Hotfix Update: Parallels Desktop 4.0 Build 3540 is available

Posted by Dave MertenParallels has launched a new build for Parallels Desktop 4.0 for Mac. Parallels continues to refine PDfM 4.0 to improve the customer experience. Below is a list of improvements and bug fixes.

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Parallels Desktop 4 updated

Filed under: Software, Snow LeopardPopular virtualization software Parallels has been updated to build 3810. The software offers many upgrades and fixes, including Windows DirectX 9.0 with Shaders Model 2 support, as well as "experimental" support for Snow Leopard and Windows 7 beta. The "experimental" caution, as you might surmise, means not all features will work. For example, in Snow Leopard, there is no USB support, and Parallels notes there is no shared networking support.Parallels has been running a competitive race against VMware Fusion as each software solution tries to out-feature and outperform the other.The Parallels update can be downloaded at this link, or you can select "check for updates" from the Parallels application help menu. A complete list of the enhancements in this build can be found here. Some users are reporting faster performance and some improvements with use of peripherals.TUAWParallels Desktop 4 updated originally appeared on The Unofficial Apple Weblog (TUAW) on Thu, 08 Jan 2009 13:00:00 EST. Please see our terms for use of feeds.Read�|�Permalink�|�Email this�|�Comments
Will Google's Android Play DOS to Apple's iPhone?

Daniel Eran Dilger Today's broad array of smartphone operating system contenders are offering lots of potential answers to a problem that only requires one. It appears the market has two options ahead: either pool generic hardware makers behind a single operating system and deliver a smartphone marketplace that resembles the Windows PC market, or watch them fall to a dominant leader and have a smartphone market that resembles Apple's iPod ecosystem. This decision isn't going to be made by a class of intellectual elite, or by government mandate. it's going to be made by the market itself. Here are the factors that will influence the outcome, either marginalizing Apple's iPhone into a niche as the company has twice experienced previously at the hands of DOS in 1981 and Windows in 1991, or positioning it as the dominant leader as Apple has achieved for itself with the iPod since 2001. The third segment in this series looks at Google's Android and the Open Handset Alliance as a possible “DOS-attack” against Apple's iPhone. Subsequent segments will look at Nokia's newly opened Symbian and other mobile contenders challenging the iPhone. Will the iPhone Meet its Match from a Modern Day DOS? Will Windows Mobile Play DOS to Apple’s iPhone? Will Google's Android Play DOS to Apple's iPhone? Will Symbian Play DOS to Apple's iPhone? Google Acquires Android. In 2005, Google purchased a startup named Android, which had been in business for nearly two years. The secretive startup was known only to be working on software for mobile phones. It was being run by a who's who of mobile industry veterans, including Andy Rubin, the founder of Danger. Rubin had earlier worked at WebTV along with Chris White and Andy McFadden, both of whom had also joined Android. Richard Miner of Orange and Nick Sears of Tmobile also brought their mobile provider experience to Android. At the time of the acquisition, Google didn't announce any plans for Android and instead only told BusinessWeek, “We acquired Android because of the talented engineers and great technology. We're thrilled to have them here.” It appeared that Google was only going to be expanding its search services for mobile phone users, along the lines of the Google SMS answer system it had recently released. Google Buys Android for Its Mobile Arsenal - BusinessWeek Windows XP Media Center Edition vs Apple TV: The Fall of WebTV The GPhone Myth. As reports began to leak out about talks between Google and hardware makers throughout 2007, rumors began to fly about “the GPhone,” a competitive offering that was supposed to take on the iPhone. Some phone enthusiasts hoped Google would jump in to rescue the struggling OpenMoko project and turn it into a viable project that could attack Apple's new smartphone. In October 2007, I printed the Great Google GPhone Myth, taking apart the idea that Google would be directly competing against the iPhone, and describing that Google was really working on a free alternative to Windows Mobile as a conduit for getting its search and related services on a broader variety of mobiles. Google's services were already on the iPhone. In November, Google played its hand: it had organized a consortium of companies called the Open Handset Alliance to develop open standards for mobiles. The first product from the group would be Android, a mobile operating system built on the Linux kernel. Google wasn't getting into the phone handset business at all; it was only making sure that its mobile search products would not risk being marginalized by the threat of Windows Mobile on phones in the same way Microsoft had been working to leverage its PC monopoly to push Google search off the Windows desktop. The Great Google gPhone Myth Introducing Android: Leader of Linux. Two weeks later, Google released an early version of the Android software. On top of a Linux kernel, Android uses a specialized version of a Java Virtual Machine that takes Java language code and turns it into what Google calls “Dalvik bytecode” rather than Java bytecode as a standard JVM would. This allows Google to leverage existing and familiar Java language tools without paying Sun for a Java license. Like Mac OS X and its fraternal iPhone OS, Android includes a variety of open source libraries, including SQLite and WebKit. On top of that, Google developed a series of frameworks that handle the tasks Cocoa Touch does on the iPhone. Android also bundles a set of applications. While Apple adapted its existing Mac OS X to work in a mobile environment to create the iPhone OS, Android is more like a customized Java environment running on a specialized mobile Linux variant: elements of maturity in an otherwise experimental new platform. What is Android? -Google Android was by no means the first mobile OS using Linux. Both Palm and its amputated ACCESS software arm have Linux-based mobile platforms. Nokia has Maemo, which it uses in its Internet Tablets, and also recently acquired Trolltech and its Qtopia mobile Linux platform. Motorola has teamed up with MontaVista Software to use its Mobilinux. Intel created the Moblin project for mobile Linux, aimed at Internet devices. Google's OHA also isn't the first consortium to attempt to standardize a mobile Linux platform. The OSDL started the Mobile Linux Initiative to define requirements for hardware; the Consumer Electronics Linux Forum (CELF) then worked to define various phone profiles aimed at the Japanese market; the Linux Phone Standard (LiPS) Forum tried to do the same thing in Europe. In 2007, LiPS was folded into the new LiMo Foundation, along with the OSDL. All of these committees have had some overlap and some complementary features. Several of Google's OHA partners are also LiMo members, including NTT DoCoMo, Wind River, and Motorola. So why didn't Google just join LiMo? “LiMo, very candidly, wasn't moving fast enough,” OHA board member John Bruggeman told CNET. Google hopes to herd the Linux cats into a progressive, structured platform that can battle against Symbian and Windows Mobile to succeed as the new DOS of smartphones. Will Google fracture or unify mobile Linux? The Presumption of the Necessity of DOS. The previous segment examining Windows Mobile pointed out how the PC industry as a whole assumed that Microsoft's desktop Windows monopoly would easily take over dominance in the MP3 player market, pushing Apple into a niche position. This was expected because DOS had pushed Apple's early computers into a reduced role starting in 1981, and Microsoft had repeated this again in 1991 when the DOS world migrated to Windows, effectively pruning Apple's Macintosh into a Bonsai platform. The inability of one company to dominate any product category has been frequently repeated by PC industry pundits as a given, despite the fact that history is full of examples of this happening. Sony dominated personal music players for two decades under the Walkman brand even while equally large competitors tried to push it from this position; Nintendo has similarly owned handheld gaming despite ill-fated efforts to grab a piece of its pie by products running a generic platform such as Microsoft's WinCE (Gizmondo), Linux (GP32), and Symbian (N-Gage). In fact, outside of the Windows/DOS PC, there are actually few examples of a generic platform taking over an industry. Nearly every other consumer-facing product uses proprietary platforms: car makers, stereo equipment, appliances and so on typically all use designs custom to their maker. The paradox of the Windows PC market has been that Microsoft's broadly licensed software supposedly saves hardware makers from investing in software development while ensuring compatibility, when in reality it adds significant costs to PC makers while limiting their ability to differentiate themselves. That explains why PC makers have been perpetually merging together and going out of business while Microosft has rolled in money over the last two decades. Parallel efforts to copy Microsoft in broadly licensing an operating system have regularly failed: IBM's OS/2, Apple's Mac OS, Palm's PDA OS, even Microsoft's own efforts to duplicate Windows dominance in other markets, from copy machines to PDAs to smartphones to SPOT watches to music players. The closest copy may be Symbian, but its customers are partners, not simply consumers of a generic third party's operating system as Windows licensees are. That