Will Google's Android Play DOS to Apple's iPhone?

Daniel Eran Dilger Today's broad array of smartphone operating system contenders are offering lots of potential answers to a problem that only requires one. It appears the market has two options ahead: either pool generic hardware makers behind a single operating system and deliver a smartphone marketplace that resembles the Windows PC market, or watch them fall to a dominant leader and have a smartphone market that resembles Apple's iPod ecosystem. This decision isn't going to be made by a class of intellectual elite, or by government mandate. it's going to be made by the market itself. Here are the factors that will influence the outcome, either marginalizing Apple's iPhone into a niche as the company has twice experienced previously at the hands of DOS in 1981 and Windows in 1991, or positioning it as the dominant leader as Apple has achieved for itself with the iPod since 2001. The third segment in this series looks at Google's Android and the Open Handset Alliance as a possible “DOS-attack” against Apple's iPhone. Subsequent segments will look at Nokia's newly opened Symbian and other mobile contenders challenging the iPhone. Will the iPhone Meet its Match from a Modern Day DOS? Will Windows Mobile Play DOS to Apple’s iPhone? Will Google's Android Play DOS to Apple's iPhone? Will Symbian Play DOS to Apple's iPhone? Google Acquires Android. In 2005, Google purchased a startup named Android, which had been in business for nearly two years. The secretive startup was known only to be working on software for mobile phones. It was being run by a who's who of mobile industry veterans, including Andy Rubin, the founder of Danger. Rubin had earlier worked at WebTV along with Chris White and Andy McFadden, both of whom had also joined Android. Richard Miner of Orange and Nick Sears of Tmobile also brought their mobile provider experience to Android. At the time of the acquisition, Google didn't announce any plans for Android and instead only told BusinessWeek, “We acquired Android because of the talented engineers and great technology. We're thrilled to have them here.” It appeared that Google was only going to be expanding its search services for mobile phone users, along the lines of the Google SMS answer system it had recently released. Google Buys Android for Its Mobile Arsenal - BusinessWeek Windows XP Media Center Edition vs Apple TV: The Fall of WebTV The GPhone Myth. As reports began to leak out about talks between Google and hardware makers throughout 2007, rumors began to fly about “the GPhone,” a competitive offering that was supposed to take on the iPhone. Some phone enthusiasts hoped Google would jump in to rescue the struggling OpenMoko project and turn it into a viable project that could attack Apple's new smartphone. In October 2007, I printed the Great Google GPhone Myth, taking apart the idea that Google would be directly competing against the iPhone, and describing that Google was really working on a free alternative to Windows Mobile as a conduit for getting its search and related services on a broader variety of mobiles. Google's services were already on the iPhone. In November, Google played its hand: it had organized a consortium of companies called the Open Handset Alliance to develop open standards for mobiles. The first product from the group would be Android, a mobile operating system built on the Linux kernel. Google wasn't getting into the phone handset business at all; it was only making sure that its mobile search products would not risk being marginalized by the threat of Windows Mobile on phones in the same way Microsoft had been working to leverage its PC monopoly to push Google search off the Windows desktop. The Great Google gPhone Myth Introducing Android: Leader of Linux. Two weeks later, Google released an early version of the Android software. On top of a Linux kernel, Android uses a specialized version of a Java Virtual Machine that takes Java language code and turns it into what Google calls “Dalvik bytecode” rather than Java bytecode as a standard JVM would. This allows Google to leverage existing and familiar Java language tools without paying Sun for a Java license. Like Mac OS X and its fraternal iPhone OS, Android includes a variety of open source libraries, including SQLite and WebKit. On top of that, Google developed a series of frameworks that handle the tasks Cocoa Touch does on the iPhone. Android also bundles a set of applications. While Apple adapted its existing Mac OS X to work in a mobile environment to create the iPhone OS, Android is more like a customized Java environment running on a specialized mobile Linux variant: elements of maturity in an otherwise experimental new platform. What is Android? -Google Android was by no means the first mobile OS using Linux. Both Palm and its amputated ACCESS software arm have Linux-based mobile platforms. Nokia has Maemo, which it uses in its Internet Tablets, and also recently acquired Trolltech and its Qtopia mobile Linux platform. Motorola has teamed up with MontaVista Software to use its Mobilinux. Intel created the Moblin project for mobile Linux, aimed at Internet devices. Google's OHA also isn't the first consortium to attempt to standardize a mobile Linux platform. The OSDL started the Mobile Linux Initiative to define requirements for hardware; the Consumer Electronics Linux Forum (CELF) then worked to define various phone profiles aimed at the Japanese market; the Linux Phone Standard (LiPS) Forum tried to do the same thing in Europe. In 2007, LiPS was folded into the new LiMo Foundation, along with the OSDL. All of these committees have had some overlap and some complementary features. Several of Google's OHA partners are also LiMo members, including NTT DoCoMo, Wind River, and Motorola. So why didn't Google just join LiMo? “LiMo, very candidly, wasn't moving fast enough,” OHA board member John Bruggeman told CNET. Google hopes to herd the Linux cats into a progressive, structured platform that can battle against Symbian and Windows Mobile to succeed as the new DOS of smartphones. Will Google fracture or unify mobile Linux? The Presumption of the Necessity of DOS. The previous segment examining Windows Mobile pointed out how the PC industry as a whole assumed that Microsoft's desktop Windows monopoly would easily take over dominance in the MP3 player market, pushing Apple into a niche position. This was expected because DOS had pushed Apple's early computers into a reduced role starting in 1981, and Microsoft had repeated this again in 1991 when the DOS world migrated to Windows, effectively pruning Apple's Macintosh into a Bonsai platform. The inability of one company to dominate any product category has been frequently repeated by PC industry pundits as a given, despite the fact that history is full of examples of this happening. Sony dominated personal music players for two decades under the Walkman brand even while equally large competitors tried to push it from this position; Nintendo has similarly owned handheld gaming despite ill-fated efforts to grab a piece of its pie by products running a generic platform such as Microsoft's WinCE (Gizmondo), Linux (GP32), and Symbian (N-Gage). In fact, outside of the Windows/DOS PC, there are actually few examples of a generic platform taking over an industry. Nearly every other consumer-facing product uses proprietary platforms: car makers, stereo equipment, appliances and so on typically all use designs custom to their maker. The paradox of the Windows PC market has been that Microsoft's broadly licensed software supposedly saves hardware makers from investing in software development while ensuring compatibility, when in reality it adds significant costs to PC makers while limiting their ability to differentiate themselves. That explains why PC makers have been perpetually merging together and going out of business while Microosft has rolled in money over the last two decades. Parallel efforts to copy Microsoft in broadly licensing an operating system have regularly failed: IBM's OS/2, Apple's Mac OS, Palm's PDA OS, even Microsoft's own efforts to duplicate Windows dominance in other markets, from copy machines to PDAs to smartphones to SPOT watches to music players. The closest copy may be Symbian, but its customers are partners, not simply consumers of a generic third party's operating system as Windows licensees are. That indicates it is not necessary to duplicate the dominance exercised by Microsoft over the PC industry in the smartphone market. Google's Android and Symbian exist more as technology sharing pacts among manufacturers, but both aspire to take Microsoft's DOS role among smartphones. However, the idea that Apple's iPhone must be dethroned by a modern-day DOS, whether Windows Mobile, Android, or Symbian, is not just debatable, but does not sync with the reality of more recent events. Apple's recent history of the iPod further refutes the idea that a software analog to Microsoft is needed. The iPod Emergence: Apple & Pixo vs IBM & Microsoft. Apple's iPod in 2001 made no effort to clone the DOS business model; it actually did the opposite. When Apple entered the market, there were a number of existing MP3 devices using custom software, hardware designs, and DRM codecs. The iPod used off the shelf components to deliver a custom MP3 player using third party software, but Apple also added its own technologies: easy to use sync with iTunes, a fast Firewire interface that made uploading music far faster than the prevailing USB 1.0, and an attractive industrial design. With the iPod, Apple played the role of IBM in 1981, using Pixo's embedded operating system to enter the market quickly, just as IBM had used DOS. The difference was that Apple didn't direct any market attention toward Pixo and added a lot of value on top of that core embedded OS. A modern day Compaq couldn't simply clone the hardware and license Pixo to run on it in order to compete against the iPod, because the iPod was much more than just generic hardware running Pixo software. As the iPod developed, Pixo's role diminished and was eventually displaced. Just like IBM, Apple jumped into a new market just as demand was beginning to explode. Apple made MP3 players far more attractive to a general audience by delivering greater playback capacity than most entry level devices offered, along with an ease of use that encouraged buyers to jump in at the higher end of the market. That left Apple with not only the lion's share of the market, but also by far the most profitable segments of the market. Two decades prior, IBM badly fumbled its play with the early PC and ended up irrelevant in the PC world by the late 80s, sideswiped by Microsoft's DOS and the cloners who were licensing it in parallel, notably Compaq and later HP and Dell. Steve Jobs had witnessed that happen, and was determined to not let it happen again to Apple. Rather than being manipulated by a software middleware vendor as IBM had, Apple worked to incrementally develop the iPod market itself. After consuming the hard drive-based player market, Apple took on the Flash RAM-based market with a tiny hard drive system used in the iPod Mini, and followed up with Flash-based devices of its own in the Nano and Shuffle. This allowed Apple to progressively serve an increasingly wider market, incrementally growing upon an established foundation. With the iPod, Apple became, in effect, an IBM with its own internal Microsoft. Microsoft's Failure Despite Features. In contrast, Microsoft entered the music player market by promoting music player hardware reference designs around WinCE. However, it was unable to ship a finished design until the iPod had become firmly established around 2005. Later branded as PlaysForSure, the devices were sold by various hardware makers and all purported to support the same DRM and the same music subscription services while also offering a broader array of hardware that presented video before the iPod did, supported wireless before the iPod, and so on. Despite these unique features, all of those PFS designs still failed. Microsoft blamed the failure of PFS upon its music store and hardware partners and decided to take Apple on itself in 2006. It relaunched a Toshiba PFS player as its own device under the Zune brand, adding WiFi music sharing features and a larger display than the current Pods had. It failed dramatically as well. Did Microsoft's attempts to float a new DOS among music players fail because of Apple's success, or due to Microsoft's own problems? The failure of the Zune, which followed the iPod model rather than the DOS model, seems to suggest that Microsoft itself was to blame. Consider too that Microsoft's Windows Mobile phones, which use the same underlying operating system as its failed PlaysForSure music players and the Zune, had similarly flopped even before Apple could release a charismatic phone equivalent to the iPod. Of course, when the iPhone was released, it hit Windows Mobile hardest. The iPhone made Windows Mobile Smartphones look ridiculous and underpowered, and made Windows Mobile Pocket PC phones look clumsy and awkward, despite the fact that they both supported a variety of features the iPhone didn't, including the ability to edit documents, capture video, send MMS, and so on. Simply adding on features did not enable Microsoft to compete against Apple. The only conclusion that can be drawn from all this is that competing against Apple requires more than just having a feature arsenal. Microsoft's failures in themselves do not necessarily mean that Google's Android will fail in its attempts to float its own smartphone platform. Why Microsoft’s Zune is Still Failing Microsoft’s Zune, Vista, and Windows Mobile 7 Strategy vs the iPhone Will Google Succeed where Microsoft Failed? Microsoft's demonstrated inability to successfully enter consumer markets for MP3 players and smartphones has given observers little faith that the company will somehow turn things around in late 2009 when its next generation of devices are expected to be released. However, prior to that the first fruits of Google's efforts to build its own smartphone operating environment will arrive. Will Google's Android take over Microsoft's crown as the “DOS vendor” among smartphones? Supporters of Google's Android project point to some parallels between Android for smartphones and Windows on the PC: Android will allow hardware makers to differentiate in ways that can offer features Apple can't (or doesn't want to); it should allow software developers to offer features Apple does not allow on the iPhone; it embraces open, hobbyist experimentation in ways that Apple currently isn't; and it opens the potential for content providers that Apple is not interested in allowing. Openness is Android's key competitive feature. Will all this openness allow Google to unseat the iPhone to become the primary platform developers want to participate in, and subsequently soak up the market for third party hardware makers that Windows Mobile serves? While Google currently has no market share due to the fact that no Android phones have yet shipped, it does have broad vocal support from a variety of the same kinds of hardware manufacturers that supported DOS and Windows and helped to make those platforms successful in the desktop PC market. HTC and Android. The first Android phone is expected to be the HTC Dream; Taiwan's HTC (High Tech Computer) also manufactures Palm's Treo Pro phone as well as many of the most visible Windows Mobile devices. In addition to models produced under its own name, HTC also sells Windows Mobile devices under the Dopod brand, as well as no-name phones branded by providers, such as AT&T, Orange, Sprint, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless, Vodafone, and others. HTC will also be building the XPERIA X1 Windows Mobile phone for Sony Ericsson. HTC was quick to throw its support behind Android despite its long term alliance with Windows Mobile. Why would it so enthusiastically support an unproven platform from a company that has no experience in consumer hardware platforms? One can only assume that HTC is not happy with the current state of Windows Mobile, and desperately wants another “DOS” to succeed where Microsoft's has so spectacularly failed. As an Original Design Manufacturer for Palm, HTC watched as Palm adopted Windows Mobile in place of the Palm OS and subsequently fell even deeper into crisis. Palm's only successful phone since has been its Palm OS-based Centro. HTC undoubtedly sees Android as its ticket to becoming the next Dell, but without a similar dependance upon Microsoft. Android for mobile phones is essentially playing the role of Linux for PCs, except that it has the backing of a major company behind it. Can Android Take on the iPhone with Openness as its Feature? As great as this sounds, it's important to consider that Linux on the desktop has made no significant progress in eating into Windows dominance after a decade of trying. Being open, free, flexible, and decentralized hasn't been enough of an advantage to get consumers to migrate from Windows to Linux in any fraction of significance. Similarly, in the music business, Linux-based MP3 players have had no impact on the iPod, despite offering more features, flexibility, support for additional codecs, and so on. In the mobile phone area, Linux enjoys a sizable portion of the smartphone market, but this is almost entirely due to phones sold by Motorola in China, where the advantages of Linux' openness are void. Motorola's Linux phones offer nothing to users in terms of openness or flexibility, and are really no different in terms of features than other appliance 'feature phones' based upon closed operating systems. And again, a key problem with assaulting Apple in a feature war is that neither the iPod nor the iPhone became popular by being “highly featured.” They both delivered perhaps 80% of the functionality found in all other devices in the market. Rather than trying to match every feature and cater to every niche as Microsoft had with Windows Mobile, Apple's devices did a few things very well at launch, and incrementally developed into full featured devices that still lack some of the more unique features of their competitors. Further, in terms of openness, the demographic that embraces Linux' characteristic freedoms is not the same as the demographic that buys smartphones in quantity and then pays for data service. This is a critical fact to consider because a big part of the iPhone's success stems from the fact that it is being pushed by mobile providers who want to capture the cream of the market willing to pay a premium for data services. The Frankenphone. Combining the fractured aesthetic of HTC's Windows Mobile phone hardware with Android's software, based upon Linux' perpetually unfinished DIY openness and Google's Java-like development platform, will not result in a product similar to the iPhone. Instead, it will look a lot like phones that have already failed in the