slick, streamlined System 7 was the co-star of Macworld, sharing the limelight with Apple’s new multimedia app. Sculley’s keynote was its usual shade of dull, save the impressive QuickTime tour of Ben & Jerry’s Vermont factory, which roused the crowd from its slumber. Also unveiled were a series of networking products, including the Macintosh LC Ethernet card. MWE Boston 1991: While PowerBook rumors were flying and many Mac users were getting their first glimpse at System 7, the trade floor was still buzzing about a bombshell announcement just weeks earlier. Industry rivals Apple and IBM (and Motorola) put aside their differences and entered into a unique partnership that would eventually produce the microchip that would power the Mac for more than a decade. Macworld Expo Tokyo 1991-1992: Just because Apple didn’t bother to release any new products (although CEO John Sculley did cut the ribbon on opening day) doesn’t mean Macworld Tokyo had a hard time filling the Makuhari Messe convention center when it opened its doors on Feb. 13, 1991. A rabid overseas fanbase was eager to get their hands on the latest and greatest in Mac apps and accessories, and Apple embraced its new audience with open arms. MWE SF 1992: Continuing the theme of the prior year’s conference, Macworld 1992 featured hundreds of new applications using QuickTime and an astute prediction from Sculley: “I believe pervasive networking will be the driving force of the information industry during the 1990s.” The Mac may have been this crowd’s “ideal multimedia machine,” but an ex-Apple employee’s latest OS was making some noise up the road as the NeXTWORLD Expo opened its doors to those who wanted to think slightly differenter. MWE Boston 1992: After a successful PowerBook launch the prior October, Apple used Macworld Boston to upgrade its best-selling model with more RAM and a lower price point, setting the stage for a series of dockable PowerBook Duos that would be released in the fall. MWE SF 1993: Held entirely at its now-permanent Moscone Center home, Sculley used his final Macworld San Francisco keynote to unveil a host of imaging products, including ColorSync, LaserWriter Pro workgroup printers, StyleWriter II personal printer, Apple Color Printer and Apple Color OneScanner. Making all those projects that much easier were the Apple Adjustable Keyboard and ADB Mouse II, Apple’s first teardrop-shaped clicker. MWE Boston 1993: The best product Steve Jobs didn’t have a hand in, Sculley finally rolled out the Newton MessagePad at Macworld Boston, more than a year after publicly demonstrating its prototype. Unlike anything on the market, Newton was a bold device with a brilliant interface that ought to have been as popular as the iPhone. Instead, only a few hundred thousand were sold over its four-and-a-half-year reign. MWE Tokyo 1993: Apple’s first product launch outside the United States brought a slew of new hardware, including the Macintosh Color Classic, Macintosh LC III, Macintosh Centris 610 and 650, Macintosh Quadra 800, PowerBook 165c, and the LaserWriter Select 300 and 310 laser printers. All those new products paid off, as the expo attracted nearly 100,000 attendees in just its third year. MWE SF 1994: With more than 70,000 attendees on hand to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Mac, the sprawling Apple booth didn’t disappoint. Visitors were met with a slew of new products, including a walking tour of its online service, eWorld, along with the recently released Macintosh TV and Powerbook Duo 270c. But buzz on the floor was mostly surrounding the upcoming PowerPC transition, which promised faster, more powerful Macs for the next decade. MWE Boston 1994: The critical, if not commercial, success of Newton brought some 70,000 attendees to the following year’s Macworld Boston, forcing Apple to set up its booth across the street from the World Trade Center. It was worth the trip, as new Power Macs showed off the capabilities of the first PowerPC chips and System 7.5 introduced users to Stickies, WindowShade and the Control Strip. MWE Tokyo 1994: Instead of showing off OS 7.5 for umpteenth time or adding another PowerPC model to its Power Mac line, Apple took the wraps off the QuickTake 100 digital camera. Designed in association with Kodak, the QuickTake looked more like a pair of binoculars than a camera but made an instant splash with the expo crowd. Also introduced was Color StyleWriter printer, to make sure all those photos looked their best. MWE SF 1995: As expected, the chip transition was in full swing, with PowerPC Power Macs drawing attention at the expo, but the most excitement centered around Power Computing, the first company to take advantage of Apple’s licensing program. MWE Boston 1995: Trying to steal some of the thunder from the forthcoming Windows 95 release, Apple demoed Copland in all its buggy, crashy glory on brand-new AppleVision displays. Be thankful it failed; if not, Steve might never have come back. MWE Tokyo 1995: Apple welcomed a new clone manufacturer to its ranks, Japan-based Pioneer Electronic, and proudly took the wraps off the active-matrix PowerBook 5300c, which thankfully didn’t explode on the stage. The same can’t be said about the Singapore plant that was manufacturing them. MWE SF 1996: Sinking revenue and executive board shake-ups cast a dark shadow over Macworld’s 12th annual event, which saw a continued push away from Apple’s proprietary platform with the release of the PC compatibility card, capable of turning any Power Mac into a dual micro-processor system capable of running Windows 95. MWE Boston 1996: The first U.S. keynote by CEO Gil Amelio made some attendees long for John Sculley, but the 20 percent across-the-board price cut on the Performa line was certainly welcome, as was the Performa 6400’s new InstaTower case. Before dousing the Copland project with a giant bucket of cold water, Gil got the crowd riled up by declaring Apple was “transitioning from a dialogue that has centered on survival to a dialogue that’s going to center on excitement.” We think the excitement he was referring to had something to do with the imminent launch of the first issue of MacAddict magazine. That, or the return of Steve Jobs, we’re not sure. MWE Tokyo 1996: CEO Gil Amelio announced the fruits of its partnership with Bandai in the form of a gaming console based on Apple’s Pippin technology. Officially called Pippin Atmark, the device was supposed to combine the best parts of each company into a super-computer-video-game-machine, and if you had stopped by Apple’s booth, it certainly seemed that way. Sadly, we know how the story ended. MWE SF 1997: Steve Jobs’ first appearance on a Macworld stage was preceded by a lengthy, rambling Gil Amelio, whose three-hour, teleprompter-plagued speech may have inspired Jobs to take over speaking duties. Amelio was supposed to rev up the crowd by showing the stunning Twentieth Anniversary Mac and outlining Apple’s NeXT-based OS strategy, but botched the whole thing up, effectively ruining Steve’s big moment. MWE Boston 1997: As late as July 2, Amelio was planning to deliver the keynote address at Macworld Boston, so when he was abruptly forced out July 5, all eyes turned to the new kid on the block. The excitement was palpable when the lights finally dimmed, and when Steve stepped out on stage to a 30-second standing ovation, a new era in Apple had clearly begun. And then he announced a partnership with Microsoft, drawing boos. MWE Tokyo 1997: Before Steve killed the project later in the year, Apple teamed with Fujifim for its last attempt at a digital camera, the QuickTake 200, which used removable cards to store pictures but was lost in a sea of cheaper, smaller entries. Also introduced at the show were the Power Macintosh 4400, 7300, 8600 and 9600, and the Powerbook 3400c, which immediately assumed the short-lived position of the world’s fastest laptop. MWE SF 1998: Just months before the iMac would turn the industry on its head, iCEO Steve’s first full Macworld San Francisco keynote brought no new products, but still had the crowd in awe with a surprise “one more thing” announcement: Apple’s profitable again. Macworld Expo New York 1998: Making the move south to the Big Apple could have been disastrous for Macworld, but diehard Mac fans would have jumped a motorcycle onto a speeding train to catch a glimpse of the iMac. Attendance dipped noticeably from the prior year’s Boston show, but enough shows up to give Macworld East a permanent new home in New York City’s Jacob K. Javits Convention Center.MWE Tokyo 1998: The Macworld Tokyo crowd cheered politely for the debut of the first Japanese-language Think Different ad, but went absolutely wild when Steve Jobs appeared on stage (via a taped message). He didn’t show off any new products, but assured the audience that Apple wouldn’t be leaving them out of their new OS strategy: “Apple is committed to having the best kanji (Chinese characters) systems in the world, and we're pouring even more into R&D toward that end.” MWE SF 1999: A rainbow of iMacs greeted visitors to Apple’s booth, but all eyes were on “the world’s most open-minded personal computer,” a sleek tower dressed in blue and white with a hinged door for easy access to its G3 processor. And the color-coordinated Apple Studio Displays weren’t too shabby either. MWE New York 1999: Say hello to the iBook. But first, say hello to Noah Wyle, star of “Pirates of Silicon Valley,” who fooled the crowd momentarily with his nearly-spot-on Steve Jobs impersonation (though he forgot to unscrew the cap to his water bottle). After a demo of the imminent OS 9, the real Steve unveiled Apple’s newest laptop, a candy-colored clamshell book that had a handle and looked strangely like a potty seat. MWE Tokyo 1999: Steve’s first keynote at Macworld Toyko was basically a rewrite of January’s Macworld San Francisco presentation, with the exception of an untimely crash of the Power Mac G3 during Microsoft’s Internet Explorer demo. But all anyone really cared about were iMacs. NEXT: Macworld Expo: The 2000's Macworld Expo the 2000's - Apple's return MWE SF 2000: With the renaissance in full swing, Steve announced Apple’s next-generation operating system in earnest at the first Macworld of the new millennium. With “state-of-the-art plumbing,” “killer graphics” and a 12-month, “gentle migration,” Steve introduced the masses to the blue-tinged world of Aqua of the Dock and kept his promise: A public beta was in our hands by September. MWE New York 2000: Indigo, Ruby, Sage and Snow iMacs, dual-processor Power Macs, optical mice, translucent keyboards, iMovie 2, and 15-, 17- and 22-inch displays. None stood a chance against the star-crossed star of the show, the jaw-dropping Power Mac G4 Cube. Everyone wanted to take one home, but strangely, few people actually did. MWE Tokyo 2000: After an quiet debut in 1999, Steve pulled out all the stops in 2000, unveiling brand-new portables and Power Macs, including the iBook Special Edition and Pismo PowerBook. Steve also made good on his ’98 vow to include the highest-quality Japanese fonts in OS X. MWE SF 2001: One of Jobs’ shining moments (even by his standards), the 2001 Stevenote featured a shipping date for Mac OS X, two more pieces of the digital hub (iDVD and iTunes), SuperDrive-equipped graphite Power Mac G4s, and the piece de resistance, the “mega-wide,” one-inch thick Titanium Power Mac G4. Suddenly, all was right-side up with the world (including the Apple logo on the case). MWE New York 2001: A preview of Mac OS X Puma (and a few lengthy third-party demos) brought scarcely any new features, but faster iMacs and Quicksilver Power Macs promised an all-around zippier experience. MWE Tokyo 2001: The final aesthetic flourish for the iMac brought the trippy Flower Power and Blue Dalmatian patterns and added CD-RW drives to accompany iTunes 1.1 Joining the art-deco all-in-ones were new Power Mac G4 Cubes, which also added the elusive CD-RW drives. MWE SF 2002: A 14-inch iBook joined the wildly popular 12-inch “ice-book” family and iPhoto rounded out Apple’s digital hub vision, but the show-stopper was the flat-panel iMac G4, an overdue update that was well worth the wait. Part-computer, part-sculpture, the “Sunflower” iMac firmly cemented the Stevenote as the greatest show on earth. MWE New York 2002: A notably lackluster presentation eliminated Apple’s free e-mail in favor of a paid service and delivered a rehash of the Jaguar demo Steve gave two months earlier at WWDC. No killer new products to speak of, but iSync, iCal and iTunes 3 made their debut, along with solid-state iPods (with Windows support) and 17-inch iMacs, but attendees couldn’t help but notice the spring was missing from Steve’s step.MWE Tokyo 2002: Steve crammed another 5 gigabytes into the diminutive iPod music player as the Macworld Tokyo expo was moved to the more spacious Big Sight convention center for Apple’s last overseas splash. Turned out the switch was prophetic, as Steve took the wraps off the stunning 23-inch Cinema HD display, Apple’s largest to date. MWE SF 2003: Final Cut Express, Airport Extreme, iLife, Keynote and Safari would have been enough for most company’s trade shows, but not Apple. After nearly two hours of nonstop announcements, Steve saved the best for last: The largest (17-inch) and smallest (12-inch) PowerBooks ever, dressed to the nines in classy aluminum. MWE New York 2003: After Steve bailed on his annual keynote to protest IDG’s plan to move to the expo back to Boston the following year, the show, now known as Macworld CreativePro Conference & Expo, found itself in a tailspin. Apple fulfilled its commitment to exhibit--and even announced the availability of Soundtrack as a standalone product--but the thrill was most definitely gone.MWE Tokyo 2003: On the heels of the east-coast shake-up, Apple abruptly pulled out of the Japan show, too, and IDG cancelled the event altogether. MWE SF 2004: A somewhat disappointing keynote delivered Garageband and way too much John Mayer, but still finished on a high note as Steve unveiled the product no one knew they needed: a smaller iPod in a rainbow of flavors. MWE Boston 2004-2005: A pair of intimate Boston expos closed the book on Macworld East for good, as IDG vowed to focus its efforts on the sole remaining show in San Francisco. MWE SF 2005: Also known as the keynote that brought down ThinkSecret, Steve took to the Moscone stage in 1995 looking to capitalize on all the attention Apple was getting. Along with a new iLife and a surprise successor to the defunct AppleWorks, two low-priced products sought to dispel the notion of Apple as a high-priced niche company: the $99 iPod shuffle and $499 Mac mini. MWE SF 2006: Apple kicked off the Intel transition by fitting its two most popular Macs with Core Duo processors. Little was changed from the new iMac aside from its new brain, but the PowerBook underwent a series of tweaks and refinements, including the retirement of its famous name “because we’re kind of done with Power and we want Mac in the name of our products.” MWE SF 2007: The last great Macworld keynote ever. Nuff said. MWE SF 2008: With the near-impossible task of following the launch of the iPhone, Steve took the stage for his last Macworld San Francisco keynote with a bag full of assorted treats--cheaper Apple TVs, iTunes movie rentals, iPod touch and iPhone software updates, Time Capsule--and one big trick. Steve’s lasting image as the master of Macworld ceremonies: sliding the Macbook Air out its plain manila envelope. MWE SF 2009: Apple’s final Macworld appearance was preceded by letter from Steve explaining his “nutritional problem” and “decision to have Phil deliver the Macworld keynote,” so attendees were prepared for a lackluster event. Apple surprised some with the new 8-hour, 17-inch Mac Book Pro, iLife ’09 and iWork ’09, but it just wasn’t the same without the man who made it all happen. Macworld Expo elsewhere Building off the success of U.S. shows, a number of expos around the globe tried to capitalize on the Macworld name, to limited success: 1989: Macworld Canada 1991: Macworld Mexico, Hong Kong, Stockholm and New Zealand 1992: Macworld Barcelona, Paris (cancelled due to popularity of Apple Expo) 1994: Macworld Expo Summit (Washington, D.C.) 1996: Macworld Taiwan 2004: Macworld UK 2005: Macworld on Tour (only schedule date, in Kissimmee, Fla., cancelled)
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Leopard and the History and Future of Mac OS X on PowerPC