indicates it is not necessary to duplicate the dominance exercised by Microsoft over the PC industry in the smartphone market. Google's Android and Symbian exist more as technology sharing pacts among manufacturers, but both aspire to take Microsoft's DOS role among smartphones. However, the idea that Apple's iPhone must be dethroned by a modern-day DOS, whether Windows Mobile, Android, or Symbian, is not just debatable, but does not sync with the reality of more recent events. Apple's recent history of the iPod further refutes the idea that a software analog to Microsoft is needed. The iPod Emergence: Apple & Pixo vs IBM & Microsoft. Apple's iPod in 2001 made no effort to clone the DOS business model; it actually did the opposite. When Apple entered the market, there were a number of existing MP3 devices using custom software, hardware designs, and DRM codecs. The iPod used off the shelf components to deliver a custom MP3 player using third party software, but Apple also added its own technologies: easy to use sync with iTunes, a fast Firewire interface that made uploading music far faster than the prevailing USB 1.0, and an attractive industrial design. With the iPod, Apple played the role of IBM in 1981, using Pixo's embedded operating system to enter the market quickly, just as IBM had used DOS. The difference was that Apple didn't direct any market attention toward Pixo and added a lot of value on top of that core embedded OS. A modern day Compaq couldn't simply clone the hardware and license Pixo to run on it in order to compete against the iPod, because the iPod was much more than just generic hardware running Pixo software. As the iPod developed, Pixo's role diminished and was eventually displaced. Just like IBM, Apple jumped into a new market just as demand was beginning to explode. Apple made MP3 players far more attractive to a general audience by delivering greater playback capacity than most entry level devices offered, along with an ease of use that encouraged buyers to jump in at the higher end of the market. That left Apple with not only the lion's share of the market, but also by far the most profitable segments of the market. Two decades prior, IBM badly fumbled its play with the early PC and ended up irrelevant in the PC world by the late 80s, sideswiped by Microsoft's DOS and the cloners who were licensing it in parallel, notably Compaq and later HP and Dell. Steve Jobs had witnessed that happen, and was determined to not let it happen again to Apple. Rather than being manipulated by a software middleware vendor as IBM had, Apple worked to incrementally develop the iPod market itself. After consuming the hard drive-based player market, Apple took on the Flash RAM-based market with a tiny hard drive system used in the iPod Mini, and followed up with Flash-based devices of its own in the Nano and Shuffle. This allowed Apple to progressively serve an increasingly wider market, incrementally growing upon an established foundation. With the iPod, Apple became, in effect, an IBM with its own internal Microsoft. Microsoft's Failure Despite Features. In contrast, Microsoft entered the music player market by promoting music player hardware reference designs around WinCE. However, it was unable to ship a finished design until the iPod had become firmly established around 2005. Later branded as PlaysForSure, the devices were sold by various hardware makers and all purported to support the same DRM and the same music subscription services while also offering a broader array of hardware that presented video before the iPod did, supported wireless before the iPod, and so on. Despite these unique features, all of those PFS designs still failed. Microsoft blamed the failure of PFS upon its music store and hardware partners and decided to take Apple on itself in 2006. It relaunched a Toshiba PFS player as its own device under the Zune brand, adding WiFi music sharing features and a larger display than the current Pods had. It failed dramatically as well. Did Microsoft's attempts to float a new DOS among music players fail because of Apple's success, or due to Microsoft's own problems? The failure of the Zune, which followed the iPod model rather than the DOS model, seems to suggest that Microsoft itself was to blame. Consider too that Microsoft's Windows Mobile phones, which use the same underlying operating system as its failed PlaysForSure music players and the Zune, had similarly flopped even before Apple could release a charismatic phone equivalent to the iPod. Of course, when the iPhone was released, it hit Windows Mobile hardest. The iPhone made Windows Mobile Smartphones look ridiculous and underpowered, and made Windows Mobile Pocket PC phones look clumsy and awkward, despite the fact that they both supported a variety of features the iPhone didn't, including the ability to edit documents, capture video, send MMS, and so on. Simply adding on features did not enable Microsoft to compete against Apple. The only conclusion that can be drawn from all this is that competing against Apple requires more than just having a feature arsenal. Microsoft's failures in themselves do not necessarily mean that Google's Android will fail in its attempts to float its own smartphone platform. Why Microsoft’s Zune is Still Failing Microsoft’s Zune, Vista, and Windows Mobile 7 Strategy vs the iPhone Will Google Succeed where Microsoft Failed? Microsoft's demonstrated inability to successfully enter consumer markets for MP3 players and smartphones has given observers little faith that the company will somehow turn things around in late 2009 when its next generation of devices are expected to be released. However, prior to that the first fruits of Google's efforts to build its own smartphone operating environment will arrive. Will Google's Android take over Microsoft's crown as the “DOS vendor” among smartphones? Supporters of Google's Android project point to some parallels between Android for smartphones and Windows on the PC: Android will allow hardware makers to differentiate in ways that can offer features Apple can't (or doesn't want to); it should allow software developers to offer features Apple does not allow on the iPhone; it embraces open, hobbyist experimentation in ways that Apple currently isn't; and it opens the potential for content providers that Apple is not interested in allowing. Openness is Android's key competitive feature. Will all this openness allow Google to unseat the iPhone to become the primary platform developers want to participate in, and subsequently soak up the market for third party hardware makers that Windows Mobile serves? While Google currently has no market share due to the fact that no Android phones have yet shipped, it does have broad vocal support from a variety of the same kinds of hardware manufacturers that supported DOS and Windows and helped to make those platforms successful in the desktop PC market. HTC and Android. The first Android phone is expected to be the HTC Dream; Taiwan's HTC (High Tech Computer) also manufactures Palm's Treo Pro phone as well as many of the most visible Windows Mobile devices. In addition to models produced under its own name, HTC also sells Windows Mobile devices under the Dopod brand, as well as no-name phones branded by providers, such as AT&T, Orange, Sprint, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless, Vodafone, and others. HTC will also be building the XPERIA X1 Windows Mobile phone for Sony Ericsson. HTC was quick to throw its support behind Android despite its long term alliance with Windows Mobile. Why would it so enthusiastically support an unproven platform from a company that has no experience in consumer hardware platforms? One can only assume that HTC is not happy with the current state of Windows Mobile, and desperately wants another “DOS” to succeed where Microsoft's has so spectacularly failed. As an Original Design Manufacturer for Palm, HTC watched as Palm adopted Windows Mobile in place of the Palm OS and subsequently fell even deeper into crisis. Palm's only successful phone since has been its Palm OS-based Centro. HTC undoubtedly sees Android as its ticket to becoming the next Dell, but without a similar dependance upon Microsoft. Android for mobile phones is essentially playing the role of Linux for PCs, except that it has the backing of a major company behind it. Can Android Take on the iPhone with Openness as its Feature? As great as this sounds, it's important to consider that Linux on the desktop has made no significant progress in eating into Windows dominance after a decade of trying. Being open, free, flexible, and decentralized hasn't been enough of an advantage to get consumers to migrate from Windows to Linux in any fraction of significance. Similarly, in the music business, Linux-based MP3 players have had no impact on the iPod, despite offering more features, flexibility, support for additional codecs, and so on. In the mobile phone area, Linux enjoys a sizable portion of the smartphone market, but this is almost entirely due to phones sold by Motorola in China, where the advantages of Linux' openness are void. Motorola's Linux phones offer nothing to users in terms of openness or flexibility, and are really no different in terms of features than other appliance 'feature phones' based upon closed operating systems. And again, a key problem with assaulting Apple in a feature war is that neither the iPod nor the iPhone became popular by being “highly featured.” They both delivered perhaps 80% of the functionality found in all other devices in the market. Rather than trying to match every feature and cater to every niche as Microsoft had with Windows Mobile, Apple's devices did a few things very well at launch, and incrementally developed into full featured devices that still lack some of the more unique features of their competitors. Further, in terms of