market. Apple's advantage comes from slick hardware designs with a close attention to detail, combined with software that purposely does less so that it can do what it does better. Even Apple's own conservative attempts to broaden its software capabilities with iPhone 2.0 have resulted in instability problems that can be blamed upon both Apple's early releases of its phone operating system and software from inexperienced third party developers new to the platform. Would the current frustrations with iPhone 2.0 be somehow mitigated by additional openness that also embraced all kinds of variables from different hardware makers with less quality control than Apple, a loose committee of additional cooks working to serve up operating system features targeted at every possible conceived need, and a wider third party software group with fewer constraints on illegal behaviors? The Failure of Open. While it is politically unpopular to criticize the well meaning efforts of open source contributors, the failure of Linux on the desktop, the failure of the vaporware Indrema game console, and the failure of the OpenMoko project to deliver a workable phone within a year of its deadline all underline the serious problems open development faces in the world of consumer oriented devices. Open has simply failed to deliver on its promises in the world of consumer hardware. OpenMoko was supposed to release its first mobile phone to consumers for $250 several months in advance of the iPhone. When the iPhone shipped, the group then announced new plans to get its phone out by the end of 2007. Instead, this spring the group announced new plans to move to an entirely different development platform, and ship its phone mid year for $400 with limited functionality and incomplete software outside of basic GSM phone features. Linux's notable successes, from Motorola's Linux phones to the Tivo DVR to Linksys Routers, have often come without any associated openness or freedom, and were instead delivered simply to provide their manufacturer with a free kernel to build upon. This indicates that while Linux may find its way into an increasing number of smartphones, it will likely not be accompanied by the glorious freedom of an open development environment Google has said it would offer with Android. Apple iPhone vs the FIC Neo1973 OpenMoko Linux Smartphone Can Google Succeed Where Open Has Previously Failed? Despite “openness” being Android's strongest competitive feature compared to Apple's iPhone, Google recently revealed that its wide-open development model is intentionally gravitating towards a closed association of top tier partners due to practical considerations. In July, Google accidentally sent out a notice that revealed that it had been seeding private SDK updates to only a subset of its contributors, angering those who believed that Android would be as open as Linux on the desktop or the OpenMoko project. Further, Google has restricted initial development to higher level APIs just as Apple did, further indicating that Google itself realizes that being wildly open to impress a minority of hobbyists will not result in the commercial success of its new platform. That serves to neuter Android's primary advantage over the iPhone. Without delivering on the premise of being wide open, Android is really just a less mature set of Java libraries used to create a specialized binary that runs on a Linux foundation. Unlike Apple's iPhone, Android phones won't have a slick user interface developed by professional artists, nor the iPhone's legacy of mature software development frameworks crafted over the last thirty years, nor the iPhone's tightly integrated hardware with award winning industrial design, nor its marketing power tied into the iPod and Apple's retail stores. Android won't be an open iPhone, it will only be a Windows Mobile phone with a better kernel that runs specialized Java software instead of Win32 or .NET code. Don't expect consumers to be impressed by that. The Biggest Missing Feature. There is one remaining factor that strangles to death any last remaining hope that Android might assassinate the iPhone and assume the crown of the “DOS of smartphones.” That is: Android delivers zero price advantage to consumers. In 1981 and 1991, consumers who wanted Apple computers faced the sticker shock of a somewhat arrogant price tag. Apple sold its computers, as it still does, at the higher end of the market, but there was simply far more range in prices available. In 1981, that meant the Apple II was $2600 and the new Apple III was $3500, even before you added a monitor. On the low end, Commodore sold its far less powerful, but “still a computer” Vic-20 for $300, while IBM entered the market with the IBM PC at $3000. Over the next few years, Apple focused on delivering additional sophistication at the same price, releasing the $10,000 Lisa and then the $2,500 Macintosh. IBM continued selling PCs in the same $3,000 to $10,000 range, but other DOS PC vendors began selling machines at prices that ranged as low as $1500. That left Apple with a roughly $1000 price premium over low end PCs. The products weren't really comparable, but consumers only saw the huge price difference. In 1991, Apple was still selling moderate to high-end Macintoshes for $3,800 to $10,000; the crippled Mac LC was $2500, and obsolete-at-birth Mac Classic ranged from $999 to $1500. Windows allowed PC makers to ship a functional $1500 PC and claim a rough approximation to Apple's $2500 entry level system, maintaining that apparent $1000 price premium. Today, pundits are lucky to find a Dell or HP system that is even a couple hundred dollars less than a comparable Mac. However, in the smartphone business, the iPhone 3G is now the same price, if not less, than generic competing phones on the market. Even more significant is the fact that the price of the phone hardware is nearly nothing compared to the cost of the service plan. This fact simply eases any price premium that could cause buyers to flock to a smartphone running a generic operating system over buying the iPhone 3G, regardless of whether it runs Windows Mobile or Android. 1990-1995: Planting Software Seeds Android Partners Have Already Failed. That same pricing principle similarly prevented buyers from considering many of the alternatives to the iPod. While Apple's original iPod models were more expensive than many of the first MP3 players on the market, they were price competitive with models offering similar features. By 2004, it was Apple who was undercutting MP3 competitors on price. Microsoft offered zero price advantage when it began selling the Zune, a major factor in its failure, but Microsoft simply couldn't out-price the iPod; it was already losing money offering the Zune at the same price as the iPod. Apple now has tremendous market power in buying RAM and other components that will prevent any competitors from being able to offer a huge discount over the iPhone's $199 price tag. Even if competitors were to give their phones away, they would only offer a $200 discount to users who would then still need to pay the same mobile fees to use the phone. Android's other partners, including Samsung and LG, have already failed to capture any significant market share in the music player market. Are they going to maintain their position as smartphone makers now that they face similar competition from Apple, its iPod ecosystem, its iTunes Music and Apps Store, Apple's retail store experience, and other factors that are pushing the iPhone? If they can, it is not obvious how partnering with Android will help. Other Problems for Android. Android was announced in early November 2007 and was followed with an early preview SDK within a couple weeks, a month ahead of Apple's initial announcement of the iPhone 2.0 SDK. However, between March and July 2008, Apple delivered nine progressive releases of its SDK, opened its App Store, and sold 60 million apps, raising $30 million to support iPhone software development in just the first month. It has since released three more SDK updates to developers related to iPhone 2.1, which is expected next month. Android just published its first open SDK beta update earlier this week, warning developers that “applications developed with it may not quite be compatible with devices running the final Android 1.0.” Additionally, Android still has no phones available. By the time the HTC Dream is expected to launch, Apple will have an installed base of around ten million iPhone (and iPod touch) users supporting software development through iTunes. The business model for selling Android apps is no better than that for selling jailbreak iPhone apps: there is no iTunes Apps Store to promote them, so users will have to track them down on their own. Android developers also have no real freedom that jailbreak iPhone developers lack. The only difference is that there are ten million iPhones to sell jailbreak apps to, and currently zero Android phones. If selling a jailbreak iPhone app sounds like more trouble than its worth, imagine trying to sell Android apps to a non-existant audience. Now add the official iPhone App Store into the mix, where publicity, promotion and profits are booming. What platform is going to have the most applications? How many users will flock to a smartphone platform with no apps? The wisdom of releasing a desirable phone and achieving a significant installed base before releasing an SDK makes a lot more sense in retrospect. Additionally, while Apple has a decade of experience in shipping regular updates to Mac OS X and its Xcode developer tools, Google has only shipped a random assortment of web-oriented SDKs (a number of which have been abandoned) as a tangent to its core business of selling advertisements. When the Android SDK 1.0 is finished later this year, developers will not only lack an installed base to sell their apps to, but will also have no high profile market for selling their apps in, and subsequently no financial incentive to develop applications that add value to the Android platform, just like Linux on the PC desktop. Around the same time, possibly within the next month, Apple will be shipping its second major OS release: iPhone 2.1. Apple will also be upgrading its entire user base to the new software so that developers will have a cohesive platform to target. This mirrors the efforts Apple has taken to upgrade its Mac OS X users to the same reference release. Mobile developers will be seeing money pouring in via iTunes while crickets chirp in the Android section of various mobile online stores. Apple’s iPhone Vs. Other Mobile Hardware Makers: 5 Revenue Engines Same Same, But Different: DOS Model Problems. Android developers will also have a series of other problems to manage. Like Windows Mobile, Android is intended to support everything, from BlackBerry-style keypad phones with a small touchscreen to the simple Windows Mobile Smartphone form factor lacking a touch screen to iPhone-like full size touch screens. Also like Windows Mobile, Android phone makers will have the option to leave off Bluetooth, WiFi, GPS location services, graphics hardware acceleration, and so on. Each Android phone will also have unique camera hardware, support for different video and audio codecs, and varied support for other differentiating proprietary services demanded by mobile operators. This will force developers to to make complex decisions regarding the lowest common denominator they choose to support. So while the iPhone will have a cohesive feature set, a managed software environment, and a functional market, Android will be a loose federation of hardware makers selling the same random features found on Windows Mobile today, with a chaotic development environment that lacks any central market for users or developers. And it will be run as an experiment by a company with no experience in consumer hardware or platform development. The Missing Tap. One specific example of the “DOS model problem” is that Android currently does not support multitouch. It's not touched on in the API, and Google quietly tap dances around its omission. Why no multitouch? Because multitouch screens are expensive, and most OHA hardware members are more interested in making a profit in a competitive phone market rather than impressing consumers as Apple did with the iPhone. Most existing smartphones, even those trying to directly rival the iPhone, use a stylus driven, pressure sensitive tap screen or a simpler, cheaper touch technology that lacks support for sensing multitouch. The iPhone's screen can actually sense up to five fingers at once, but the primary feature multitouch offers on the iPhone is the two fingered tapping and the pinching effects everyone associates with it. Android could certainly support multitouch if there were a demand for it, but that's the point: Google knows that its hardware partners are cheap and unlikely to put out hardware that actually competes with the iPhone. Instead of using expensive technologies that deliver clever yet largely invisible functionality, OHA members, just like PC makers, are far more likely to add flashy, impractical gadgety fluff that's cheap to tack on, such as slide out keyboards, neon tubes, and scratch and sniff stickers. That's how you impress gullible nerds on the cheap. Google itself is blowing smoke and erecting mirrors to distract from the reality that it being a “DOS vendor” means supporting bargain basement hardware from penny pinching duplicators. Android has been demonstrating some “wow” features such as a Street Maps app that pans around based on an internal compass in the demonstration phone. The problem is that that kind of thing only makes for a fun demo. Nobody needs to twirl around their phone in the air to see a view of the other side of the street, but everyone who has used an iPhone will wonder why they can't pinch to zoom out. Even worse, most Android phones aren't going to have a compass built into them, so Google is demonstrating features most Android users won't be able to use. That Sounds Like Microsoft… Google's design decisions are beginning to look a lot like Windows Vista; rather than actually working to make laptops boot faster, Microsoft came up with the idea of adding a small screen to the back of Vista laptops so users could check their email without having to wake the system up. But this was a stupid idea for a number of reasons, the most obvious being that most users just want a laptop that boots up quickly. Few laptops got the mini screen, but every user who tries Vista on their laptop will wonder why it doesn't boot up as fast as Mac OS X Leopard. In the same way, Google is advertising features for Android that most users won't ever see in their actual phones while ignoring things people will expect based on their exposure to the iPhone. Android is simply selecting the wrong features. Android will offer the advantages of supporting MMS, recording video, and the list of other features Windows Mobile already supplies. Those features didn't stop Apple from firing past Microsoft in the smartphone arena however, just as the Zune's highly touted WiFi and screen didn't phase iPod buyers. Incidentally, just months after the Zune, Apple had not only demonstrated a larger display but a higher definition multitouch screen, and not only WiFi, but functional WiFi that could be used to browse the web or check email. This suggests that Apple, with its faster release schedule, won't stay behind any of the leading features potentially offered by Android for very long. Android partners, however, will find it as difficult to catch up with Apple's unique features, just as Microsoft has been stymied to keep up with Mac OS X, the iPod, and the iPhone. The underlying reason: both Google and Microosft are tasked with maintaing support for a huge variety of hardware options demanded by all their partners. Apple has the unique circumstances to do only what it needs to do itself. Android in Windows Mobile's Shoes. Like Windows Mobile, Android faces a difficult market. In the US, it competes against the popular BlackBerry in corporate markets and the iPhone among consumers. Worldwide, it competes against entrenched market leader Nokia. The difference is that Google, unlike Microsoft, has no in. Windows Mobile was adopted by Windows-bound IT shops despite its weaknesses. Nobody has any preexisting reason to try an Android phone apart from hobbyists and open software enthusiasts, a demographic that has done little to move Linux on the PC desktop. Google also lacks Microsoft's installed base; it's starting from zero. The smartphone industry initially doubted Apple's chances of making much progress with the iPhone, despite the company having the Mac platform, the iPod, retail stores, platform development experience, marketing savvy, industrial design prowess, and so on. Google doesn't have any of those things. Mobile Providers vs Android. Apple also started with an exclusive partnership with AT&T, a three legged race that demanded effort from both. Google is hoping that hardware makers handle the hardware details and that mobile providers will be excited to sell its Android phones. While hardware makers such as HTC clearly appreciate having found a free alternative to Windows Mobile, it's not obvious why providers would be excited about Android, as it promises an openness that most mobile providers strongly oppose. AT&T took a big risk in getting behind the iPhone, as the phone encouraged users to use email rather than fee-based SMS and MMS, it supported WiFi for data access, and it bypassed AT&T's MEdia Net services to plug into iTunes instead. Verizon refused to parter with Apple and grant it those kinds of concessions. Is AT&T going to take a similar risk to partner with a phone that is not exclusive to it, and is Verizon now going to open its arms to support phones that do not exclusively support BREW, VCast and its other proprietary services? While Android may well eat into Microsoft's Windows Mobile business by stealing away its hardware makers, it seems unlikely that Android will ever serve as more than free alternative to Windows Mobile in a market where Windows Mobile is increasingly irrelevant. Android may have the dubious distinction of swallowing Microsoft's mobile business the same way Microsoft ate up the Palm OS, but even if it accomplishes that goal, Google will likely find itself unsustainably hungry immediately afterward. It will also find itself swimming in a shark tank of hungry rivals, including Nokia's Symbian, RIM's BlackBerry, and Apple's iPhone. Symbian is the final generic platform vying for the opportunity to play DOS in the smartphone market. The next article will examine Nokia's chances in its bid to match Microsoft's PC dominance in the mobile market while setting out in a new venture to copy Android's open software model. Did you like this article? Let me know. Comment here, in the Forum, or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It's also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!

