ContextFree.js and Algorithm Ink: Making Art With Javascript

Aza Raskin: Computers programs lost something important when displaying a splash of color stopped being one line of code. As a kid, I remember being able to type “plot x,y? on the Apple II to throw up a phosphorescent splotch. When the simplicity of the one-line plotter went away, so did the delight at being so effortlessly generative — in a visual way — on the computer. ContextFree.js is a stab at making it easy again. It’s like a grown up version of Logo (or at least...

Aza Raskin: Computers programs lost something important when displaying a splash of color stopped being one line of code. As a kid, I remember being able to type “plot x,y? on the Apple II to throw up a phosphorescent splotch. When the simplicity of the one-line plotter went away, so did the delight at being so effortlessly generative — in a visual way — on the computer. ContextFree.js is a stab at making it easy again. It’s like a grown up version of Logo (or at least the Turtle Graphics part of Logo). If you remember Logo, you know how cool this is. If you don’t, trust me, check this out. And as Ryan Singer points out, the UI that Raskin created for the Algorithm Ink “IDE” is quite clever, too. ★

  • ★ The Unsatisfying State of Twitter Web Clients for the iPhone

    Twitter and the iPhone seem, at a glance, a perfect match: bite-sized micro-content paired with the world’s best mobile web reader. But here’s the thing: there’s not yet a single good iPhone Twitter client. The main things I want in a Twitter interface on my iPhone, roughly in order: A readable, attractive list of tweets, with the ability to page back to previous tweets so I can catch up if I haven’t looked at Twitter in a while. A good text input field for posting, including a live character count and responsive typing speed. The ability to mark tweets as favorites. An easy way to create @username replies. A way to view a list of replies directed at me. There’s not a single available Twitter client for the iPhone that offers all of the above. And the single biggest problem is out of the hands of third-party developers: paging. The API only returns the 20 most recent tweets, and the optional parameter to request previous pages (20 tweets at a time) has been marked “Temporarily Disabled” for over six months. This means when you use a third-party Twitter client, you see the 20 most recent tweets in your stream, and that’s it. It’s a deal-breaking limitation for third-party clients, because when you read your stream via the Twitter.com web site, paging works just fine. It’s unclear what the rationale behind this API limitation is — I can find no public explanation for it from anyone at Twitter. If it’s to prevent API clients from overwhelming Twitter’s servers by paging back through the entire history of users’ timelines (say, for the purpose of building a database for a Twitter search engine), this could be solved by allowing paging, but limiting the results to the most recent N pages, where N is a relatively low number like 10. That would suffice for common case of someone wanting to catch up on the last few dozen tweets from the people they follow. This limitation isn’t just a problem for Twitter web clients. Unless Twitter re-opens this ability in the API, it’ll impose a serious limitation on the coming-soon-to-the-iTunes-App-Store native iPhone application Twitter clients as well. Given that third-party iPhone applications won’t run in the background, each time you launch such a client you’ll see the 20 most recent tweets and no more. Twitter.com You don’t need a “client” to use Twitter, of course. You can just use the regular Twitter.com web site, which renders fine in Mobile Safari. It’s not, however, optimized for display on the iPhone. At its default size, it’s far too small to be readable: You can use the double-tap trick to zoom in on the content column, but you sort of have to double-tap at just the right spot near the top to get the entire column (including icons) sized perfectly. Once you’re zoomed in it’s a pretty good iPhone Twitter display: it looks pretty good, includes user icons, and displays 20 tweets per page. It also includes “Newer” and “Older” buttons at the bottom of the list for paging. At the end of each tweet are two buttons: a star for marking favorites and an arrow for creating an @username reply. However, at just 18  18 px, these buttons are far too small to be usable on an iPhone’s touch screen. Apple, in the iPhone Human Interface Guidelines for Web Applications, recommends that controls have a tappable area at least 44 px high.1 (For example, the back/forward/etc. toolbar at the bottom of the screen in Mobile Safari is 44 pixels high.) In terms of area, an 18  18 px button is just 16 percent the size of a 44  44 px button. But what really kills the usability of these buttons in Mobile Safari is that you’re typically viewing them scaled down. Twitter.com’s tweet list, not including the user icons, is 470 px wide; the iPhone screen in portrait mode is just 320 px wide. When zoomed to the width pictured above, these buttons are just 10 or 11 px wide. You’ve got to zoom significantly to use these buttons on the iPhone. For posting, the Twitter.com interface is a disaster on the iPhone. It works, but the size is all wrong. When you tap in the field to begin writing, Mobile Safari zooms the view to a width that cuts off half the field. If you zoom back out to a scale where the entire field is visible, the text is ludicrously small. Worse, typing in the field is dreadfully slow. The JavaScript Twitter.com uses to display the live character count works just fine in a desktop browser, but it’s way too slow for the iPhone. Worse, you can’t even see the character count while typing because it’s off the screen if you’re zoomed in close enough to make the text in the field legible. In short, Twitter.com is a perfect example of a web page that renders and works correctly in Mobile Safari, but which provides a user experience far inferior to what could be done with an iPhone-optimized web site. It seems weird that sites like Facebook and Amazon, which do so much more than Twitter, have iPhone-optimized interfaces, but Twitter does not. m.Twitter.com Twitter also provides a “mobile web” interface — a web interface for phones with rudimentary browsers. It used to be that to access this interface, you used a different URL: m.twitter.com. That was good. A few weeks ago they changed this, however, and Twitter is now using user-agent sniffing to automatically serve the mobile web interface to Mobile Safari, even when you go to the regular twitter.com domain. This is bad. You can change which version you’re getting in the footer at the bottom of the page. (Even if you don’t have an iPhone or iPod Touch, you can try out the mobile interface by using Safari’s Develop menu to set your user agent to Mobile Safari.) This setting is remembered with a cookie, but it doesn’t take long for the cookie to be forgotten. With the old scheme, where the standard and mobile web interfaces were specified by different URLs, you could (and I did) bookmark both separately, for use in different situations. The key appeal of Twitter’s mobile web interface is that it is very fast to load. One obvious reason is that doesn’t display user icons. Another is that the entire page is almost self-contained — the CSS is inline, it doesn’t use any JavaScript, and the only image is the small Twitter logo. It also only loads 10 tweets at a time. There’s no need for zooming, and typographically the display is spot-on — perfect use of Helvetica for the iPhone. (Unless you rotate the screen to landscape: if you do, the font blows up to giant size and stays there even if you rotate back to portrait.) There’s no way to mark favorites or create @username replies. The editing interface for the mobile version stinks. Most obviously, the field is way too small: it’s just one line high and doesn’t even extend to the full width of the iPhone screen. Typing performance is good, but that’s because it doesn’t use JavaScript at all, which means it doesn’t provide a character count. It does stop you from typing any additional characters once you hit the 140 mark, though. (It’s just a text field with the maxlength attribute set to 140.) A notable omission from the mobile interface is a way to view your @yourname replies. In the standard web interface you just tap the Replies tab, and all the third-party Twitter web clients support this as well. The 10-tweet display is a bit limiting, but like the standard Twitter web interface, the mobile interface supports paging. Better to have just 10 tweets at a time but with paging than 20 tweets at a time and no paging (as with third-party clients). EDGE network performance ranges from “kind of slow” to “really damn slow”; when tending toward the latter, the difference in loading Twitter’s mobile interface and standard interface is dramatic. That’s why it stinks that it’s set with cookie rather than the URL: if you’re currently set to use the standard interface (because, say, you were on Wi-Fi) but now wish to use the mobile interface (because you’re now on EDGE), you have to wait for the entire standard web interface to load, scroll to the bottom, zoom in, and click “Mobile”. With the old way, (a) they were bookmarkable, and (b) you could keep them open in two separate tabs at the same time — making it easy to use the standard Twitter interface most of the time, while switching to the mobile web interface with just two quick taps for use on EDGE. Hahlo Dean Robinson’s Hahlo is my favorite third-party Twitter web client. If it weren’t for the no-paging limitation in the Twitter API, I’d use it as my primary iPhone interface to Twitter. My biggest complaint about Hahlo itself is that its initial screen is a list of menu items, not a list of tweets. Perhaps this seems like a ticky-tacky thing to complain about, but the main thing you want to see when loading Twitter are the tweets. Waiting for the page with the menu to load before you then wait for the page with the tweets to load is annoying. (There’s a workaround for this, though, which I’ll get to in a moment.) Plus, the menu commands are a bit oddly named: “My Timeline” is a list of your own tweets. Twitter’s own parlance for this is “Archive”. Hahlo’s second menu item, “My Friends Timeline”, is what you want: a list of the 20 most recent tweets from the people you follow. But because Hahlo is entirely Ajax-driven, the URL doesn’t change from http://hahlo.com/, which means you can’t bookmark the tweets page you see after tapping “My Friends Timeline” on the main menu. However, you can get a bookmarkable list of tweets from Hahlo by loading this URL: http://hahlo.com/friends_timeline. Most users will never realize this is possible, because there doesn’t seem to be a way to navigate to that URL from within the Hahlo UI. Once you do see Hahlo’s tweet list, it looks nice. Good size, good spacing, good use of Helvetica. It includes user icons and has reasonably-sized buttons for marking tweets as favorites and for creating replies and direct messages to the author of a tweet. Editing is where Hahlo is a Viking. Typing speed is acceptable — not great, but good enough — and the best of any Twitter web client with a live character count. In most other iPhone clients with a live character count, typing feels dreadfully sluggish. Hahlo’s character count is mostly accurate — which means it’s best-of-breed for iPhone Twitter web clients.2 iTweet Colby Palmer’s iTweet is very much comparable to Hahlo. The most notable difference is the reversed light-on-dark color scheme. (I like it.) Like Hahlo, it offers a very nice tweet display, replete with nicely-sized per-tweet buttons for marking favorites and creating replies. iTweet’s UI is more sensibly laid-out and named than Hahlo’s. At the top of the tweet list are three buttons: Menu, Refresh, and Post. (Hahlo uses the word Update instead of Post, which is ambiguous: Update could just as easily be used to mean Refresh, in the sense of “Update this list of tweets.” You shouldn’t have to press a button to figure out what it does.) iTweet’s editing field looks good. Appearance-wise, it’s my favorite of any client — the text is eminently readable, slightly bigger and bold. iTweet also provides a live character count, but unlike with Hahlo’s, iTweet’s JavaScript hooks result in terribly sluggish typing speed. It doesn’t even come close to keeping up with my two-thumb typing speed, which is rather slow to start with. It doesn’t lose keystrokes, but the UI feedback for each keystroke is delayed by a fraction of a second, completely ruining the feedback that makes the iPhone’s on-screen keyboard tolerable. PocketTweets Justin Williams and Bobby Andersen’s PocketTweets uses more gradients than any other iPhone Twitter client. The icons look good, as one might expected from Mr. Andersen, but the text is too small throughout the entire UI. PocketTweets correctly defaults to showing you a list of tweets rather than a menu, and like iTweet, offers buttons for marking favorites and replying. However, once you mark a tweet as a favorite, PocketTweets doesn’t seem to allow you to unmark it. Also, the vertical Favorite/Reply button layout is worse than the horizontal layout in Hahlo and iTweet — I find myself inadvertently invoking Reply when I mean to tap Favorite. Another annoyance is that PocketTweets doesn’t create links from @username instances in the text of a tweet. In other clients you can tap on @username to display a list of that user’s tweets — useful for picking up the context of a reply. PocketTweets’s editing UI is also too small; it feels unnecessarily cramped. Typing speed is acceptable (on part with Hahlo), and it provides a character count. Unlike Hahlo and iTweet, PocketTweets doesn’t enforce the 140-character limit in the field. With Hahlo and iTweet, once you hit the 140-character mark, you can’t enter additional characters in the field. PocketTweets lets you run long, trusting you to notice the greater-than-140 character count. I like this design — it allows you to finish your sentence and then go back and edit the message to get under the limit. Sort of like writing an article with a word count — you wouldn’t want your word processor to stop accepting input once you’ve reached the limit. One last, truly minor niggle: the name “PocketTweets” is too long to fit as a web clip name on the iPhone home screen. It gets truncated as “Pocke…eets”. PocketTweets pre-dates the iPhone web clip feature, but it goes to show that iPhone app names need to be short and sweet. Thincloud Last and least is [Thincloud], from New Leaders. For reading, Thincloud’s font is too small, the text wraps back underneath the user icon on long-ish tweets, and there’s no way to mark a tweet as a favorite or automate a reply. For posting, there’s no live character count or enforced limit — Thincloud will let you blow past the 140-character mark with nary a warning, and you won’t notice until you see your truncated tweet in the list. (On the other hand, it’s the JavaScript for the character counting that seems to slow the other clients down; typing speed in Thincloud’s editing field is the fastest of the bunch.) SMS Twitter was conceived from the outset as a service for mobile phone users, even those with ridiculous old-timey pre-2007 phones without web browsers, using SMS. Twitter’s 140-character limit on status updates is a result of the 160-character limit of SMS. For reading tweets, Twitter might work OK via SMS if you only follow a very small handful of relatively quiet friends. But if you follow even just a few dozen people, I can’t even imagine how annoying it would be to have an SMS alert jingle your phone every time someone updates. To post status updates via SMS, you associate you mobile phone number with your Twitter profile (on your Twitter.com account settings page), and then send messages to the short code 40404. Typing speed is excellent in the iPhone SMS app, but, of course, you don’t get a character count. One technical advantage to posting tweets via SMS is that it works well even with sketchy signal strength or when Twitter’s web servers are under duress. Via SMS, I was able to post live updates from the hall in Moscone West during the Macworld Expo keynote in January. (Given that Twitter’s web servers were mostly down during the keynote, however, it’s questionable whether anyone was able to read them until afterward.) So If ever there was a web app that could be — should be — better on the iPhone than on a desktop browser, Twitter is it. But it isn’t. Twitter.com is the best site for reading tweets, even though it’s not iPhone-optimized at all, simply because it allows for paging. But it’s the worst site for posting. Hahlo and PocketTweets are the best for posting, but because the Twitter API doesn’t allow for paging, no third-party client is good for reading. The result is completely unsatisfying. Using one Twitter client for reading and another for posting is like getting your sandwich at Burger King and your fries from McDonald’s — convenience is the whole point. In landscape mode, Mobile Safari’s toolbar shrinks to 32 pixels high — a reasonable compromise for an orientation where vertical screen space is at a premium.↩ In every character counting feature I’ve tested on the iPhone, the count gets thrown off when you delete characters. Something seems broken regarding JavaScript keystroke event hooks in MobileSafari, at least with the Delete key.↩