openness, the demographic that embraces Linux' characteristic freedoms is not the same as the demographic that buys smartphones in quantity and then pays for data service. This is a critical fact to consider because a big part of the iPhone's success stems from the fact that it is being pushed by mobile providers who want to capture the cream of the market willing to pay a premium for data services. The Frankenphone. Combining the fractured aesthetic of HTC's Windows Mobile phone hardware with Android's software, based upon Linux' perpetually unfinished DIY openness and Google's Java-like development platform, will not result in a product similar to the iPhone. Instead, it will look a lot like phones that have already failed in the market. Apple's advantage comes from slick hardware designs with a close attention to detail, combined with software that purposely does less so that it can do what it does better. Even Apple's own conservative attempts to broaden its software capabilities with iPhone 2.0 have resulted in instability problems that can be blamed upon both Apple's early releases of its phone operating system and software from inexperienced third party developers new to the platform. Would the current frustrations with iPhone 2.0 be somehow mitigated by additional openness that also embraced all kinds of variables from different hardware makers with less quality control than Apple, a loose committee of additional cooks working to serve up operating system features targeted at every possible conceived need, and a wider third party software group with fewer constraints on illegal behaviors? The Failure of Open. While it is politically unpopular to criticize the well meaning efforts of open source contributors, the failure of Linux on the desktop, the failure of the vaporware Indrema game console, and the failure of the OpenMoko project to deliver a workable phone within a year of its deadline all underline the serious problems open development faces in the world of consumer oriented devices. Open has simply failed to deliver on its promises in the world of consumer hardware. OpenMoko was supposed to release its first mobile phone to consumers for $250 several months in advance of the iPhone. When the iPhone shipped, the group then announced new plans to get its phone out by the end of 2007. Instead, this spring the group announced new plans to move to an entirely different development platform, and ship its phone mid year for $400 with limited functionality and incomplete software outside of basic GSM phone features. Linux's notable successes, from Motorola's Linux phones to the Tivo DVR to Linksys Routers, have often come without any associated openness or freedom, and were instead delivered simply to provide their manufacturer with a free kernel to build upon. This indicates that while Linux may find its way into an increasing number of smartphones, it will likely not be accompanied by the glorious freedom of an open development environment Google has said it would offer with Android. Apple iPhone vs the FIC Neo1973 OpenMoko Linux Smartphone Can Google Succeed Where Open Has Previously Failed? Despite “openness” being Android's strongest competitive feature compared to Apple's iPhone, Google recently revealed that its wide-open development model is intentionally gravitating towards a closed association of top tier partners due to practical considerations. In July, Google accidentally sent out a notice that revealed that it had been seeding private SDK updates to only a subset of its contributors, angering those who believed that Android would be as open as Linux on the desktop or the OpenMoko project. Further, Google has restricted initial development to higher level APIs just as Apple did, further indicating that Google itself realizes that being wildly open to impress a minority of hobbyists will not result in the commercial success of its new platform. That serves to neuter Android's primary advantage over the iPhone. Without delivering on the premise of being wide open, Android is really just a less mature set of Java libraries used to create a specialized binary that runs on a Linux foundation. Unlike Apple's iPhone, Android phones won't have a slick user interface developed by professional artists, nor the iPhone's legacy of mature software development frameworks crafted over the last thirty years, nor the iPhone's tightly integrated hardware with award winning industrial design, nor its marketing power tied into the iPod and Apple's retail stores. Android won't be an open iPhone, it will only be a Windows Mobile phone with a better kernel that runs specialized Java software instead of Win32 or .NET code. Don't expect consumers to be impressed by that. The Biggest Missing Feature. There is one remaining factor that strangles to death any last remaining hope that Android might assassinate the iPhone and assume the crown of the “DOS of smartphones.” That is: Android delivers zero price advantage to consumers. In 1981 and 1991, consumers who wanted Apple computers faced the sticker shock of a somewhat arrogant price tag. Apple sold its computers, as it still does, at the higher end of the market, but there was simply far more range in prices available. In 1981, that meant the Apple II was $2600 and the new Apple III was $3500, even before you added a monitor. On the low end, Commodore sold its far less powerful, but “still a computer” Vic-20 for $300, while IBM entered the market with the IBM PC at $3000. Over the next few years, Apple focused on delivering additional sophistication at the same price, releasing the $10,000 Lisa and then the $2,500 Macintosh. IBM continued selling PCs in the same $3,000 to $10,000 range, but other DOS PC vendors began selling machines at prices that ranged as low as $1500. That left Apple with a roughly $1000 price premium over low end PCs. The products weren't really comparable, but consumers only saw the huge price difference. In 1991, Apple was still selling moderate to high-end Macintoshes for $3,800 to $10,000; the crippled Mac LC was $2500, and obsolete-at-birth Mac Classic ranged from $999 to $1500. Windows allowed PC makers to ship a functional $1500 PC and claim a rough approximation to Apple's $2500 entry level system, maintaining that apparent $1000 price premium. Today, pundits are lucky to find a Dell or HP system that is even a couple hundred dollars less than a comparable Mac. However, in the smartphone business, the iPhone 3G is now the same price, if not less, than generic competing phones on the market. Even more significant is the fact that the price of the phone hardware is nearly nothing compared to the cost of the service plan. This fact simply eases any price premium that could cause buyers to flock to a smartphone running a generic operating system over buying the iPhone 3G, regardless of whether it runs Windows Mobile or Android. 1990-1995: Planting Software Seeds Android Partners Have Already Failed. That same pricing principle similarly prevented buyers from considering many of the alternatives to the iPod. While Apple's original iPod models were more expensive than many of the first MP3 players on the market, they were price competitive with models offering similar features. By 2004, it was Apple who was undercutting MP3 competitors on price. Microsoft offered zero price advantage when it began selling the Zune, a major factor in its failure, but Microsoft simply couldn't out-price the iPod; it was already losing money offering the Zune at the same price as the iPod. Apple now has tremendous market power in buying RAM and other components that will prevent any competitors from being able to offer a huge discount over the iPhone's $199 price tag. Even if competitors were to give their phones away, they would only offer a $200 discount to users who would then still need to pay the same mobile fees to use the phone. Android's other partners, including Samsung and LG, have already failed to capture any significant market share in the music player market. Are they going to maintain their position as smartphone makers now that they face similar competition from Apple, its iPod ecosystem, its iTunes Music and Apps Store, Apple's retail store experience, and other factors that are pushing the iPhone? If they can, it is not obvious how partnering with Android will help. Other Problems for Android. Android was announced in early November 2007 and was followed with an early preview SDK within a couple weeks, a month ahead of Apple's initial announcement of the iPhone 2.0 SDK. However, between March and July 2008, Apple delivered nine progressive releases of its SDK, opened its App Store, and sold 60 million apps, raising $30 million to support iPhone software development in just the first month. It has since released three more SDK updates to developers related to iPhone 2.1, which is expected next month. Android just published its first open SDK beta update earlier this week, warning developers that “applications developed with it may not quite be compatible with devices running the final Android 1.0.” Additionally, Android still has no phones available. By the time the HTC Dream is expected to launch, Apple will have an installed base of around ten million iPhone (and iPod touch) users supporting software development through iTunes. The business model for selling Android apps is no better than that for selling jailbreak iPhone apps: there is no iTunes Apps Store to promote them, so users will have to track them down on their own. Android developers also have no real freedom that jailbreak iPhone developers lack. The only difference is that there are ten million iPhones to sell jailbreak apps to, and currently zero Android phones. If selling a jailbreak iPhone app sounds like more trouble than its worth, imagine trying to sell Android apps to a non-existant audience. Now add the official iPhone App Store into the