• RoughlyDrafted Magazine on August 24, 2008
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Google's Android Market Guarantees Problems for Users

Daniel Eran Dilger It's great news that Google is planning to deliver a market for mobile software with its own centralized “Android Market.” It should give Apple's iPhone Apps Store competitive pressure to continue to innovate, and provide a safety net for smartphone users if Apple fails to deliver progress fast enough. If Apple and Google both fail, users will be stuck with the failed third party software models related to Microsoft's Windows Mobile and Nokia's Symbian. Those high stakes make it all the more disappointing to find that the Android Market fails to answer the tough issues correctly. iPhone App Store vs Android Market. There's no doubt that there will be apps that make it into Google's Android store that aren't currently available from Apple, likely including WiFi tethering (for using your mobile's data plan to give your laptop Internet access on the road), a feature Apple forced NullRiver's NetShare to remove from the iPhone store. That was apparently at the behest of AT&T, which staunchly refuses to support tethering without charging an expensive additional fee. AT&T's 3G network is already strained to carry relatively light-duty mobile traffic; unrestricted amounts of data being dumped on the network from far more demanding desktop apps by millions of users is currently just infeasible to accommodate. Other providers have 3G EVDO bandwidth to spare, but will cut you off just as quickly when you reach their finite definition of “unlimited” data access. Finite bandwidth is not a problem Google's 'free and open' software market can solve, because Google is not the only link in the chain in providing mobile apps. AT&T isn't going to allow tethering from Android phones either, regardless of Google's intended store policies. And Verizon Wireless likely isn't going to allow WiFi on Android phones at all. So it's a joke to say Android will transcend every problem in ways that Apple hasn't. This isn't a case of Google acting like Netflix to offer unlimited content to rival Blockbuster's censorship; instead, Google is simply making great sounding campaign promises it won't be able to deliver. AppleInsider | Google reveals open Android Market to rival iPhone's App Store Will Google’s Android Play DOS to Apple’s iPhone? Why Apple Plays God with the iPhone SDK But Wait, There's More (And Less). The Android Market will also deliver lots of problems Apple isn't, including a way to distribute malware that can't be remotely killed, or untraceable spyware that professes to be on the up-and-up when you install it, but then works behind your back and phones home sensitive data to a rogue developer's servers. Remember all the speculation last year about the possibility of developers being able to hack the iPhone open and install their own malicious tools to watch what you're doing? Under the iPhone SDK, access to that dangerous path is simply forbidden. Under Android, there's not so much as a handrail for users. Apple has already reprimanded iPhone developers who provided inadequate protection of their users' data, and then forced them to fix their problems immediately. With Google advertising its “see no evil, hear no evil” policy for its self-policing development community, Google won't even know if there's a problem. It will also lack any way to stop or reverse problems, and having renounced any accountability for protecting users with regulatory controls, Google will lack the leverage to push malicious or possibly just incompetent developers to take any action once it does discover problems. Malware and junkware on the PC is a big problem, but on a smartphone it is orders of magnitude more serious of an issue. Having to run spyware cleanup on a PC is a nusance. Having your phone subverted into a tool for advertisers or identity thieves could easily result in issues on the level of life safety. If you thought it was embarrassing to have Outlook send out spam in your name in 2001, wait until Android starts drunk dialing all your contacts to tell them about special offers, attaching your GPS location and perhaps a recent photo from your album so they know they can trust you about it. Google seems to think it can simply ignore security problems by asking developers not to take advantage of its users. This is absurdly ridiculous in our modern context. Google may as well be building unvented fireplaces in a tornado alley trailer park. Ten Myths of Leopard: 9 Apple is Spying on Users! The Unavoidable Malware Myth: Why Apple Won’t Inherit Microsoft’s Malware Crown Wired's Grotesquely Rank Hypocrisy in Mobile Security. Where did all of those mobile phone security experts from last fall run away to? They were abuzz about the imagined catastrophe that might befall the “can't even run any software” iPhone, but none have stepped forward to posit an opinion on why Android's exposed spinning blades in a dark room might result in the world's next Windows XP. Wired, which led the witch hunt against the iPhone last fall, published an article this summer titled “Google's Open Source Android OS Will Free the Wireless Web,” which went on breathlessly for days about how Android would solve the industry's problems with giddy can-do chutzpah. Nowhere did the article even suggest a criticism of its wide open, security-free business model. Instead, the author announced, “Engineers who write for just about any mobile operating system today have to spend time and cash obtaining security keys and code-signing certificates. Android would allow any application to be installed and run, no questions asked.” If you're waiting for the other shoe to drop, don't bother. It ended right there on the “time and money savings” of not having any security model. Microsoft saved a lot of money by ignoring security, too, as long as you don't count the $11 billion malware industry. Shame on Wired for continuing its descent into hopelessly unplugged irrelevance. UnWired! Rick Farrow, Metasploit, and My iPhone Security Interview Kim Zetter and the iPhone Root Security Myth High Risk, High Likelihood for Exploitation. The tech media more recently went into high alert to warn users that Apple's MobileMe web apps didn't perform SSL encryption, allowing the possibility for spies to target them in order to read their calendar and email transactions, were they to used the web apps over a public network. That's a valid concern to voice, but also an extremely unlikely threat for users to spend much time worrying about, particularly since there are a number of straightforward precautions users can take to avoid any risky exposure scenarios. There's also little business model behind sniffing calendar appointments and the kind of mundane email threads that .Mac users might engage in while drinking coffee at Starbucks. On the other hand, malicious software and social engineering exploitation is a billion dollar industry, and organized criminals in Korea, China, Russia, and of course Nigeria are as desperate for new dollars outside of the PC desktop as Google is. Rather than the unlikely scenario of on-site spies targeting a specific individual to sniff out truffles from their browser's email, these people have organized and profitable methods for delivering viral payloads to wide audiences from the convenience of a position thousands of miles away. On a smartphone, they can take your money simply by having installed software send a paid SMS. This is a real threat, not a contrived bunch of hysterical nonsense dreamed up by fear-mongering pundits. It is simply criminally negligent for Google to design a smartphone software platform with nearly zero regard for the safety of its users. We can justifiably criticize Microsoft for its lax stance on security in the 90s that resulted in the Windows malware crisis, but many of the potential dangers of certain decisions weren't fully recognized back then. Google is organizing an olympic-sized skating party on a lake it knows has dangerously thin ice. Is Apple’s MobileMe Secure? Store vs Market? It's also worth mentioning that the media is comparing what Google only intends to do with what Apple has already pulled off; I could easily draft plans for a phone that sounds better than the iPhone, but I certainly couldn't deliver it. Apple has years of experience in media sales and micro-payments in iTunes. It began selling software through iTunes in 2006, and spent years refining its software deployment system to make sure iTunes would work as a true market place for mobile software once the iPhone was ready. Anyone can open a store. There are a dozen online music and video stores that have gone out of business trying to sell music like iTunes. Apple created a real market, where both buyers and sellers can have confidence that they're getting a fair deal. Google has tried to backhandedly condemn Apple's App Store for being called a “store,” negatively associating the word with a commercial endeavor as opposed to the community effort Google's marketing team has branded a “market.” Never mind that the words really mean the same thing; Google isn't really creating a market, because markets have enforced rules. Without rules and authority, there is too much risk involved to do legitimate business. If Android were only setting up a barter system between the company's altruistic and noble minded PhDs in the Google cafeteria, there wouldn't be an issue. However, Google is setting up shop in the most corrupt, chaotic, and criminal setting on earth: the wide open Internet, a dirty enough place to turn a brand new PC into a viral porn spam server within fifteen minutes of being plugged in. Hacking iPod Games: How Apple's DRM Works Rise of the iTunes Killers Myth Can Great Google Getter Done? The company's Alfred E. W. Newman approach to security issues is more than a little alarming coming from a company that is fully aware of Internet scammers. Google's main job is identifying and scouring away the criminal tracks that SEO frauds try to leave behind in its search engine results. The company terminates its advertiser partners on a whim when it even suspects an irregularity, and the web is full or people complaining that Google has failed to pay them for hundreds of dollars of AdSense advertising without even a fair explanation. The company is hard edge and savvy when it comes to protecting its own revenues, so why is it being so soft and naive when the security of its users is on the line? Google's “do no evil” slogan, paired with its considerable contributions to society, from free search to free satellite imagery, and from its staunch support of the public interest related to WiFi and mobile broadband issues to its investments in progressive technologies to make the world a better place, all simply add up to leave its unreasonable stance on mobile security a mysterious puzzle. Can Google even pull its store off? The company serves up millions of free videos in YouTube, but remember that Google originally tried to build its own YouTube and failed; it had to buy YouTube to enter the market. Google also screwed the pooch when it dropped its own paid DRM video service and told its users to go fly a kite. That kind of customer-oblivious behavior isn't going to successfully lock horns with Apple's proven excellence in delivering the iTunes Store as a customer-friendly market place. Apple pulled together 14 year old torrent freaks and the RIAA's lawyers into the same room and made them play together. It turned the festering boil of the rotten mobile software market into a million dollar per day buffet. Google's Android Market not only faces the same challenges, but also has to fly in the face of the industry darling, starting at zero against Apple's ten million installed base of iPhones and its accelerating market share. The industry outside of Apple is working just as hard to grab its own slice as well. Google taking on the iPhone App Store is a bit like Sony deciding to build cars to take on BMW. That's all fine and good, but let's see the car before we start comparing its “planned” zero to 60 performance against that of today's cars with a proven legacy. And stop telling us that lacking both seat belts and brakes is a feature. Did you like this article? Let me know. Comment here, in the Forum, or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It's also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!