  • ★ Let the Tea Leaf Reading Begin

    The best thing about being an Apple observer is that even when the company does make a long-awaited announcement, it inevitably leads to new questions regarding what exactly they mean. Apple punditry is the Kremlinology of the tech world. So it is with this week’s announcement from Steve Jobs1 that, yes, “We want native third party applications on the iPhone, and we plan to have an SDK in developers’ hands in February.” We now know two new things: (1) that there will be “native third party applications on the iPhone”; and (2) that the SDK is scheduled for February. That leaves a long list of questions. Whither Widgets? For one: What exactly is a “native third party application”? The obvious answer is the sort of UIKit-based Cocoa-ish applications that underground iPhone hackers have been creating over the last two months — the exact sort of native apps that Apple has itself already written for the iPhone and iPod Touch. For all we know at this point, though, it could be something more like Dashboard widgets — but I think that’s unlikely. Jobs wrote: > With our revolutionary multi-touch interface, powerful > hardware and advanced software architecture, we believe we > have created the best mobile platform ever for developers. JavaScript, HTML, and CSS are cool in that they’re widely-used, widely-known coding standards — but they’re not a good way to create user experiences that take full advantage of the iPhone, and would be pretty hard for Apple to pass off as an SDK for “native apps”. Third party developers want access to the same dog food Apple’s own iPhone engineers are eating. Plus, there’s the issue of performance. Iconfactory developer Craig Hockenberry, who has been tinkering with the unofficial iPhone developer tools to create an iPhone-native version of Twitterrific, wrote a splendid weblog entry titled “Benchmarking in Your Pants” regarding the lackluster performance of JavaScript code running in MobileSafari compared to compiled Objective-C code running in a native iPhone app. Function calls, for example, were 226 times slower in JavaScript. (Hockenberry also benchmarked JavaScript running on the iPhone compared to the same code running in Safari on an Intel-based iMac; the code ran about 80 times faster on the iMac.) Back in January at the iPhone’s introduction in the Macworld Expo keynote, Jobs described some of the apps on the iPhone, including Weather and Stocks, as “widgets”. My somewhat-informed understanding is that Apple’s original plan was for the iPhone to ship with its major apps written in Cocoa and with a handful of smaller apps written as Dashboard-style HTML/CSS/JavaScript widgets — but that this plan was scuttled for performance reasons, and the Weather and Stocks widgets2 were rewritten as UIKit Objective-C apps sometime this spring.3 My guess is that they ran into what Hockenberry documented: JavaScript on the current iPhone just isn’t fast enough to provide an iPhone-caliber user experience. So my money is that the iPhone SDK that Apple plans to release this winter is the real thing — Cocoa-style UIKit apps written in Objective-C. Security? Jobs wrote: It will take until February to release an SDK because we’re trying to do two diametrically opposed things at once—provide an advanced and open platform to developers while at the same time protect iPhone users from viruses, malware, privacy attacks, etc. This is no easy task. Some claim that viruses and malware are not a problem on mobile phones—this is simply not true. There have been serious viruses on other mobile phones already, including some that silently spread from phone to phone over the cell network. As our phones become more powerful, these malicious programs will become more dangerous. And since the iPhone is the most advanced phone ever, it will be a highly visible target. External security — the threat of vulnerabilities that would allow malfeasants to compromise a victim’s iPhone — is a serious matter. There have already been several published exploits against the iPhone, including an as-of-this-writing open vulnerability in TIFF-processing code in the current iPhone OS. So clearly there is some merit to Jobs’s stated security concerns. As it stands in the current iPhone OS, all processes run as the root user; in broad layman’s terms, any process has access to everything else on the phone. So when a buffer overflow can be exploited to allow remote code execution, that code can do anything. To allow third-party iPhone apps to run today would be to trust those third-party developers not to write code with any security flaws. What the iPhone needs before Apple will allow third-party apps to run is some sort of sandbox, a way to prevent application processes from being able to access things they shouldn’t be allowed to access. But iPhone Cocoa apps are no more inherently susceptible to buffer overflow vulnerabilities than Mac Cocoa apps. And the hysteria over the iPhone’s current “everything runs as root” situation is overblown.4 Applications on your Mac don’t run as the root; they run under your user account. But all of your data — your email, your address book, your documents, everything your apps can read or write without administrator authentication — is vulnerable to any sort of hypothetical buffer overflow exploit on the Mac, and would be on the iPhone, too, even if iPhone apps didn’t all run as root. Sure, root privileges allow an exploit to do anything, but the most important thing on your system is your personal data, and an exploit doesn’t need root privileges to access that. I’m thinking Apple is more concerned about internal security — about having third-party apps limited to a sandbox so that user-installed code has no access to things like, say, the phone network modem’s firmware (the component that you need to diddle with to create SIM unlocks). That’s the key difference between the iPhone and the Mac, security-wise. Which Third-Party Developers? Mac OS X is pretty much completely open to development; even the developer tools are free, and anyone is free to write whatever software they want for the Mac. It seems unlikely that iPhone OS X development is going to be like that. One possibility is that the iPhone SDK will only be available to developers with ADC Select ($499) or Premiere ($3,499) accounts. (Premier and Select ADC members are the only ones with access to pre-release Mac OS X seeds, for example.) If that’s the case, it’s not going to be popular with hobbyist developers, but most professional Mac developers already have paid ADC memberships, and, let’s face it, we all know most iPhone apps are going to be written by Mac developers. Interviewed via email, Craig Hockenberry told me, “If there’s a simple way to get third party apps on the iPhone, you keep 90 percent of the developers happy and jailbreak/unlock has much less momentum. Sure, there will still be people that want to ‘buck the system’ but they’ll be in the minority rather than the majority.” The most intriguing part of Jobs’s announcement was this section, regarding security: Some companies are already taking action. Nokia, for example, is not allowing any applications to be loaded onto some of their newest phones unless they have a digital signature that can be traced back to a known developer. While this makes such a phone less than “totally open,? we believe it is a step in the right direction. We are working on an advanced system which will offer developers broad access to natively program the iPhone’s amazing software platform while at the same time protecting users from malicious programs. It’s hard not to interpret the scare quotes around “totally open” as a reference to Nokia’s recent “Open to Anything” ad campaign — sort of a you guys aren’t completely open either call-out. This seems like a pretty clear indication that Apple is working on a similar signing system for iPhone apps. Restricting development to paid ADC members would instantly allow Apple to associate app signatures “back to a known developer”. Here’s more information from Nokia on the signing program Jobs mentioned; here’s similar information on the Symbian site. Which Apps? Another question is whether Apple is going to allow participating (trusted-by-Apple) developers to write whatever apps they want, signing the apps themselves, or if apps will need to be approved case-by-case by Apple before being signed. Mac OS X Leopard includes a new “application signing” feature, described by Apple thusly: A digital signature on an application verifies its identity and ensures its integrity. All applications shipped with Leopard are signed by Apple, and third-party software developers can also sign their applications. That same page describes a “sandboxing” feature that seems applicable to the iPhone, too: Sandboxing prevents hackers from hijacking applications to run their own code by making sure applications only do what they’re intended to do. It restricts an application’s file access, network access, and ability to launch other applications.” The prototypical example of a potentially popular app that Apple might refuse to approve would be a VOIP app like, say, Skype, in that it would undermine the need for the phone network, which in turn undermines Apple’s revenue sharing with the iPhone’s exclusive network partners. Or, say, instant messaging, the omission of which from the current iPhone is seen by many as a concession to the fact that heavy SMS users pay handsomely for extra monthly messages. (Personally, I suspect iChat for iPhone simply didn’t make the cut for 1.0 but is planned for a future update.) “Nokia’s model is to run as trusted/untrusted,” said Hockenberry. “Trusted apps get to access more than untrusted ones. This model could be extended to allow different levels of access based upon whatever Apple wants (as owner of the root certificate.) Basic access for Wi-Fi, extended access for EDGE, hardware access for deep pockets, etc.” That makes sense, and strikes me as a likely course for Apple. Development There’s a question, then, of how developers will write the apps in the first place. If iPhones only run third-party apps that have been approved by Apple, how do you develop an application in the first place before it’s been approved? Steven Frank — who, as co-founder of Panic and an unrepentant gadget hound, may well be the single most interested person in the world in a supported iPhone SDK — described to me via email the development process for the Danger Hiptop/Sidekick: “The Hiptop/Sidekick platform has a Java SDK that abstracts away all the low-level hardware stuff so you can’t touch it, while still providing everything you need to write an application.  You test and debug in an emulator/virtual machine that can simulate edge conditions like loss of cellular network availability and so on.  When you’re almost done, and ready to try on real hardware, you apply for a ‘developer key’, which is a small certificate that you install on the phone that enables you to run third-party apps that didn’t come from the on-device for-purchase catalog.  To get the developer key, you have to prove to them you actually have an almost complete app, and aren’t just some kid who wants hot Yung Joc ringtones by submitting a build of your application.  You also have to sign a waiver that says you are no longer eligible for support from your cellular carrier.” The iTunes App Store? Which leaves us with the question of distribution and installation. The obvious route is the same one Apple has taken with iPod games: the iTunes Store. Apple, in this case, would likely get a cut of every sale. From a user’s perspective, it’d be easy and obvious: shop and pay for apps in iTunes, and iTunes takes care of installing the software, and, perhaps, synching data. This is similar to the Danger model — where apps must be approved, and can be sold only through the official channel. Limiting, to be sure, but as Frank put it, “The process [of developing for Danger] is somewhat tedious, but still an order of magnitude better than not allowing third-party applications, period.” Frank also pointed out the most glaring downside of Danger’s pay-to-play development model: “One drawback to this approach from the user’s perspective is that there is basically no free third-party software. Everything costs at least a couple bucks.” The announcement appeared on Apple’s Hot News web page, but with no permalink, so it’s likely to disappear from Apple’s web site in a week or two as newer items appear. I’ve saved a plain text copy here for posterity.↩ I wonder if the Calculator app was originally a widget, too. UI-wise, it’d certainly be a cinch, because just like with the iPhone’s Weather and Stocks apps, it more or less looks and acts exactly like the corresponding widget in Mac OS X. So my theory is that when Apple made the decision to rewrite the iPhone widgets as native iPhone Cocoa apps, they used the widgets as the specs for the apps. “Make a native app that looks and acts exactly like this widget,” more or less. One thing that makes me think this is that the iPhone Calculator app doesn’t make any sounds when you press the buttons. Pure JavaScript/HTML widgets can’t make sounds when you click or tap buttons. I find typing on the iPhone keyboard to be much more satisfying with the sound on; with the sound off, because the keys are virtual, there’s no sensory feedback at all. The Calculator app would feel more real if it simply made the same button-clicking noises as the iPhone keyboard.↩ That this change was — I believe — made rather late in the game might explain why vestigial references to “widgets” remained in the shipping iPhone 1.0 software. (It could also mean, of course, that Apple plans to re-expose this feature at some point in the future.)↩ It certainly is a curious question why all iPhone apps run as root. I don’t know the answer. But I’ll bet there’s an interesting engineering trade-off involved somewhere. If you think the reason is laziness or ignorance on the part of the iPhone OS X engineers, you’re an idiot.↩