mix, where publicity, promotion and profits are booming. What platform is going to have the most applications? How many users will flock to a smartphone platform with no apps? The wisdom of releasing a desirable phone and achieving a significant installed base before releasing an SDK makes a lot more sense in retrospect. Additionally, while Apple has a decade of experience in shipping regular updates to Mac OS X and its Xcode developer tools, Google has only shipped a random assortment of web-oriented SDKs (a number of which have been abandoned) as a tangent to its core business of selling advertisements. When the Android SDK 1.0 is finished later this year, developers will not only lack an installed base to sell their apps to, but will also have no high profile market for selling their apps in, and subsequently no financial incentive to develop applications that add value to the Android platform, just like Linux on the PC desktop. Around the same time, possibly within the next month, Apple will be shipping its second major OS release: iPhone 2.1. Apple will also be upgrading its entire user base to the new software so that developers will have a cohesive platform to target. This mirrors the efforts Apple has taken to upgrade its Mac OS X users to the same reference release. Mobile developers will be seeing money pouring in via iTunes while crickets chirp in the Android section of various mobile online stores. Apple’s iPhone Vs. Other Mobile Hardware Makers: 5 Revenue Engines Same Same, But Different: DOS Model Problems. Android developers will also have a series of other problems to manage. Like Windows Mobile, Android is intended to support everything, from BlackBerry-style keypad phones with a small touchscreen to the simple Windows Mobile Smartphone form factor lacking a touch screen to iPhone-like full size touch screens. Also like Windows Mobile, Android phone makers will have the option to leave off Bluetooth, WiFi, GPS location services, graphics hardware acceleration, and so on. Each Android phone will also have unique camera hardware, support for different video and audio codecs, and varied support for other differentiating proprietary services demanded by mobile operators. This will force developers to to make complex decisions regarding the lowest common denominator they choose to support. So while the iPhone will have a cohesive feature set, a managed software environment, and a functional market, Android will be a loose federation of hardware makers selling the same random features found on Windows Mobile today, with a chaotic development environment that lacks any central market for users or developers. And it will be run as an experiment by a company with no experience in consumer hardware or platform development. The Missing Tap. One specific example of the “DOS model problem” is that Android currently does not support multitouch. It's not touched on in the API, and Google quietly tap dances around its omission. Why no multitouch? Because multitouch screens are expensive, and most OHA hardware members are more interested in making a profit in a competitive phone market rather than impressing consumers as Apple did with the iPhone. Most existing smartphones, even those trying to directly rival the iPhone, use a stylus driven, pressure sensitive tap screen or a simpler, cheaper touch technology that lacks support for sensing multitouch. The iPhone's screen can actually sense up to five fingers at once, but the primary feature multitouch offers on the iPhone is the two fingered tapping and the pinching effects everyone associates with it. Android could certainly support multitouch if there were a demand for it, but that's the point: Google knows that its hardware partners are cheap and unlikely to put out hardware that actually competes with the iPhone. Instead of using expensive technologies that deliver clever yet largely invisible functionality, OHA members, just like PC makers, are far more likely to add flashy, impractical gadgety fluff that's cheap to tack on, such as slide out keyboards, neon tubes, and scratch and sniff stickers. That's how you impress gullible nerds on the cheap. Google itself is blowing smoke and erecting mirrors to distract from the reality that it being a “DOS vendor” means supporting bargain basement hardware from penny pinching duplicators. Android has been demonstrating some “wow” features such as a Street Maps app that pans around based on an internal compass in the demonstration phone. The problem is that that kind of thing only makes for a fun demo. Nobody needs to twirl around their phone in the air to see a view of the other side of the street, but everyone who has used an iPhone will wonder why they can't pinch to zoom out. Even worse, most Android phones aren't going to have a compass built into them, so Google is demonstrating features most Android users won't be able to use. That Sounds Like Microsoft… Google's design decisions are beginning to look a lot like Windows Vista; rather than actually working to make laptops boot faster, Microsoft came up with the idea of adding a small screen to the back of Vista laptops so users could check their email without having to wake the system up. But this was a stupid idea for a number of reasons, the most obvious being that most users just want a laptop that boots up quickly. Few laptops got the mini screen, but every user who tries Vista on their laptop will wonder why it doesn't boot up as fast as Mac OS X Leopard. In the same way, Google is advertising features for Android that most users won't ever see in their actual phones while ignoring things people will expect based on their exposure to the iPhone. Android is simply selecting the wrong features. Android will offer the advantages of supporting MMS, recording video, and the list of other features Windows Mobile already supplies. Those features didn't stop Apple from firing past Microsoft in the smartphone arena however, just as the Zune's highly touted WiFi and screen didn't phase iPod buyers. Incidentally, just months after the Zune, Apple had not only demonstrated a larger display but a higher definition multitouch screen, and not only WiFi, but functional WiFi that could be used to browse the web or check email. This suggests that Apple, with its faster release schedule, won't stay behind any of the leading features potentially offered by Android for very long. Android partners, however, will find it as difficult to catch up with Apple's unique features, just as Microsoft has been stymied to keep up with Mac OS X, the iPod, and the iPhone. The underlying reason: both Google and Microosft are tasked with maintaing support for a huge variety of hardware options demanded by all their partners. Apple has the unique circumstances to do only what it needs to do itself. Android in Windows Mobile's Shoes. Like Windows Mobile, Android faces a difficult market. In the US, it competes against the popular BlackBerry in corporate markets and the iPhone among consumers. Worldwide, it competes against entrenched market leader Nokia. The difference is that Google, unlike Microsoft, has no in. Windows Mobile was adopted by Windows-bound IT shops despite its weaknesses. Nobody has any preexisting reason to try an Android phone apart from hobbyists and open software enthusiasts, a demographic that has done little to move Linux on the PC desktop. Google also lacks Microsoft's installed base; it's starting from zero. The smartphone industry initially doubted Apple's chances of making much progress with the iPhone, despite the company having the Mac platform, the iPod, retail stores, platform development experience, marketing savvy, industrial design prowess, and so on. Google doesn't have any of those things. Mobile Providers vs Android. Apple also started with an exclusive partnership with AT&T, a three legged race that demanded effort from both. Google is hoping that hardware makers handle the hardware details and that mobile providers will be excited to sell its Android phones. While hardware makers such as HTC clearly appreciate having found a free alternative to Windows Mobile, it's not obvious why providers would be excited about Android, as it promises an openness that most mobile providers strongly oppose. AT&T took a big risk in getting behind the iPhone, as the phone encouraged users to use email rather than fee-based SMS and MMS, it supported WiFi for data access, and it bypassed AT&T's MEdia Net services to plug into iTunes instead. Verizon refused to parter with Apple and grant it those kinds of concessions. Is AT&T going to take a similar risk to partner with a phone that is not exclusive to it, and is Verizon now going to open its arms to support phones that do not exclusively support BREW, VCast and its other proprietary services? While Android may well eat into Microsoft's Windows Mobile business by stealing away its hardware makers, it seems unlikely that Android will ever serve as more than free alternative to Windows Mobile in a market where Windows Mobile is increasingly irrelevant. Android may have the dubious distinction of swallowing Microsoft's mobile business the same way Microsoft ate up the Palm OS, but even if it accomplishes that goal, Google will likely find itself unsustainably hungry immediately afterward. It will also find itself swimming in a shark tank of hungry rivals, including Nokia's Symbian, RIM's BlackBerry, and Apple's iPhone. Symbian is the final generic platform vying for the opportunity to play DOS in the smartphone market. The next article will examine Nokia's chances in its bid to match Microsoft's PC dominance in the mobile market while setting out in a new venture to copy Android's open software model. Did you like this article? Let me know. Comment here, in the Forum, or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It's also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!