• RoughlyDrafted Magazine on August 28, 2008
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Microsoft's Mojave Attempts to Wet Vista's Desert

Daniel Eran Dilger Nearly two years after Windows Vista was finally released, Microsoft has remained unable to shake off its reputation as being slow, incompatible with existing hardware and software, and generally a poor and overpriced product that nobody wants. Microsoft is now trying to reverse Vista's bad reputation by insisting that the software's problems are not technical but rather just the fault of ignorant customers duped in part by Apple's “Get a Mac” campaign. What's Vista's real problems, and will Microsoft's “Mojave Experiment” help solve them? Blame Apple! Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer has joined Windows Enthusiast pundits in theorizing that Vista's image problems are primarily the result of Apple's advertisements that regularly poke fun at the problems in Vista. The company has now taken aim at shooting at the messenger with a $300 million ad campaign. In July, Brad Brooks, Microsoft's VP of Windows Vista consumer marketing, addressed the company's business partners at its Worldwide Partner Conference, saying, “We've got a pretty noisy competitor out there. You know it. I know it. It's caused some impact. We're going to start countering it. They tell us it's the iWay or the highway. We think that's a sad message.” Another sad message Brooks had to deliver was that Vista's problems aren't really the fault of Apple. “We broke a lot of things,” Brooks admitted. “We know that, and we know it caused you a lot of pain. It got customers thinking, hey, is Windows Vista a generation we want to get invested in?” Vista: Pay it Forward! Brooks also noted that “Windows Vista is an investment in the long term. When you make the investment into Windows Vista, it's going to pay it forward into the operating system we call Windows 7.” Pay it forward? Is Windows 7 going to be a free upgrade to Windows Vista users, in the same way Apple is expected to offer the next Mac OS X 10.6 Snow Leopard release to existing users of 10.5 Leopard? That's highly unlikely, as Microsoft can't sustain its egregious profits collected through the Windows monopoly by giving away updates for free. Windows Vista raised the price of Windows, putting a new definition on the phrase “pay it forward.” Myths of Snow Leopard 7: Free?! Microsoft Admits Windows Vista Mistakes, Criticizes Apple Ads - InformationWeek Reality Impairment at Microsoft Talking out one's ass appears to be a job requirement for all Microsoft executives, starting at the top. A serious case of reality impairment has resulted in the paradox of the company both admitting that Vista is flawed and “broke a lot of things,” while at the same time maintaining that Vista's reputation is entirely the fault of stupid customers and a comically unflattering portrayal by its competitor. In the “Mojave Experiment,” Microsoft plans to dispel the notion that Windows Vista is problematic and incompatible by publishing a series of videotaped interviews with users who arrived with negative impressions of Vista and left excited about the new operating system. This was achieved by presenting the users with a demonstration of “Mojave,” a new operating system that Microsoft later revealed to be Vista, much to the surprise of the interviewed users who'd heard so many bad things about it. However, the Mojave Experiment is so full of false information and saccharine gloss that it couldn't possibly appeal to anyone smart enough to turn on a PC. Even setting aside the fact that the ad experiment basically seeks to blame users for being dumb, the attempt by Microsoft to paint over Vista's problems is transparent and flawed, for a number of reasons. What's wrong with Mojave. Microsoft can't seem to decide whether it wants to admit that Vista has problems or not, and its waffling back and forth just makes the company look increasingly disingenuous. Is Vista a poorly launched, flawed product that the company is working to fix as quickly as possible, or is it awesome and wildly successful and just the victim of bad press? Microsoft tries to tell both stories at once, which is purely dishonest. In contrast, Apple said from the start last year that its Apple TV product was a “hobby” attempting to break into a difficult market. Critics lambasted it for not immediately taking over the market like the iPod had or iPhone later did. Apple's more recent problems in launching MobileMe were quickly noted by the company along with the intent to address complaints about it rapidly. Microsoft isn't alone in being able to stumble, but its complete lack of candor makes it hard to understand if the company realizes that it even has problems to solve. With Vista, Microsoft has issued a flurry of giddy press releases claiming widespread adoption based on the number of licenses sold and naming it “the fastest selling operating system in Microsoft history,” ignoring the fact that Windows sales are increasing simply because they are tied to PC sales. Microsoft has no competition in the PC operating system market due to its monopoly position, so it could release Windows Wet Toast and still sell it faster than XP and ME and 98 Special Edition and every other version of Windows in the past that was tied to an increasingly younger and smaller hardware market. Vista Sales to Non-Users. Many of Vista's “sales” were free vouchers distributed with PCs sold in the holiday season prior to its launch. Even more than a year and a half later, PC makers continue to put Windows XP on their systems, even those sold with a Vista license, while corporate users almost always remove the default Vista to install an earlier version of Windows. There's also a busy third party industry developing around removing Vista for consumers. In late July APCMag cited Jane Bradburn, a manager for commercial notebook sales at HP, as saying, “From the 30th of June, we have no longer been able to ship a PC with a XP license. However, what we have been able to do with Microsoft is ship PCs with a Vista Business licence but with XP pre-loaded. That is still the majority of business computers we are selling today.” The arrangement is supposed to end by January 2009, but HP is trying to extend the deadline because customers simply don't want Vista installed. EWeek also noted that between April 2007 and May 2008, its survey of business users indicated that Vista climbed from 2% to 5%, but that Windows XP jumped from 74% to 83%, three times the adoption of Vista. That growth came from migration from older versions of Windows. Even in its wildest projections, EWeek says Vista will only reach 28% adoption in businesses by the end of 2010. CNET reported that a Jully 2008 survey by systems management appliance company KASE found that 60% of companies surveyed have no plans to deploy Windows Vista, a ten percent increase in disinterest from late 2007. A full 42% were actively exploring Vista alternatives, and 11% had already made the switch to Mac OS X or Linux. Microsoft is simply lying about the level of Vista excitement, and it's gotten too obvious for the company to continue to do so. XP still killing Vista in sales volume: HP 60 percent skipping Vista, so Ballmer looks to Apple | The Open Road The Truth Is… oh Look a Distraction! At the same time, Microsoft notes on its Vista website “we know a few of you were disappointed by your early encounter. Printers didn't work. Games felt sluggish. You told us—loudly at times—that the latest Windows wasn't always living up to your high expectations for a Microsoft product.” That's some brutal honesty for a company with a knack for spinning wild fantasies about fictitious product enthusiasm for a product never actually put to use in many cases. At the same time however, in trying to refute away Vista's real problems, Microsoft uses a variety of tactics that just return to blind fantasyland. Microsoft is a Marketing Company, not a Tech Company. The company plays its Mojave Experiment hand on a new website, incidentally designed using Adobe Flash rather than the company's own Silverlight. Despite the site's oddly designed, usability-impared interface, it's still possible to pull out lots of details from the experiment that say as much about Microsoft's crafty, misleading marketing as they do about its technical problems, underling the simple fact that Microsoft is first and foremost a marketing company that flogs third rate technology products. Mojave took 140 people and asked them to score Windows Vista. The average response was 4.4. After demonstrating Vista SP2 under the name “Mojave,” respondents ranked Vista at 8.5, a stunning improvement. But what were they ranking? Microsoft notes that “many said they would have rated it higher, but wanted more time to use it themselves.” That sounds good at first blush, but it really indicates that the responses were biased by hyped up enthusiasm rather than facts, and that participants realized it, reserving their final judgement until they could actually see more. The “Mojave Experiment” What does Mojave Prove? Mojave tries to represent that Vista's bad reputation is the fault of ignorant consumers who have heard bad things that aren't true about Vista, and have made up their mind without getting the facts. At the same time however, Microsoft also publicly admits that Vista “broke a lot of things” and that specifically, “Printers didn't work. Games felt sluggish.” Did Mojave clear up mistaken notions for participants, or did it just erect smoke and mirrors in a carefully controlled demonstration that skirted around Vista's real problems, including those Microsoft admits? That's a question that answers itself. Mojave didn't send uses home with Vista in a Mojave package and then ask them how well it worked with their existing peripherals and games, or how fast it was in comparison to their existing PC software. This is Not the Droid You're Running Vista On. Instead, Microsoft sat them down in front of a HP Pavillion DV 2000 with 2GB of RAM. That's what HP called its “entertainment powerhouse” laptop, although HP only shipped it with 1GB RAM. Microsoft maxed out the RAM for the purposes of the test, making the laptop a bit more expensive than its usual street price of around $1050. According to Windows enthusiast Joe Wilcox, PC laptops actually cost $700, “half as much” as Apple's laptops. At least that's the Average Selling Price for consumer retail PC laptops according to NPD's Stephen Baker, compared to Apple's $1500 ASP. Wilcox insisted that his spin on NPD's figures couldn't possibly be biased because he wrote his article on a MacBook Air running Leopard. However, his $2,700 laptop did help drive up Apple's stellar ASP for its laptops well above the entry price for Mac Books, discounting his theory that revolved around the assumption that every Mac buyer pays the average price of all the laptops Apple sells. Wilcox and Microsoft are both disingenuously dancing on both ends of the truth. Many consumers are actually buying cheap laptops at Target that can't run Vista ideally, while Microsoft demonstrates its Vista on a considerably better equipped system in the Mojave Experiment to suggest that Vista doesn't have the performance problems that users have heard about from the majority of their peers who bought cheap PCs and are seeing Vista run particularly sluggishly on them. Should You Pay Twice as Much for a Mac? I Did! You Get What You Pay For. The fact that Apple sells more high end laptops to pro users at retail, and that it does not sell anything in the range of the cheap junk being hawked at big box retailers like Wilcox' Target both result in Mac laptops fetching a higher ASP. That fact also means that Mac buyers will be happier with their purchase and have a more favorable impression of Mac OS X because they're running it on a better system. That's all obvious stuff. However, selling people cheap laptops that don't work well, and then demonstrating a fake “new operating system” that appears to work well when running on a faster machine full of RAM is simply a dishonest bait and switch scam. Wilcox does nearly admit that PC makers are already stretching their credibility as they attempt to sell cheap boxes based on price alone, citing Baker as saying, “We aren't seeing any particularly substantive moves down in price on the Windows side, either in desktops or notebooks.” PCs can't get cheaper because they're already unprofitable and consumers are already disgusted with their performance when running the increased overhead of Vista. Wilcox also sets up a tilted comparison between a Dell PC desktop with integrated graphics and an iMac with dedicated graphics and claims a price advantage for Dell, although noting that, while “Dell offers more for less than the iMac,” “that 'more' also means Windows Vista, which won't satisfy some shoppers.” Why Aren't Shoppers Satisfied with Vista? Like Microsoft, Wilcox and his Windows Enthusiast pundit friends can't seem to decide if Vista has any real problems or if it's all just an unfair taint suggested by Apple's Get a Mac ads. However, while Apple has taken shots at Vista's incompatibility with printers and other hardware and its scarce updates that have been few and far between over the last year and a half of its being on the market, Apple also notes in its Get a Mac ads that Macs can run Vista, and can run it faster than PCs. So Apple isn't inventing and publishing false reports on Vista, it's merely advertising its Mac hardware as superior to PCs. The Vista flaws Apple's ads have referenced are flaws Microsoft itself has admitted to its partners, so the Get a Mac umbrage frequently voiced by Windows Enthusiasts is both hypocritical and ridiculous. However, in the Mojave Experiment, Microsoft downplayed those well-known faults by only carefully demonstrating certain features on a high end machine, and without actually exposing Mojave/Vista users to 'a lot of things Vista broke,' 'printers that didn't work', or 'games that felt sluggish.' It Can't Even Print. In response to complaints that Vista doesn't work well with existing PC hardware, Microsoft's Mojave website says that “the Windows Vista Compatibility Center lists compatibility status for over 9,000 products (5,500 devices and 3,500 software programs).” It even notes 2,000 printers, 200 scanners, and 500 cameras specifically. That sounds good until you realize that Apple ships support for over 3,100 printers in Mac OS X Leopard, a product that is targeted primarily toward education and consumers and which is not expected by users to run on any old hardware that might be in use by PC users. Vista is supposed to run on 95% of the world's PCs, and yet it doesn't even match the printer drivers that ship with Leopard, a number which does not include all of the third party drivers available for the Mac. Oh, but there's more. Not only did Microsoft dance around the truth to feed its Mojave Experiment participants a carefully controlled stream of garbage, but it also inadvertently revealed more serious problems related to Vista, which I'll consider in the following article. Did you like this article? Let me know. Comment here, in the Forum, or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It's also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!