  • ★ Listen to Tim Cook

    One thing Apple knows is what it does. Apple designs and produces very nice things. All this hubbub over low-cost laptops is outside the realm of what makes Apple Apple. There has long been, especially in the business press, a strong bias towards encouraging Apple to act like a “normal” computer company. Remember when it was common for analysts to call for Apple to break itself apart into separate software and hardware companies? Or for Apple to obtain a license for Windows and make “well-designed” Windows PCs. Or for Apple to sell licenses for Mac OS X to Dell? A lot of the current action in laptops, industry-wide, is at the low end of the market. Some of these machines look pretty interesting. None of them look like something Apple would make. But yet there was (and is) this consensus that given current industry trends, combined with the rather shaky (to say the least) state of the global economy, well of course, what Apple needed to do was cheapen its MacBook lineup. Exhibit A, exhibit B, exhibit C. What Apple announced Tuesday was exactly the opposite. Instead of making them cheaper, they made them better. Dramatic performance improvements in graphics, and a significant leap forward in industrial design and build quality. Cheap laptops creak and squeak at the seams. Apple’s new MacBooks are cut from solid blocks of aluminum and hardly have any seams. Apple doesn’t make computers that people have to buy. They make computers that people want to buy. The “netbook” market is an entirely different game. Apple may well go there eventually, but it won’t be for another year or two, and then when they do, it will drive the PC press nuts because Steve Jobs will announce it in such a way that makes it seem as though Apple invented the entire product category. (Aside: I think — and this is nothing more than my own speculation here — that it’s more likely that a hypothetical really small (as in much smaller than even the Air), really cheap (as in less than $700) notebook computer from Apple would not be a Mac. It’d run some variant of “OS X” of course, but I think it’d resemble a hot-rodded big-screen iPhone with a keyboard, not a stripped down small-screen MacBook. The iPhone OS would run faster on a $600 netbook than it does on an actual iPhone. Mac OS X would run slower, probably a lot slower. Apple builds things up, not down. Just my hunch. (Also: It’s too bad Apple has already used the name “iBook”.)) Higher performance and improved build quality are in direct opposition to lower prices. These guys calling for $800 Apple notebooks have the company all wrong. To me, the most interesting part of yesterday’s event had nothing to do with product announcements, but rather was COO Tim Cook’s “state of the Mac” segment at the beginning. This was Apple speaking directly to its investors and to the business press. Apple wants them to understand the Mac business. Cook outlined six main points which he claims Apple believes are the reasons behind the four-year-long growth in Mac sales: Better computers Better software Compatibility Vista Marketing Retail Stores “You may wonder,” Cook said, “why is Vista on the list. I think it’s fair to say that Vista hasn’t lived up to everything Microsoft had hoped it would. And consequently, it’s opened doors for a lot of people to consider switching to the Mac.”1 What does not appear on that list is price. This is not to say price is irrelevant to the Mac, or that Apple is somehow immune to the circumstances of the economy, but simply that price is not and has never been one of the main factors in the Mac’s success. Cook’s list isn’t marketing bullshit — it’s an accurate, succinct description of Apple’s computer business. Other PC makers fight viciously over pricing because it’s the only factor on which they can differentiate. Few of them bother trying to make better computers — most just build bland, junky wrappers around Intel’s reference chipsets. (Notable exceptions in the laptop space include Sony and Lenovo.) None can offer better software because they all ship the same version of Windows. They’re stuck with Vista. They all seem, for whatever reason, incapable of producing Apple-level marketing and advertising. And none of them who’ve tried have been able to do their own retail stores successfully. Price is all they have. Cook then showed two pie charts. One showing the Mac’s unit share in the U.S. retail market at 18 percent, up from “a single digit number, just a few years ago”. Cook then drops the kicker, the single key point you need to grasp to understand Apple’s Macintosh business: “And what’s more impressive than this is if you look at revenue share. Because we focus on fully-features systems, and we don’t compromise on quality, our revenue share is over 31 percent. That means that one out of every three dollars that’s spent on computers in U.S. retail is spent on the Macintosh. What a difference a few years makes.” 31 percent of the money on 18 percent of the unit sales. Those numbers are stunning — and they would not get more impressive by selling $800 MacBooks. Yesterday’s entire event, the whole thing, could be summarized by these five words from Cook: “We don’t compromise on quality.” Cook really rubbed this point in, putting up a slide and reading aloud this quote from Peter Burrows of BusinessWeek: “Vista looks like it could turn out to be one of the greatest missteps in tech history.” The executive-level rivalry between Microsoft and Apple seems to be at the highest level since the John Sculley era at Apple.↩

  • Will Google's Android Play DOS to Apple's iPhone?