The Complete iTunes History -- SoundJam MP to iTunes 9

Watching Steve take the stage and roll out a new version of iTunes got us all nostalgic for the old days, when iTunes logos changed color and our jukebox looked like it could withstand a bomb blast. Below is the history of the application that is running more than any other on our Macs. It spawned the iPod, iPhone, Apple TV and gave us an excuse to throw out those ugly CD towers that resided in the corners of our houses in the 90s. The ever present, iTunes. THE STARTSoundJam MP Somewhere around the time Metallica began suing Napster over the leak of its "Mission: Impossible II" track, "I Disappear," in 2000, a light bulb appeared over Steve Jobs’ head. Ever the innovator, Apple’s iCEO saw the peer-to-peer network as more than an illegal nuisance and began to develop a way to leverage the Napster revolution into the next killer Mac app. Audio players such as Audion and SoundApp had already exposed the inadequacies of QuickTime, and Apple knew it needed to build its solution from the ground up.After being rebuffed by Panic, which was already in negotiations with AOL over use of its Audion code, Steve Jobs approached Robin Casady and Michael Greene to discuss their SoundJam MP app, a powerful digital encoding program that looked a lot like Apple’s QuickTime player. After a series of short negotiations, Casady & Greene sold the rights for SoundJam to Apple for an undisclosed sum, and Apple immediately set to work on the app that would forever change the digital landscape.While the terms of the contract were top secret (Casady and Greene discontinued their app on June 1, 2001, but were barred from discussing the Apple deal for two years), Apple certainly wasn’t shy about ransacking SoundJam as it incorporated many of its signature features into iTunes, including visualizers, plug-ins, online retrieval of album data and drag-and-drop playlist creation. Much to the dismay of Jelly fans, however, Apple opted to leave SoundJam’s skins on the cutting-room floor. iTunes 1 (Jan. 9, 2001-Oct. 23, 2001) About 10 months later, at Macworld San Francisco in 2001, Apple debuted iTunes alongside iDVD and the CD-RW-enabled Power Macs. While it wasn’t exactly a show-stopper (though 275,000 copies were downloaded in the first week), the "world’s best and easiest to use ‘jukebox’ software" definitely raised the bar for music players on the Mac, which were relatively sparse and rather pricey (SoundJam cost $40). By offering iTunes as a free download and installing it on every new Mac, Apple essentially cut down the competition at the pass--or at least put a good scare into them. "Apple has done what Apple does best--make complex applications easy, and make them even more powerful in the process," said Steve Jobs at the time. "iTunes is miles ahead of every other jukebox application, and we hope its dramatically simpler user interface will bring even more people into the digital music revolution."For many Mac users, iTunes was an introduction to digital music, and Apple strived to create a straightforward jukebox that needed little or no instruction to get started. Popping a music CD into your Mac automatically launched iTunes, which loaded the disc, collected track data from Gracenote and added them to your library. A clean interface split into boxes kept everything neat and always within reach of a mouse click.Conspicuously missing from iTunes 1 was the ability to burn a CD on an external drive, a deficiency compounded by Apple’s mostly CD-RW-less line of Macs. Apple answered the cries a month later at Macworld Tokyo with the introduction of new iMacs and Cubes with write-able drives, a 1.1 update that added third-party support, and the launch of the controversial "Rip, Mix, Burn" campaign. iTunes 2 (Oct. 23, 2001-July 17, 2002) After racking up more than a million downloads in just a few short months, it quickly became clear that iTunes was every bit as revolutionary as Apple hoped. What all those users didn't know, however, was that the music player was merely the first part of a strategy that would redefine the company as more than a Mac maker. in October 2001, Steve Jobs showed us the next piece of Apple's digital hub in the form of an oddly named, undeniably sexy hand-held device. Built exclusively to leverage the popularity of Apple's music app, iPod came bundled with a brand-new version of iTunes that allowed it to seamlessly integrate with the songs and playlists stored on our Macs.Along with a considerable ratcheting of burn time, Apple also added "the three most requested features" into iTunes 2: MP3 CD burning, a 10-band equalizer and cross fading. A holdover from SoundJam, iTunes’ overdue equalizer came preloaded with more than 20 presets and brought robust, receiver-style tweaking to the desktop. The new crossfader eliminated the annoying gaps between songs and paved the way for a new generation of laptop DJs, and a sound enhancer appealed to audiophiles by adding depth and richness to tracks.But the real reason for iTunes 2 was iPod support, offering an unparalleled experience that transferred a few days’ worth of music from your Mac to your pocket in just about 10 minutes. iTunes 3 (July 17, 2002-April 28, 2003) Introduced at the final Macworld New York keynote as a companion to the first “solid-state touch wheel” iPod, iTunes 3 was a mostly incremental update with few dramatic changes. In the 18 months since its inception, some 14 million copies had been downloaded, so Apple had little reason to change the formula; rather it added just enough new features and enhancements to keep the iPod + iTunes revolution rolling.With iTunes 3, however, Apple threw down another gauntlet. Reduced prices, greater capacities and slimmer enclosures made the second-generation iPod even more desirable, but the addition of Windows support was the big change, opening up the popular player to millions of new music lovers. But Apple wisely kept iTunes tied to the Mac, forcing Windows users to sync their iPods with MUSICMATCH, a sub-par jukebox that basically served as an advertisement for iTunes’ sleek interface and finer points.As if to drive the point home, iTunes 3 added a few dozen new features, including track ratings, Sound Check for consistent volume playback, support for Audible audiobooks and Smart Playlists, which streamlined and automated the creation of digital mixes based on a series of predetermined rules. A few other enhancements--new track tags, library consolidation, playlist importing/exporting and track joining--added to the experience and widened the gap between iTunes and every other jukebox on the market.�� Click to embiggenTHE STOREiTunes 4 (April 28, 2003-Sept. 7, 2005) If iTunes 1 was a revolution, iTunes 4 was a bloody coup. What otherwise would have been a point update with a few minor playback improvements, AAC encoding and network sharing, iTunes 4 would have barely been noticeable without the addition of a new member to the "Source" sidebar: Music Store. A first-of-its-kind shopping experience that blew the roof off the industry and turned a thorn into a rose, the iTunes Music Store brought 200,000 high-quality songs from BMG, EMI, Sony Music Entertainment, Universal and Warner under one fully searchable, completely legal roof.Album artwork, one-click purchasing, in-apps video and a mostly unrestrictive DRM all for less than $1 a track. A million tracks were sold in the first week; four months later it surpassed 10 million. Along the road to the milestone 100 millionth download, however, Apple took iTunes 4 in a decidedly different direction when it rolled out the second generation of its store. Determined not to duplicate its prior proprietary mistakes, Apple didn’t renege on its promise to deliver the iTunes Music Store to Windows users by year’s end--and certainly didn’t skimp on the goods. A near-identical port of its award-winning iApp made its way onto PCs in October 2003 with a streamlined, expanded store (Mac users called it iTunes 4.1).With a 28-month upgrade path, version 4 stayed on desktops longer than any other iTunes release, gaining a slew of new features before retiring to digital graveyard: iMix, Party Shuffle, Apple Lossless, Podcasting, AirTunes, iPod photo and shuffle, and the European and Asian Music Stores all made their debuts under the iTunes 4 umbrella. Half a billion songs and 10 updates later, Apple had established itself as the undisputed king of the digital music domain. iTunes 5 (Sept. 7, 2005-Oct. 12, 2005) �Where iTunes 4 was a lengthy, meandering release, the next version came and went in just five weeks. Introduced in tandem with the iPod nano at what would become an annual September digital music event, iTunes 5 packed an overall peppiness and a refined, cleaner mini player, but was surprisingly light on new features--and fittingly was the first numbered upgrade that didn’t come with a new color for the music note in its icon.Sadly, the highlight of the pack was a new Search Bar that made quick work of rummaging through the store’s two million songs, rounded out by Smart Shuffle, playlist folders, parental controls, AAC VBR importing and Outlook syncing. Ultimately, though, it was the bug-ridden app’s dark platinum makeover that got the most attention. iTunes 5 ditched the outdated brushed-metal skin of its predecessors, and the thinner, sexier look filled many a forum with praise and criticism.Better known as iTunes 4.10, the fifth version of iTunes was mostly a disappointment. Rumors about TV show purchases and movie rentals that had swirled in the days leading up to the event failed to materialize, and even Steve struggled to come up with something nice to say: "We are constantly improving iTunes with new features like... better searching because we love music ourselves and want to surprise and delight music fans around the world." iTunes 6 (Oct. 12, 2005-Sept. 12, 2006) What a difference 35 days make. At an unexpected "One More Thing" event in early October, Steve kicked iTunes 5 to the curb and rolled out the red carpet for the next generation of the digital jukebox. Arriving in tow with new iMacs and video iPods, iTunes 6 brought serious changes to the store, adding online gift options, customer reviews, "Just For You" recommendations and some 2,000 music videos and Pixar shorts, all priced at $1.99 and formatted for new iPod’s 2.5-inch color screen.But that wasn’t all. Never content to rest on his laurels, Steve rolled out TV show downloads with iTunes 6, priced at the same $1.99 as the far-shorter music videos. Just five Disney shows were available at launch--"Lost," "Desperate Housewives," "Night Stalker," "That's So Raven" and "The Suite Life" --but when more than a million videos were purchased inside of three weeks, it didn’t take long before other networks came knocking. Before the end of the year, NBC Universal had signed up, followed shortly by MTV, Showtime, Fox and CBS, and soon iTunes 6 had done for TV what iTunes 4 did for music, cramming more than 220 shows onto its shelves within 12 months.iTunes 6’s TV Store didn’t make quite as much noise as the Music Store, but its 11-month tenure marked the start of an exciting time for Apple, as momentum began to build toward something huge on the horizon.