• RoughlyDrafted Magazine on August 13, 2008
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Myths of Snow Leopard 8: It's Just An OS.

Daniel Eran Dilger Apple's limited comments on Snow Leopard, the next version of Mac OS X due in about a year, have opened the playing field for rampant speculation. Here's a look at a series of myths that have developed around the upcoming release. The eighth myth of Snow Leopard: Snow Leopard is Just an Operating System Stretching the Meaning of OS. The definition of “operating system�? has grown dramatically throughout the history of personal computing. In the 70s, CP/M was little more than a boot loader. In the 80s, Apple's SOS, the “Sophisticated Operating System�? developed for the ill-fated Apple III, introduced the novel idea of a modular driver architecture for printers, disks, and files systems. After the company returned to making Apple II models, much of SOS was salvaged in ProDOS. Apple's parallel development of the Lisa not only delivered an operating system, but also a full suite of productivity apps as part of the included Lisa 7/7 Office System software, the first consumer office suite. It would be another half decade before Microsoft bundled its Word and Excel apps with its newly acquired PowerPoint to release Microsoft Office for the Macintosh, followed by a Windows version. In a 1987 interview with Dave Ottalini, Andy Hertzfeld said, “I did the Macintosh Operating System and I was very familiar with the Apple /// and especially in the I/O system of the Macintosh, I was influenced by the Apple /// [SOS] operating system.�? The Mac's System Software in 1984 added in the concept of developer Toolbox that enabled applications to share one set of code for drawing window controls, managing print and file dialogs, and later dealing with multimedia. Apple bundled fewer apps with the Mac than the Lisa due to complaints from third party developers. Instead, the company partnered with Microsoft to deliver the Mac's key productivity apps, a move that turned out to be Apple's worst decision ever. In the late 80s, NeXTSTEP built upon the idea of the Mac Toolbox; NeXT delivered high level, object oriented frameworks and visual developer tools for rapidly building applications on top of a Unix foundation. Steve Jobs' new operating system went well beyond just booting up the machine. It included speech-enabled email messaging, DSP audio processing, PostScript color and transparency, a documentation reference library, dictionary, and even the complete works of Shakespeare. Apple III FAQ File Lisa GUI Prototypes Office Wars 1 - Claris and the Origins of Apple iWork Office Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office Monopoly The Expanding OS at Microsoft. Throughout the 80s and into the 90s, Microsoft continued to sell the simplistic DOS, largely based upon the 1970s CP/M. The company started to bundle DOS with a Mac-like environment it called Windows, which started to become popular with Windows 3.1 in 1991. Microsoft shipped Windows primarily to port its Macintosh apps to the IBM PC in order to abandon its software partnership with Apple on the Mac. After similarly backing out of efforts to work with IBM on a DOS replacement called OS/2, Microsoft next attempted to deliver Windows NT as an entirely new operating system for PC users, based loosely upon concepts from AT&T Unix-rival VMS, after Microsoft acquired Digital's VMS developer team in the late 80s. Despite touting NT in the early 90s as the next Windows, Microsoft was unable to ship NT as a replacement to DOS for mainstream users until Windows XP 2001. However, Microsoft's greatest contribution in expanding the definition of the OS came from its efforts to tie products together to leverage its monopoly DOS position in order to advance its applications business. Prior to transitioning DOS users to Windows, it told developers to target OS/2. That left a vacuum for Microsoft's own new Windows Office apps, which had not been wildly popular until then. By 1995, Microsoft was licensing Windows and Office together to PC makers as tightly integrated products, cutting out competition from third party apps. Starting in 1996, as the Windows platform began to face the threat of the Netscape Navigator web browser paired with Sun's Java, Microsoft began to insist that its acquired Internet Explorer was an integrated part of the OS, enabling it to expand its monopoly and stifle any competitive pressure. It has since tied in the Windows Media DRM architecture, and has also tightly integrated Office and the Outlook Exchange client. While sold separately, both have become very close to being an extension of Windows. The company is now working to sell Windows, Office, and the requisite OneCare security software updates as a $70 per year subscription package called “Equipt,�? basically making all consumer Microsoft software an über-OS for Windows PC users, and again shutting out the third party developers who have been flourishing in the vibrant niche of servicing Windows' malware, viruses, and other security problems. 1990-1995: Microsoft's Yellow Road to Cairo Microsoft’s Outrageous Office Profits The Unavoidable Malware Myth: Why Apple Won’t Inherit Microsoft’s Malware Crown Five Factors Shifting the Future of Malware and Platform Security Enter Mac OS X. By the time the Mac OS X beta emerged in 2000, a desktop operating system was expected to include everything from an email and web client to audio/video playback and Office functionality. In order to compete against Windows, Apple had needed to partner with Microsoft to deliver Internet Explorer, Outlook Express, and Office on the Mac. As Mac OS X began reaching a mainstream audience in 2002, Microsoft pulled the plug on Mac development, putting Internet Explorer and Outlook Express into maintenance mode and making minimal advancement to the Mac version of Office apps. For Apple to keep up with Microsoft, it would need to develop its own applications. Mac OS X's NeXSTEP legacy gave it a leg up on putting together an application portfolio. Apple had already adapted NeXTMail, a pioneering email client, into a decent email program simply called Mail, and shipped a central Address Book and later iCal scheduling client with Mac OS X. In 2003, Apple shipped Safari as its own standards-based web client. It later shipped iChat instant messaging and other supporting applications that rounded out the OS. At the same time, Apple also began assembling a suite of multimedia apps in iLife: iTunes, iPhoto, iMovie, iDVD, and GarageBand. It has also put together an alternative to Office in iWork: Pages, Numbers, and Keynote. While both are sold separately from the OS, iLife ships for free on new Macs and iWork comes bundled as a trial that can be ordered online. Why Apple Bounced Back AppleInsider | Road to Mac OS X Leopard: Mail 3.0 The Future of the Web: Safari, Firefox and Internet Explorer Mac OS X vs Mac Office? The expansion of Mac OS X means something particularly interesting for Microsoft Office. Apple is describing Snow Leopard's key feature as being support for Exchange Server messaging, a role formerly delegated to Microsoft. That makes it the next step in the company's incremental independence from Microsoft's software on the Mac, following its banishment of IE, Outlook Express, Windows Media Player, and MSN. Snow Leopard promises to obsolesce Entourage. That being the case, it would make sense for Apple to bundle its Exchange savvy, Snow Leopard version of Mail, iCal, and Address Book into the next version of iWork for sale to PowerPC Mac users and others who don't meet the minimum requirements for Snow Leopard. That move would also directly position iWork against Office and expand iWork's user base on the Mac platform. Current Office users sometimes argue that Apple needs to allow Microsoft to maintain its monopoly position in Office to prevent Macs from being shut out of the corporate world. Businesses do prefer to train employees in one set of software; iWork does not work like Microsoft Office, forcing companies to settle on one or double their user training efforts. However, Microsoft has already began work to ensure that Office on Windows does not work or look the same as its Mac version. The Windows edition was given a Ribbon UI for marketing reasons, with a Start Button-style user interface branding to tie it into Vista. That wouldn't work on the Mac side, so Microsoft gave Mac users an oddball, clownish user interface that is neither Mac-like nor immediately familiar to Office users. Because iWork works like the rest of Mac OS X and is both consistent and intuitive, users will pick it up faster than having to learn the quirky, lipsticked pig that is Office 2008 for Mac. Even Windows users are likely to find iWork easier to figure out than Microsoft's Mac version of Office. Apple's iWork still has a ways to go in matching every feature of Office, but it offers a much stronger foundation to build upon than the current version of Mac Office. Safari on Windows? Apple and the Origins of the Web The Web Browser Renaissance: Firefox and Safari Microsoft's Scorched Earth Office Policy. Microsoft is radically changing the Office user interface on the Windows side to force companies to adopt Vista while also attempting to stave off the advance of the free OpenOffice productivity software, which is also sold by Sun as StarOffice and by IBM as Lotus Symphony. OpenOffice (and other competing suites, including some online productivity offerings) have worked hard to copy the look and feel of Microsoft's Office to facilitate adoption by companies while requiring minimal new training. Microsoft's response is to take Office 2008 in a patented new direction that competitors can't follow, a trick it used to kill competition in the DOS market when it released Windows as a product that only appeared to work with MS-DOS, and subsequently Windows 95, a product that integrated MS-DOS. With iWork, Apple didn't try to copy the old Office look and feel, which has made little progress since the late 90s. Instead, it has fleshed out its own productivity software interface with direct feedback Inspector panels; Mac OS X-native, customizable toolbars; and close integration with other OS features from advanced graphics compositing to media library browsing to native font and color selection panels. Office Wars 4 - Microsoft’s Assault on Lotus and IBM This All Happened Before. While Microsoft's strategy of driving Office into a unique, proprietary direction makes sense as a way to disrupt compatibility and familiarity with open software, it is also leaving the door wide open for Apple to enter. This is exactly what happened five years ago when Microsoft dropped Internet Explorer on the Mac, creating a vacuum that resulted in Safari, which is now teamed up with Firefox in an effort to eat into IE market share and break open Microsoft's proprietary hold over web development. With advances in Javascript and HTML5-style sophisticated web applications, Safari is now helping to erode not only IE's control over the web, but also break up Windows' hegemony in application development. MobileMe demonstrates how rich, open web applications can provide familiar email, calendar, contacts, and other features using the cross platform web rather than a proprietary development platform. While Apple hasn't announced plans to to deliver iWork apps on MobileMe yet, their current availability for the Mac not only makes up for the weaknesses of Microsoft's Mac Office 2008, but also directs attention to the Mac platform and its unique set of productivity apps. By offering Snow Leopard and “iWork 2009�? with Exchange 2007 support as well as integration with MobileMe and Snow Leopard Server's push messaging services, Apple will be able to aggressively push Mac OS X and the Mac into new territory long held hostage by Microsoft. Myths of Snow Leopard 4: Exchange is the Only New Feature Apple’s Mobile Me Takes On Exchange, Mobile Mesh Snow Leopard Server Takes on Exchange, SharePoint Cocoa for Windows + Flash Killer = SproutCore WWDC 2008: New in Mac OS X Snow Leopard Myths of Snow Leopard 1: PowerPC Support — RoughlyDrafted Magazine Myths of Snow Leopard 2: 32-bit Support Myths of Snow Leopard 3: Mac Sidelined for iPhone Myths of Snow Leopard 4: Exchange is the Only New Feature! Myths of Snow Leopard 5: No Carbon! Myths of Snow Leopard 6: Apple is Out of Ideas! Myths of Snow Leopard 7: Free?! Myths of Snow Leopard 8: It's Just An OS. Cocoa for Windows + Flash Killer = SproutCore Apple’s other open secret: the LLVM Complier Ten Big New Features in Mac OS X Snow Leopard I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast! Submit to Reddit or Slashdot, or consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!