    Daniel Eran Dilger Today's broad array of smartphone operating system contenders are offering lots of potential answers to a problem that only requires one. It appears the market has two options ahead: either pool generic hardware makers behind a single operating system and deliver a smartphone marketplace that resembles the Windows PC market, or watch them fall to a dominant leader and have a smartphone market that resembles Apple's iPod ecosystem. This decision isn't going to be made by a class of intellectual elite, or by government mandate. it's going to be made by the market itself. Here are the factors that will influence the outcome, either marginalizing Apple's iPhone into a niche as the company has twice experienced previously at the hands of DOS in 1981 and Windows in 1991, or positioning it as the dominant leader as Apple has achieved for itself with the iPod since 2001. The third segment in this series looks at Google's Android and the Open Handset Alliance as a possible “DOS-attack” against Apple's iPhone. Subsequent segments will look at Nokia's newly opened Symbian and other mobile contenders challenging the iPhone. Will the iPhone Meet its Match from a Modern Day DOS? Will Windows Mobile Play DOS to Apple’s iPhone? Will Google's Android Play DOS to Apple's iPhone? Will Symbian Play DOS to Apple's iPhone? Google Acquires Android. In 2005, Google purchased a startup named Android, which had been in business for nearly two years. The secretive startup was known only to be working on software for mobile phones. It was being run by a who's who of mobile industry veterans, including Andy Rubin, the founder of Danger. Rubin had earlier worked at WebTV along with Chris White and Andy McFadden, both of whom had also joined Android. Richard Miner of Orange and Nick Sears of Tmobile also brought their mobile provider experience to Android. At the time of the acquisition, Google didn't announce any plans for Android and instead only told BusinessWeek, “We acquired Android because of the talented engineers and great technology. We're thrilled to have them here.” It appeared that Google was only going to be expanding its search services for mobile phone users, along the lines of the Google SMS answer system it had recently released. Google Buys Android for Its Mobile Arsenal - BusinessWeek Windows XP Media Center Edition vs Apple TV: The Fall of WebTV The GPhone Myth. As reports began to leak out about talks between Google and hardware makers throughout 2007, rumors began to fly about “the GPhone,” a competitive offering that was supposed to take on the iPhone. Some phone enthusiasts hoped Google would jump in to rescue the struggling OpenMoko project and turn it into a viable project that could attack Apple's new smartphone. In October 2007, I printed the Great Google GPhone Myth, taking apart the idea that Google would be directly competing against the iPhone, and describing that Google was really working on a free alternative to Windows Mobile as a conduit for getting its search and related services on a broader variety of mobiles. Google's services were already on the iPhone. In November, Google played its hand: it had organized a consortium of companies called the Open Handset Alliance to develop open standards for mobiles. The first product from the group would be Android, a mobile operating system built on the Linux kernel. Google wasn't getting into the phone handset business at all; it was only making sure that its mobile search products would not risk being marginalized by the threat of Windows Mobile on phones in the same way Microsoft had been working to leverage its PC monopoly to push Google search off the Windows desktop. The Great Google gPhone Myth Introducing Android: Leader of Linux. Two weeks later, Google released an early version of the Android software. On top of a Linux kernel, Android uses a specialized version of a Java Virtual Machine that takes Java language code and turns it into what Google calls “Dalvik bytecode” rather than Java bytecode as a standard JVM would. This allows Google to leverage existing and familiar Java language tools without paying Sun for a Java license. Like Mac OS X and its fraternal iPhone OS, Android includes a variety of open source libraries, including SQLite and WebKit. On top of that, Google developed a series of frameworks that handle the tasks Cocoa Touch does on the iPhone. Android also bundles a set of applications. While Apple adapted its existing Mac OS X to work in a mobile environment to create the iPhone OS, Android is more like a customized Java environment running on a specialized mobile Linux variant: elements of maturity in an otherwise experimental new platform. What is Android? -Google Android was by no means the first mobile OS using Linux. Both Palm and its amputated ACCESS software arm have Linux-based mobile platforms. Nokia has Maemo, which it uses in its Internet Tablets, and also recently acquired Trolltech and its Qtopia mobile Linux platform. Motorola has teamed up with MontaVista Software to use its Mobilinux. Intel created the Moblin project for mobile Linux, aimed at Internet devices. Google's OHA also isn't the first consortium to attempt to standardize a mobile Linux platform. The OSDL started the Mobile Linux Initiative to define requirements for hardware; the Consumer Electronics Linux Forum (CELF) then worked to define various phone profiles aimed at the Japanese market; the Linux Phone Standard (LiPS) Forum tried to do the same thing in Europe. In 2007, LiPS was folded into the new LiMo Foundation, along with the OSDL. All of these committees have had some overlap and some complementary features. Several of Google's OHA partners are also LiMo members, including NTT DoCoMo, Wind River, and Motorola. So why didn't Google just join LiMo? “LiMo, very candidly, wasn't moving fast enough,” OHA board member John Bruggeman told CNET. Google hopes to herd the Linux cats into a progressive, structured platform that can battle against Symbian and Windows Mobile to succeed as the new DOS of smartphones. Will Google fracture or unify mobile Linux? The Presumption of the Necessity of DOS. The previous segment examining Windows Mobile pointed out how the PC industry as a whole assumed that Microsoft's desktop Windows monopoly would easily take over dominance in the MP3 player market, pushing Apple into a niche position. This was expected because DOS had pushed Apple's early computers into a reduced role starting in 1981, and Microsoft had repeated this again in 1991 when the DOS world migrated to Windows, effectively pruning Apple's Macintosh into a Bonsai platform. The inability of one company to dominate any product category has been frequently repeated by PC industry pundits as a given, despite the fact that history is full of examples of this happening. Sony dominated personal music players for two decades under the Walkman brand even while equally large competitors tried to push it from this position; Nintendo has similarly owned handheld gaming despite ill-fated efforts to grab a piece of its pie by products running a generic platform such as Microsoft's WinCE (Gizmondo), Linux (GP32), and Symbian (N-Gage). In fact, outside of the Windows/DOS PC, there are actually few examples of a generic platform taking over an industry. Nearly every other consumer-facing product uses proprietary platforms: car makers, stereo equipment, appliances and so on typically all use designs custom to their maker. The paradox of the Windows PC market has been that Microsoft's broadly licensed software supposedly saves hardware makers from investing in software development while ensuring compatibility, when in reality it adds significant costs to PC makers while limiting their ability to differentiate themselves. That explains why PC makers have been perpetually merging together and going out of business while Microosft has rolled in money over the last two decades. Parallel efforts to copy Microsoft in broadly licensing an operating system have regularly failed: IBM's OS/2, Apple's Mac OS, Palm's PDA OS, even Microsoft's own efforts to duplicate Windows dominance in other markets, from copy machines to PDAs to smartphones to SPOT watches to music players. The closest copy may be Symbian, but its customers are partners, not simply consumers of a generic third party's operating system as Windows licensees are. That indicates it is not necessary to duplicate the dominance exercised by Microsoft over the PC industry in the smartphone market. Google's Android and Symbian exist more as technology sharing pacts among manufacturers, but both aspire to take Microsoft's DOS role among smartphones. However, the idea that Apple's iPhone must be dethroned by a modern-day DOS, whether Windows Mobile, Android, or Symbian, is not just debatable, but does not sync with the reality of more recent events. Apple's recent history of the iPod further refutes the idea that a software analog to Microsoft is needed. The iPod Emergence: Apple & Pixo vs IBM & Microsoft. Apple's iPod in 2001 made no effort to clone the DOS business model; it actually did the opposite. When Apple entered the market, there were a number of existing MP3 devices using custom software, hardware designs, and DRM codecs. The iPod used off the shelf components to deliver a custom MP3 player using third party software, but Apple also added its own technologies: easy to use sync with iTunes, a fast Firewire interface that made uploading music far faster than the prevailing USB 1.0, and an attractive industrial design. With the iPod, Apple played the role of IBM in 1981, using Pixo's embedded operating system to enter the market quickly, just as IBM had used DOS. The difference was that Apple didn't direct any market attention toward Pixo and added a lot of value on top of that core embedded OS. A modern day Compaq couldn't simply clone the hardware and license Pixo to run on it in order to compete against the iPod, because the iPod was much more than just generic hardware running Pixo software. As the iPod developed, Pixo's role diminished and was eventually displaced. Just like IBM, Apple jumped into a new market just as demand was beginning to explode. Apple made MP3 players far more attractive to a general audience by delivering greater playback capacity than most entry level devices offered, along with an ease of use that encouraged buyers to jump in at the higher end of the market. That left Apple with not only the lion's share of the market, but also by far the most profitable segments of the market. Two decades prior, IBM badly fumbled its play with the early PC and ended up irrelevant in the PC world by the late 80s, sideswiped by Microsoft's DOS and the cloners who were licensing it in parallel, notably Compaq and later HP and Dell. Steve Jobs had witnessed that happen, and was determined to not let it happen again to Apple. Rather than being manipulated by a software middleware vendor as IBM had, Apple worked to incrementally develop the iPod market itself. After consuming the hard drive-based player market, Apple took on the Flash RAM-based market with a tiny hard drive system used in the iPod Mini, and followed up with Flash-based devices of its own in the Nano and Shuffle. This allowed Apple to progressively serve an increasingly wider market, incrementally growing upon an established foundation. With the iPod, Apple became, in effect, an IBM with its own internal Microsoft. Microsoft's Failure Despite Features. In contrast, Microsoft entered the music player market by promoting music player hardware reference designs around WinCE. However, it was unable to ship a finished design until the iPod had become firmly established around 2005. Later branded as PlaysForSure, the devices were sold by various hardware makers and all purported to support the same DRM and the same music subscription services while also offering a broader array of hardware that presented video before the iPod did, supported wireless before the iPod, and so on. Despite these unique features, all of those PFS designs still failed. Microsoft blamed the failure of PFS upon its music store and hardware partners and decided to take Apple on itself in 2006. It relaunched a Toshiba PFS player as its own device under the Zune brand, adding WiFi music sharing features and a larger display than the current Pods had. It failed dramatically as well. Did Microsoft's attempts to float a new DOS among music players fail because of Apple's success, or due to Microsoft's own problems? The failure of the Zune, which followed the iPod model rather than the DOS model, seems to suggest that Microsoft itself was to blame. Consider too that Microsoft's Windows Mobile phones, which use the same underlying operating system as its failed PlaysForSure music players and the Zune, had similarly flopped even before Apple could release a charismatic phone equivalent to the iPod. Of course, when the iPhone was released, it hit Windows Mobile hardest. The iPhone made Windows Mobile Smartphones look ridiculous and underpowered, and made Windows Mobile Pocket PC phones look clumsy and awkward, despite the fact that they both supported a variety of features the iPhone didn't, including the ability to edit documents, capture video, send MMS, and so on. Simply adding on features did not enable Microsoft to compete against Apple. The only conclusion that can be drawn from all this is that competing against Apple requires more than just having a feature arsenal. Microsoft's failures in themselves do not necessarily mean that Google's Android will fail in its attempts to float its own smartphone platform. Why Microsoft’s Zune is Still Failing Microsoft’s Zune, Vista, and Windows Mobile 7 Strategy vs the iPhone Will Google Succeed where Microsoft Failed? Microsoft's demonstrated inability to successfully enter consumer markets for MP3 players and smartphones has given observers little faith that the company will somehow turn things around in late 2009 when its next generation of devices are expected to be released. However, prior to that the first fruits of Google's efforts to build its own smartphone operating environment will arrive. Will Google's Android take over Microsoft's crown as the “DOS vendor” among smartphones? Supporters of Google's Android project point to some parallels between Android for smartphones and Windows on the PC: Android will allow hardware makers to differentiate in ways that can offer features Apple can't (or doesn't want to); it should allow software developers to offer features Apple does not allow on the iPhone; it embraces open, hobbyist experimentation in ways that Apple currently isn't; and it opens the potential for content providers that Apple is not interested in allowing. Openness is Android's key competitive feature. Will all this openness allow Google to unseat the iPhone to become the primary platform developers want to participate in, and subsequently soak up the market for third party hardware makers that Windows Mobile serves? While Google currently has no market share due to the fact that no Android phones have yet shipped, it does have broad vocal support from a variety of the same kinds of hardware manufacturers that supported DOS and Windows and helped to make those platforms successful in the desktop PC market. HTC and Android. The first Android phone is expected to be the HTC Dream; Taiwan's HTC (High Tech Computer) also manufactures Palm's Treo Pro phone as well as many of the most visible Windows Mobile devices. In addition to models produced under its own name, HTC also sells Windows Mobile devices under the Dopod brand, as well as no-name phones branded by providers, such as AT&T, Orange, Sprint, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless, Vodafone, and others. HTC will also be building the XPERIA X1 Windows Mobile phone for Sony Ericsson. HTC was quick to throw its support behind Android despite its long term alliance with Windows Mobile. Why would it so enthusiastically support an unproven platform from a company that has no experience in consumer hardware platforms? One can only assume that HTC is not happy with the current state of Windows Mobile, and desperately wants another “DOS” to succeed where Microsoft's has so spectacularly failed. As an Original Design Manufacturer for Palm, HTC watched as Palm adopted Windows Mobile in place of the Palm OS and subsequently fell even deeper into crisis. Palm's only successful phone since has been its Palm OS-based Centro. HTC undoubtedly sees Android as its ticket to becoming the next Dell, but without a similar dependance upon Microsoft. Android for mobile phones is essentially playing the role of Linux for PCs, except that it has the backing of a major company behind it. Can Android Take on the iPhone with Openness as its Feature? As great as this sounds, it's important to consider that Linux on the desktop has made no significant progress in eating into Windows dominance after a decade of trying. Being open, free, flexible, and decentralized hasn't been enough of an advantage to get consumers to migrate from Windows to Linux in any fraction of significance. Similarly, in the music business, Linux-based MP3 players have had no impact on the iPod, despite offering more features, flexibility, support for additional codecs, and so on. In the mobile phone area, Linux enjoys a sizable portion of the smartphone market, but this is almost entirely due to phones sold by Motorola in China, where the advantages of Linux' openness are void. Motorola's Linux phones offer nothing to users in terms of openness or flexibility, and are really no different in terms of features than other appliance 'feature phones' based upon closed operating systems. And again, a key problem with assaulting Apple in a feature war is that neither the iPod nor the iPhone became popular by being “highly featured.” They both delivered perhaps 80% of the functionality found in all other devices in the market. Rather than trying to match every feature and cater to every niche as Microsoft had with Windows Mobile, Apple's devices did a few things very well at launch, and incrementally developed into full featured devices that still lack some of the more unique features of their competitors. Further, in terms of openness, the demographic that embraces Linux' characteristic freedoms is not the same as the demographic that buys smartphones in quantity and then pays for data service. This is a critical fact to consider because a big part of the iPhone's success stems from the fact that it is being pushed by mobile providers who want to capture the cream of the market willing to pay a premium for data services. The Frankenphone. Combining the fractured aesthetic of HTC's Windows Mobile phone hardware with Android's software, based upon Linux' perpetually unfinished DIY openness and Google's Java-like development platform, will not result in a product similar to the iPhone. Instead, it will look a lot like phones that have already failed in the market. Apple's advantage