� Click to embiggenTHE SYNERGYiTunes 7 (Sept. 12, 2006-Sept. 9, 2008) Billed as the "most significant enhancement to the world’s most popular music jukebox and online music and video store since it debuted," iTunes 7 was indeed a dramatic reinvention of the five-and-a-half-year-old iApp, with sweeping interface changes, speed boosts and a renewed focus on the jukebox.Packing two new navigation views--a list mode dotted with album artwork and an officially sanctioned version of Steel Skies’ Cover Flow--iTunes 7 put the emphasis back on iTunes as a music player, starting with the debut of the MiniStore, which strengthened the marriage between the two segments. Everything from the Source list to iPod integration received an overdue makeover, and Apple even fixed the age-old microsecond of silence that iTunes stubbornly inserted between joined tracks. Of course, it wouldn’t be an iTunes update without a new addition to the store, and Apple didn’t disappoint here, either. With users already downloading more than a million videos and TV episodes each week, iTunes 7 made the logical leap to movies, adding some 75 near-DVD quality titles from Walt Disney Pictures, Pixar, Touchstone Pictures and Miramax Films at launch and growing to more than 2,500 films from nearly every studio over the course of its two-year upgrade cycle. What made the seventh version so significant, however, was its versatility. By the time it had run its course, iTunes 7 had well grown into its role as the center of the digital hub, with iPhone, iPod touch Apple TV, movie rentals, the App Store, and a slew of nanos and shuffles all landing on its watch. Through it all, iTunes 7 never felt stale, bloated or sluggish, smoothly adapting to the new demands with little more than a software patch. �iTunes 8 (Sept. 9, 2008-Sept. 9, 2009) After 19 software updates to iTunes 7, it was time for the next whole number, and Apple finally delivered iTunes 8 at its annual music event in 2008. Following such a tremendous update was no easy task, and Apple could easily have packaged the new stuff into iTunes 7.8, if not for the super-smart technology hiding within.The centerpiece of iTunes 8 was the Genius feature, an underrated playlist tool that combined the controlled randomness of Smart Shuffle with the queue capabilities of Party Shuffle (iTunes DJ after 8.1) to transform your Library into a personalized radio station. Adding to the fun was the optional Genius Sidebar, a mildly intrusive strip of song recommendations culled from a mix of your favorite songs (and in later versions, TV shows and movies) and "anonymously-gathered knowledge from millions of other iTunes users," all crunched by a series of Apple algorithms, neatly packaged and beamed back to your computer.Minor tweaks elsewhere improved upon the broad refinements introduced in the prior release, and Apple dumped the Search Bar in favor of a return to field-specific exploring. An enhanced grid mode replaced album view with an iPhoto Events-like scheme that grouped albums and artists into interactive mini widgets. Taking a break from its relentless tide of upgrades, the store was mostly left out this round of enhancements, but iTunes 8 did usher in high-definition content (despite Steve’s previous declaration of 2005 as the year of HD).iTunes 9 (Sept. 9, 2009) Exactly a year after iTunes 8 meekly landed on desktops, Apple welcomed Steve Jobs back to the main stage by dropping a bombshell of a release that overhauled the store, made iPhone syncing effortless and updated the classic vinyl jacket for the 21st century.Open iTunes 9 and you’re immediately smacked by a new white background, giving the grid a clean, bright look that makes your album art pop and beckons you inside. Speed improvements are noticeable throughout, particularly when using Cover Flow, which can now handle speedy scrolling with only the slightest bit of lag. Delving further into the latest version of Apple’s nearly nine-year-old jukebox reveals hipper icons, a few extra curves and whistles, and a new Home Sharing feature that finally lets your trade music with friends and family members.Flip to the store and you’ll find a host of newness, beginning with a personalized welcome note, sensible layout, enhanced album pages with quick view windows and previews that borrow cues from the mobile iTunes Store. Dig a little deeper and you’ll find iTunes Extras (think DVD bonus features for digital movies) and iTunes LPs, the greatest thing to happen to music since, well, iTunes. A far greater thing than the digital PDF booklets bundled with album purchases, iTunes LP--while currently limited to just 12 albums and saddled with nonuniform pricing (Jay-Z’s pre-order costs $16.99 while Pearl Jam’s costs $9.99)--is poised to rekindle the creativity and connection that’s all but been stripped away by MP3s. �With iTunes X most likely slated for a September 2010 release, we can only wonder what new features are being realized in a secret bunker in Cupertino. Only time, and Steve Jobs, will tell. �What has been your favorite feature over the years? Share in the comments. �
Quickie: Update to Parallels 2.5 for Leopard goodness

If you're still running a build of Parallels Desktop 2 but need to upgrade to Leopard, the company has released an update to the software that brings it up-to-speed with Leopard compatibility. Read More...
RC 2 of Parallels Desktop 3.0 Update boosts performance

The Parallels team has issued a new release candidate build for the upcoming update to Parallels Desktop 3.0. We are expecting to see a final release of this update any day now...Read More...
Apple lists Snow Leopard incompatibilities

Filed under: OS, Software, Apple, Snow LeopardWith Snow Leopard in users' hands for less than 24 hours, reports of software incompatibilities are coming in (as well as what's been updated). Apple has posted a list of its own to the knowledge base. The article notes that, when Snow Leopard is installed, known-incompatible software is moved to a folder aptly named Incompatible Software. Additionally, known-incompatible software is prevented from opening (you'll see an "Incompatible software" message). As of this writing, there are 21 pieces of software on Apple's official list, including Parallels Desktop v. 2.5 (and earlier) and AirPort Admin Utility for Graphite and Snow v. 4.2.5. A few of our readers shared their experiences in our liveblog earlier tonight, including installation troubles. We're sure that all vendors are working to update their products. If something continues to give you trouble, hold tight. Help is (probably) on the way.TUAWApple lists Snow Leopard incompatibilities originally appeared on The Unofficial Apple Weblog (TUAW) on Fri, 28 Aug 2009 23:00:00 EST. Please see our terms for use of feeds.Read�|�Permalink�|�Email this�|�Comments Sponsored Topics: Snow Leopard - Apple - Operating system - Unofficial Apple Weblog - TUAW
Leopard and the History and Future of Mac OS X on PowerPC

Daniel Eran DilgerHow long will Apple continue to support existing models of Macs in the latest version of Mac OS X? Previous versions of Apple’s OS have drawn the line for officially supported Macs based on practical considerations, rather than just being arbitrary or artificial. Here's what the past suggests for Mac OS X Leopard and the version that comes after it.The Post-Copland Crisis.Apple carried along official support for the 1986 Mac Plus through Mac System 7.5.5 in 1996. That established an expectation for Mac users that any new Mac System Software would be able to run across a decade long generation of old hardware. Further, Apple had only begun officially selling System 7 as a retail product a few years earlier; many Mac users continued to think of the Mac operating system as something that was available for free, as it had been in the past. That unreasonable support expectation combined with the sense of entitlement held by Mac users had helped to complicate Apple’s mid-90s failure to deliver Copland as a successor to System 7 between 1993 and 1995, and would continue to dog the company in its plans to provide a significant system software update after Copland was mothballed. Faced with the task of maintaining full backward compatibility for both existing applications and a wide range of hardware--but without any assurance that a significant number of Mac users would actually pay for the upgrade--it’s no wonder why Apple was stuck at System 7 for over a decade (Mac OS 8 and Mac OS 9 were only retoolings of the System 7 operating system released in 1991), and why plans to completely overhaul System 7 with