Daniel Eran DilgerHow long will Apple continue to support existing models of Macs in the latest version of Mac OS X? Previous versions of Apple’s OS have drawn the line for officially supported Macs based on practical considerations, rather than just being arbitrary or artificial. Here's what the past suggests for Mac OS X Leopard and the version that comes after it.The Post-Copland Crisis.Apple carried along official support for the 1986 Mac Plus through Mac System 7.5.5 in 1996. That established an expectation for Mac users that any new Mac System Software would be able to run across a decade long generation of old hardware. Further, Apple had only begun officially selling System 7 as a retail product a few years earlier; many Mac users continued to think of the Mac operating system as something that was available for free, as it had been in the past. That unreasonable support expectation combined with the sense of entitlement held by Mac users had helped to complicate Apple’s mid-90s failure to deliver Copland as a successor to System 7 between 1993 and 1995, and would continue to dog the company in its plans to provide a significant system software update after Copland was mothballed. Faced with the task of maintaining full backward compatibility for both existing applications and a wide range of hardware--but without any assurance that a significant number of Mac users would actually pay for the upgrade--it’s no wonder why Apple was stuck at System 7 for over a decade (Mac OS 8 and Mac OS 9 were only retoolings of the System 7 operating system released in 1991), and why plans to completely overhaul System 7 with Copland and Gershwin failed.If Apple had the luxury of operating outside of a real market economy and could simply rely on guaranteed future sales at high retail prices, it could have plowed along for twice as long and eventually released something, as Microsoft did a decade later with Windows Vista. As Windows Enthusiasts like to point out, Vista will eventually get deployed no matter how bad it is. [The Secrets of Pink, Taligent and Copland][Has Leopard Fallen into a Copland-Vista Conundrum?][SCO, Linux, and Microsoft in the History of OS: 1990s]Spindler’s Complications.By 1990, Apple CEO John Sculley had recognized that Apple needed to set a reasonable minimum hardware threshold for its operating system releases and to figure out a way to get Mac users to fund the expensive operating system development the company was doing. At that time, both Microsoft and IBM were charging PC users around $100 for retail copies of Windows or OS/2, neither of which were even really usable.Figuring out how to actually accomplish those goals never got done at Apple. Instead, Sculley’s successor Michael Spindler attempted to imitate Sony by releasing ranges of Mac hardware under a variety of vaguely Latin sounding names--Quadra, Centris, and Performa--and a series of confusing, nondescript model numbers. Starting in early 1994, Apple also underwent a complex transition from its original 680x0 Macs to PowerPC hardware. Since much of the original Mac software was written in assembly language, the transition relied on emulation of the existing Mac System Software, which further complicated efforts to deliver significant new features without breaking existing software or prematurely cutting off support for existing machines. Non-PowerPC Macs continued to be sold into 1996.Spindler’s Apple also began plans to license the Mac software to other hardware makers in late 1994, including APS, Bandai, DayStar, Motorola, Pioneer, Power Computing, Radius, and UMAX. That effort skimmed off the cream of Apple’s profitability and handed it to the cloners, leaving Apple to service the low end of the market at Sears with its Performas while also funding the development of nearly profitless Mac System Software to support an increasingly wide range of hardware. [Why Apple Failed]Simplifying the Mac Hardware Lineup Around the G3.When Steve Jobs returned to Apple in 1997, the company's product line was all over the place, although efforts were already underway to simplify things. Apple had only just discontinued the last of its 680x0-based Macs a year earlier. Under Spindler replacement Gil Ameilo, Apple had also scraped together a "Unity" release of System 7, newly rebranded as Mac OS 7.6. That release officially extended support back to all "32-bit clean" Macs, which included the eight year old Mac IIci from 1989.The installed base of Mac hardware not only spanned across two hardware platforms--680x0 and Power PC--but nearly each individual Mac model from Apple had also used its own highly customized and often uniquely quirky hardware design. The cloners were also introducing subtle differences in their own machines, too.Despite using the very modern PowerPC processors and Open Firmware, Macs in 1997 still incorporated old Mac ROMs to maintain software compatibility with the existing Mac OS. After taking control of Apple in the middle of that year, Jobs announced the release of a highly simplified product line using the new G3 processor. The G3 was such a significant leap over earlier PowerPC processors that even the entry level G3s were faster than the top of the line models Apple had been selling. So while Apple had a confusing array of eight different major PowerMac models at the beginning of 1997, by the end of the year it only had two: a desktop G3 and a tower G3. It also shipped a G3 PowerBook.[How CPR Saved Apple]Mac OS X 10.0 - 10.2: G3 Only.The introduction of the G3 processor created a clean line between it and the wide array of odd PowerPC hardware designed prior to 1997. The G3 also signaled the end of the line for the various models built by Mac cloners, who all refused to license new versions of the Mac OS at terms Jobs deemed reasonable. The G3 was also the first PowerPC processor optimized to run Mac software. That made it an easy minimum target for Mac OS X, which remained in development through 2001. In the meantime, Jobs bought out Power Computing--the largest Mac cloner--for $100 million, and terminated other clone agreements by releasing Mac OS 7.7 as “Mac OS 8? in mid 1997. That revision also became the first edition of the Mac OS to really be successfully sold at retail; over 1.2 million copies were sold within the first two weeks. The next fall in 1998, Apple released Mac OS 8.5, which was the first version to be PowerPC-only, limiting support to Macs sold over the last five years. In 1999, Apple shipped Mac OS 9. The new Apple had proved it could plan, ship, and sell regular releases of an operation system. The next task would be shipping Mac OS X as a major new leap past the classic System 7.Between 2001 and 2002, the 10.0 to 10.2 versions of Mac OS X limited support to the G3 desktop Macs, including those first introduced in late 1997. It did not support the original PowerBook G3 unveiled alongside the G3 desktops however. The first supported PowerBook was the "WallStreet" revision introduced in May of 1998. That maintained the roughly five year support window for machines to be updated with new versions of Mac operating system software. [Apple Sells 1.2 Million Copies of Mac OS 8 - Apple][Leopard, Vista and the iPhone OS X Architecture]Mac OS X 10.3: New World Macs Only.After moving its hardware line to the G3, Apple next delivered a revised "New World" platform which modernized the Mac's hardware and removed its old hardware ROMs, replacing them with “ROM in RAM? software loaded from disk. The first New World model was the first iMac in 1998. The beige G3 Macs from 1997 were replaced with a single new "blue and white" G3 in early 1999, which used the same translucent plastic as the iMac. Apple shipped its first "New World" laptop in the Lombard PowerBook G3, distinguished by its translucent bronze keyboard. In July 1999, Apple released the iBook.The release of Mac OS X Panther 10.3 in 2003 extended support back to Macs with G3 processors and built-in support for USB. This wasn't due to an actual requirement for USB, but rather a shorthand way to describe a cutoff for the support of the significantly different architecture of "Old World" Macs designed prior to the iMac, as all New World Macs also provided support for USB. Panther retained a roughly five year support window for existing Mac models.Mac OS X 10.4: Modern New World Macs Only.In 2004, Mac OS X Tiger 10.4 retained support for most New World Macs using G3 processors, but required support for built-in FireWire. Again, this wasn't related to a need for FireWire ports, but rather a way to exclude support for the earliest of the now five year old New World Macs, which Apple decided would not run Tiger acceptably, including: the original 1998 iMac.the original 1999 iBook.the 1999 "Lombard" PowerBook G3.These five year old machines can still run Tiger using XPostFacto, a third party enabler designed to force Mac OS X to run on earlier systems. However, significant differences in their hardware--coupled with their limited performance--prevented Apple from officially supporting them.In the case of the Lombard PowerBook, its DVD drive was never supported for movie playback under Mac OS X because the system did not have the power to decode DVD video in software; under Mac OS 9, it relied on a hardware decoder. Rather than holding up Mac OS X to develop custom support for the obsolete hardware decoder in the now half-decade old Lombard PowerBooks, Apple told its users to continue using the playback software it came with. [XPostFacto: OS X for Legacy Macs - Other World Computing]Mac OS X 10.5: 867 MHz Processor Required.For Leopard, Apple is specifying an 867 MHz G4. That excludes support for the now functionally obsolete G3s, and draws a line down the middle of the 2001 "Quicksilver" PowerMac G4s, excluding support for the 2001 G4 Cube and the first three generations of the Titanium PowerBook G4 up to late 2002. This again maintains official support for five to six years of Mac models.This break roughly corresponds to the arrival of the G4+, a revised version of the G4 with support for L3 cache and improvements to AltiVec. It is also near the line for supporting Quartz Extreme and the higher end Core Image, both of which are technologies used to delegate graphics work to the video card. However, Core Image is not a requirement for using Leopard; such a requirement would exclude support for all G4 desktops and laptops prior to 2003. Leopard Looms Large.That indicates Apple is being fairly liberal in officially supporting older models in Leopard. The obvious reason for this is that Apple wants to sell Leopard to as many Mac users as possible, even more than it wants to use Leopard to sell new Macs. Between 2001 and 2002, Apple sold just over 6 million Macs. From 2003 to the present, Apple has sold about 23 million Macs. Apple wants to target the broadest possible market for Leopard, so excluding support for older machines is done with some hesitation. By extending support back into 2001, Apple is selling to an audience of nearly 30 million versus 23 million.At the same time however, the likelihood of selling retail copies of Leopard to users of older Macs begins to drop as six year old machines go out of service or are no longer viewed by their owners as needing brand new software. This spring, analysts estimated an installed base of around 22 million active Mac users, an increase of 6 million over their figures from 2005.[Mac install base estimated at 22 million pre-Leopard - AppleInsider][Market Share vs Installed Base: iPod vs Zune, Mac vs PC]Is Leopard the Last Hurrah for Power PC Macs?The reports of PowerPC's obsolescence have been greatly exaggerated. Last year, the rumor was that Leopard would be released only for Intel Macs. This year, with Leopard looming on the horizon, the new rumor is that Mac OS X 10.6--possibly named Lynx or Cougar--will be Intel-only. However this is only uninformed speculation. When this rumor came up earlier about Leopard, I posted the article, “Unraveling The PowerPC Obsolescence Myth.? It pointed out that Apple would not release an Intel-only Leopard for an audience of the roughly 3 million new Intel Macs sold in 2006 when it could reach an installed base of around 20 million Macs with a Universal Leopard.It noted, “If Apple continues to sell new Macs at current rates, it will be 2008 before Intel Macs begin to outnumber PowerPCs, and that assumes that every year, 4 million old PowerPC Macs will be destroyed. There will be a significant proportion of PowerPC Macs still buying software well into 2010, and the market will accommodate them.?[Unraveling The PowerPC Obsolescence Myth]Why the Mac OS X Backward Compatibility Window May Increase.Apple’s Mac OS support troubles back in 1996 related to the support of multiple platforms, a wide variety of different models, and an inability to effectively market the Mac OS. Those issues are no longer factors today. Despite Apple’s maintenance of dual platforms since the transition to Intel began in 2006, technology has erased the barrier as a real problem.The majority of the installed base of around 22 million Macs is PowerPC; less than 10 million are Intel Macs. Apple has started to sell dramatically more new Macs at a faster rate over the last couple years--displacing the PowerPC majority more rapidly--but there will still be a lot of PowerPC Macs well into 2010. Worrying about 10.6 or even 10.7 being Intel-only shouldn't be among anyone's greatest concerns. By 2009, the likely ballpark release date of Leopard's successor, the trailing end of officially supported Macs would include over 8 million PowerPC Macs sold since 2004, even more machines--and more recent models--than Apple is targeting now by reaching back into 2001 to support QuickSilver G4s in Leopard. Further, supporting machines from 2003--including the first G5s--will be no difficult stretch, because the Mac architecture didn't change dramatically between 2003 and 2005 in the way that it rapidly did between 1997 and 2000. In addition, Mac OS X hardware dependancies have been designed to degrade gracefully. For example, the acceleration framework and Core Graphics libraries make use of specialized hardware if available, or simply run on the general purpose CPU if it isn’t.It's also interesting to note that prior to 2000, Macs weren't sold with Mac OS X because it didn't yet exist. That means earlier versions of Mac OS X supported years of Macs that were never really designed to run it, while Leopard still supports the vast majority of the machines anyone ever bought with the expectation to actually use Mac OS X. New generations of Mac OS X will have fewer reasons to exclude support for existing hardware, leaving the support line tied to practical performance.[Why Apple hasn't used Intel processors before]Intel-Only Not Necessary.Around 11 million Macs were sold between 2003 and 2005, and all of them were PowerPC. It would be foolish for Apple to simply exclude that audience in the next revision of Mac OS X without good reason. As it works out, there really isn't any good reason for Apple to ditch PowerPC. Apple's Universal Binaries architecture makes it relatively easy to maintain support across multiple platforms. It's not like the move from Motorola 680x0 classic Macs to PowerPC, where old 680x0 software was emulated at significant cost on PowerPC, and new PowerPC code couldn't run at all on 680x0 Macs. That situation left developers to wonder which they should invest their support in and for how long. Universal Binaries means there isn't any tough choice to make.Universal Binaries not only support PowerPC and Intel, but also make supporting 32 and 64 bit architectures easy. Leopard supports all four Mac platforms in the same software release:32 bit PowerPC G464 bit PowerPC G532 bit Intel64 bit Intel Microsoft faces big problems in migrating its users to 64 bits, because it has no seamless architecture to waltz its 32 bit Intel users onto 64 bit hardware. Instead, Windows users have to obtain a separate 64 bit edition of their operating system, new 64 bit drivers, and new 64 bit applications. Supporting both is problematic, and deploying software across both is also trouble. Even Microsoft hasn’t delivered its portfolio of applications for its 64 bit versions of Windows. Microsoft faces enough troubles selling Vista, let alone its deferred plan to deal with 64 bits and EFI at some point in the future. Apple already has both issues covered, allowing it to concentrate on more interesting tasks. [How Apple’s Firmware Leapfrogs BIOS PCs]Applications that are Intel-Only.For Apple and third party developers using Apple's Xcode tools, supporting both Intel and PowerPC architectures is really no more difficult than supporting just Intel Macs. In fact, Apple has also ported Mac OS X to the ARM architecture for use in the iPhone and the iPod Touch, demonstrating that it can flex its multi-platform muscle in several directions, not just as one-time, disposable transition plan. Universal Binaries isn’t a crutch, its a powerful deployment technology.There are only three types of developers that will have any reason to deliver Intel-only Mac apps:Companies like Adobe, which base their applications on their own custom, internal cross platform architecture. Since Adobe maintains its own system that is based on Intel-centric development, its new apps such as Soundbooth aren't ever going to appear for PowerPC. If it used Xcode’s Universal Binaries, this would not be a problem. Xcode doesn't target Windows though (at least not in a way Adobe can use!), so Adobe rolled its own system. Software designed for Windows and ported to Intel Macs