comes from slick hardware designs with a close attention to detail, combined with software that purposely does less so that it can do what it does better. Even Apple's own conservative attempts to broaden its software capabilities with iPhone 2.0 have resulted in instability problems that can be blamed upon both Apple's early releases of its phone operating system and software from inexperienced third party developers new to the platform. Would the current frustrations with iPhone 2.0 be somehow mitigated by additional openness that also embraced all kinds of variables from different hardware makers with less quality control than Apple, a loose committee of additional cooks working to serve up operating system features targeted at every possible conceived need, and a wider third party software group with fewer constraints on illegal behaviors? The Failure of Open. While it is politically unpopular to criticize the well meaning efforts of open source contributors, the failure of Linux on the desktop, the failure of the vaporware Indrema game console, and the failure of the OpenMoko project to deliver a workable phone within a year of its deadline all underline the serious problems open development faces in the world of consumer oriented devices. Open has simply failed to deliver on its promises in the world of consumer hardware. OpenMoko was supposed to release its first mobile phone to consumers for $250 several months in advance of the iPhone. When the iPhone shipped, the group then announced new plans to get its phone out by the end of 2007. Instead, this spring the group announced new plans to move to an entirely different development platform, and ship its phone mid year for $400 with limited functionality and incomplete software outside of basic GSM phone features. Linux's notable successes, from Motorola's Linux phones to the Tivo DVR to Linksys Routers, have often come without any associated openness or freedom, and were instead delivered simply to provide their manufacturer with a free kernel to build upon. This indicates that while Linux may find its way into an increasing number of smartphones, it will likely not be accompanied by the glorious freedom of an open development environment Google has said it would offer with Android. Apple iPhone vs the FIC Neo1973 OpenMoko Linux Smartphone Can Google Succeed Where Open Has Previously Failed? Despite “openness” being Android's strongest competitive feature compared to Apple's iPhone, Google recently revealed that its wide-open development model is intentionally gravitating towards a closed association of top tier partners due to practical considerations. In July, Google accidentally sent out a notice that revealed that it had been seeding private SDK updates to only a subset of its contributors, angering those who believed that Android would be as open as Linux on the desktop or the OpenMoko project. Further, Google has restricted initial development to higher level APIs just as Apple did, further indicating that Google itself realizes that being wildly open to impress a minority of hobbyists will not result in the commercial success of its new platform. That serves to neuter Android's primary advantage over the iPhone. Without delivering on the premise of being wide open, Android is really just a less mature set of Java libraries used to create a specialized binary that runs on a Linux foundation. Unlike Apple's iPhone, Android phones won't have a slick user interface developed by professional artists, nor the iPhone's legacy of mature software development frameworks crafted over the last thirty years, nor the iPhone's tightly integrated hardware with award winning industrial design, nor its marketing power tied into the iPod and Apple's retail stores. Android won't be an open iPhone, it will only be a Windows Mobile phone with a better kernel that runs specialized Java software instead of Win32 or .NET code. Don't expect consumers to be impressed by that. The Biggest Missing Feature. There is one remaining factor that strangles to death any last remaining hope that Android might assassinate the iPhone and assume the crown of the “DOS of smartphones.” That is: Android delivers zero price advantage to consumers. In 1981 and 1991, consumers who wanted Apple computers faced the sticker shock of a somewhat arrogant price tag. Apple sold its computers, as it still does, at the higher end of the market, but there was simply far more range in prices available. In 1981, that meant the Apple II was $2600 and the new Apple III was $3500, even before you added a monitor. On the low end, Commodore sold its far less powerful, but “still a computer” Vic-20 for $300, while IBM entered the market with the IBM PC at $3000. Over the next few years, Apple focused on delivering additional sophistication at the same price, releasing the $10,000 Lisa and then the $2,500 Macintosh. IBM continued selling PCs in the same $3,000 to $10,000 range, but other DOS PC vendors began selling machines at prices that ranged as low as $1500. That left Apple with a roughly $1000 price premium over low end PCs. The products weren't really comparable, but consumers only saw the huge price difference. In 1991, Apple was still selling moderate to high-end Macintoshes for $3,800 to $10,000; the crippled Mac LC was $2500, and obsolete-at-birth Mac Classic ranged from $999 to $1500. Windows allowed PC makers to ship a functional $1500 PC and claim a rough approximation to Apple's $2500 entry level system, maintaining that apparent $1000 price premium. Today, pundits are lucky to find a Dell or HP system that is even a couple hundred dollars less than a comparable Mac. However, in the smartphone business, the iPhone 3G is now the same price, if not less, than generic competing phones on the market. Even more significant is the fact that the price of the phone hardware is nearly nothing compared to the cost of the service plan. This fact simply eases any price premium that could cause buyers to flock to a smartphone running a generic operating system over buying the iPhone 3G, regardless of whether it runs Windows Mobile or Android. 1990-1995: Planting Software Seeds Android Partners Have Already Failed. That same pricing principle similarly prevented buyers from considering many of the alternatives to the iPod. While Apple's original iPod models were more expensive than many of the first MP3 players on the market, they were price competitive with models offering similar features. By 2004, it was Apple who was undercutting MP3 competitors on price. Microsoft offered zero price advantage when it began selling the Zune, a major factor in its failure, but Microsoft simply couldn't out-price the iPod; it was already losing money offering the Zune at the same price as the iPod. Apple now has tremendous market power in buying RAM and other components that will prevent any competitors from being able to offer a huge discount over the iPhone's $199 price tag. Even if competitors were to give their phones away, they would only offer a $200 discount to users who would then still need to pay the same mobile fees to use the phone. Android's other partners, including Samsung and LG, have already failed to capture any significant market share in the music player market. Are they going to maintain their position as smartphone makers now that they face similar competition from Apple, its iPod ecosystem, its iTunes Music and Apps Store, Apple's retail store experience, and other factors that are pushing the iPhone? If they can, it is not obvious how partnering with Android will help. Other Problems for Android. Android was announced in early November 2007 and was followed with an early preview SDK within a couple weeks, a month ahead of Apple's initial announcement of the iPhone 2.0 SDK. However, between March and July 2008, Apple delivered nine progressive releases of its SDK, opened its App Store, and sold 60 million apps, raising $30 million to support iPhone software development in just the first month. It has since released three more SDK updates to developers related to iPhone 2.1, which is expected next month. Android just published its first open SDK beta update earlier this week, warning developers that “applications developed with it may not quite be compatible with devices running the final Android 1.0.” Additionally, Android still has no phones available. By the time the HTC Dream is expected to launch, Apple will have an installed base of around ten million iPhone (and iPod touch) users supporting software development through iTunes. The business model for selling Android apps is no better than that for selling jailbreak iPhone apps: there is no iTunes Apps Store to promote them, so users will have to track them down on their own. Android developers also have no real freedom that jailbreak iPhone developers lack. The only difference is that there are ten million iPhones to sell jailbreak apps to, and currently zero Android phones. If selling a jailbreak iPhone app sounds like more trouble than its worth, imagine trying to sell Android apps to a non-existant audience. Now add the official iPhone App Store into the mix, where publicity, promotion and profits are booming. What platform is going to have the most applications? How many users will flock to a smartphone platform with no apps? The wisdom of releasing a desirable phone and achieving a significant installed base before releasing an SDK makes a lot more sense in retrospect. Additionally, while Apple has a decade of experience in shipping regular updates to Mac OS X and its Xcode developer tools, Google has only shipped a random assortment of web-oriented SDKs (a number of which have been abandoned) as a tangent to its core business of selling advertisements. When the Android SDK 1.0 is finished later this year, developers will not only lack an installed base to sell their apps to, but will also have no high profile market for selling their apps in, and subsequently no financial incentive to develop applications that add value to the Android platform, just like Linux on the PC desktop. Around the same time, possibly within the next month, Apple will be shipping its second major OS release: iPhone 2.1. Apple will also be upgrading its entire user base to the new software so that developers will have a cohesive platform to target. This mirrors the efforts Apple has taken to upgrade its Mac OS X users to the same reference release. Mobile developers will be seeing money pouring in via iTunes while crickets chirp in the Android section of various mobile online stores. Apple’s iPhone Vs. Other Mobile Hardware Makers: 5 Revenue Engines Same Same, But Different: DOS Model Problems. Android developers will also have a series of other problems to manage. Like Windows Mobile, Android is intended to support everything, from BlackBerry-style keypad phones with a small touchscreen to the simple Windows Mobile Smartphone form factor lacking a touch screen to iPhone-like full size touch screens. Also like Windows Mobile, Android phone makers will have the option to leave off Bluetooth, WiFi, GPS location services, graphics hardware acceleration, and so on. Each Android phone will also have unique camera hardware, support for different video and audio codecs, and varied support for other differentiating proprietary services demanded by mobile operators. This will force developers to to make complex decisions regarding the lowest common denominator they choose to support. So while the iPhone will have a cohesive feature set, a managed software environment, and a functional market, Android will be a loose federation of hardware makers selling the same random features found on Windows Mobile today, with a chaotic development environment that lacks any central market for users or developers. And it will be run as an experiment by a company with no experience in consumer hardware or platform development. The Missing Tap. One specific example of the “DOS model problem” is that Android currently does not support multitouch. It's not touched on in the API, and Google quietly tap dances around its omission. Why no multitouch? Because multitouch screens are expensive, and most OHA hardware members are more interested in making a profit in a competitive phone market rather than impressing consumers as Apple did with the iPhone. Most existing smartphones, even those trying to directly rival the iPhone, use a stylus driven, pressure sensitive tap screen or a simpler, cheaper touch technology that lacks support for sensing multitouch. The iPhone's screen can actually sense up to five fingers at once, but the primary feature multitouch offers on the iPhone is the two fingered tapping and the pinching effects everyone associates with it. Android could certainly support multitouch if there were a demand for it, but that's the point: Google knows that its hardware partners are cheap and unlikely to put out hardware that actually competes with the iPhone. Instead of using expensive technologies that deliver clever yet largely invisible functionality, OHA members, just like PC makers, are far more likely to add flashy, impractical gadgety fluff that's cheap to tack on, such as slide out keyboards, neon tubes, and scratch and sniff stickers. That's how you impress gullible nerds on the cheap. Google itself is blowing smoke and erecting mirrors to distract from the reality that it being a “DOS vendor” means supporting bargain basement hardware from penny pinching duplicators. Android has been demonstrating some “wow” features such as a Street Maps app that pans around based on an internal compass in the demonstration phone. The problem is that that kind of thing only makes for a fun demo. Nobody needs to twirl around their phone in the air to see a view of the other side of the street, but everyone who has used an iPhone will wonder why they can't pinch to zoom out. Even worse, most Android phones aren't going to have a compass built into them, so Google is demonstrating features most Android users won't be able to use. That Sounds Like Microsoft… Google's design decisions are beginning to look a lot like Windows Vista; rather than actually working to make laptops boot faster, Microsoft came up with the idea of adding a small screen to the back of Vista laptops so users could check their email without having to wake the system up. But this was a stupid idea for a number of reasons, the most obvious being that most users just want a laptop that boots up quickly. Few laptops got the mini screen, but every user who tries Vista on their laptop will wonder why it doesn't boot up as fast as Mac OS X Leopard. In the same way, Google is advertising features for Android that most users won't ever see in their actual phones while ignoring things people will expect based on their exposure to the iPhone. Android is simply selecting the wrong features. Android will offer the advantages of supporting MMS, recording video, and the list of other features Windows Mobile already supplies. Those features didn't stop Apple from firing past Microsoft in the smartphone arena however, just as the Zune's highly touted WiFi and screen didn't phase iPod buyers. Incidentally, just months after the Zune, Apple had not only demonstrated a larger display but a higher definition multitouch screen, and not only WiFi, but functional WiFi that could be used to browse the web or check email. This suggests that Apple, with its faster release schedule, won't stay behind any of the leading features potentially offered by Android for very long. Android partners, however, will find it as difficult to catch up with Apple's unique features, just as Microsoft has been stymied to keep up with Mac OS X, the iPod, and the iPhone. The underlying reason: both Google and Microosft are tasked with maintaing support for a huge variety of hardware options demanded by all their partners. Apple has the unique circumstances to do only what it needs to do itself. Android in Windows Mobile's Shoes. Like Windows Mobile, Android faces a difficult market. In the US, it competes against the popular BlackBerry in corporate markets and the iPhone among consumers. Worldwide, it competes against entrenched market leader Nokia. The difference is that Google, unlike Microsoft, has no in. Windows Mobile was adopted by Windows-bound IT shops despite its weaknesses. Nobody has any preexisting reason to try an Android phone apart from hobbyists and open software enthusiasts, a demographic that has done little to move Linux on the PC desktop. Google also lacks Microsoft's installed base; it's starting from zero. The smartphone industry initially doubted Apple's chances of making much progress with the iPhone, despite the company having the Mac platform, the iPod, retail stores, platform development experience, marketing savvy, industrial design prowess, and so on. Google doesn't have any of those things. Mobile Providers vs Android. Apple also started with an exclusive partnership with AT&T, a three legged race that demanded effort from both. Google is hoping that hardware makers handle the hardware details and that mobile providers will be excited to sell its Android phones. While hardware makers such as HTC clearly appreciate having found a free alternative to Windows Mobile, it's not obvious why providers would be excited about Android, as it promises an openness that most mobile providers strongly oppose. AT&T took a big risk in getting behind the iPhone, as the phone encouraged users to use email rather than fee-based SMS and MMS, it supported WiFi for data access, and it bypassed AT&T's MEdia Net services to plug into iTunes instead. Verizon refused to parter with Apple and grant it those kinds of concessions. Is AT&T going to take a similar risk to partner with a phone that is not exclusive to it, and is Verizon now going to open its arms to support phones that do not exclusively support BREW, VCast and its other proprietary services? While Android may well eat into Microsoft's Windows Mobile business by stealing away its hardware makers, it seems unlikely that Android will ever serve as more than free alternative to Windows Mobile in a market where Windows Mobile is increasingly irrelevant. Android may have the dubious distinction of swallowing Microsoft's mobile business the same way Microsoft ate up the Palm OS, but even if it accomplishes that goal, Google will likely find itself unsustainably hungry immediately afterward. It will also find itself swimming in a shark tank of hungry rivals, including Nokia's Symbian, RIM's BlackBerry, and Apple's iPhone. Symbian is the final generic platform vying for the opportunity to play DOS in the smartphone market. The next article will examine Nokia's chances in its bid to match Microsoft's PC dominance in the mobile market while setting out in a new venture to copy Android's open software model. Did you like this article? Let me know. Comment here, in the Forum, or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It's also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!