Copland and Gershwin failed.If Apple had the luxury of operating outside of a real market economy and could simply rely on guaranteed future sales at high retail prices, it could have plowed along for twice as long and eventually released something, as Microsoft did a decade later with Windows Vista. As Windows Enthusiasts like to point out, Vista will eventually get deployed no matter how bad it is. [The Secrets of Pink, Taligent and Copland][Has Leopard Fallen into a Copland-Vista Conundrum?][SCO, Linux, and Microsoft in the History of OS: 1990s]Spindler’s Complications.By 1990, Apple CEO John Sculley had recognized that Apple needed to set a reasonable minimum hardware threshold for its operating system releases and to figure out a way to get Mac users to fund the expensive operating system development the company was doing. At that time, both Microsoft and IBM were charging PC users around $100 for retail copies of Windows or OS/2, neither of which were even really usable.Figuring out how to actually accomplish those goals never got done at Apple. Instead, Sculley’s successor Michael Spindler attempted to imitate Sony by releasing ranges of Mac hardware under a variety of vaguely Latin sounding names--Quadra, Centris, and Performa--and a series of confusing, nondescript model numbers. Starting in early 1994, Apple also underwent a complex transition from its original 680x0 Macs to PowerPC hardware. Since much of the original Mac software was written in assembly language, the transition relied on emulation of the existing Mac System Software, which further complicated efforts to deliver significant new features without breaking existing software or prematurely cutting off support for existing machines. Non-PowerPC Macs continued to be sold into 1996.Spindler’s Apple also began plans to license the Mac software to other hardware makers in late 1994, including APS, Bandai, DayStar, Motorola, Pioneer, Power Computing, Radius, and UMAX. That effort skimmed off the cream of Apple’s profitability and handed it to the cloners, leaving Apple to service the low end of the market at Sears with its Performas while also funding the development of nearly profitless Mac System Software to support an increasingly wide range of hardware. [Why Apple Failed]Simplifying the Mac Hardware Lineup Around the G3.When Steve Jobs returned to Apple in 1997, the company's product line was all over the place, although efforts were already underway to simplify things. Apple had only just discontinued the last of its 680x0-based Macs a year earlier. Under Spindler replacement Gil Ameilo, Apple had also scraped together a "Unity" release of System 7, newly rebranded as Mac OS 7.6. That release officially extended support back to all "32-bit clean" Macs, which included the eight year old Mac IIci from 1989.The installed base of Mac hardware not only spanned across two hardware platforms--680x0 and Power PC--but nearly each individual Mac model from Apple had also used its own highly customized and often uniquely quirky hardware design. The cloners were also introducing subtle differences in their own machines, too.Despite using the very modern PowerPC processors and Open Firmware, Macs in 1997 still incorporated old Mac ROMs to maintain software compatibility with the existing Mac OS. After taking control of Apple in the middle of that year, Jobs announced the release of a highly simplified product line using the new G3 processor. The G3 was such a significant leap over earlier PowerPC processors that even the entry level G3s were faster than the top of the line models Apple had been selling. So while Apple had a confusing array of eight different major PowerMac models at the beginning of 1997, by the end of the year it only had two: a desktop G3 and a tower G3. It also shipped a G3 PowerBook.[How CPR Saved Apple]Mac OS X 10.0 - 10.2: G3 Only.The introduction of the G3 processor created a clean line between it and the wide array of odd PowerPC hardware designed prior to 1997. The G3 also signaled the end of the line for the various models built by Mac cloners, who all refused to license new versions of the Mac OS at terms Jobs deemed reasonable. The G3 was also the first PowerPC processor optimized to run Mac software. That made it an easy minimum target for Mac OS X, which remained in development through 2001. In the meantime, Jobs bought out Power Computing--the largest Mac cloner--for $100 million, and terminated other clone agreements by releasing Mac OS 7.7 as “Mac OS 8�? in mid 1997. That revision also became the first edition of the Mac OS to really be successfully sold at retail; over 1.2 million copies were sold within the first two weeks. The next fall in 1998, Apple released Mac OS 8.5, which was the first version to be PowerPC-only, limiting support to Macs sold over the last five years. In 1999, Apple shipped Mac OS 9. The new Apple had proved it could plan, ship, and sell regular releases of an operation system. The next task would be shipping Mac OS X as a major new leap past the classic System 7.Between 2001 and 2002, the 10.0 to 10.2 versions of Mac OS X limited support to the G3 desktop Macs, including those first introduced in late 1997. It did not support the original PowerBook G3 unveiled alongside the G3 desktops however. The first supported PowerBook was the "WallStreet" revision introduced in May of 1998. That maintained the roughly five year support window for machines to be updated with new versions of Mac operating system software. [Apple Sells 1.2 Million Copies of Mac OS 8 - Apple][Leopard, Vista and the iPhone OS X Architecture]Mac OS X 10.3: New World Macs Only.After moving its hardware line to the G3, Apple next delivered a revised "New World" platform which modernized the Mac's hardware and removed its old hardware ROMs, replacing them with “ROM in RAM�? software loaded from disk. The first New World model was the first iMac in 1998. The beige G3 Macs from 1997 were replaced with a single new "blue and white" G3 in early 1999, which used the same translucent plastic as the iMac. Apple shipped its first "New World" laptop in the Lombard PowerBook G3, distinguished by its translucent bronze keyboard. In July 1999, Apple released the iBook.The release of Mac OS X Panther 10.3 in 2003 extended support back to Macs with G3 processors and built-in support for USB. This wasn't due to an actual requirement for USB, but rather a shorthand way to describe a cutoff for the support of the significantly different architecture of "Old World" Macs designed prior to the iMac, as all New World Macs also provided support for USB. Panther retained a roughly five year support window for existing Mac models.Mac OS X 10.4: Modern New World Macs Only.In 2004, Mac OS X Tiger 10.4 retained support for most New World Macs using G3 processors, but required support for built-in FireWire. Again, this wasn't related to a need for FireWire ports, but rather a way to exclude support for the earliest of the now five year old New World Macs, which Apple decided would not run Tiger acceptably, including: the original 1998 iMac.the original 1999 iBook.the 1999 "Lombard" PowerBook G3.These five year old machines can still run Tiger using XPostFacto, a third party enabler designed to force Mac OS X to run on earlier systems. However, significant differences in their hardware--coupled with their limited performance--prevented Apple from officially supporting them.In the case of the Lombard PowerBook, its DVD drive was never supported for movie playback under Mac OS X because the system did not have the power to decode DVD video in software; under Mac OS 9, it relied on a hardware decoder. Rather than holding up Mac OS X to develop custom support for the obsolete hardware decoder in the now half-decade old Lombard PowerBooks, Apple told its users to continue using the playback software it came with. [XPostFacto: OS X for Legacy Macs - Other World Computing]Mac OS X 10.5: 867 MHz Processor Required.For Leopard, Apple is specifying an 867 MHz G4. That excludes support for the now functionally obsolete G3s, and draws a line down the middle of the 2001 "Quicksilver" PowerMac G4s, excluding support for the 2001 G4 Cube and the first three generations of the Titanium PowerBook G4 up to late 2002. This again maintains official support for five to six years of Mac models.This break roughly corresponds to the arrival of the G4+, a revised version of the G4 with support for L3 cache and improvements to AltiVec. It is also near the line for supporting Quartz Extreme and the higher end Core Image, both of which are technologies used to delegate graphics work to the video card. However, Core Image is not a requirement for using Leopard; such a requirement would exclude support for all G4 desktops and laptops prior to 2003. Leopard Looms Large.That indicates Apple is being fairly liberal in officially supporting older models in Leopard. The obvious reason for this is that Apple wants to sell Leopard to as many Mac users as possible, even more than it wants to use Leopard to sell new Macs. Between 2001 and 2002, Apple sold just over 6 million Macs. From 2003 to the present, Apple has sold about 23 million Macs. Apple wants to target the broadest possible market for Leopard, so excluding support for older machines is done with some hesitation. By extending support back into 2001, Apple is selling to an audience of nearly 30 million versus 23 million.At the same time however, the likelihood of selling retail copies of Leopard to users of older Macs begins to drop as six year old machines go out of service or are no longer viewed by their owners as needing brand new software. This spring, analysts estimated an installed base of around 22 million active Mac users, an increase of 6 million over their figures from 2005.