using a WINE-like engine. This is how EA is porting its new games to the Mac. They are actually Windows games running on a thin portability layer that emulates the Windows APIs. Since games don't integrate into the desktop UI, a full Mac port isn't very valuable for users or worth doing for the developer, particularly since the Mac gaming market is still pretty small. Porting over Windows games is far faster and keeps new releases in sync so that Mac gamers will have access to new titles sooner, and won't miss features such as network play. Environment emulators and other software tied directly to the x86 architecture, including Parallels. These can't be ported to PowerPC for the same reason that it makes no sense to port Virtual PC to Intel. Apart from running Windows--which is tightly bound to the 32-bit x86 architecture--there is really very little software that needs to run on a specific processor.For most other software, including the vast majority of what makes up Mac OS X, it really isn't difficult to deliver both PowerPC and Intel versions, so as long as there are PowerPC Macs around, there'll be PowerPC software. That makes it extremely unlikely that Apple would drop support for PowerPC in the next generation of Mac OS X after Leopard.Maintaining and Growing the Mac Installed Base.What about the argument that Apple would prefer to “force? users to buy a new Mac to get the latest system rather than simply upgrade their existing hardware? Consider that Apple’s Mac profit margins are around 20% or less, while its Mac OS X margins are closer to Microsoft’s 80% Windows margins. [Office Wars 2 - Microsoft’s Outrageous Office Profits]Mac users paying to upgrade to Mac OS X are likely to buy a new Mac eventually as a replacement, so Apple’s delaying that hardware sale for a profitable software upgrade makes more sense than forcing existing Mac users to go out and buy new hardware, which might involve comparing a new Mac against a PC running Windows.The more Macs that can run the most recent version of Mac OS X, the more attractive the target is for third party developers. Apple wants to maintain the majority of Mac users on the latest version of its software. In contrast, Windows Vista is competing against Windows XP, and the fact that Microsoft only earns 20% of its revenues from (the much more expensive) retail box sales indicates that most PC users upgrade when buying a new PC. More Mac users pay to upgrade their software.That fact contributes toward making the Mac platform far more valuable than Windows; despite having only 3% market share of the entire world’s production of PCs, Apple makes more money on hardware sales than Dell with its 15% share of the market, and--after including Microsoft’s tremendous losses from its non-monopoly businesses--made half as much money in software as Microsoft did with its 98% share. Windows Enthusiast prefer not to think about this.Even stripping Apple of its iPod revenues, which PC pundits love to do, the company still earned $4.4 billion on its Macintosh business last year, over a third as much Microsoft brought in from its entire Windows, Office, and server operations combined. Apple’s 2% of the PC market doesn’t seem so small anymore. [Can Apple Take Microsoft in the Battle for the Desktop?][Market Share vs Installed Base: iPod vs Zune, Mac vs PC]What do you think? I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast! Submit to Reddit or Slashdot, or consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!
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Why Dan Frommer and Scott Moritz Are Wrong on iPhone Sales
Daniel Eran DilgerSilicon Alley Insider's Dan Frommer says Apple's announcement of reaching its million mark goal in iPhone sales three weeks early is actually bad news for Apple and is convolutedly "below plan." He also says the announcement only props up the speculative conjecture by Scott Moritz of the Street that Apple's iPhones sales are somehow woefully below expectations. They're wrong, here's why.The PremiseFrommer wrote that Apple isn't selling iPhones as fast as planned and is set to only sell around half of its 2008 goal.His premise revolves around the idea that if Apple were selling iPhones at "a constant rate," a million phones in 74 days would be five million per year. However, because it sold over a quarter of those in the opening day and a half at the end of June, Frommer calculates that sales of the remainder in the 72 days since the first of July mean that Apple is only hitting a "3.6 million annual run rate."By the end of 2008, that would only result in 5.8 million units instead of the ten million goal Apple. [Silicon Alley Insider: Apple's iPhone: 1 Million Is Below Plan]Strike One: The Run Rate Myth.The most obvious problem with that idea is the fact that devices don't sell at a constant “run rate." Apple's iPhone sales took off at launch much faster than the original iPod due to the fact that a swell of early adopters were ready to buy it after being convinced over six months of anticipation. At the same time, many potential buyers held off on plans to buy the iPhone until they could read reviews and get a real sense of how it worked. Many were also locked into contracts with Verizon or Sprint. With only six months of advanced notice, it will still be a few more months before the majority of buyers who want an iPhone even get the chance to buy one without having to pay outrageous fees to cancel their existing mobile contract. iPhone sales are also now taking on the network effect of the iPod, as early adopters show their friends. All these factors have difficult to estimate impacts upon sales that make trying to figure a static “run rate? a very simplistic and pointless exercise.However, there is another factor that simply blows the entire idea of a static “run rate? out of the water. Last November, I predicted that sales of the Zune would bomb that winter because Microsoft had failed to critically examine Apple's historical sales patterns. Sure enough, the Zune was thrown against the rocks by Apple's riptide. Frommer's idea ignores that same reality by imagining that iPhone sales will schlep along at a linear pace. Had Frommer tried to calculate an "annual run rate" for the iPod based on a portion of third quarter sales at any point over the last half decade, he would never have been close to accurate. That’s because Apple’s iPod sales roughly triple every winter quarter.In 2002, it sold nearly as many iPods in its winter quarter as it did the first three quarters combined: 219,000In 2003, it actually sold more iPods in its winter quarter than in the first three combined: 733,000In 2004, it again sold more iPods in its winter quarter than in the first three: 4,580,000In 2005, it sold more than 4 million units every quarter, but still sold nearly three times as many in the winter: 14,480,000.In 2006, it sold more than 8 million units every quarter, and then sold over 21 million in the winter quarter.In 2007, it has maintained quarterly sales between 10.5 and 9.8 million per quarter.[Strike 3: Why Zune will Bomb this Winter]Strike Two: The Have it Both Ways Myth.One particularly annoying bit of analysts' talk about Apple's expectations is that they can't seem to decide if Apple's projections are bad because they are conservative lowballs, or if they are bad for being overly enthusiastic figures the company won't be able to reach. They often try to describe them as both, loading contempt on both sides of the scale. This makes them look very foolish. Do they think we have no memory, or are they just changing their stories back and forth in sheer desperation?Frommer tried to argue both sides at once in the same article. Recall that Apple only ever gave two iPhone sales goals: one million by the end of the first quarter of sales, and ten million by the end of 2008. In his piece, Frommer suggests Apple will only be able to sell 5.8 million iPhones by the end of 2008, based on that fallacious "run rate." That would be just over half of Apple's ten million goal. However, he then says that Apple's immediate short term goal was an unimpressive low ball, no doubt because Apple reached it three weeks early.Apple's stated goals must be a greatly frustrating logical conundrum for Frommer, because even at a “run rate" of one million in a quarter, Apple could only ever hope to sell six million iPhones by the end of 2008, another five quarters later. No wonder he's faced with trying to say that the immediate goal was too low and the longer term one is too high! Frommer needs to stop trying to pound round facts into square holes just so they can be stacked up like bricks the way he would like them to be.Strike Three: The Market Bearing Price Myth.While Frommer and Moritz are enamored with the idea that iPhone prices could only be cut if sales were in crisis, a variety of obvious market realities don't support that simpleton idea. Between now and the end of 2008, Apple has just two holiday seasons. If it wants to dramatically exploit its historical potential for selling roughly three times as many gadgets during the winter season, it makes sense to trade off unit pricing for volume sales, even if it could perhaps sell fewer at a higher price and make more short term profits doing so.Such a strategy isn't unique. Microsoft and Sony currently lose money on their new game consoles in desperate bids to establish their gaming and HD video playing platforms. Even so, this year they both cut prices again to accelerate volume demand. Nintendo purposely aimed low to capture volume sales using a more attractive price point. Given high demand for the Wii and extremely constrained availability, Nintendo "should" seemingly raise its console price and profiteer. It hasn't. While prices are clearly linked to demand, it is a common fallacy to think that the "right price" is always the highest the market will bear. Jobs' 99 cent pricing in the iTunes store is clearly not the top price consumers will pay for downloads. Music labels are fuming that other licensees such as Verizon will collect $2.50 or more for portions of a song sold as a ringtone. Jobs wants media prices low to induce volume sales and attract buyers to the legitimate market for music and movie downloads. Labels and studios want "market pricing," in part so they can jack up the price of popular music to exploit consumers, and in part so they can exploit artists by threatening to release their work at lower tiered prices and signal to the market that their careers are over.[Universal vs Apple in the iTunes Store Contracts][Nintendo Wii vs Microsoft Xbox 360 and Sony PS3]This All Happened Before.Dial back the clock twenty years, and you'll discover that Steve Jobs also fought with Apple CEO John Sculley over the price of the original Macintosh. The desire to use an expensive but pioneering amount of RAM and a futuristic new processor had inflated the price of the Mac, but the design team was still able to deliver it at a fairly attractive price point of $1,995. Scully determined that the Mac would still sell at $2495, delivering high profits to fund splashy advertising. Nothing on the market was really similar to the Mac apart from Apple's $9,995 Lisa. VisiOn for the PC similarly cost nearly $10,000 and did far less. Sculley thought that the market would bear anything Apple might charge. Andy Hertzfeld recalled on Folklore.org that in October 1983, "Steve Jobs strode into the software area one evening, looking angry. 'You're not going to like this,' he told us, 'but Sculley is insisting that we charge $2495 for the Mac instead of $1995, and use the extra money for a bigger marketing budget. He figures that the early adopters will buy it no matter what the price. He also wants more of a cushion to protect Apple II sales. But don't worry, I'm not going to let him get away with it!'"Jobs fought Sculley over the price increase, but Sculley prevailed. Sure enough, Macs did sell well out of the gate to early adopters at the higher price, but sales then began to stall. While Jobs couldn't cut the price for the original Mac to induce wider adoption in the mid 80s, he could choose to cut the price of the iPhone early and use interest in the iPod Touch to ramp users toward the iPhone. That price cut will dramatically boost sales this winter, just as iPod price cuts and feature refreshes do every year.Apple will earn less profit on individual hardware sales of the iPhone, and may even earn slightly less money overall this quarter than it might have selling the iPhone at $599. However, a $399 iPhone will dramatically boost the company's sustainable subscriber revenues and devastatingly cut into stationary rivals like Palm and the Windows Mobile licensees, giving them little opportunity retool and strike back with copycat products. [Price Fight - Folklore.org][Office Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office Monopoly]Strike Four: The Myth of Unlimited Availability.Another problem with idea that iPhone sales were in crisis--and that a price cut is a conspiracy to hide the truth--is that Apple sold out of iPhones in many of its retail stores throughout the first three weeks on sale.Carl Howe of Blackfriar's Communications tracked iPhone availability every day through July, and then animated the results in a movie that depicts just how constrained iPhone inventories in Apple's retail stores were. So not only did Apple meet its 94 day goal 20 days early, but it did so despite having no or few iPhones to sell in many of its stores during the first 21 days. Price isn't just related to demand, but also to supply.That also demonstrates the fallacy of Scott Moritz' assertion that Apple secretly planned to sell a million iPhones in a day and a half, and was sorely disappointed after failing to do so. How could Apple have planned on selling a million units in one day when it didn't even have a million units on the shelves of its stores during the first month? Remember, Moritz wasn't saying Apple had a delivery problem in getting enough units to stores as Nintendo is experiencing with its constrained supplies of the Wii. Instead, he tried to suggest that interest in the iPhone was far below Apple's estimates, and buyers were leaving it on the shelf like Windows Vista. The result, he claimed, was that "rivals were rejoicing."The only real rejoicing by rivals was that Moritz was volunteering to repeat the talking points handed to him by Verizon shill Roger Entner of IAG Research. Just hours before Apple announced it had sold a million units, Moritz tried to get some traction out of the idea that Apple had dropped the price in desperation to find another half million or so customers over the next three weeks. Apple isn't the typical tech company being run by visionless bean counters. It it were, it would have continued selling $600 iPhones at least through the end of September and then announced that it had sold its million. Apple had to push out new iPods in early September and fit the iPhone into the price range because next month it will be rolling out Leopard and a series of new software updates. Apple feeds the press in small, consistent, and regular feedings so reporters know what to write. If Apple were a big stupid company such as, say HP, it would parade out a mix of dozens of consumer and business products all together in one big event, and nobody would ever hear about any of it. HP did.[Why a million iPhones in 74 days is better than you think- Blackfriars][HP's marketing this week: fashionable but ineffective - Blackfriars][Unraveling Anti-Apple Panic: the iPhone Launch Success] [More on Scott Moritz and the Jim Cramer Misinformation Engine]Strike Five: It's Too Late to Deny the iPhone.The most comical part of Frommers’ analysis is that he’s trying to stuff a cat back into a bag and explain that there was never really any cat, long after everyone in the room heard the purr and pet the thing. Sorry, but the windows of opportunity to doubt the iPhone have long since closed.Real Windows Enthusiasts were aware of the need to deny the iPhone well before its release. They all chimed in with reasons why the iPhone wouldn't work, wouldn't offer what consumers want, and wouldn't sell well, all hoping that their non-stop misinformation campaigns would act as a self-fulfilling prophesy. They failed miserably.John Dvorak began his smear campaign immediately, appearing on CNBC to say that the iPhone was "trending against what people are really liking in phones nowadays, which are those little keypads.? He explained, “The BlackJack, the Samsung, the BlackBerry obviously pushes this kind of thing. The Palm, all of these. I guess some of these stocks went down on the Apple announcement, thinking that Apple could do no wrong. But I think Apple can do wrong, and I think this is it." Reader Jim Barrow sent in a link to a MarketWatch article from March, where Dvorak scribed a rambling diatribe entitled "Apple should pull the plug on the iPhone." He offered no factual basis for worrying that the iPhone might not work out apart from the offhanded comment that "there is no likelihood that Apple can be successful in a business this competitive," words which echoed Dvorak's 1984 observation that "the Macintosh uses an experimental pointing device called a 'mouse.' There is no evidence that people want to use these things."In April, Dvorak inflamed his 'pull the plug' rhetoric further in a TWiT podcast, where he reported to an audience of hundreds of thousands that the iPhone only delivered "40 minutes of talk time" and "the interface fouls up constantly.? Dvorak said that his inside information on the iPhone came from a "guy at Cingular who’s testing the product," adding, "he’s telling me confidentially and I shouldn’t be telling anybody."