• RoughlyDrafted Magazine on July 9, 2008
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Ten Big New Features in Mac OS X Snow Leopard

Daniel Eran Dilger Apple is marketing the idea of there being “no new features�? for Snow Leopard and instead promising an overall improvement in how Mac OS X works under the hood, thanks to a diligent code optimization and refactoring cycle discussed in the previous article. At the same time, there are plenty of significant new features coming in Snow Leopard to look forward to. Here are ten big new features (plus a few minor ones) that you probably haven't heard much about from anywhere else, including my previous articles on the subject that already described QuickTime X, Grand Central, and OpenCL. WWDC 2008: New in Mac OS X Snow Leopard Snow Leopard Server Takes on Exchange, SharePoint Pulling Invisible New Features into Snow Leopard. Apple's increasing collaborations with the open source community have pulled back the veil of secrecy on several new but mostly invisible enhancements that will be showing up in Snow Leopard. One relates to LLVM, the Low Level Virtual Machine compiler architecture project originally founded at the University of Illinois. Apple began contributing to LLVM development in 2005, and started using it Leopard to expand support for OpenGL hardware features. Lower-end Macs that lack the silicon to interpret that specialize graphics code can now do it in software. LLVM is also working its way into Apple's Xcode IDE, initially as a highly efficient optimizer and code generator that works as a bolt-on upgrade to components of GCC, but eventually as a complete compiler replacement. That project, known as Clang, was opened up last year. LLVM compiler technology not only makes developers more productive, but also results in code that runs significantly faster on the same hardware. Apple's other open secret: the LLVM Complier The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure Project Another openly hidden secret in Mac OS X is CUPS, the Common Unix Printing System. Beginning with Jaguar in 2002, Apple adopted and licensed CUPS from its developer as Mac OS X's printing engine. It then purchased the project outright. CUPS is also the de facto printing system for Linux distros and is available for BSD and other commercial Unix systems. That means Apple owns the project that develops the printing architecture for Linux. That's not an issue because Apple has established a reputation in open source as a strong contributor and open sharer. According to a review of bug fixes and improvements in CUPS software, 24% of the enhancements came from Apple while 76% came from free and open source software contributors working with Linux, OpenSolaris, and other projects. Of course, 100% of both sides benefited from that sharing. CUPS collaboration has resulted in high quality code and the advancement of new features. CUPS 1.4, the version sources say Snow Leopard will use, adds performance enhancements and a variety of security improvements that use sandboxing to prevent malware attacks on the printing system from being able to read sensitive documents that may be in use by printers. Common UNIX Printing System A third significant new feature originating from an open source project in Snow Leopard is ZFS support, portions of which come from the OpenSolaris project (along with Sun's DTrace technology, which Apple uses in its Instruments performance profiling tool). Leopard debuted read-only ZFS features, but Snow Leopard and Snow Leopard Server will provide both read and write support for Sun's new 128-bit file system. ZFS was designed to provide “simple administration, transactional semantics, end-to-end data integrity, and immense scalability.�? ZFS hype during the development of Leopard helped the new file system reach buzzword status as news of the three letter acronym swept through blogs and the tech media. It is frequently described as being the imminent replacement for the Mac's native HFS+. However, the benefits of ZFS including as storage pooling, data redundancy, automatic error correction, dynamic volume expansion, and snapshots all apply primarily to servers and higher-end workstation users who deal with multiple disk drives. ZFS isn't going to replace HFS+ outright in Snow Leopard, and has limited relevance today to desktop and laptop users, particularly those who never move beyond the single disk drive installed in their system. More Predictions for WWDC 2007: Solaris, Google, Surround Apple - Mac OS X Leopard - Developer Tools - Instruments Symbiotic: What Apple Does for Open Source Apple's Open Source Assault Pushing Visible New Features in Snow Leopard. Apple's extensive work in developing push support for Exchange Server on the iPhone will also be included in Snow Leopard's Mail, Address Book, and iCal. Push support in those client side apps are also being used to power MobileMe's push messaging subscription service and Snow Leopard Server's push messaging services. Apple will be offering both in parallel as alternatives to Exchange, thanks to smart planning on the part of Apple's engineers to develop an interoperable push architecture in Mac OS X and on the iPhone. There is also a fourth application of push that has developed alongside push messaging: Apple's new Push Notification Service. PNS allows iPhone and iPod touch users to set up server side notification alerts that don't require mobile applications to stay running in the background just to update users of the external events they track. Along with Bonjour discovery, PNS will keep iPhones wirelessly connected in all sorts of sophisticated ways that third party developers can imagine in their applications. Whether Apple will integrate a listener for the same PNS system into the desktop side of Mac OS X remains to be seen, but it would allow a single, unified interface for alerting client users of new events. I proposed a system wide, Growl-style notification system in the Leopard Wish List published back in 2005. Snow Leopard Server Takes on Exchange, SharePoint Apple’s Mobile Me Takes On Exchange, Mobile Mesh With the strong push into push messaging, Apple will make mobile devices even more tightly integrated with its desktop products. Leopard delivered Back To My Mac as a novel way to use Wide Area Bonjour's dynamic service registration as a mechanism for sharing resources served from home to any location without configuring static naming services for address lookups. Because any software can register itself with .Mac/MobileMe, this opens the door to third party developers with the vision to exploit the potential of these enabling technologies. A Global Upgrade for Bonjour: AirPort, iPhone, Leopard, .Mac Ten Big Predictions for Apple in 2008 Among the technologies profiled earlier in Myth 3 that have been trickling from the iPhone into Mac OS X, there's at least one idea I proposed for the iPhone that will be in Snow Leopard's Safari: self contained web apps. The new feature will allow users to run web applications as a local app in its own window, essentially making the web platform into a native-looking app that can run outside of Safari. I proposed a similar feature as a possibility for the iPhone prior to the announcement of the Cocoa Touch SDK: web apps packaged up into a set of files that could be run on the device as a Dashboard widget-like standalone app, even when off the network. Why Apple hasn't pursued such an obvious strategy is a little hard to figure out, but it seems they've got the ball rolling on the desktop. That ball will be rolling even faster thanks to SquirrelFish, a new JavaScript interpreter that will make Safari and any other WebKit-based browsers, standalone self contained apps, and Dashboard widgets all a lot faster. Apple's MobileMe, Yahoo's Flickr, and Google various web apps will all gain new speed thanks to faster JavaScript execution. SquirrelFish will also raise the bar in performance and efficiency in the Rich Internet Applications sector in general, giving Flash, Silverlight, and Java a faster, simpler, and more openly interoperable runtime to compete against. RoughlyDrafted: Leopard Wish List: 2005 How Open will the iPhone Get? Surfin’ Safari » Announcing SquirrelFish Microsoft's Application Features in Mac OS X, System Wide. Microsoft's business model of tacking on features hasn't been a total wash. The company's desperate efforts to invent novel marketing features for every new release of Windows and Office have pioneered a number of ideas that have later found their way into Mac OS X. One example is the idea of Fast User Switching, which Apple added to Panther. Windows XP pioneered the trick, but built it upon the kluge that is Terminal Services. Microsoft also helped originate the basis of Ajax web apps by inventing XMLHttpRequest in order to make its Outlook Web Access 2000 web app work decently within Internet Explorer. Today, standards-based web apps are eating a hole into Microsoft's monopoly on the proprietary desktop platform, and tools such as SproutCore and resulting products such as MobileMe are poised to tear down interoperability barriers and level the playing field. Microsoft may now regret having opened Pandora's Box in terms of standards-based web applications, but its efforts to seal the web back up with the proprietary Silverlight plugin, which turns web apps into .NET programs, will now be next to impossible. Another example of a Microsoft innovation are the fancy text features in Word, such as red underlining to highlight spelling mistakes and the green squiggle for grammar errors. Word also features a variety of word auto correction, smart dash insertion, and text replacement features (such as typing TM to get the ™ character). The former have already become system-wide features in Mac OS X, while sources indicate that the latter text processing features will find their way into Snow Leopard, and therefore every application that runs on it. RoughlyDrafted: Remote Display part 3: Terminal Server Cocoa for Windows + Flash Killer = SproutCore Super Size Me. On top of injecting Word features into its OS for the use of every application, Apple will also expand the use of its own Data Detectors, a technology it invented in the mid 90s for identifying useful bits of text and making it actionable. Leopard introduced Data Detectors in Mail as a way to extract contacts and events for use in Address Book and iCal, but Snow Leopard will expose Data Detectors everywhere it draws text. Sources also indicate Snow Leopard will expand upon Font Book to provide full Auto Activation of any fonts requested by any application, using Spotlight to track them down. Snow Leopard is also suggested to have a new set of frameworks specifically for working with multitouch trackpad gestures, patterned after those introduced with the MacBook Air. Speaking of the ultra-thin Air, sometimes less is more. However, the high cost and relatively low capacity of Solid State Drives like the $1000, 64 GB SSD option offered for the Air means that one Microsoft feature Snow Leopard could do without is bloat. As one reader noted, “Currently, Leopard requires 9 GB of available disk space for installation and iLife requires an additional 3 GB. This means that a product such as the [SSD] MacBook Air comes with the hard drive 20% full.�? How the MacBook Air stacks up against other ultra-light notebooks Leopard Predictions for WWDC 2006 WWDC 2007: An Inside Perspective From the Halfway Point Think Small. Snow Leopard aims below the bloat to accommodate the coming wave of SSD-based systems. In the latest build, sources say Apple's own apps are losing weigh dramatically across the board. The apps in the Utilities folder all drop from 468 MB to 111.6 MB, for example. Other apps are similarly svelte, as the graph below indicates. Is this the product of just code optimization and shared resources? One factor likely relates to work on Resolution Independence, which substitutes bitmapped raster graphics (which define every pixel) with smaller vector graphics files (which draw GUI elements and controls by recipe). Vector graphics can be scaled to any size while retaining a high quality appearance, while bitmapped graphics can quickly look blocky when scaled up. Adding larger bitmapped versions can solve that problem, but at the cost of consuming more disk space. Apple earlier told developers it would be providing a library of shared, high quality vector graphics they could use instead of each packaging their own bitmapped art into every app. The dramatic size reductions in these apps must also involve more efficient Localization. For example, Mac OS X Leopard's Mail currently weighs in at over 285 MB, but the majority of its bulk comes from 18 language localizations inside the application bundle that consume 276 MB. The actual Universal Binary code is only a few megabytes and even its associated graphics and other resources only amount to 2.8 MB. Why does Apple default to dumping support for 18 or more languages in every app without providing any simple, centralized way to get rid of the unnecessary ones? Perhaps that question is answered in Snow Leopard, where Mail is reportedly just 91 MB. That's too big to simply to be an English-only, stripped down version for developers, but still far smaller than than Leopard's. Across the board, it appears Snow Leopard apps are about a third as large as their Leopard equivalents. And so while Snow Leopard paradoxically gains more useful features through code improvements and under-the-hood retooling rather than from a Microsoft-style new feature focus that aims to deliver “wow�? with flashy marketing gimmicks, the system is also getting smaller and tighter. There must also be some other subtraction, right? Will Snow Leopard scrape away the old Carbon API? That's the next myth. WWDC 2008: New in Mac OS X Snow Leopard WWDC 2008: Is Mac OS X 10.6 the Death of Carbon? I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast! Submit to Reddit or Slashdot, or consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks! Technorati Tags: Apple, Development, Mac, Software