  • ★ Leopard

    The two and a half years between the debut of Mac OS X 10.4 Tiger and today’s release of 10.5 Leopard feels long, not just because it’s been the longest-ever stretch between major Mac OS X revisions, but also because it’s been an eventful two and a half years. How eventful? Think about this: When 10.4.0 shipped, it was PowerPC-only; Intel-based Macs existed only in secret Cupertino labs. There are plenty of other writers who’ve written excellent, top-to-bottom reviews of Leopard as a whole. If you read no other today, read Jason Snell’s at Macworld. (And, of course, stay tuned for John Siracusa’s, coming Sunday at Ars Technica, which will cover not just the new-to-Leopard UI minutia, but also the numerous significant developer-level additions — be prepared for a lot of Leopard-only apps from indie developers in the immediate future.) My nutshell take is this: I’ve been using Leopard full-time for about three months, and there’s no question it’s a worthy update. Is 10.5.0 truly ready for production use, or would most users be better off waiting for 10.5.1? We’ll see. No one ever got hurt by waiting a week or two to install a new OS. But there’s no question that most of the new features and changes in Leopard are winners. There are some turds, too, but the ratio of improvements-to-regressions is pretty high by my score. The most significant new feature in Leopard is Time Machine. That’s why the retail packaging and default desktop picture are Time-Machine-flavored, and a few years from now when we’re installing Mac OS X 10.7 Feral Alley Cat, it’s the feature we’ll remember when reminiscing about what was new in 10.5. The most striking aspect of Time Machine is its UI. When it debuted at WWDC 2006, it immediately faced criticism that it was just downright gimmicky. It is in fact gimmicky, but, I think, that’s actually a good thing in Time Machine’s particular and unique case. Apple has made something so effect-laden and so extraordinary that users want to see it in action — the fact that that something is backups, which, let’s face it, is effectively a chore, is a noteworthy achievement. Making backup software that people can’t wait to try, and which, once activated, just automatically kicks in and does its thing on a regular schedule, is like making people want to go ahead and sign up for life insurance. The argument for Time Machine’s game-like UI isn’t that it’s more usable, but that more people will use it. That’s actually more important in the case of backup software: there will be data saved that would otherwise have been lost if Time Machine instead sported a more traditional, straightforward visual appearance, because there will be some number of users who will have turned Time Machine on in the first place only because it looks so damn cool. It’s results that matter most, and the result of Time Machine is going to be that more Mac users will be backing up their data regularly than ever before. For some Mac users, who otherwise still wouldn’t be backing up regularly, it’s going to end up being the most important feature Apple has ever added to the Mac OS. The design of Time Machine is the single most Apple-like thing in Leopard. No way would a UI like this have come from anyone else, including the old pre-return-of-Steve-Jobs Apple Computer — if anything, the old Apple of the 1990’s was more traditional than any other UI design company. After Time Machine, it’s the little things that stand out most in Leopard. Quick Look, for example, is a joy to use. Just select a file in the Finder and hit the space bar. Boom, you have an instant preview. Hit space again and it goes away. (Apple’s choice of the space bar as the toggle is perfect.) It takes about 30 seconds of playing with Quick Look to wonder how you ever lived without it. The same goes for the finally-unified window chrome look-and-feel. Spend a day or two in Leopard, then sit down in front of Tiger, and the brushed metal really just looks absurd. (On the Leopard turd front, however, we’ll be saying the same thing about the translucent menu bar when 10.6 comes out — it’s a gimmick that makes menu text harder to read.) But what I like best, and what I think Apple deserves the most praise for, is that fact that they’ve gone back and refined all sorts of little things, changes so small that they fall far beneath the not-that-high-in-the-first-place threshold of Apple’s own “300+ New Features” list. E.g. the way that when you rename files in the Finder now, you get a default text selection of just the name part, without the file extension. Or, take this example (which example will sure make mine the Leopard review with the least exciting screenshots in the world). Here’s a segment of the Keyboard tab in the Keyboard & Mouse System Preferences panel from 10.4: This isn’t the worst UI copy in the world, but it’s not great. How many users really understand what exactly the difference is between “hardware” and “software” features, here? Here’s how this looks in Leopard: This isn’t just slightly better wording, it’s completely better. Same exact feature, but someone at Apple took the time to rewrite the UI copy, and it’s better for it. Leopard is chock full of details like this — little things that won’t be promoted on the box cover or mentioned in mainstream media reviews, but which, taken cumulatively, epitomize why Mac OS X keeps getting better with each major release.

  • The Next Killer App

    Any successful information technology requires a killer app — an application so compelling that it can, all by itself, justify the purchase of a given device. When it comes to personal computers, there have been many killer apps, starting with the spreadsheet, but there haven’t been any new ones in a long time, which is a problem. This column is about a potential new killer app for the PC platform, perhaps its last one. What do you know about telepresence? I have for the last several months been shooting for Maryland Public Television a new PBS documentary about how information technology has transformed our lives and businesses. It is an esoteric and very close look at a few technologies. Some, like the rise of office automation and the personal computer, are obvious: secretaries and telephone operators have disappeared while all the rest of us learned to type. Others, like RFID (radio-frequency identification) chips, are harder to see but just as transforming by creating a real-time distribution system in which we can know where everything is moving all the time, taking just-in-time inventory from a goal to a reality. One of the most striking of these technologies, which has yet to achieve wide use, is telepresence — high-definition video conferencing as a substitute for business travel. Telepresence is not far from being here on a wide scale and the effects — even beyond business — should be profound. I see telepresence shortly invading our homes. The way vendors tend to implement telepresence today is fairly uniform if inconsistently interoperable. A special conference room is built that is actually half a conference room, half of a table set against a wall that is all video screens. Typically three big projection or LCD displays are side by side in landscape mode with a third landscape screen mounted higher on the wall above the middle lower screen. The three lower screens are used to show the remote participants in the meeting. Sometimes all three screens are devoted to participants at a single location, but up to four locations can be linked if needed. The top screen is used for meeting materials like PowerPoint presentations or videos intended to be seen by all the participants. A couple weeks ago I used a system of this type (in this case it was from Hewlett-Packard but there are similar systems from Cisco and other vendors) to interview the people who designed it. I was in Palo Alto and they were in Corvallis, Oregon. In addition to the telepresence system (called Halo, whatever that means) I had a camera crew at both ends to record the action in each room. These rooms are not cheap to build or run. The HP systems cost either $249,000 or $349,000 to build, depending on the model, and $18,000 per month to operate. This gets you a DS3 connection (45 megabits per second) to a low-latency global network and 24/7 support. Each of the lower screens uses six megabits per second, with the remaining 27 megabits per second for that fourth upper screen. If this seems like bandwidth overkill for PowerPoint, understand that this HP system was co-developed with the Dreamworks movie studio specifically to allow dispersed groups of executives to review 1080p HD footage from upcoming films and for dispersed editors to actually work together to edit films without having to be in the same city. With feature film production budgets now averaging $50 million, $18,000 per month for editing support is nothing. With just over 100 such rooms now in operation for HP, part of the high price is also simply investment recovery. If HP were selling 10,000 of these rooms per month the price would be substantially lower. Video conferencing has been around for a couple decades, but telepresence is different from that. You can see the entire other side of the conference table, for example, and the people who are sitting across from you appear to be life sized. They can see you and you can see them. When another person speaks to you they can look you in the eye. Body language and emotions are easy to detect and the sound of each participant seems to come from his or her direction. You can watch the people who aren’t talking to see if they are even paying attention. It really is tele-PRESENCE and the fact that you are looking in a video screen is forgotten after a minute or two. Here are some lessons I learned from the experience. For one thing, size really does matter. The big screens changed for me the entire experience, though I think a home telepresence system could do fine with a single big HD screen instead of three. Eye contact is important, too, and that is generally accomplished through two techniques — mounting the camera as far as possible from the subject then using some subtle video morphing software to make it seem as though the camera was actually mounted behind the screen. For a home system I believe most of this effect could be achieved by simply increasing the distance from subject to camera, reducing the angle at which the camera is seen above the screen. This is the major failing in video chat systems where the camera is mounted on the display. Using the system I quickly came to understand that the real power wasn’t in bringing together groups of big shots for huge powwows at which sweeping global decisions would be made. The quintessential telepresence meeting lasts 10 minutes and involves a group of people at any level who simply need to come to a concensus. Nobody flies 10,000 miles for a 10 minute meeting yet everybody walks down the hall for one. Being able to hold such a meeting is what can make a widely distributed group of workers function like people in the same building, which has been one of the nagging problems of global development and outsourcing. The fact that it already has eight rooms up and running in India may give HP some advantage in that respect. We’re early in this process, but I think telepresece is going to be a big deal. It comes down to a big, high-resolution screen, good sound, mounting the camera far enough away to simulate eye contact, and of course throwing lots of bandwidth at the problem. Some of these components, like relatively cheap high-def big screens, are here today. The processing power required is here, too. The only significant obstacle to us having our own telepresence systems is bandwidth, and we can predict with some accuracy when we’ll have that. This bandwidth calculation involves applying some variation of Moore’s Law in two dimensions. Available bandwidth at a reasonable price is always increasing over time. The second dimension involves changes in compression technology and increases in processor power that over time reduce the amount of bandwidth that will be required to carry a high-res video signal. With the passage of time, then, available bandwidth increases while, at the same time, bandwidth requirements decrease. This has the effect of amplifying Moore’s Law, accelerating that point at which telepresence at a reasonable cost is possible. So when will it happen? When will we have telepresence capability in our homes? Some of us are there already and don’t even know it, the only remaining problem being one of integration. The home embodiment of that HP Halo system would be a single big screen, which using even the current HP technology would require six megabits-per-second. Millions of Internet users in Asia and Europe already have that kind of upstream bandwidth and hundreds of thousands of U.S. residential customers (mainly Verizon FiOS users) do too. But HP’s Halo system is old-tech, using MPEG-2 compression that is more than a decade old. A home system built around a more powerful codec like H.264 and using more powerful hardware could reduce the required bandwidth for home telepresence by at least half, making the likely barrier three megabits-per-second. That kind of bandwidth is nothing to users in Korea or Japan and it is nothing, too, for fiber-to-the-home users in the U.S. (mainly Verizon) and wouldn’t be that much of a stretch, either, for fiber-to-the-curb vendors like AT&T. Giving two megabits upstream to every cable modem user wouldn’t be trivial, but it is possible and could be — I think WILL BE — spurred by competitive pressures from DSL. So the bandwidth is coming and millions of people will have it, even in America, by 2008. What’s missing is both consumer demand and painless satisfaction of that demand through easy-to-use high-volume products, which come down to big screens, cameras, and PC systems running the right software. The part of this that is both hardest and easiest is stimulating demand. People aren’t demanding telepresence because they have never experienced telepresence. If you show them they will come. This is 100 percent analogous to the introduction of color TV in the 1950s. People didn’t know they wanted color TV until they saw color TV. But once they saw it, the lure of color TV was instant and obvious. What was difficult with color TV was that it required a large and very expensive video production and distribution infrastructure that cost tens of billions of dollars and required major financial commitments from vendors like RCA, which had to build transmitters, receivers, cameras, an entire TV network (NBC) and even subsidize the production of color programs like Bonanza to seed the system. Home telepresence requires almost none of that and, in fact, actually leverages the huge investment already made in HDTV, since that’s what those big telepresence screens will no doubt be used for when nobody wants to visit with Grandma or play video strip poker. All that’s required to sell consumers on home or small business telepresence, then, is allowing them to experience it. And, of course, making it affordable. I think Apple will be the first PC-only vendor to embrace the telepresence business. Steve Jobs would like another killer app. His last attempt at creating one — video editing — was only somewhat successful. The iPod of course qualifies for killer app status, but I don’t think it has actually sold many computers, though lots of iPods. Apple had big screen TVs ready to introduce a year and a half ago but cancelled them at the last moment as too mundane. You could buy an HDTV from HP or Dell and Apple apparently didn’t have that much more to offer. But this time it will be different. Imagine one of the new aluminum and glass iMacs only instead of a 24-inch screen make it 42 inches. The familiar iSight camera will be there in the bezel. but this time the camera will have HD resolution. This hang-it-on-the-wall iMac would establish yet another category of computers, which is what Apple loves to do. They’ll sell a million units to the faithful and all it will take is putting an active telepresence system in every Apple store connected to every other Apple store for prospective users to play with. This gets Apple into the big screen TV business with a system that has higher margins simply because it isn’t just a TV but is also a Mac. Look for all this after Christmas along with refreshed Macs featuring the H.264 encoder chip I pre-announced a number of months ago. Look for Apple to also facilitate telepresence by turning it into a service as it has more and more wanted to do. Then imagine that system connected to a 3G iPhone. For Apple the point is to create a platform to allow more natural implementation of “lean back” content. Apple TV was the first push in this direction, but this telepresence system will be both easier to use and more expensive, two attributes near to Steve Jobs’s heart.