[John Dvorak: How Wrong Can One Guy Be?][Readers Write: Don't Write About John Dvorak Anymore]It'll Be the Death of You.Dvorak was joined by Rob Enderle, who called the iPhone “damned? and “not a very good phone? at every opportunity in the months before its launch, despite not really knowing anything about it, or even ever offering any rational criticism. Instead, Enderle appealed to fantasy fears of sexual assault, murder, and the violent death of children, all of which he suggested might somehow be related to the iPhone. Unaware that a password protected iPhone--or even a unauthorized unit without a configured service plan--can still be used to make emergency phone calls, Enderle wrote about, "an emergency situation where, say, a woman was being raped and couldn’t call for help because she didn’t remember her iPhone password." As I understand, with a Windows Mobile phone, even if the unit crashed while trying to place the call, at least the victim could use it like a brick as a blunt weapon. Enderle also feared that being unable to take out the battery would somehow making recharging it impossible, resulting an a scenario where one might end up on “the wrong side of town? with a dead iPhone and be murdered because of it. Being on the wrong side of town was apparently the source of most murders prior to the arrival of the cell phone, which somehow made it safe to be in bad neighborhoods. For those who unfazed by the prospect of one's own own grizzly death in relation to the iPhone, Enderle appealed to his readers to please think of the children, particularly the potential for their brutal decapitation in an iPhone-related collision. "If you are buying this phone for a child or another member of your family," Enderle warned, "please emphasize that entering data on this phone while driving is dangerous." In contrast, operating the slide out keyboards of an HTC brick phone, or using both hands to thumb type on a BlackBerry may or may not save your children as they drive off an embankment, but at least you'll know they didn't die at the hands of Apple's "damned" iPhone.[SCO, Linux, and Microsoft in the History of OS: 1970s][Mac OS X vs Linux: Third Party Software and Security]Pure Concentrated Evil with a Multitouch Screen.Brian Lam of Gizmodo published an impassioned plea to boycott the iPhone shortly before its launch, due to the fact that Cingular had purchased the AT&T name, a brand Gizmodo's writer correlated with "monopoly tactics" in the late 70s. Gizmodo hasn't ever called for the boycotting of Verizon Wireless, which is well known for its anti-consumer tactics and which shares just as much blood with the old AT&T as its Baby Bell sibling Cingular, nor has it ever urged the boycott Microsoft products due to "monopoly tactics." Gizmodo also failed to boycott any other GSM phones that are tied to AT&T.Gizmodo's Lam and Enderle then teamed up with Slate's David Sessions in an article purporting to expose Apple's rated battery life for the iPhone. Sessions complained about the attention the iPhone was getting, and tried to dismiss Apple's announcement of a two fold increase in battery life over what was originally advertised. Unbelievably, Sessions and friends could only explain away the iPhone's jump in talk time by crediting its glass screen, saying that "glass transmits light more efficiently than plastic." That and some witchcraft.However, all of these individuals sharply reduced their squirt rate of false information after the iPhone's successful launch. In day and a half, Apple sold 270,000 iPhones compared to the 500,000 Palm OS Treos, 1.03 million RIM BlackBerrys, and 1.51 million Windows Mobile phones that were sold worldwide in the first 90 days of 2007.Apple has since nearly matched highflying RIM in sales during July, despite being limited to a single carrier and only offered for sale in the US. At this point, denying the iPhone is like saying the Earth is flat. It might be fun to do at a Renaissance Faire, but pretending to seriously doubt reality is not a good career move unless you work for the Street--or perhaps Rupert Murdoch, as Dvorak does.[Secret iPhone Details Lost in a Sea of Hype and Hate][iPhone Sales vs Zune, Palm, RIM, Symbian, Windows Mobile]And Now: a Warning.Let it be known that anyone who publishes further misinformation or blows out similar inanity will risk being instantly awarded a Zoon on the spot. No complicated voting, no tedious application process. New Zoon nominees will be rubber stamped with the same effortless fast tracking as the ECMA declaring Microsoft technology as an international standard.In fact, I’m going to totally Zoon Dan Frommer and Scott Moritz right now, as well as John Dvorak, Rob Enderle, Brian Lam, David Sessions, and even Roger Entner. And John Sculley. And while I’m handing out an intellectual property construct that costs me nothing to distribute, I will also award Steve Jobs with a Zoon for the whole two month “just kidding? iPhone pricing situation, although I might take half of it back if I get a $100 coupon that doesn’t force me to spend $500 to actually use it. So let that be a warning to you out there on the Tubes thinking about how to linkbait an article at the expense of the progress of technology. I have a rapid firing gun full of Zoons and I’m not shy about cranking them out. Be sure to post any nominees.What do you think? I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast! Submit to Reddit or Slashdot, or consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!
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Microsoft's Zune, Vista, and Windows Mobile 7 Strategy vs the iPhone
Daniel Eran Dilger What secret partner has Microsoft discovered to bail water from the deck of Zune and its Zune Marketplace music store in a last ditch attempt to take on Apple's iTunes, the iPod, and iPhone? Microsoft's own Windows Mobile, of course, with some help from Windows Vista! Who Else Will Help Zune? Certainly not Nokia, as one Zune fansite tried to suggest last week. Nokia has nothing to gain by promoting the Zune. A more credible sounding rumor, as long as we're inventing stuff, would be to instead suggest that it could be Sony Ericsson that is interested in putting the Zune software on its new phones. At least Sony has already demonstrated its complete failure at selling music on its own, and actually has a Windows Mobile phone in the works. The simpler reality is that Sony Ericsson may have no choice in the matter. Microsoft is clearly out to wed the Zune with Windows Mobile in a effort to get the two failures to prop each other up in its “I'm not dead yet!” fight against the iPhone. Microsoft is likely to make inclusion of its Zune Marketplace a mandatory feature that its Windows Mobile partners will have to swallow, just as it forced its PC licensees to bundle its Internet Explorer browser and later Windows Media Player, while prohibiting them from seeking their own bundling deals with other companies. Microsoft took quick steps to block Compaq's licensing of QuickTime, for example. Those deals were bad for HP, Compaq, Dell, and the other PC makers, bad for competition within the tech industry, and subsequently bad for consumers. However, they did enable Microsoft to use its powerful Windows monopoly position to push proprietary standards and or anti-interoperable technologies designed to expand its monopolized control, while making big money selling Windows in a market that lacked any alternatives. Will Nokia Rescue Microsoft’s Zune? Haha No. Apple in the Web Browser Wars: Netscape vs Internet Explorer Microsoft's Plot to Kill QuickTime A Lot Has Changed. This time around however, all Microsoft has to leverage is Windows Mobile, a struggling platform with little respect in the industry, now in a distant third place. Further, the technology Microsoft is trying to push is essentially its Windows Media DRM, which has already been swept up and trashed by Apple's iTunes, QuickTime, and the iPod. The dismal fate of Windows Media was sealed with the failure of PlaysForSure. The Zune's new, albeit incompatible, reincarnation of Windows Media DRM never stood any chance of making any headway. However, the most problematic part of Microsoft's strategy of pushing its Zune Marketplace store on its Windows Mobile partners is that music stores don't make money. Apple's iTunes Store is the biggest online music store on Earth, and does tremendous volumes of sales. Still, Apple reports minimal profits from the store. It recently warned its investors that it's now selling so much through iTunes that the low profit, high volume venture may have a negative impact on the company's overall profit margins. As problems go, that's certainly a nice one to have. Apple is not at all worried about turning a big profit with iTunes because it runs the store exclusively with the intent of ensuring new content for the iPod, iPhone, and Mac. That in turn sells its hardware. However, Microsoft doesn't have hardware sales to nurture. It has barely sold two million Zune units, many at fire sale prices (compared to 150 million iPods, 93 million of which have been sold since the Zune's release). It now faces impossible odds in tilting against the momentum of iTunes' rapidly spinning windmills, with no possible upside in terms of eventual music store profitability. There's simply no way that any amount of investment in the Zune Marketplace could deliver profits, because Microsoft is competing against Apple's non-profit motivation behind iTunes. Further, Windows Mobile is similarly a big loser with no potential because Microsoft has little ability to profitably license its mobile software. It's competition is the iPhone OS, which Apple develops for free to sell iPhone hardware (Microsoft does not sell its own phone hardware); RIM's mobile OS, which is also free for BlackBerry hardware; the Symbian OS, a partnership between hardware makers; and various mobile distributions of Linux, including Google's Android, all of which are also run as profitless ventures to support hardware sales (or in Google's case, service sales). The Great Google gPhone Myth Why Microsoft’s Zune is Still Failing 10 FAS: 7 - Apple’s Hardware and Dvorak’s Microsoft Branded PC Good Money After Bad. All that unpleasant reality hasn't phased Microsoft. Its executives haven't found a way to make money in consumer electronics yet, and the company's attempts just keep getting more and more expensive. Barron's recently featured the speculation of one Microsoft investor who hoped the company would spin off its hemorrhaging online services division as well as its profitless entertainment and devices unit, which includes the Zune, Xbox, and Windows Mobile. The investor calculated the value of Microsoft's other businesses (its high profit Office, Windows, and server divisions) and decided that the market wasn't assigning any value at all to Microsoft's consumer electronics and services products divisions. No wonder; they're nothing but a huge drain on Microsoft! Even so, the investor seemed to think there must be some value to obtain from selling off the black holes, citing the market value of the highly profitable Nintendo. The investor's real intent seemed to be finding a way to “discourage the company from overinvesting in the business.” Microsoft's stock has only appreciated by 6.3% over the last decade. Apple has appreciated 1,822.6% in the same period. Microsoft is trying to develop new markets as Apple has, it's just failing to do so. Microsoft’s Outrageous Office Profits Strength in Bundles. Microsoft has always been interested in promoting its products by using strong ones to prop up weak ones. From the start, it bound its strong Mac apps to the rather weak Windows offering to invent the PC platform, and has since tied Word and Excel to a suite of otherwise fair to marginal apps under the Office banner. Once Windows became established, the company tied in an unfinished, third-rate web browser and was able to rapidly build it into a strong competitor through market inertia. On the server side, Microsoft similarly ties in tragic products into package deals that often (but not always) enable the weak bits to gain some traction. So Microsoft is again working to stitch together its various properties to support each other, but now most all of its recent products are in flames and desperately need reinforcement. There's only so much one failure can do to support another. Even worse, Microsoft's historic strengths are no longer working. The Windows monopoly was supposed to brace up Windows Media Players, Windows Media Center, Windows Mobile, Windows Live Search, Windows Live Soapbox, and a series of other cobranded products that haven't gone anywhere. Office Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office Monopoly Office Wars 4 - Microsoft’s Assault on Lotus and IBM Why Does Microsoft Really Want Yahoo? Certifiable Failure. Windows itself is now in the throes of crisis, as the failed launch of Vista nearly two years ago has signaled the undoing of Microsoft's ability to rely on its desktop monopoly to advance failures into strength. Is Vista going to put out the Zune's flames by beating with its own flame-engulfed wings? That's part of Microsoft's current strategy, which included rebranding PlaysForSure as 'Certified for Windows Vista.' The Zune is also Certified for Windows Vista, despite not being compatible with the Certified for Windows Vista PlaysForSure. Confused? You needn't be for long, as the remnants of Microsoft's one-time strategy for creating an 'ecosystem of hardware, service, and software partners' to provide choice and freedom in the music industry is pretty much dead now. All of Microsoft's significant PlaysForSure store partners, including AOL MusicNow, MTV URGE, Musicmatch Jukebox, Wal-Mart Music, Yahoo Music, and Microsoft's own MSN Music have now unplugged their PlaysForSure stores, ironically making the brand among the least accurate names for a service ever. The remaining stores making use of PlaysForSure music, principally Rhapsody and Napster, are now on death's door. PlaysForSure video stores such as CinemaNow, which once worked with Microsoft's PlaysForSure-certified Portable Media Players no longer do. Even Amazon's UnBox service, which is supposed to sync with some devices that are PlaysForSure-certified, has not bothered to get certified under Microsoft's program. Incidentally, the failure of Yahoo Music and Microsoft's MSN Music (and the company's outrageous plan to simply unplug its customers from DRM authentication) caused CNET to wonder if Apple might be next in line to make users' music purchases unplayable, echoing the poorly conceived idea that Microsoft's Vista failure, its mobile platform incompetence, and desktop viral malware security crisis all somehow also predict a similar certain doom for Apple at some point in the future. For some reason, CNET saw no connection between the failure of Yahoo and MSN (hint: PlaysForSure), and no reason to speculate about the future of other media stores facing actual failure and likely disbanding in the near future, including Rhapsody, Napster, UnBox and Microsoft's own Zune. Nearly all of the recent DRM deactivation controversies, including Major League Baseball's, have been related to Microsoft's software, although Google decided to similarly to dump users of its paid video when it pulled the plug on Google Video last fall. Rise of the iTunes Killers Myth Forrester Research: Epic Terror of iTunes and Apple TV But Wait, What About This Ecosystem Failure Sounds Familiar? The complete failure of Microsoft's PlaysForSure hardware and software licensing program paints a damning prophetic picture foreshadowing the fate of Windows Mobile. Pundits often dance around this fact by spewing Microsoft's talking points: Window Mobile has lined up scores of hardware partners! Windows Mobile has lots of software partners! Choice is good! Oh wait, that's the same stuff they said about PlaysForSure in explaining why the iPod couldn't stand a chance once Microsoft could deliver its Windows Media Player reference designs and the Windows Media DRM that would enable PlaysForSure stores to open their doors. The only real difference between PlaysForSure and Windows Mobile is that the former was expected to prove that the Windows licensing model would work well among mobile devices, while the latter has already proven