• RoughlyDrafted Magazine on June 22, 2008
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With disappointments like these, who needs successes?

Will someone please page the lithesome yet strong-handed nymphs whose job it is to massage the furry one's scalp right between the antlers? The Macalope's got a headache again. What's causing it this time? PC World's 15 Biggest Tech Disappointments of 2007 (motto: "It's not another lame top-10 piece if we have 15 items!"). The Macalope doesn't have a problem with most of the items, even Leopard. You just knew an Apple product was going to be on there somewhere -- they simply can't resist -- and Leopard probably did disappoint some people. While this furry beast's admittedly low expectations about Leopard were exceeded and he's had nary a problem with it, others reportedly have. But the iPhone? If that's a tech disappointment, the Macalope hopes 2008 brings Apple a slew of similar disappointments. It'll be a banner year. PC World itself admits that "the phone itself is pretty terrific". Oookay, so you don't so much have a beef against the iPhone. Then what's your beef by-product? But AT&T's broadband service? Definitely second-rate. Really? This broadband service? Or maybe you mean this one. Are you at all familiar with the definition of "definitely"? The $600 price tag -- which soon dropped by $200 and then was followed by a $100 quasi-rebate -- didn't help. What about the fact that it makes every other cell phone look like ass? Did that help? "I think the biggest debacle of 2007 is the iPhone pricing bait and switch," says Peggy Watt, a PC World contributing editor and professor of journalism at Western Washington University. Wow! That's some statement! Which is to say, that's some absurd statement with little to no basis in fact! First of all, Peggy, a bait and switch is when you get someone in the door by telling them the price will be lower than it is, not higher than it one day will be. Or you tell them they'll be getting a "professor of journalism" and then just give them an assistant professor of journalism instead. That's a bait and switch. Second, how is dropping the iPhone's price and giving a rebate -- one that all but quenched the outrage -- possibly a bigger debacle than this one, which improbably didn't make PC World's list? You're entitled to your opinion, assistant professor Peggy. It just happens to be wrong. "People do expect tech prices to drop, but not as quickly as the iPhone did. Apple's response was pretty lame, too; a partial credit that couldn't be used for a lot of popular items (such as iTunes)." Uh, yeah, that would be pretty much the only item it couldn't be used for. Customers may not redeem their store credits: (1) at any iTunes Store in the United States or elsewhere, (2) Apple Store locations outside the United States; (3) at Apple resellers; (4) for cash; (5) to purchase Apple Gift Cards, or,iTunes Store Gift Certificates, to give iTunes Store content as gifts, or to create iTunes Store allowances; or (6) as payments on Apple accounts. Customers may not resell, transfer, or otherwise assign the credits. Unless you count cash as a "popular item". Which, the Macalope supposes, it is seeing how popular it is with masked bandits. Other "popular items" you couldn't use an iPhone rebate for are liquor, anabolic steroids and hookers. Which probably explains why the Macalope has heard that Jose Canseco never cashed his in. But, c'mon, PC World. If you really felt you had to put in two Apple products because you had three Microsoft products, you easily could have picked the Apple TV and no one would have thought twice about it. The horny one knows you're PC World, but listing the iPhone as one of the year's biggest tech disappointments just makes you look stupid. Er.

• Beyond Binary on December 17, 2007
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Microsoft's Mojave Experiment Exposes Serious Vista Problems

Daniel Eran Dilger In its enthusiastic efforts to sweep Vista's problems under the rug using theatrical demonstrations on trick props, the Microsoft's Mojave Experiment also unintentionally exposes some other embarrassments and technical deficiencies related to the “new” operating system now nearly halfway through its expected lifespan. Microsoft’s Mojave Attempts to Wet Vista’s Desert Let Sleeping Dogs Lie! Microsoft bragged that 83% and 89% of Vista users in a separate study would recommend it to others or expressed satisfaction with it (respectively), but it then has to point out that nearly half of those were actually only “somewhat likely” to recommend it and more than half were only “somewhat satisfied” with their experience. In contrast, most consumer satisfaction ratings, such as ChangeWave's smartphone comparisons, only present “very satisfied” users. In a competitive market, users who were only “somewhat satisfied” would be very likely to move on to something else. The iPhone has “very satisfied” 79% of its users in that independent study. But Vista has only “very satisfied” 43% of users in Microsoft's own study, a ranking that compares to the feedback ChangeWave got back on the dreadful smartphones from LG and Sanyo. That's not saying much. On its “Windows Vista: Look how far we've come” page (I am not making this up), Microsoft notes that Vista runs 98 of the top 100 consumer applications. Assuming that Microsoft didn't figure in any Mac-only apps, that means two top sellers still can't run on Vista nearly two years after its launch. Maybe that isn't something to brag about either. Look, It Toots Its Own Horn. “When Windows Vista debuted in January 2007,” Microsoft notes, “we declared it the best operating system we had ever made.” This reminds me of the toddler diapers commercial where the kids sing “I can pull them off an on! Mommy, wow, I'm a big kid now.” Good job patting yourself on the back, Microsoft. Well done. But what was everyone else saying? “'Windows Vista is beautiful,' The New York Times raved,” the site points out, omitting the fact that the Times' review was actually titled “Vista Wins on Looks. As for Lacks …” and began by observing, “Microsoft’s description, which you’ll soon be seeing in millions of dollars’ worth of advertising, is 'Clear, Confident, Connected.' But a more truthful motto would be 'Looks, Locks, Lacks.'” The supposedly “raving” review also noted that the user interface in “Vista has something of a multiple-personality disorder,” noted “some jaw-dropping misfires,” “some useful XP features have simply been removed,” and concluded “that’s not to say, however, that Vista is worth standing in line for on Jan. 30,” before asking “Is it too little, too late?” Windows Vista: Look how far we've come And Shut Up About Security, You're Only Making Things Worse. Microsoft also works hard to advertise Vista's stronger security, a notable improvement. The company says, “Windows Vista has fewer than half the security vulnerabilities of Windows XP,” but that claim relates directly to the fact that Microsoft itself releases the majority of vulnerability reports for its products because the open source community doesn't have the same access to discover and publicize its weaknesses as Linux, Mac OS X, or other products making use of open source code. Microsoft's Vista vulnerability count is therefore about as useful as China's reports on its own human rights violations. However, it also notes that Vista is “60% less likely to be infected by spyware or malware than Windows XP SP2.” That's great, but Windows XP SP2 isn't exactly known to be bulletproof. It's hard to find a Windows PC that isn't dripping with spyware and malware, so only being a little better than half as infected is bad news for Vista, not something to advertise. “Come to Beijing, where you're now 60% less likely to be persecuted for your beliefs, run over by a tank, or die from pollution!” Of course, Microsoft also takes a disingenuous potshot at Apple by saying, “in early 2008, Windows Vista was shown to have 89% fewer vulnerabilities than MacOS X 10.5, making it the most secure Windows release to date.” That non sequitur also fails to point out that Vista was a year old at that point, while Leopard had just been released. But even more damning is that that factoid was sourced from a Microsoft employee's blog, who posted the vulnerability count figures without any context, and without disclosing the fact that “Mac OS X vulnerabilities,” just like the cited “Linux vulnerabilities,” include every flaw found in their bundled open source libraries and servers, regardless of whether these are turned on by default or exposed to users at all. Microsoft does not bundle in counts for flaws found in its equivalent software libraries, and typically even excludes flaws discovered in Internet Explorer and Java. While pundits like to talk a lot about vulnerability counts, they never qualify what those numbers actually represent. For example, does it have any impact on security overall to find that throughout the last year: for Mac OS X: • 16% of the listed vulnerabilities threatened the potential for system access • 10% threatened to expose sensitive data or system info • the largest amount, 29%, were only denial of service attacks while under Windows Vista: • 43% of the vulnerabilities threatened to provide to system access • 24% threatened to expose sensitive data or system info • only 5% were limited to threatening a denial of service attack Microsoft has to lie through its teeth to suggest that Leopard has greater security issues that Vista, despite having just admitted that Vista is only 60% less likely to be infected than a Windows XP machine. How many Mac OS X machines have malware or adware infections? There are simply no credible threats of malware infection on the Mac, and no amount of countable vulnerabilities in Java, Perl, or OpenSSL have changed that this last year during which researchers on Microsoft's payroll were blogging about misleading vulnerability counts on the Mac. The last time we looked at vulnerability numerology for December 2007, it turned out that over third of the Mac OS X flaws that Secunia had tallied up were actually blank placeholders or duplicates. A quarter of the reminder were related to Sun's Java SDK or JRE, which few users touch, and which Microsoft does not include in its own counts for Vista. There were actually half as many flaws in Apple's own Leopard code as there were in Vista's, which really means that Microsoft hasn't delivered some breakthrough in security that has launched Vista to a lofty new position of safety, but only that it is significantly better than Windows XP, but not better enough to get users to spring for an expensive upgrade, accept the performance hit, and buy a bunch of new hardware and software. Conversely, the virus, malware, adware, and spyware plague on Windows has motivated many PC users to move to Macs. Microsoft is upset that Apple is advertising this fact, but before Microsoft complains about Apple telling the truth, Microsoft should really stop lying about Mac security and vulnerability counts, because that kind of blatantly dishonest hypocrisy doesn't help its case at all. Vista vs Mac OS X Security: Why George Ou’s ZDNet Vulnerability Numerology is Absurd Microsoft's Black Kettle. It is comical that Windows enthusiasts try to suggest that the runaway success of the iPod and iPhone is primarily due to Apple's marketing. Microsoft has blown out hundreds of millions of dollars to flog Vista, but it has flopped because it delivers too little advantages at a high price in terms of compatibility, performance, and of course that arrogantly high retail price tag. Microsoft has only backhandedly acknowledged Apple's success with the Mac, iPod, and iPhone in its statements to investors, warning them that it would have to give up profits in order to try to match Apple's business model. Microsoft's business teeters upon its ability to prevent competition in the markets it operates in. Now that the company is facing a credible competitor to the future of Windows from Apple's Macintosh, it must now start delivering upon its promises and actually ship products people want. However, Microsoft is still stuck with Vista until it can release Windows 7 in 2010, likely alongside Windows Mobile 7, its first attempt to copy the iPhone. Apple's current rampage across the PC, MP3 player, smartphone, and mobile Internet device markets demands a stronger response than just rolling out a plan to show up years late to the party. Windows Vista, 7, and Singularity: The New Copland, Gershwin, Taligent Microsoft’s Zune, Vista, and Windows Mobile 7 Strategy vs the iPhone Over the last decade, Microsoft has been content to collect licensing money for warmed up old code without regard for security or features. No amount of Mojave marketing tricks can disguise the problem that the company shipped an Edsel with Vista: a product it arrogantly assumed the market would buy simply because it was Microsoft pushing it out. Let's see how well the company does with some friendly competition. Did you like this article? Let me know. Comment here, in the Forum, or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It's also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!