  • August 2007 Zoon Awards for Technical Ignorance and Incompetence

    Daniel Eran DilgerIn an effort to recognize the spectacular efforts of individuals and organizations promoting the regression of human achievement in the field of technology, a series of nominations await your vote to determine the recipients of August 2007 Zoon Awards.Meet the Zoons.Segregated by color, the various Zoons highlight the world's absolute worst in small minded ignorance, paid to say propagandism, and blind devotion to products without merit.The Pink Zoon is awarded for a spectacular effort in fear-based propagation of uncertainty and doubt, or efforts to infect headlines with false information with the primary goal of preventing innovation, competition, and the emergence of new ideas, or simply to make a quick profit.
The White Zoon is awarded for the blinding glare of a shiny blank brain, particularly when such ignorance is presented with authoritarian emphasis by an individual or news source operating well outside its abilities. This award may also be assigned to a company or organization in recognition of epic failure.
The Brown Zoon is awarded for squirting extraordinary amounts of intentionally noxious misinformation, whether dredged from an impacted recollection of twenty years ago, sucked from the trusty bucket of canned responses, or simply invented as needed to create an intolerable outburst of stink.These should not be considered as first, second and third placements, as each tie for an equal standing in the Zoon Hall of Shame. It is also possible to award multiple parties for the same award, either as shared participants or, in the case of an unclear majority vote, tied nominations.Meet the Zoon Nominees.As one might imagine, determining the most fitting recipient might be difficult given the wide range of potential candidates standing in line. Here's a brief background on the nominations for August.Troy Wolverton, San Jose Mercury News.A writer for the Street and most recently, the San Jose Mercury News, Wolverton always manages to dig up an unattractive headline for any news related to Apple. A series of articles documented his negative spin and inaccurate reporting, particularly when the subject related to Apple.Wolverton promised me and other readers that he would answer the questions related about his shoddy journalism record, then cowardly ran away. He also wrote emails to RDM readers assuring them that he was only ever honest and unbiased, and that RoughlyDrafted should be read with great suspicion.[10 FAS: 8 - San Jose Mercury News’ False Apple Scandal][Troy Wolverton Documents Faux Apple Shareholder Outrage]Wolverton is nominated for a White and Brown Zoon.Neil Cavuto, Fox News.While actually based on reports from the end of July, I wrote about Cavuto in August, qualifying his nomination for arrogantly complaining about how Apple purportedly over promised iPhone shipments it then failed to deliver. In reality, Apple didn't indicate any sales goals for its first weekend. Cavuto also confused AT&T authorization numbers with Apple's sales figures. Fox News subsequently corrected his comments to suggest that he hadn't made the error, but still failed cover up the core problem that Cavuto's entire rant been a specious bit of ignorant rambling delivered--rather hypocritically--with far too much arrogance than the subject required.Cavuto is nominated for a Pink and White Zoon.[10 FAS: 9 - Troy Wolverton, Neil Cavuto, and the Apple Stock Scandal]Jim Cramer, Scott Moritz and Brett Arends, the Street.After documenting how he would spin false information to manipulate the market as a hedge fund manager, Cramer praised his apprentice Moritz for publishing a string of articles dredging up or simply inventing false information about the iPhone with the intent to knock value from Apple and suggest that Apple's phone was not competitive, not selling as expected, and that Apple's deal with AT&T was an unprecedented deal earning unconscionable profits. Arends is thrown in for good measure after delivering similar work directly from the mouths of Street-savvy Verizon shill, Roger Entner of IAG Research.Cramer, Moritz, and Arends are nominated for a White and Brown Zoon.[More on Scott Moritz and the Jim Cramer Street Misinformation Engine][The Street's Flaccid Campaign Against the iPhone][Unraveling Anti-Apple Panic: the iPhone Launch Success]George Ou, ZDNet, CNET.Nominated in August primarily for his article misrepresenting typography technology and falsely portraying Mac OS X as incompetent in the area of text rendering, Ou deserves extra reason to earn your Zoon vote for failing to admit that he falsified his report, and instead attacking those who pointed out his error.[Tech: Zoon for George Ou]After posting the article detailing why he was wrong and establishing a pattern of his consistently inaccurate and tilted writing, someone who appeared to be Ou emailed me to say:“If you're gonna do a hit piece, at least do it accurately... I'm not going to get uptight about a little man like you chewing on my feet and I'm not even going to bother cursing at you for writing a blatant hit piece on me. It's not worth my time.?Assuming that the author was unlikely to actually be Ou, I did a search on the email and found an online comment from the same address mentioning being a former ballet dancer. To determine if the author was Ou or just simply a joker trying to get a response, I wrote back, “Hi George, What was inaccurate in my article? Are you really a ballet dancer??Ou tu?In reply, Ou wrote, “I was a professional Ballet dancer up till 2000 and I still try to perform now and then,? but didn’t note anything that was incorrect in the article. When I asked for the correction again, I got two emails, one insisting that, “The 'FreeBSD community' is essentially Sam Leffler. Sam pretty much wrote all that wireless code. Sam is an employee (contractor) of Atheros. Atheros is involved in that FreeBSD code.?The second said, “You don't even understand the fact that the same Atheros ‘team’ led by Sam Leffler that wrote Apple's wireless drivers is the same team that wrote the open source MadWiFi drivers for Linux and FreeBSD. The same wireless drivers Apple said there was no problem on had to be patched three times a month later. And here you are slandering me because I defended two researchers against a billion dollar corporation.“When you smear my photograph and slap a "SHILL" on top of it, that is slanderous and insulting. You're accusing me of taking payola which is a crime and only a ‘little man’ would slander someone like that. It's one thing to disagree with me or not like a certain piece I wrote, but smearing someone's photo with accusations of shill is nothing but the act of a coward. Unprofessional? There's nothing unprofessional about calling trash like you little and I'd say that to your face.?Pearls Thrown.How could a professional writer fail to understand his subject matter, fail to grasp basic logic, and then be so arrogant about it on top? I wrote, “George, I don't have to prove that people from FreeBSD did not contribute to Apple's driver. I never stated that, and it has no relevance to statements I made. You had to prove that Atheros did not deliver the driver, and that it came directly from FreeBSD without Atheros' involvement. That was the question, and your misunderstanding of the architecture of Mac OS X helped you to confuse the situation.“The truth is that Atheros contracted with an expert to port some of the FreeBSD code for use in its driver for Mac OS X, which only shares significant similarities with FreeBSD in its userland environment. Atheros had to deliver unique work for Apple to offer a working driver for Mac OS X, and paid a contractor to complete that work.“You maintained that Atheros simply wasn't involved at all, and that Mac OS X's driver just came from the FreeBSD repository. That was wrong. Your explanation of why this was the case was also wrong. It is clear you still do not understand the situation entirely. That's why you shouldn't be writing about it as if you are an expert, simply because someone told you something that sounded believable off the record. You don't understand the issues involved, but operate under the assumption that everything you think up as a plausible idea is also the truth. It isn't.“Slander, as noted in my article, is spoken. Libel is written. Just FYI. Also, a shill doesn't necessarily need to be paid, so calling you a shill isn't ‘accusing you of payola.’ Also, payola really only is illegal in broadcasting. There are plenty of people who are paid to say things, and nobody is arresting them. The company you work for largely serves advertisers; that isn't illegal, or all of CNET would be shipped off to jail.“There is nothing cowardly about pointing out that you are a shill and then documenting your attempts to spread misinformation in efforts to make Vista look good and Apple look bad. There is something very cowardly about fuming that you've been outed, and rather than apologizing and correcting your error, and then maintaining that you're simply better that others so your misinformation campaigns don't matter.“I don't have a little man complex, so repeating that doesn't really bother me. It does make it clear that you have some size issues in addition to your general lack of professionalism and technical incompetence.?To which Ou elegantly replied, “Go find yourself a bathhouse in the city where you belong. You have no business writing.? Using the same address, Ou responded to several other online sites defending himself and ignoring the errors of his article. How does Ou have a job? Ou is nominated for a Pink, White, and Brown Zoon, and his winning will also earn a Zoon for ZDNet and its CNET parent.Windows Genuine Advantage, Microsoft.After choosing a delightfully ironic name for its software DRM system, Microsoft then bungled its validation system for users worldwide. The hundreds of millions of PCs running Windows XP and Windows Vista phone home to Microsoft at regular intervals, but the company set up the system with a single point of failure. An inevitable failure prevented the company from maintaining resilience to downtime--something the company highly touts as an Enterprise feature of Windows Server--but it also highlighted the problem of validating software in general using a system that assumes guilt when there is any question in reaching the validation server. Windows users who tried to verify their genuine software had software features remotely turned off because of the WGA problems.