for some time now that it can't. Windows Mobile has been a snowball of failure ever since it launched a half decade ago with clumsy-looking phones running buggy, poorly architected software with abysmal battery life that makes the iPhone 3G look exceptional in comparison. Windows Mobile simply shares too much in common with the PlaysForSure failure to escape the event horizon if its blackhole. Pairing software from one vendor to hardware from another is problematic in the PC market, but completely untenable among highly integrated mobile devices. Microsoft tried to blame PlaysForSure incompatibilities on its music store and hardware partners, but the real problem was the model. Microsoft's own software problems didn't help either of course. The issue on Windows Mobile is even more significant because having functional mobile phone service is far more critical than being passively entertained by an MP3 player. Unchecked diversity among the devices of a platform is a bug, not a feature. The mantra of choice and freedom, hailed among Windows enthusiasts and homebrew hackers alike, makes for a great mission statement but in reality delivers products that just don't work. It's great to be able to compile your own servers from free and open source software, but most consumers don't want the accountability that comes along with that freedom when trying to dial 911 from their phone. For that matter they don't even want to troubleshoot the installation of a firmware update, or deal with why software designed for a tall screen looks awful on a square screen. With an integrated product like the iPhone, they can complain to Apple for a fix. With Windows Mobile, you get passed around by Microsoft from the mobile operator to the hardware maker to the third party software developer. Everyone is responsible but nobody is accountable. The Spectacular Failure of WinCE and Windows Mobile Count the Flames of Windows Mobile. And so, in terms of failing platforms, Windows Mobile is closer to PlaysForSure on the flames meter than it is to the only smoldering Vista, which is a moderate success by comparison. If attaching the Zune, Microsoft's phoenix on fire, to Vista's train wreck didn't have any impact on the relative salvageability of either, what will Windows Mobile 7 do for Zune 3 a year and a few months from now in late 2009 at the earliest? That's Microsoft's current schedule, barring any customary delays. By then, Apple will have had the iPhone in international distribution for more than a year, the App Store will be a year and a half old, and the WiFi iTunes Store will be more than two years old. What in Windows Mobile 7 will make a difference for smartphone buyers? According to Microsoft: copycat touch controls hobbled by an interface trying to look like Vista (below, and yes they did spell Internet Explorer wrong, as well as putting a space in ActiveSync), and no doubt a major new push to force Zune Marketplace media sales down the throats of Windows Mobile users in imitation of Apple. Microsoft is no Apple. The problem of course, is that the market for Windows Mobile phones is almost exclusively among corporate IT users, who don't give a rats ass about downloading music from the Zune store. So there's really little potential for cross pollination between Windows Mobile and the Zune. In contrast, Apple originally marketed the iPod and iPhone to consumers, who do buy up music to the tune of billions of tracks every year. Apple now has success to build upon, and has targeted its year-old iPhone platform toward the enterprise, with development tools, a software deployment infrastructure, and management utilities that in most cases meet or exceed what Microsoft has delivered over past decade on WinCE and Windows Mobile. On top of that, the iPhone platform has a far superior, standards-based web browser, development frameworks recognized to be easier to use than Microsoft's mobile .NET, and a core OS that is simply more stable, not to mention a user interface that's designed to look good and be simple to use rather than to match the flashy branding of a failed desktop OS. WWDC 2007: Kevin Hoffman Presents .Net vs. Cocoa The Other Problem: Windows Mobile is Going Down. Anyone banking on Microsoft's promises to deliver Windows Mobile 7 on time by the end of 2009 should also consider the company's track record in delivering Windows Mobile updates. The company initially intended to get Windows Mobile 5 out next to Longhorn [Vista] in mid to late 2004. Windows Mobile 5 was actually released in May 2005, and Vista finally popped out “officially” at the end of 2006, although one couldn't actually buy it until it was relaunched to consumers in early 2007. Even after Microsoft “released” its subsequent Windows Mobile 6 nearly a year later (based upon the same underlying WinCE 5), it took six months or more for many of Microsoft's partners to approve it and set up distribution so that users could actually get the software on their phones. In contrast, Apple releases regular iPhone updates every month or two that are always available to users immediately after their release, directly from Apple. Microsoft doesn't exactly have years of leisure at its disposal. Windows Mobile has already been hit hard by competition from the iPhone and from other rivals, including RIM in the enterprise market and Symbian internationally. That competition has resulted in Microsoft's mobile market share slipping year over year. This year, Microsoft failed to meet its frequently repeated goal of selling “more than 20 million units” through all of its various hardware partners, and instead only sold 18 million. Microsoft senior vice president Andy Lees blew off the missed goal as a “rounding error.” He cited numbers from IDC that indicated Windows Mobile had grown from 11% to just under 13% of the worldwide market for smartphones, growing faster than the overall market, and that unit sales of Windows Mobile phones have both outpaced sales of BlackBerry phones and outsold the iPhone by a factor of two. Windows Mobile misses target Oops, Microsoft Fibbed a Bit There. Canalys reports that Microsoft actually started out with a 23% share of the smartphone market in Q1 2004, which fell to 18% in Q1 2005, then down to 12% in Q1 2006, where it remained in its Q4 2007 figures. Apple ranked at 7% worldwide in Q4 2007, but that was based on sales in one market, of one model, and on one mobile provider, after only being on the market for six months. Smart mobile device shipments hit 118 million in 2007, up 53% on 2006 (Canalys press release: r2008021) If the best Microsoft can do is to claim victory for selling twice as many phones as Apple, worldwide across all of its partners despite having a many years long head start and that great ecosystem of manufacturers behind it, then it should probably just not say anything. Incidentally, with the release of the iPhone 3G, AT&T is reporting having doubled its sales volumes, not to mention all of the other new markets the iPhone 3G is now being sold in worldwide, at half the price of the original model. Within just the US smartphone market, which was Apple's only market last year and is also Microsoft's strongest market for Windows Mobile, the iPhone grabbed a 27% share in its debut third quarter of 2007, and maintained a 28% share in the fourth quarter 2007, behind RIM with 41%, but ahead of Palm at 9%. Adding up all of the Windows Mobile manufacturers selling in the US, Microsoft could only claim to have its software on 21% of the phones sold, a significant step behind Apple. Canalys, Symbian: Apple iPhone Already Leads Windows Mobile in US Market Share, Q3 2007 iPhone Grabs 27% of US Smartphone Market Also, all of these figures bundle in all of the “convergence” Pocket PC mobile devices sold by Microsoft's partners, but none of the iPod touch units Apple sells, which are likely to be in well in excess of its iPhone sales. So Apple's mobile WiFi platform is actually far larger and growing much faster than market statistics companies report under their smartphone category. Anyone hoping that Windows Mobile 7 to going to reverse that trend when it arrives over a year from now is seriously delusional. Did you like this article? Let me know. Comment here, in the Forum, or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It's also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!
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50 Killer Mac Apps For Under $50
Who doesn't need more for less? We present 50 Mac|Life-approved applications--many free, all under $50--that'll guarantee you get the most from your Mac without traumatizing your wallet.The Internet is full of noise--countless different applications for every occasion, with reviews everywhere that love and hate them at the same time. While that’s hardly news, it’s still a hassle that isn’t going away. Say you picked up a spiffy new MacBook Pro, and it’s time to kit it out with the leanest, meanest software. After all, Macs have that rich history of garage-roots development, of a few folks in a basement brewing up quality software that smokes the big-name stuff. So you’ve got a feeling there’s great, affordable software just waiting for you to find it--and you’re right. But how do you sift through the zillion calendar apps and jillion media players to find the gems worthy of your hard drive space? And more importantly, your time and money?We’re here to help with a compendium of essential software. It didn’t come easily--we debated, argued, haggled, and even pleaded to secure a prized position on this list for our favorite, most useful applications. But by limiting the software we’re highlighting to 50, we’ve guaranteed you the best of the best--no Internet spew here. And by capping the cost of the software we’ve selected at $50, we’ve made sure you can reasonably buy what you need. You may love your Mac already, but you’re not gonna believe how much it can do once you load up even a few of these choice applications. EntertainmentSure, iPods and iTunes make music and movies easier to enjoy, but they're not without headaches of their own. That's where these awesome apps come in. They take the pain out of kicking back with your favorite flicks and tunes.Simplify MediaShare & stream your iTunes library over the Internet.The iPod has made several portable music formats obsolete, and we sure don’t miss schlepping around fragile cassette tapes or heavy wallets full of CDs. But even the mighty iPod has its limits--namely capacity. That’s where Simplify Media (free, Simplify Media, simplifymedia.com) comes in handy. It guarantees that the size of your music library doesn’t matter by letting you stream music between computers via the Internet. Yup, this app will play your entire library on any computer (as long as the one that has your library is powered up and online).Stream your tunes from home or the next cube.Once installed, a simple login fires up your music. Simplify Media works with iTunes just like the built-in LAN sharing does, and the remote libraries appear under Shared, alongside any local shared libraries. Even better, you can add up to 30 friends’ shared libraries, and an iPhone app ($5.99) lets you pipe your music to your iPhone or iPod touch.SuperSyncSuperSync keeps multiple iTunes collections in sync.Speaking of iTunes libraries--streaming is great, but what if you want to sync libraries across multiple Macs? SuperSync ($22, SuperSync, supersync.com) makes it so. Sure, Apple introduced limited music-transfer capabilities with Home Sharing in iTunes 9, but that feature requires computers to be on the same local network. SuperSync one-ups iTunes by syncing iTunes libraries over the Internet. It’s perfect for anyone who uses multiple Macs, and SuperSync also has a bunch of other tricked-out features. In deference to the record companies, Apple makes transferring music from an iPod to a computer unnecessarily difficult. SuperSync handles the task with ease, making it a bacon-saver when the hard drive in your Mac kicks the bucket. SuperSync will even allow you to sync libraries cross-platform.SuperSync's color-coded interface helps you synchronize your iTunes tracks across multiple Macs.VLC Media PlayerNever worry about video file types again. If most of your Mac video-watching happens in the form of DVDs or QuickTime movies, you probably don’t think too much about player software. But move beyond the most basic video types, and you’re asking for trouble. With the myriad formats, containers, and encoding parameters available, the simple act of playing back a cat video can become incredibly frustrating. VLC Media Player (free, VideoLAN, www.videolan.org) is like a Swiss Army knife for digital media. It’s open source and cross-platform, and the app will play back practically any audio or video file you throw at it. VLC also handles file conversions with ease, so you can use it to convert audio and video for use online or on portable devices.It plays, it converts, it makes toast (okay, maybe not that last one.)RipItBackup & convert DVDs with RipIt.There are plenty of legit reasons to rip a DVD. Backup copies of kids’ movies for the minivan, watching Glee on your iPod touch while you’re on the bus, or even just saving battery power on your laptop (playing back a file from a hard drive is much more efficient than spinning a DVD).RipIt's simple interface makes ripping DVDs seamless and easy.Once the domain of übernerds, DVD ripping is a one-click affair thanks to RipIt ($19.95, The Little App Factory, ripitapp.com). And since it makes full rips, all of the menus, bonus features, and subtitles remain intact. You can play back the resulting files with DVD Player on your Mac or use a freeware tool like Handbrake to convert your rips into iPod-friendly formats. Delicious LibraryWe love the iTunes Store, but we still end up accumulating books, DVDs, console games, and, yes, even CDs. Delicious Library ($40, Delicious Monster Software, www.delicious-monster.com) helps catalog your collections by--get this--taking snaps of UPCs via your webcam and then automatically organizing your meatspace content onto virtual shelves for easy sorting and browsing. You can track loans to friends, post items for sale on Amazon, and publish Web catalogs formatted for your iPhone. That way, you can avoid buying another copy of John Hodgman’s More Information Than You Require. Connect360We’re Apple-faithful, but that doesn’t stop us from engaging in a little Modern Warfare 2 on our Xbox 360. And since the 360 is much more than a simple gaming machine, we also use it to stream iTunes tracks to our entertainment center and view pictures from our iPhoto library on our HDTV--with the help of Connect360 ($20, Nullriver Inc, www.nullriver.com), that is. It works over wired or wireless networks, and it even streams H.264 video straight from our MacBook. Sweet! PeelPack rats, beware: Peel ($14.95, Hjalti Jakobsson, www.getpeel.com) can get really overwhelming, really fast. But if you’re an avid follower of music blogs, Peel can automagically grab new tracks as they’re posted. So forget all that pesky right-clicking and manually adding to iTunes. Just feed Peel a list of your favorite music blogs, and then kick back as tons of new, free tunes get downloaded straight to your Mac. You may never have to buy (or pirate) music again. CoverScoutCover Flow is one of those features that looks great in a demo but doesn’t quite translate at home. iTunes can attempt to find the album art that makes Cover Flow actually useful, but it’s limited in scope and can’t make fuzzy matches. CoverScout ($39.95, equinox USA, www.equinux.com) scours the Internet to find your missing album art and presents you with multiple options to let you choose the best images. Don’t Cover Flow without it. TuneUpFor all of those untitled and mistitled tracks in your music library, there’s TuneUp ($19.95/one year, $29.95/lifetime; TuneUp Media; www.tuneupmedia.com). Like CoverScout, TuneUp can find and download missing album art, but its best trick is cleaning up your ID3 tags--the artist, title, and album info displayed in iTunes. A quick search is all it takes to clear up all those Track 1s and Unknown Artists in your library. It sure beats cleaning up metadata by hand.Next Page: Productivity Apps >> ProductivityTakin' care of business, every day. Takin' care of business, every way. Workin' on a Mac, it's all right. This productivity software is workin' overtime.WriteRoomBlocks distractions so you can write in peace.Proving the tired adage that “less is more,” WriteRoom ($24.95, Hog Bay Software, www.hogbaysoftware.com) is a light text editor with a full-screen mode. Start a new document, and everything else fades away--your Dock, your menubar, and other windows on your Desktop. You’re left with a black screen and friendly green text for a clutter- and distraction-free experience. The Escape key toggles between full-screen mode and windowed mode, which resembles TextEdit with a live word count.WriteRoom can save your work as plain text, rich text, or Microsoft Word’s .doc format. The