• RoughlyDrafted Magazine on August 14, 2008
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Will Nokia Rescue Microsoft's Zune? Haha No.

Daniel Eran Dilger Windows enthusiast blogs are atwitter with the news that mobile giant Nokia is considering a partnership with Microsoft to install the Zune Marketplace software on its phones, a move they hope will pull Microsoft's MP3 player out of its doldrums and make it a contender that can rival the iPod. There's a few bricks missing from this load however. Make. Believe. The reports all hinge on a post made by Zune fansite Zunescene, which cited an anonymous, “well placed source within Microsoft” as the basis for its suggestion that Nokia was not just considering a partnership, but already working with the Zune team to get Microsoft's Zune-only music storefront working on its mobile phones. Neither Microsoft nor Nokia have officially made any comment on the idea, and the Zunescene site has never before presented any credible insider information from Microsoft employees. Cited comments from the source sounded suspiciously like a Magic 8 Ball. The development timeline? “It's too soon to say!” The main problem with this story is that Microsoft doesn't exactly keep secrets. The original Zune was unveiled many months before it was made available; the industry knew it was going to be a rewarmed Toshiba Gigabeat long before it hit the shelf. Details of the second model were also leaked out months in advance, as was its new software features, which were leaked so forcefully that there wasn't much left in the can once it actually appeared. The simple fact is that Microsoft and Apple have completely opposite strategies for launching their new products. Apple uses the media to build anticipation through secrecy, while Microsoft uses the press to blow out vapor to hide reality. Microsoft doesn't have secrets, it has optimistic roadmaps enshrouded in nebulous clouds of vapor. Apple is to Secrets as Microsoft is to Vapor. Apple characteristically refuses to provide any advance details on new products and then creates dramatic launch hype by pulling the curtain off products that exceed most observers' expectations. That's why Apple has earned a reputation as being cantankerous and antagonistic with rumor sites; Apple sues to stop advanced leaks because they destroy its ability to launch surprise attacks. When details leak, critics can feign being wholly unimpressed by what they knew to be in the pipeline, and simply reset their expectations to something well beyond unreasonable. In stark contrast, Microsoft typically floats vaporware concepts for new products months or years in advance of their actual launch. These often suggest capabilities that will not actually be delivered. It then allows and encourages its sprawling 'burbs of pundits to make giddy predictions about the low, low price and amazing features this new promised concept will bring to the market. Once the obscuring power of the vapor is completely exhausted, Microsoft typically rolls out an imitative, expensive, unfinished product that the pundits then have to make excuses for until it either suffocates the competition (as its new products often did in the 90s) or falls out of sight and into oblivion (as about half of its products did in the 90s, and as most do today). Microsoft's Cloud isn't Servers. For a list of examples of Microsoft's vapor-billowing train to oblivion, look no further than the last several years of CES announcements: 2000: Microsoft TV, WinCE smartphone 2001: Xbox, Ultimate TV, and Windows Powered, an umbrella term for various WinCE devices 2002: Mira Windows Powered Smart Displays and Freestyle (aka Windows XP Media Center PCs) 2003: Media Center PC, Tablet PC, SPOT watches; the “Video iPod” Media2Go is delayed until mid 2004 2004: Windows XP Media Center Edition 2004, and Portable Media Center devices announced the previous year 2005: Digital Entertainment Anywhere vapor 2006: Xbox 360, Windows Mobile-based Portable Media Center devices 2007: Windows Vista, Windows Home Server 2008: HD-DVD (scrubbed last minute), Surface, Zune, more Windows Home Server. CES: Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas Scratching the Surface of Microsoft's New Table PC Lessons from the Death of HD-DVD Origins of the Blu-ray vs HD-DVD War The Spectacular Failure of WinCE and Windows Mobile Searching for Success The only successful product that can be salvaged from Microsoft's consumer shipwreck of the last decade has been the Xbox line, which has cost Microsoft many billions every year, and is now approaching obsolescence and a sharp downturn in sales before it can even turn any profit. There's no evidence of secrets anywhere, just lots of vaporware concepts that either never made it into the real world (Mira), roam the earth as undead zombies (Windows Mobile, Windows Media Center, WHS, Vista), died after being exposed to realities the market (Microsoft TV, SPOT, HD-DVD), or linger on as incomplete vaporware ghosts (Surface). One can also make lists of Microsoft's abandoned software offerings and service plans, most of which were imitations of the competition. Microsoft pulled the plug on its Live Search Books and Live Search Academic programs (copycats of Google's Book Search) in May after scanning millions of works. And of course it did something similar after finding out it couldn't earn a quick return on its efforts to clone Apple's QuickTime with ActiveMovie, Surround Video, DirectShow, and then Active Authoring Format. Microsoft's Plot to Kill QuickTime Video Game Consoles 2007: Wii, PS3 and the Death of Microsoft’s Xbox 360 Behold: the Apple clone two years behind. The Apple-rumor report on Microsoft's supposed partnership with Nokia is ridiculous simply for the fact that if Microsoft had any sort of announcements that might possibly create any glimpse of good news for its stillborn Zune music player, it wouldn't be holding them back. Microsoft desperately needs some distractive vapor to obscure the fact that it has been trailing Apple by at least two years at every step of the game. Games: Microsoft advertised the concept of Zune gaming well over a year ago, and there's still nothing to show. Apple launched iPod games in 2006. It's now offering console games downloadable over the air from major developers on its mobile WiFi platform. If Microsoft released gaming today, it would already be more than two years behind. But it hasn't. Podcasting: Microsoft released its Zune podcast listings so late in the game it had to call them… podcasts. That term was invented in 2004 by publishing pioneers, and the technology was added to iTunes in 2005. Apple announced it had no trademark claim on the term in late 2006, and Microsoft launched its own podcast directory for the Zune in November 2007. Two years behind (and some change). Partnerships: Apple pioneered links with Nike, Starbucks, Audible, all the major music labels and movie studios, indie distributors, and hardware accessory makers, even including MP3 rival Creative. Microsoft has yet to forge any significant partnerships with the Zune. And who'd want to marry a cad who formerly beat up its PlaysForSure wives and left them for dead (including Creative)? That was just two years ago! WiFi Music Store: Back in March, Francois Ruault, directeur de la division grand public of Microsoft France, was unashamed in leaking to the press the story that Microsoft would release its third generation Zune player in Europe at the end of 2009, along with a WiFi music store like Apple's. That's two years behind, and frankly, WTF? Video: Apple's fourth generation iPod gained the ability to do video output in 2004, and the subsequent model could actually play back full motion video on screen. The original Zune, released a year later with a larger screen purportedly intended for watching video, lacked the ability play most standard video formats, requiring an ages-long transcoding process first. The following year, Microsoft's new flash based Zune was released without video output at all, driving Microsoft years back into the past compared to the video Nano that shipped at the same time. Touch: Microsoft's enthusiast minions tried to equate the $10,000 Surface bathtub of scanners and projectors with the consumer-priced, handheld iPhone last year, but Microsoft is only officially promising to copy some of the iPhone's software features in its Windows Mobile 7, also scheduled for the end of 2009. That's well beyond two years behind. Zune Sales Still In the Toilet Why Microsoft’s Zune is Still Failing From Vista to Zune: Why Microsoft Can’t Sell to Consumers Microsoft : vers un portail de contenus mobiles Zune But I Digress! Is it perchance possible that Microsoft could leverage Nokai's dominance of the international phone market to get its Zune Marketplace running in more places than Apple's WiFi iTunes Store, and subsequently pole vault its Zune failure and its iPhone-humbled Windows Mobile platform into a premier spot? Apart from being too tasty of a concept for Microsoft to keep under wraps, there's additional reason for laughing at the idea. The most obvious is that Nokia is a Microsoft competitor! Yes, sometimes companies do deals with their seeming arch-rivals. Apple and Microsoft have forged agreements and partnerships on Office, OOXML, and Exchange ActiveSync. Microsoft licensed Adobe's Flash for Windows Mobile, a direct competitor to its own (albeit unfinished) Silverlight. And Nokia is already joined at the hip with rival Sony Ericsson in the Symbian software partnership. However, each of those partnerships is an example of a give and take deal. Nokia is already trying to establish its own Ovi portal as a mobile music store. It needs Microsoft's Zune Marketplace as much as it needs another Symbian virus. Not only is the Zune Marketplace a sleepy, deserted mall with no customers and scant merchandise, but it has absolutely zero traction (or attraction) in Europe or other markets where Nokia sells its phones. The Zune is only sold in the US, where Nokia has minimal uptake. Adding the Zune Marketplace to its phones would do nothing for Nokia apart from making its own store look sidelined and associating the company with another megafailure brand. Nokia already has NGage for that. Further, Nokia's Symbian OS is a direct competitor to Microsoft's Windows Mobile, and there is no love lost between them. Nokia can only be irate over Sony Ericsson's jumping into bed with Windows Mobile in an attempt to deliver the XPERIA X1 as its heir to take on the iPhone. Nokia itself has also taken clear steps away from Symbian, but in the direction of Linux, not Microsoft. So why would Nokia be at all interested in promoting Microsoft's rival mobile operating system at its own expense, with nothing to show in return apart from some embarrassment? It isn't of course. There is however, another mobile platform that is interested in teaming up with Microsoft's Zune to advance the prospects of both. The next article will take a look at this white knight, and whether it's likely to actually offer any help. Did you like this article? Let me know. Comment here, in the Forum, or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It's also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!

• RoughlyDrafted Magazine on August 8, 2008
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What's new in iPhone 2.0.1 - Notes and Video Report

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