[Tech: WGA the Dog]WGA is nominated for a White Zoon.Oliver Rist, InfoWorld, IDG.Suggested by reader Robert de Bie, Rist yesterday wrote an article titled “Does Mac OS X suck? Apple's desktop platform has impressive technical chops, but it falls short from a business perspective.?Never mind the sophisticated and professional headline, the real question is, did Rist back up his headline, or simply cower in a bed of second hand fear, uncertainty and doubt? No need to guess, really; this is InfoWorld, a rag primarily useful for its ads. No competent IT manager wastes much time reading the ramblings of such stuffshirt columnists.Rist brings up the idea that Mac OS X is really just Unix with some frosting, making it easy to coo about, but not really ready for real business. Unfortunately, Rist offers no basis for anything that he says. In fact, his headline and (forgone) conclusion don't even match what he writes in between. Under the subject of networking, Rist says, “OS X has an excellent networking client, both wired and wireless — due in large part to FreeBSD rather than anything coming out of Cupertino.? But wait, does FreeBSD write the Mac’s Apple File Protocol? Does it maintain Samba for Windows networking? Wrong on both counts. By spouting the dittohead myth that Mac OS X is just FreeBSD with an Apple logo, Rist has already established that he knows nothing about the subject he's pretending to be an expert in. He then says nothing else about networking, granting that Mac OS X has no real issues.Security Absurdity. On the subject of security, he says “It's a pretty secure system. Yes, ever since OS X has become more popular, attacks and breaches on the platform have become more numerous. And, yes, those numbers are high enough that if I were managing a portfolio of MacBooks I'd be installing anti-virus on them.? Rist linked his comment to another IDG article reporting on a Mac OS X worm threatened by the anonymous "InfoSec Sellout," which turned out to be a fraud. That's the extent of the acceleration in Mac OS X “attacks and breeches,? a crank call? There are yet no viruses for Mac OS X, and all the malware that exists is proof of concept ideas hatched in a lab. Strike two for Rist in trying to write about security issues. Even so, he concedes, “once the personal firewall is up and the AV installed, I'd fully expect to see far, far fewer security-related problems from my Mac clients than my Windows clients.?[10 FAS: 10 - Apple’s Mac and iPhone Security Crisis.]Many Words, Little Point.On the subject of reliability, Rist beats up Artie MacStrawman for insisting that Mac OS X apps never crash. He then provides some recollected figures for estimating how many times he has noticed a Mac app crash compared to Vista crashes. He passes by saying, “Apple's probably less crash-prone overall.?On the subject of software compatibility, Rist says Apple “treats third-party developers like the proverbial redheaded stepchild, which results in significantly fewer third-party software options for Apple users than Windows users,? then follows up with the genius, “When it comes to mission-critical, vertical-type business software, Windows clients far outnumber Apple clients. If they didn't, Macs would be populating a much larger number of corporate desktops.?How does this guy get work writing? By the end of page one, Rist had said nothing at all. On page two, Rist really gets going. He starts off referring to "Apple jihaders," as if he has a fundamentalist shock radio show rather than a column designed to inform IT managers. Rist says people don't want to retrain employees to use Macs, and then suggests that retraining users for the significantly different Vista would not be an issue. He gives the Mac a “grudging? pass again and moves to hardware. [Paul Thurrott's Merciless Attack on Artie MacStrawman]Mac OS X’s Hardware Features.He says that Gateway has more USB ports and a finger print scanner in the same form factor for less cost, without outlining his comments with any factual basis. He then complains that his MacBook suffered a hard drive failure after four months. “That's a pretty short time frame for serious hardware failure,? Rist wrote. It's odd that hardware issues are being outlined in an article about “why Mac OS X sucks,? but someone writing to an audience of experienced IT users should be aware that computing hardware--particularly hard drives--is most likely to fail in its first few months. Past that break in period, most hard drives typically have a relatively stable three year life span, after which problems become statistically more likely to occur. It's called the bathtub lifespan curve, because like the contour of a tub, it starts high, then drops low for a long stretch, then begins to rise again. Clearly, Rist doesn't know what he's talking about at all, even when complaining about consumer Mac hardware in the context of Mac OS X as a business operating system.Dude, You’re Being a Shill.After "passing" all of his categories, Rist then fails Mac OS X in “business orientation.? There are good and justified reasons for faulting Apple in the IT arena, but Rist doesn't mention a single one. Instead, he prattles on about Apple's consumer ads, and how they portray the typical Mac user with a “SOHO, I'm-cooler-than-you, coffee house image.? For all the dittoheads who like to repeat this idea, I'd like to remind you all that Dell's memorable mascot was a smirky pothead who couldn't finish sentences beyond, “Dude, you're gettin’ a Dell! (excited thumbs up).? That had no impact on Dell's Enterprise sales, because serious enterprise users don't make their decisions based on watching prime time TV and deciding whether they like the advertisements targeted at families. So please shut up about the Justin Long and John Hodgman Get a Mac ads. Enterprise Worthy Dell Pothead Vs. the Too Good for You Coffee Drinking Mac.Highly Unqualified.Rist is a “senior senior contributing editor? at InfoWorld. With this sort of incompetence and ignorance, it makes one wonder what kind of single celled organisms must pass for junior editors at IDC and its various ComputerWorld, PC World, and InfoWorld properties.While writing “a column devoted to running Microsoft technologies in medium and large enterprise environments,? Rist only notes experience in running a small Microsoft-oriented software business and writing for rags like Computer Shopper. That qualifies him as a Microsoft shill, but not as a columnist offering advice about ‘medium and large enterprise’ IT environments.Rist is nominated for Pink, White and Brown Zoons.Microsoft’s Pseudo-Philanthropy in New Orleans.Bob Emery notes that Microsoft is offering free software for hurricane-hit businesses in the devastated New Orleans area. However, in order to qualify, users have to sign up for a three year plan, of which Microsoft only covers the first year. A local paper noted “For the typical small business of 50 employees and 25 personal computers licensing Microsoft Windows Vista and the Office 2007 suite of programs, the free year can result in savings of as much as $12,050.?Of course, what that really means is that recovering small businesses will actually have to shell out $24,100 just for software licenses, in addition to buying computers capable of running Vista. One might think that a company earning $50 billion in revenues might be able to offer more than an advertisement to struggling businesses, particularly since software costs Microsoft nothing to deliver.[Microsoft gives free software to hurricane-hit businesses - New Orleans CityBusiness]Votes toward Microsoft's headline friendly, fake philanthropy will help the company earn its White Zoon for its WGA fiasco.Vote in the Forum and add your comments.Official awardees: Pink : George Ou, ZDNet, CNETWhite : Windows Genuine Advantage, MicrosoftBrown : George Ou, ZDNet, CNETWhat do you think? I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast! Submit to Reddit or Slashdot, or consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!

  • ★ iPhone-Likeness

    Anyone involved in Mac software development is familiar with arguments over whether a particular app is “Mac-like”. In the early days of the Mac — the first decade or so — the entire Mac community was largely in agreement about just what this meant. To be un-Mac-like was to be ignorant of the fundamental concepts and norms of the Mac OS. It was something you could spot in an instant — software designed by engineers who just did not get it. In the last decade, however, accusations of “un-Mac-likeness” have largely degenerated into meaningless hand-waving. You still occasionally see UI mistakes that are genuinely un-Mac-like — like, say, outright Windows-isms such as ordering dialog box buttons OK/Cancel rather than Cancel/OK — but in most cases, when someone complains “that’s not Mac-like”, what they really mean is “I don’t like that.”1 The overriding factor, I think, is that the overall scope of the Mac platform (and Windows, too, for that matter) has grown so large that it supports a wide variety of UI design philosophies and styles. iPhoto and Aperture have very different styles, both visually and functionally, but yet they’re both photo management apps made by Apple. There are still fundamental norms and conventions which all Mac software should adhere to, but there no longer exists a single, simple, overall design style or philosophy that defines Mac-likeness. The iPhone, on the other hand, is very much where the Mac was in the 1980s. It is new, innovative, and ambitiously stretches the bounds of what current hardware can support. Like, the Mac, the iPhone has established UI conventions that aren’t just different, but contrary to the conventions of what has preceded it. Apple has sketched out a remarkably clear picture of what it means for an app to be “iPhone-like”. And, just as many third-party Mac developers in the ’80s struggled to design Mac-like software because they couldn’t shake preconceptions forged in the “everything is just text” pre-Mac era, many third-party iPhone developers aren’t wholly getting the iPhone-like part. In many cases, I think, it’s because they can’t shake preconceptions forged designing Mac software. I’ll put forth one central, overriding guideline for iPhone UI design: Figure out the absolute least you need to do to implement the idea, do just that, and then polish the hell out of the experience. I further suggest the following, more specific, guidelines: Each screen should display one thing at a time. That “thing” may be a list, but it should just be a list. Minimize the number of on-screen elements. Make UI elements large enough to be easy to tap; place them far enough apart that there is little risk of tapping the wrong target by mistake. Eschew preferences as much as possible, and assume that nearly all users will use the default settings. As you show more detail, conceptually you move from left to right — but it’s best to minimize how deep you can get while drilling down to the right. These guidelines describe nearly every iPhone app designed by Apple, and apply to the ones I like most from the App Store. Notes on Notes As a case study, consider the iPhone’s built-in Notes app. This app is an excellent example of what it means to be iPhone-like.2 There are only two screens in Notes. First, a list of all Notes. A row in the list shows the note’s title and the date on which it was last modified. The list is always and only sorted chronologically, most recent first. There are only two things you can do at this screen: open an existing note by tapping it, or create a new note by tapping the “+” button that is always visible at the top of the list. There are no folders. There are no other sorting options. When you create or edit a note, the toolbar at the top offers two buttons: “Notes”, which points back to the left and takes you to the list of notes, and “Done”, which ends the editing mode by putting the keyboard away and using the full screen to display the contents of the current note. There is no explicit “Save” button — changes are always saved automatically. There is no “Cancel” button when creating a new note; just hit “Done” or “Notes” before typing anything and no new note will be created. There is no separate title field. The first line of text in the note is used as the title. Change the first line of the note, and you change the name of the note. After opening an existing note, there is no “Edit” button — to switch to editing mode, simply tap the content area of the note itself and the keyboard will appear, with the insertion point at the position where you tapped in the note. In an interview with Kyle Baxter in July, Brent Simmons said this regarding his design for the iPhone version of NetNewsWire: “Clarity is more valuable than density.” The iPhone&