preferences offer tons of customization: auto-save, character counts, the appearance of text in full-screen mode, and more. But WriteRoom’s real magic is how it gets out of your way and lets you focus on what you’re doing.BusyCalOne calendar application to rule them all.BusyCal ($40, BusyMac, www.busymac.com) is iCal on steroids. It dances circles around iCal, chanting, “Everything you can do, I can do better.” And it’s right. Sharing is a snap: You can set up two-way syncing with your Google Calendar or with other BusyCal calendars on your local network or the wide-open Internet. But even aside from sharing, BusyCal offers tons of calendaring bells and whistles: customizable views, sticky notes, weather forecasts, moon phases, graphical icons, a to-do list, notes, tags, and much more. And since it uses the Sync Services built into Mac OS X, your BusyCal calendars can sync with MobileMe and your iPhone. You can even switch back to iCal anytime without losing any of the events or to-dos you entered in BusyCal.So what if iCal is free? BusyCal is better.ThingsFlexible to-do list syncs with iCal and the iPhone. For busy people like us, a good to-do list is beyond essential. But some that we’ve tried are so complicated that just managing your tasks becomes a chore in itself. So the light, easy-to-understand Things ($49.95, Cultured Code, www.culturedcode.com) is a breath of fresh air. You can go the full Getting Things Done route, adding contexts, priority levels, a tickler file, and so on. Or you can keep it simple, with one-off and repeating tasks and multistep projects. iCal syncing can get your deadlines on your calendar, and Things on the Mac can sync wirelessly with Things on the iPhone ($9.99 in the App Store). We’ve tried multiple task-managment systems, from Web-based ToodleDo to iPhone apps like ToDo to Mail’s built-in To-Do list to good old paper and pencil. Things is the cream of the crop for its good looks, quick entry, and easy syncing.Things uses tags to organize your projects in a million ways--or you can ignore the tags altogether and just work.Express ScribeTranscriptions made easy... well, easier.Transcribing an interview, lecture, or other recording is hard enough, just with the listening and typing. Toss in the extra arm movement as you frantically click from your text editor to your audio-playback application every time you want to pause the recording or rewind a few seconds, and your transcribing job just got tougher and more frustrating. Express Scribe (free, NCH Software, www.nch.com.au/scribe) lets you set system-wide hotkeys for audio playback so you can stay in your text editor, fully control the audio, and never need to reach for your mouse.Express Scribe can also slow down your audio without changing the pitch, supports video, works with lots of file types, loads recordings from analog or digital audio recorders, and more. Plus, it’s completely free. Wahoo!NoteBookThe Mac is silly with note-taking applications (Evernote, Yojimbo, ShoveBox, MacJournal…shall we go on?), but Circus Ponies’ NoteBook ($49.95, Circus Ponies, www.circusponies.com) is a standout. If you subscribe to “a place for everything, and everything in its place,” NoteBook can be the place for notes, Web clippings, bookmarks, documents, voice memos, photos, and more. It struts its flexibility with ready-made templates for planning a trip, writing a research paper, collecting recipes, keeping a journal, and so on, while its fun spiral-notebook interface is a nice touch. TextExpanderA thousand monkeys at a thousand typewriters could produce Hamlet a lot faster if they knew how to use TextExpander ($29.95, SmileOnMyMac, www.smileonmymac.com). This wonder app installs as a System Preferences pane and lets you define shortcuts for your most commonly used words and phrases. Abbreviate long URLs, your email signoff, even your own photo or scanned signature file. Then as you type those shortcuts, they’re automagically expanded to what you really wanted to say. Brilliant. iFinance 3Sure, Quicken is popular and Mint.com is free, but iFinance 3 ($29, Synium Software GmbH, www.synium.de) was built from the ground up just for Macs, and it shows. The intuitive interface makes it a cinch--dare we say a pleasure?--to track your accounts, keep an eye on your cash flow, set up a budget, and graph your expenses. It can also import from CSV and QIF files for easier data entry. Plus, a companion iPhone app lets you enter transactions on the go.FlexTimeThis charming timer app ($18.95, Red Sweater Software, www.red-sweater.com) lets you set up multistep routines that run once or repeat ad nauseam. Each step can be marked by a sound, spoken text, or even running a script. Once your routine is perfect, you can export the audio to iTunes--great for following a recipe’s carefully timed steps or taking your favorite yoga routines on the road. DEVONthink PersonalAnother great catch-all for storing, sorting, organizing, and searching information, DEVONthink ($49.95, DEVONtechnologies, www.devon-technologies.com) can take almost anything you can throw at it. Documents, PDFs, photos, multimedia files, bookmarks, webpages, iChat logs--all of those can be imported, sorted, and read right in DEVONthink. Searching is easy, and you can cobble together a brand-new document from items in your DEVONthink database and export it to your favorite text editor for printing or as HTML for posting. Next Page: Internet Apps >> InternetIt's a wild place, that Interweb, so there's nothing like a few primo apps to tame everything from blogging to FTPs to Twitter and Flash banners.TransmitTraveling the two-lane FTP highway.FTP has been around forever. Social networking and cloud computing may come and go, but FTP is in it for the long hall. Fortunately, there are a wealth of great FTP clients for the Mac, and the best of those is Transmit ($29.95, Panic, www.panic.com/transmit). The client utilizes a split directory window that shows the path on your computer and the path on the FTP site. With in-app search and the ability to sync folders on your Mac and on the FTP site, Transmit helps alleviate the search and drag-and-drop blues of other clients. The sync feature is especially helpful for Web developers and designers. You can even create desktop droplets for quick uploads to heavily used sites.Two-window FTP FTW.Mac-JournalWeb-based apps suck.Blogging about your life is a faux pas. Blogging about anything else that people actually care about is the proper way of utilizing of the blogging systems available out there. The ongoing problem is that most blogging platforms are bit of a pain to use because they’re Web-based. Plus, if you’re somewhere without Internet access, you can’t start laying out your blog posts for your site. MacJournal ($39.95, Mariner Software, www.marinersoftware.com) solves that problem with an easy-to-use multiplatform blogging client. Lay out your articles offline with images, video, and audio, then save them for later posting. The app includes the ability to both write in full-screen mode so you won’t be interrupted by your Twitter friends, and to record an audio podcast in the client.Create blog posts quickly and without browser issues.TweetieMulti-account Twitter action.After wowing the world with its iPhone Twitter app, atebits decided to release a desktop version of Tweetie ($19.95, atebits, www.atebits.com/tweetie-mac/). The app can handle multiple Twitter accounts, compose tweets in a separate window, allow you to change the account you’re sending a tweet from on the fly, and let you drag and drop pics and videos right into the Compose window. Don’t have the perfect media on your Mac for a tweet? Record a video or shoot a pic from your iSight camera directly in Tweetie. And since Twitter conversations can be difficult to follow, Tweetie displays the conversation you’re having in a timeline if you just double-click one of the pertinent tweets. The Tweetie bookmarklet in Safari also allows you to share links quickly from your browser.Have an actual conversation on Twitter with Tweetie.DropboxStop, drop, and roll on home.Transferring large files can be a huge pain. Where the hell did you leave that thumb drive? External hard drives leave an unsightly bulge in your pocket, and all those cables are always getting tangled in your shoes. That’s a safety hazard, son. Dropbox (2GB storage for free, 50GB for $9.99/month; Dropbox; www.dropbox.com) is a cloud-based storage drive that you can access from any computer or iPhone. Just pop files into the Dropbox folder on your Mac, and it automatically syncs up with the online disk (which you can view on Dropbox’s website) and with any other machines you have the application installed on. You can even share folders and files with other Dropbox users. If the free 2GB box doesn’t cut it, you can upgrade to 50GB for $10 a month.Access your files from anywhere in the universe (with an Internet connection).LogMeInIf you need to remotely access a Mac or (gasp) a PC with Windows on it, LogMeIn (free, LogMeIn, logmein.com) allows you to peer into your remote computer from anywhere. You can launch apps, move files, and adjust your preferences via a Web-based interface, as if you were sitting at that computer. For $29.99, you can get your iPhone in on the action too. TweetDeckIf you’re a Twitter power user, TweetDeck (free, TweetDeck, www.tweetdeck.com) should be in your arsenal of Twitter apps. The interface is a series of columns that displays info like your friends’ feeds, saved searches, mentions, direct mentions, and Facebook updates. You can also keep up with trending topics with just a quick glance. If there’s something you need to track on Twitter, TweetDeck can make a column for it. VuzeAllegedly, BitTorrent steals medication from senior citizens, but isn’t it time to forget about all the evil things it supposedly does? Instead, focus on the greatness of Vuze (free, Vuze, www.vuze.com) and its ability to download legally available video files. After you’ve done the downloading, Vuze can convert your files for use on the iPhone, Apple TV, iPod, Xbox 360, TiVo, and PlayStation 3. It’ll even stream videos to your set-top boxes. Nice! BannerZestCreating Flash banners is difficult, especially when you don’t know or own Flash. BannerZest ($49, Aquafadas, www.aquafadas.com) takes the pain out the process and gives you a simple way to create quick, beautiful Flash banners. From a standard gallery to an interactive experience, BannerZest comes with a collection of themes for different uses, and it uploads your banners to your FTP or MobileMe disk. FileChuteSending large files over email can result in the dreaded bounced email. FileChute ($17.95, Yellow Mug Software, www.yellowmug.com) works with your MobileMe-, FTP-, or WebDAV-accessible Web server. Drop your file into the app, and it uploads it to your online server of choice and then creates a URL to add to your email. If you drop more than one file, you get an archive uploaded to your server. Adios, bounced emails! Next Page: Content Creation Apps >>Content CreationSure, Adobe's stuff is the gold standard, but you don't want to have to count on a good night at the poker table to pay for it, right? Cue these killer applications, which let you effectively draw, edit photos, render, animate, and even scratch for a very fair price.djay 3Budgeted beats to grow on.You want to spin phat beats, but your slim bank keeps you from purchasing the high-end DJ equipment and software. That’s okay, young DJ-in-training, djay 3 ($49.95, algoriddim, www.djay-software.com) gives you everything you need to rock the house without losing your shirt. This surprisingly robust audio-mixing software integrates with your iTunes library and puts all the usual mixing and scratching right on your desktop. The application supports multitouch trackpad scratching and fading between tracks, so it’s especially perfect for the last few generations of MacBooks. And as you grow as a DJ, the application will grow with you thanks to its support for MIDI controllers. That means when you get the cash for those fancy digital mixers and turntables, djay will be right there with you.With your iTunes catalog at your fingertips, you'll find some pretty interesting mashups.AudacityFree audio editor extraordinaire.Audio editing seems simple at first. Then suddenly, you’re knee-deep in samples, frequencies, and bitrates. Sound editing really is part science, part black magic, so we’re thankful that Audacity (free, SourceForge, audacity.sourceforge.net) removes one of the biggest obstacles: choosing a quality application and figuring out how you’re going to pay for it. Audacity is both terrific and free, which is kinda hard to beat. An audio-recording and -editing application, it captures up to 16 channels at once from multiple sources, features noise removal, includes a metadata editor, and supplies unlimited undos. It can handle most of the audio files out there, and it’ll work with multiple files types in the same project. Audacity is also is cross-platform, so if you’re a recent Mac arrival, you may already know about its awesome power.So many features, you'll second-guess the price: free.SketchUp3D for you and me.Maya, 3D Studio Max, and SketchUp--all of these will let you create magical 3D worlds. Only one will do it for free, and you probably nailed it in one--it’s Google’s SketchUp software (free, Google, sketchup.google.com) that brings the world of 3D to the average Joe. You can create your own items or utilize Google’s 3D warehouse to find models created by other SketchUp users. With all those models at your fingertips, you can create floor plans for your home, build a level for your favorite FPS, or export the files to animation software or Photoshop. The application includes tutorials that’ll get you up and rendering in no time at all… so now nothing stands between you and virtual-world domination!Build a virtual man-cave for you and your stuff.RingerWham-bam ringtone, ma'am.We get tons of people asking us, “How do I make a ringtone for my iPhone?” Until recently, we told them to launch GarageBand, cut a ringtone, and export it to iTunes. Now we recommend Ringer ($15, Pixel Research Labs, pixelresearchlabs.com/ringer) as the quickest and easiest way to create ringtones from your favorite songs and audio files. Ringer has access to your entire iTunes library and works with MP3, AAC, MOV, MP4, M4V, and QuickTime files. Yeah, you can make a ringtone from a video file. A super-simple editor with waveform information makes it a snap to select the perfect section of audio, and you can fade in and out of the file and preview the ringtone before cropping it and sending it to iTunes for a sync with your iPhone. AcornUsing an image editor doesn’t have to cost you hundreds of dollars. In fact, with Acorn ($49.95, Flying Meat, www.flyingmeat.com/acorn), you’ll get features like layers, AppleScript support, 64-bit support, drawing, and filters in a package that’s easy on the wallet. This easy-to-use software strips away most of the features most people don’t use and gives you a clean image-editing tool. InkscapeWhile raster-based image editors like Photoshop are great at pushing pixels around, the vector-based drawing programs are where all the real action happens. The open-source application Inkscape (free, Inkscape, www.inkscape.org) is similar to powerhouses like Illustrator and CorelDraw, but with one important difference--it’s free. The app utilizes the Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) file format and includes a nice 3D drawing tool that allows you to set your vanishing points. ScreenflickWith Snow Leopard, Apple introduced screen-capture into QuickTime, and it’s a nice feature if you’re looking to make a quick full-screen screencast. But if you want something that has features like fixed location output at up to 60 fps, Screenflick ($25, Araelium Group, www.araelium.com/screenflick) is an application you can get behind. It’ll highlight mouse clicks and keyboard events, adding a nifty visual cue into your screencasts that highlights what you’re doing. BracketeerWhile your eye can take in an amazing range of light to dark, your camera cannot. In order to help create images that include a tonal range that the average camera can’t capture, HDR applications and plug-ins have appeared on the market. These applications take a series of images that have been bracketed from dark to light and combine them to include the darkest darks to the lightest lights in one HDR image. Bracketeer ($29.95, Pangea Software, pangeasoft.net/pano/bracketeer) is a standalone application that does just that. Adjust the saturation, the contrast, and exposure from within the application. The application will even auto-align your images in case you got the hiccups while taking your pics. iStopMotion 2 HomeMost animators’ first animation was probably a stop-motion piece with Star Wars action figures. And whether those childhood lightsaber battles have you hoping to become the next Brad Bird, or you just love the look of stop-motion, iStopMotion ($49, Boinx Software, www.boinx.com/istopmotion/overview) is a quick, easy way to create simple stop-motion animations. Use your iSight or connect a camera to your Mac and start making your own Wallace and Gromit short. You’ll feel the Force, Lu… sorry. Next Page: Utility Apps >>UtilitiesSlick utilities can add crucial functionality to your Mac, so we've selected the best options for everything from secure password managers and system-troubleshooting tools to an app that will let you play Windows games on your Mac... without Windows!AppZapperCompletely trash applications.Unlike using Windoze, installing and uninstalling apps on a Mac is painless. Drag an application’s icon into your Applications folder, and you’re pretty much good to go. Deleting them is just as simple--just grab them and toss them into the Trash. But if you’ve ever dug around Library or System folders on your Mac, you’ll see that even after you Trash an app, many of them leave crumbs in different parts of your machine. For cleaning up those last little bits, AppZapper ($12.95, Austin Sarner and Brian Ball, www.appzapper.com) is a must-have utility that’s also great for troubleshooting problems. Wiping out all of an application’s preferences and other random files can often turn a troublesome app into a perfectly behaved one after a clean reinstall. Completely remove unwanted applications with a simple drag and drop.HazelClean and organize your Mac--automatically.Hazel ($21.95, NoodleSoft, www.noodlesoft.com) is kind of like Rosie the Robot for your Mac. Or it’s like OS X’s Folder Actions… if they were super-awesome, easy to use, and perfect for helping you keep your Mac’s folders and files organized. Hazel installs as a pane in System Preferences, monitoring locations that you choose, and performs actions on files based on your criteria. By creating simple rules, you can delegate repetitive and annoying file-management tasks to Hazel--for example, automatically add downloaded MP3s to iTunes or move DMGs to an archive on an external drive. Hazel can delve deep into metadata for complex actions like copying images into subfolders by ISO settings or reorganizing music files according to bitrate. You can even set up simple rules for auto-deleting items that have been in the Trash longer than a certain amount of time.1PasswordKeep all your confidential info on lockdown.You’ve heard it before--secure, unique passwords are the way to go. Yet there you are, still using the same password for everything from your maclife.com login to your Gmail and your bank account. Do we even have to tell you again why that’s a colossally bad idea? 1Password ($39.95, Agile Web Solutions, agilewebsolutions.com) can help clean up your online act, creating and managing complex passwords for every online account and then logging you in with a keyboard shortcut. The app can also be used to securely store personal information like credit card numbers and addresses for use in Web forms. And since all of your passwords are unique, you won’t have to worry about your banking info being compromised because of a data breach at that sketchy Russian website you used to download MP3s for a penny.1Password securely stores Web passwords, logins, software licenses, and other important information.iPhone ExplorerStore & browse files on your iPhone.Breaking tradition with the iPods of yore, Apple doesn’t provide the ability to use your iPhone as a USB drive. iPhone Explorer (free, myPod Apps, www.mypodapps.com) is a simple app that will let you drag and drop files onto your phone for easy portability. The app itself is lightweight, and all it takes is a USB cable to view your iPhone’s folder structure. In addition to storing files, iPhone Explorer can be used to restore iTunes tracks from your iPod to a Mac or to rescue photographs from the depths of your iPhone’s memory. No jailbreaking is required, but more adventurous users with jailbroken phones can also recover contacts, messages, email, and other data. It’s a powerful tool, but it’s simple to use for the careful novice.AppleJackAppleJack (free, The Apotek, applejack.sourceforge.net) is one of those things you’ll install once and never think about again—if everything goes right. But if, god forbid, your Mac starts acting weird one day--or stops acting, period--it’ll be AppleJack to the rescue. It’s a command-line utility for diagnosing and repairing problems with your computer. Use the menu-driven system to repair permissions, validate preferences files, and remove screwy cache files.SuperDuperWith Time Machine built into OS X, there’s really no good reason not to have an automatic backup. But Time Machine has its limits--a big one being the lack of bootable backups. SuperDuper ($27.95, Shirt Pocket, www.shirt-pocket.com) easily handles creating and updating bootable clones of your Mac’s hard drive so you’ll be ready to go when disaster strikes. Just plug in your clone, restart, and you’re up and running again. CrossOver GamesPC fanboys like to slag the Mac for having fewer games, but with CrossOver Games ($39.95, CodeWeavers, www.codeweavers.com), Mac users--and Linux fans too--can easily play games coded for Windows machines. The list of officially supported games is hundreds deep, and since CrossOver is based on Wine, you don’t even need a copy of Windows just to play Team Fortress 2. Clean My MacHard drives are never big enough. Whether you have a MacBook Air or a Mac Pro, there always comes a point when there’s just not enough space on your internal disks. Clean My Mac ($29.95, MacPaw, macpaw.com) can help with that problem, scouring your Mac’s drive and tossing out all sorts of gunk you don’t need. Use it to toss unneeded language files, scrub extraneous code from universal binaries, and thoroughly clean up after deleted applications. rooSwitchOS X’s Fast User Switching is handy for juggling multiple user accounts and their corresponding settings, but rooSwitch ($19, Rocket, rooswitch.com) allows you to maintain different settings on a per-application basis. Use it to manage Home and Work browser profiles, for example, or to have different profiles in your word processor for writing or editing documents. rooSwitch works with nearly any application, and it supports Automator and AppleScript for the ultimate in customizability. Next Page: Wild Card Apps & Staff Picks >> Wild CardsNot all Mac apps fall into your neat little categories. These five break the mold and completely deserve a place on your hard drive.BricksmithVirtual bricks you can't lose or step on? Sold!Legos are the official plastic brick of Mac|Life--we’ve had many discussions about the empires we built in our childhood bedrooms and how much we miss “playing Legos” as the soulless adults we are today. Bricksmith (free, donations accepted; Allen Smith; bricksmith.sourceforge.net) lets you recapture the magic in a highly geeky way. It’s a 3D Lego-model creator, offering drag-and-drop construction using thousands of parts in every color of Lego’s rainbow. Tutorials and the one finished model that’s included show you the ropes, and once you’re done with your virtual creation, you can export step-by-step instructions to build it for real. There’s even a mini figure generator where you can design and outfit a matching Lego man and insert him into your model. This software couldn’t be cooler.We can't believe an application this sweet is donationware.CameraBag DesktopGive your photos a new identity or some old-timey charm.We named the iPhone version of CameraBag one of our “101 Essential Apps for 2008,” and now the same fun can be had on your Mac, thanks to CameraBag Desktop ($19, Nevercenter, www.nevercenter.com). You drag in a digital image, and the app re-creates the look of a real film photograph--choose from Helga, Lolo, Mono, 1962, 1974, Instant, Magazine, Cinema, or Colorcross.For more variations, click the Reprocess button, and all the options will change their look and coloring just slightly. Or check the Multi-filter box and experiment with adding multiple filters to a single photo. Of course, you can export your altered images back to your hard drive without affecting the original file. The novelty of taking an everyday digital snapshot and making it look like a Polaroid image or washed-out 1974 photograph never gets old.Your digital photos, plus extra personality.SousChefRecipe database + shopping list + cooking assistant = one kitchen lifesaver.SousChef ($30, Acacia Tree Software, acaciatreesoftware.com) edges out MacGourmet ($49.95, www.marinersoftware.com) in the cooking-assistant category for its cloud database of recipes. Every time a SousChef user enters a recipe (133,000-plus at press time), it’s synced to the cloud, and you can search those and import them into your own library. You can also opt out of sharing your own recipes so Aunt Erma’s secret matzo ball soup stays in the family.Once a recipe’s in your library, you can edit, print, email, or blog it--or even add its ingredients to your grocery list. Click the Cook button for a full-screen view of the instructions that you can read from across the room, keeping your Mac out of the splatter zone. The Mac’s built-in speech recognition lets you advance the recipe’s steps with your own voice, or you can use the Apple Remote or a Keyspan Front Row Remote.TemporisAttractive, drag-and-drop timelines make it easy to "show, don't tell."Everyone loves a good infographic, or at least geeky types like us do. (And the geeks shall inherit the earth, don’cha know?) Temporis ($24.99, Bartas Technologies, www.bartastechnologies.com) makes it easy to create neat-looking timelines on your Mac, which you can then print or export as PDF or TIFF files that are ready for importing into your presentation software, word processor, or page-layout app.Adding new events is just a Command-click away, and it’s a snap to drag the start and end dates around on the timeline. The Arrange button will automatically stagger your timeline’s events into the most logical and easy-to-read order, and the Inspector lets you tweak fonts, colors, titles, labels, and your timeline’s span and intervals. You can even export the event data separately as an XML or CSV file.Manga Studio Debut 4Create your own comics and manga, and even manga-fy your photos.Manga Studio Debut 4 ($49.99, Smith Micro, my.smithmicro.com) is a must-have for fans of Japanese manga or anyone who wants to make their own comic books. Its ingenious Beginner’s Assistant groups together the tools by processes so you can intuitively wind your way through a typical manga workflow: sketch, panel, draw, tone, and add character dialogue.You can scan or draw your own art (graphics tablets supported, natch), play with the included samples, purchase manga content from www.contentparadise.com, or even import your own digital photos and watch Manga Studio make them all comicky-looking. Draw speed lines, add dialogue bubbles, move your pages around, and then print or export your finished comic book. Manga Studio Debut 4 is the younger brother to professional-level Manga Studio EX 4 ($299.99), but Debut has plenty of advanced features too, including layers, templates, customizable patterns, and more.Mac|Life Staff PicksBass TunerI’m a beginning bass player--like, very beginning. So it’s a huge help that I don’t have to worry about staying in key. This terrific, simple, and streamlined little app ($9, www.rustykat.com) lets me quickly get in tune in front of my MacBook using the built-in mic. With that necessity sorted, I can fire up some tracks and tablature and focus on struggling to play along.MultiwiniaMultiwinia ($19, www.ambrosiasw.com) offers crazy replayability. You devise a strategy for your stick-figure army, then watch them take on up to four other teams in six game types on 40 vector-graphic maps. Online multiplayer against Mac and Windows players works flawlessly and keeps me coming back for more. No Napoleon complex necessary. MetaXIf you need to tag a large amount of MP4 files, you could use iTunes’ painfully slow process. Instead I found MetaX (free, www.kerstetter.net) for all my tagging needs. The app will search the IMDB catalog and plug the information into the appropriate fields, then share that info via tagChimp. You can even scan DVD barcodes via iSight! BeanFor a word dork like me, word processors are a big deal. Bean (free, www.bean-osx.com) is a lightweight, open-source word processor. It’s missing many of the blinky lights and thingamajigs of the big boys, and that’s exactly the point. Fewer distractions equals better writing, faster. And for anyone who needs to hit a certain length, the live word count rocks. FluidI often find that Firefox has the tendency to crash when I have too many Web applications running. But Fluid (free, fluidapp.com) lets me create a site-specific browser out of my most essential websites, like Google Docs and Flickr. Simply plug in the URL, and voilà! You have a separate application running that won’t go down if something else does. Next Page: More Gaming Bang for 50 Bucks >> More Bang for 50 BucksSome of the Mac's best games are also its cheapest? Sweet!Fifty bones won’t buy you even one new Xbox 360 or PS3 game, but on the Mac, you can snap up a stack of premier games for less than that. Or at least, that was our theory when we gave Florence, our new associate online editor, 50 whole American dollars and asked her to max out her Mac with the best gaming that short stack of money could buy. Man, did she score--check out the results of her diligent “research.”Plants Vs. Zombies$16, amazon.comLine up perilous peashooters and sun-soaking sunflowers against an abominable horde of zombies in Plants vs. Zombies.This animated tower-defense favorite pits you against a horde of zombies with one thing on their (decaying) minds--invading your home for brains! Pit your arsenal of zombie-fighting plants, each with their own spectacular organic weaponry, against 26 zombies and 50 levels of adventure. Fair warning: Once you start playing this excellent game, it’s incredibly hard to stop. World of Goo$10, amazon.comStack up adorable globs of goo to build structures and watch them band together as you help transport them across various levels.World of Goo is another addictive and totally adorable puzzle game. Created around the idea that circular goo balls make adequate building materials (naturally), the game has you solving puzzles by dragging and dropping goo to create all kinds of crazy structures that enable you to transport your goo across the level. The oh-so-cute googly-eyed blobs pack the game with charm, and you can also connect online and play against other Goo architects around the world.Braid$15, playgreenhouse.comBraid's aesthetically appealing backdrop and profound storyline will keep you engrossed until the very end.Some games defy description, and Braid might be easy to pass over because it appears to be just a mix of platforming and time control set against a gorgeous backdrop. But it subverts and transcends those two well-worn clichés with brilliant design and an absorbing story that packs a twist that you’ll never see coming. Watch the YouTube videos if you need help solving its puzzles, but just make sure you see this masterpiece through to the end.Balcassa$8, openplanetsoftware.comBalcassa has a mountain of exciting brainteasers for the puzzle fiend.Balcassa feeds off those nightmares you still have about attempting to master that archaic, rainbow-colored Rubik’s cube. And while most of you probably never cracked the damn thing (we didn’t!), Balcassa gives you a second chance. The objective of the game is to slide the cubes into a specific sequence, pattern, or orientation. It may sound like a simple task, but much like fiddling with a Rubik’s cube, figuring it all out is the real reward.Freeware FunIf you’re interested in first-person shooters and MMORPGs, Quake Live and Second Life can give you hours of entertainment at our favorite price: $0.00. Both games perform smoothly on Mac OS 10.4 or later. Quake Live doesn’t require beefy hardware because it runs through your Web browser. But that doesn’t stop it from delivering all the fast-paced action of the classic first-person shooter. Second Life, while not as packed with storyline as World of Warcraft, offers a similar massively multiplayer world where you can meet people, customize your character’s look, and participate in a virtual world that’s just like our own. You don’t even have to watch the clock to make sure you’re on time for a player-versus-player raid!You don't need fancy computer hardware to frag your way through this beloved shooter.Vital Statistics on Our 50 Killer AppsTotal cost if you bought all 50 apps: $1219.83Number of apps that are free: 13Apps that have an iPhone counterpart: 15Whaddaya waiting for? (apps that have a free demo): 39Number of countries these apps were born in: 7Apps named "iSomething": shockingly... just 3!Apps that require Snow Leopard: 1Apps that require Leopard: 14Apps that promise "iLife integration!": 9
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Will Windows Mobile Play DOS to Apple's iPhone?
Daniel Eran Dilger Today's broad array of smartphone operating system contenders are offering lots of potential answers to a problem that only requires one. It appears the market has two options ahead: either pool generic hardware makers behind a single operating system and deliver a smartphone marketplace that resembles the Windows PC market, or watch them fall to a dominant leader and have a smartphone market that resembles Apple's iPod ecosystem. This decision isn't going to be made by a class of intellectual elite, or by government mandate. it's going to be made by the market itself. Here are the factors that will influence the outcome, either marginalizing Apple's iPhone into a niche as the company has twice experienced previously at the hands of DOS in 1981 and Windows in 1991, or positioning it as the dominant leader as Apple has achieved for itself with the iPod since 2001. The first segment in this series will look at Windows Mobile as a possible “DOS-attack” against Apple's iPhone. Subsequent segments will look at Google's Android, Nokia's newly opened Symbian, and other mobile contenders challenging the iPhone. Will the iPhone Meet its Match from a Modern Day DOS? This All Happened Before… But Things Have Changed. It's easy to try to predict the future with the help of hindsight. However, while we know history keeps repeating, events always do so in slightly different ways that keep us surprised, as anyone who has tried to salvage fashion and wear it again a generation later has found. In this case, we have two historical events serving as potential foreshadowing events. Which will win out: a DOS model or the iPod model? Windows Enthusiasts had been confidently praying for Microsoft's Windows Media platform to save them from the iPod ever since Apple released its music player. When the PlaysForSure world came crashing down, they rushed to support Microsoft's own solo attempt to compete against the iPod with Zune. Things really got ugly when the iPhone arrived. Meditative prayers for deliverance from the iPod turned into incessant voodoo chanting against the iPhone, accompanied by spirited dancing around the truth and needling attacks. Philip Solis of ABI Research shifted his attention from conducting interviews that suggested a mass Zune migration to issuing reports denying that the iPhone was a smartphone at all by his own definition. Rob Enderle jumped from hopeful optimism for the Zune (“Microsoft is trying to encompass Apple and turn them into a bit player. The strategy is brilliant, but the question is can they execute?”) to angry condemnation of the iPhone, calling it “damned” and “not a good phone” months before he had ever even touched one. Enderle is now serving as a consultant to Dell's plans to resurrect its failed “DJ Ditty,” and offering up opinions on how to compete with the iPod, despite having no experience in guiding companies into competition apart from a long career of cheerleading Microsoft's monopoly position, which was devoid of any functional competitors. Mike Elgan initially wrote that the Zune “scares Apple to the core,” and was confident that Microsoft would “leverage the collective power of Windows XP, Windows Vista, Soapbox (Microsoft’s new ”YouTube killer“) and the Xbox 360” to kill Apple's iPod business. After the Zune failed and the iPhone took off, Elgan complained that Apple was “arrogant” and “the new Microsoft” and needed to be stopped. Since then, Microsoft has canceled XP, Vista has floundered, Soapbox went nowhere, an the Xbox 360 has done nothing to advance Zune sales. Paul Thurrott similarly called iTunes a dangerous monopoly despite the wide open market for iPod alternatives, and warned “Apple should be stopped before the abuses get too great and harm too many consumers.” However, Thurrott himself has chosen to bravely negotiate those dangers and use iTunes, iPods, the iPhone, and pays for MobileMe. He celebrates his use of Apple products in front of Mac users, and then bad mouths them in his Windows-oriented blogs. Lately he has been increasingly unable to find anything good to say about the Zune or Windows Mobile either, however. More Absurd iPhone Myths: Third Party Software Panic Mac OS X vs Linux: Third Party Software and Security Arrogance Unleashed: The Foul Stench of Computerworld’s Mike Elgan Forrester Research: Epic Terror of iTunes and Apple TV Windows Mobile is Not the DOS You're Looking For. Even the most devoted, hardcore fans of the Zune and Windows Mobile are having a hard time praising their current incarnations. The next version of each, both of which promise to address their huge gap in functionality compared to the iPhone and iPod touch, is scheduled for late 2009 or 2010. That is an eternity away, particularly considering that the iPhone went from rumor to 2.0 over the same period of time. A year and a half from now, the iPhone will be splitting atoms and curing cancer (so to speak). While Apple has received some appropriate criticism for releasing iPhone 2.0 with considerably less stability and polish than the original iPhone 1.x software, updates improving the situation have been released regularly, with two just in the last month. Windows Mobile users are lucky if they get a minor bug fix once a year, and many users have to wait months after an update is released before their hardware manufacture or mobile provider approves the update for download. The original iPhone also had some teething problems that were quickly addressed in a series of regular updates over its first six months on the market. In comparison, Windows Mobile has been out for over half a decade. It has not only rarely received updates, but has never performed admirably. It is known for poor battery life, rampant instability, and a poor development architecture that is well behind the iPhone's Cocoa Touch frameworks. Over the last two years, Apple delivered eleven updates to the iPhone OS compared to two from Microsoft, despite the fact that Apple only sold the iPhone over three fourths of that period. Over the next two years, Apple will likely ship another dozen updates while Microsoft only plans to ship one: Windows Mobile 7 DOS Model Problems. In addition to the faults of Windows Mobile that can be directly blamed upon Microsoft, there are also serious flaws within the model for selling a universal operating system across a number of hardware devices. The “DOS model” has demonstrated problems for PC makers, but in a mobile device, those problems have even greater significance. Microsoft is troubled with having to support a wide range of Windows Mobile phones that all support different features. PDA-style “Pocket PC” Windows Mobile devices use a larger stylus tap screen, while “Windows Mobile Smartphones” such as the Motorola Q, only provide a tiny screen with no touchscreen capacity. Also, only a few Windows Mobile phones have an accelerometer, or WiFi, or GPS, and the camera in each is unique. These hardware differences complicate developers' ability to release software that takes advantage of the features of each phone appropriately. Should a game provide accelerometer controls that only work on a few Windows Mobile phones? Should a document viewer application attempt to take advantage of a larger, interactive tap screen or try to cram into a tiny screen driven only by hardware buttons? The iPhone has one screen interface and a single set of hardware features for developers to target. While new iPhone models will eventually broaden those features, Apple will be managing the transition, and has the power to deliver software that abstracts different abilities seamlessly, just as it has on the Mac. For example, location services on the iPhone 3G works identically to those on the original iPhone apart from lacking GPS, and the iPod touch works the same way despite only being able to use WiFi to find its location. Developers don't have write to a specific profile, they simply ask the device for a location and the software uses the hardware available. Supporting devices from different manufactures all trying to differentiate themselves is simply far more difficult. Wait, Stop, Come Back. Microsoft's core inability to deliver a decent mobile operating system after a decade of trying, on top of the fact that supporting a wide variety of hardware is simply more difficult to pull off compared to Apple's integrated model, makes it simply hard to make the case that Microsoft will float out a third generic platform to overtake the smartphone industry following its DOS and Windows for the PC, both of which were actually more the product of fortunate positioning and existing market power. In reality, while Microsoft talks up its plans to take over the smartphone market, Windows Mobile has been dramatically losing market share among smartphones despite having taken over the software reigns at Palm and snuffing out the Palm OS to take its position as heir to the Treo dynasty. The Windows desktop monopoly has done nothing to shore up Windows Mobile's declining market share, which according to Canalys has slipped from 23% in 2004 to around 12% today. Instead, Apple rose to match and then exceed Microsoft's market share among smartphones in the US within just three months of sales. It not only maintained its lead in the US, but with the release of the iPhone 3G appears to have caught up to Microsoft's entire worldwide shipments across all of its providers in its first weeks on going on sale. Microsoft’s Zune, Vista, and Windows Mobile 7 Strategy vs the iPhone DOS and Windows Then… When Apple released its Macintosh in 1984, the IBM DOS PC had already captivated the market and was widely established. The majority of PCs being sold had already migrated away from CP/M and other DOS competitors, leaving Apple to compete against a strongly entrenched platform led by the much larger IBM, which had monopolized business machines for decades prior to entering the new personal computing market. Apple also had a severe price premium to overcome when selling against DOS PCs (most of which were sold with a fraction of the RAM or graphics capabilities of the Mac), and Apple itself was doing a poor job of marketing the Mac, with CEO John Sculley choosing to promote “Apple II forever” while Jean-Luis Gassée pulled plans to push Macs in business and targeted the high end desktop publishing niche instead. When Microsoft began successfully promoting Windows in 1991, it was selling to that same DOS PC audience, which had only become further entrenched over the last eight years. The Mac was already hammered into a tight niche and Apple had done little to advance its technological lead over the PC. On top of all that, Apple had handed Microsoft a wide open license to use its Mac interface conventions, and then embroiled itself in unsuccessful litigation to undo the damage. By the time Windows began shipping broadly, Sculley was focused on his political career while Gassée was getting ready to start his own company. Mac Office, $150 Million, and the Story Nobody Covered Jean-Louis Gassée Returns from Obscurity… to Talk About MobileMe … and the iPhone Now. Today, the circumstances are wildly different. Windows Mobile does not enjoy any dominant position in the US (where RIM is far ahead) or worldwide (where Nokia is leading by a dramatic margin). Competition between Windows Mobile and other alternatives has left Microsoft's product looking unattractive outside of a few niche markets among Microsoft IT shops, many of whom are now considering the iPhone instead. The iPhone has broad appeal leveraging Apple's iPod, Mac, and retail store successes. Apple is actually marketing its products effectively now through its own retail stores. AT&T and other mobile partners are also working to sell the iPhone because it generates more money for them; ten years ago, Apple could barely get retailers to stock its products, let alone market them. Not only are Apple's sales outpacing those of Windows Mobile devices, but users are now browsing the web four times more frequently from the iPhone than from Windows Mobile. Apple not only has a huge mindshare and technical lead, but has a co-development platform spanning the Mac desktop and the iPod touch handheld that shares technology with the iPhone. While Microsoft sells some Pocket PC PDAs lacking mobile service that are not counted in its smartphone market share, Apple sells a vast number of iPod touch devices that likely outnumber sales of the iPhone by a wide margin, and those are similarly not counted in Apple's smartphone market share. Considering the entire WinCE platform, which includes Windows Mobile Smartphones, Pocket PC (mobile and non-mobile), Zune, and other PlaysForSure licensed Portable Media Center devices, Microsoft's influence over handheld devices is insignificant compared to Apple's with the iPod and iPhone, despite the fact that the iPhone and the iPod touch are barely a year old. In the US, where Apple sold the majority of its iPhones in 2007, it outflanked all Windows Mobile sales in its first quarter of sales. A Better DOS than MS-DOS. Who will pick up the torch Microsoft has dropped? The most likely contender may be Google's Android. Microsoft's leading Windows Mobile partner HTC certainly thinks so, as it is hedging its bets to become a member of Android's Open Handset Alliance. Can Android play DOS to the iPhone for commodity smartphone hardware manufacturers, and will Google end up with a Microsoft-like role among phone makers? The next article will take a look. Did you like this article? 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