[Mac install base estimated at 22 million pre-Leopard - AppleInsider][Market Share vs Installed Base: iPod vs Zune, Mac vs PC]Is Leopard the Last Hurrah for Power PC Macs?The reports of PowerPC's obsolescence have been greatly exaggerated. Last year, the rumor was that Leopard would be released only for Intel Macs. This year, with Leopard looming on the horizon, the new rumor is that Mac OS X 10.6--possibly named Lynx or Cougar--will be Intel-only. However this is only uninformed speculation. When this rumor came up earlier about Leopard, I posted the article, “Unraveling The PowerPC Obsolescence Myth.�? It pointed out that Apple would not release an Intel-only Leopard for an audience of the roughly 3 million new Intel Macs sold in 2006 when it could reach an installed base of around 20 million Macs with a Universal Leopard.It noted, “If Apple continues to sell new Macs at current rates, it will be 2008 before Intel Macs begin to outnumber PowerPCs, and that assumes that every year, 4 million old PowerPC Macs will be destroyed. There will be a significant proportion of PowerPC Macs still buying software well into 2010, and the market will accommodate them.�?[Unraveling The PowerPC Obsolescence Myth]Why the Mac OS X Backward Compatibility Window May Increase.Apple’s Mac OS support troubles back in 1996 related to the support of multiple platforms, a wide variety of different models, and an inability to effectively market the Mac OS. Those issues are no longer factors today. Despite Apple’s maintenance of dual platforms since the transition to Intel began in 2006, technology has erased the barrier as a real problem.The majority of the installed base of around 22 million Macs is PowerPC; less than 10 million are Intel Macs. Apple has started to sell dramatically more new Macs at a faster rate over the last couple years--displacing the PowerPC majority more rapidly--but there will still be a lot of PowerPC Macs well into 2010. Worrying about 10.6 or even 10.7 being Intel-only shouldn't be among anyone's greatest concerns. By 2009, the likely ballpark release date of Leopard's successor, the trailing end of officially supported Macs would include over 8 million PowerPC Macs sold since 2004, even more machines--and more recent models--than Apple is targeting now by reaching back into 2001 to support QuickSilver G4s in Leopard. Further, supporting machines from 2003--including the first G5s--will be no difficult stretch, because the Mac architecture didn't change dramatically between 2003 and 2005 in the way that it rapidly did between 1997 and 2000. In addition, Mac OS X hardware dependancies have been designed to degrade gracefully. For example, the acceleration framework and Core Graphics libraries make use of specialized hardware if available, or simply run on the general purpose CPU if it isn’t.It's also interesting to note that prior to 2000, Macs weren't sold with Mac OS X because it didn't yet exist. That means earlier versions of Mac OS X supported years of Macs that were never really designed to run it, while Leopard still supports the vast majority of the machines anyone ever bought with the expectation to actually use Mac OS X. New generations of Mac OS X will have fewer reasons to exclude support for existing hardware, leaving the support line tied to practical performance.[Why Apple hasn't used Intel processors before]Intel-Only Not Necessary.Around 11 million Macs were sold between 2003 and 2005, and all of them were PowerPC. It would be foolish for Apple to simply exclude that audience in the next revision of Mac OS X without good reason. As it works out, there really isn't any good reason for Apple to ditch PowerPC. Apple's Universal Binaries architecture makes it relatively easy to maintain support across multiple platforms. It's not like the move from Motorola 680x0 classic Macs to PowerPC, where old 680x0 software was emulated at significant cost on PowerPC, and new PowerPC code couldn't run at all on 680x0 Macs. That situation left developers to wonder which they should invest their support in and for how long. Universal Binaries means there isn't any tough choice to make.Universal Binaries not only support PowerPC and Intel, but also make supporting 32 and 64 bit architectures easy. Leopard supports all four Mac platforms in the same software release:32 bit PowerPC G464 bit PowerPC G532 bit Intel64 bit Intel Microsoft faces big problems in migrating its users to 64 bits, because it has no seamless architecture to waltz its 32 bit Intel users onto 64 bit hardware. Instead, Windows users have to obtain a separate 64 bit edition of their operating system, new 64 bit drivers, and new 64 bit applications. Supporting both is problematic, and deploying software across both is also trouble. Even Microsoft hasn’t delivered its portfolio of applications for its 64 bit versions of Windows. Microsoft faces enough troubles selling Vista, let alone its deferred plan to deal with 64 bits and EFI at some point in the future. Apple already has both issues covered, allowing it to concentrate on more interesting tasks. [How Apple’s Firmware Leapfrogs BIOS PCs]Applications that are Intel-Only.For Apple and third party developers using Apple's Xcode tools, supporting both Intel and PowerPC architectures is really no more difficult than supporting just Intel Macs. In fact, Apple has also ported Mac OS X to the ARM architecture for use in the iPhone and the iPod Touch, demonstrating that it can flex its multi-platform muscle in several directions, not just as one-time, disposable transition plan. Universal Binaries isn’t a crutch, its a powerful deployment technology.There are only three types of developers that will have any reason to deliver Intel-only Mac apps:Companies like Adobe, which base their applications on their own custom, internal cross platform architecture. Since Adobe maintains its own system that is based on Intel-centric development, its new apps such as Soundbooth aren't ever going to appear for PowerPC. If it used Xcode’s Universal Binaries, this would not be a problem. Xcode doesn't target Windows though (at least not in a way Adobe can use!), so Adobe rolled its own system. Software designed for Windows and ported to Intel Macs using a WINE-like engine. This is how EA is porting its new games to the Mac. They are actually Windows games running on a thin portability layer that emulates the Windows APIs. Since games don't integrate into the desktop UI, a full Mac port isn't very valuable for users or worth doing for the developer, particularly since the Mac gaming market is still pretty small. Porting over Windows games is far faster and keeps new releases in sync so that Mac gamers will have access to new titles sooner, and won't miss features such as network play.  Environment emulators and other software tied directly to the x86 architecture, including Parallels. These can't be ported to PowerPC for the same reason that it makes no sense to port Virtual PC to Intel. Apart from running Windows--which is tightly bound to the 32-bit x86 architecture--there is really very little software that needs to run on a specific processor.For most other software, including the vast majority of what makes up Mac OS X, it really isn't difficult to deliver both PowerPC and Intel versions, so as long as there are PowerPC Macs around, there'll be PowerPC software. That makes it extremely unlikely that Apple would drop support for PowerPC in the next generation of Mac OS X after Leopard.Maintaining and Growing the Mac Installed Base.What about the argument that Apple would prefer to “force�? users to buy a new Mac to get the latest system rather than simply upgrade their existing hardware? Consider that Apple’s Mac profit margins are around 20% or less, while its Mac OS X margins are closer to Microsoft’s 80% Windows margins. [Office Wars 2 - Microsoft’s Outrageous Office Profits]Mac users paying to upgrade to Mac OS X are likely to buy a new Mac eventually as a replacement, so Apple’s delaying that hardware sale for a profitable software upgrade makes more sense than forcing existing Mac users to go out and buy new hardware, which might involve comparing a new Mac against a PC running Windows.The more Macs that can run the most recent version of Mac OS X, the more attractive the target is for third party developers. Apple wants to maintain the majority of Mac users on the latest version of its software. In contrast, Windows Vista is competing against Windows XP, and the fact that Microsoft only earns 20% of its revenues from (the much more expensive) retail box sales indicates that most PC users upgrade when buying a new PC. More Mac users pay to upgrade their software.That fact contributes toward making the Mac platform far more valuable than Windows; despite having only 3% market share of the entire world’s production of PCs, Apple makes more money on hardware sales than Dell with its 15% share of the market, and--after including Microsoft’s tremendous losses from its non-monopoly businesses--made half as much money in software as Microsoft did with its 98% share. Windows Enthusiast prefer not to think about this.Even stripping Apple of its iPod revenues, which PC pundits love to do, the company still earned $4.4 billion on its Macintosh business last year, over a third as much Microsoft brought in from its entire Windows, Office, and server operations combined. Apple’s 2% of the PC market doesn’t seem so small anymore. [Can Apple Take Microsoft in the Battle for the Desktop?][Market Share vs Installed Base: iPod vs Zune, Mac vs PC]What do you think? I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast! Submit to Reddit or Slashdot, or consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!
Lightspeed 3.0 & Web Store 2.0

One of the announcements coming out of Macworld last week was the upcoming release of Lightspeed 3.0, an update to the Mac Point-of-Sale software. Lightspeed is a complete POS solution that covers both front counter and back office retail needs, and one of the few that runs natively on the Mac platform. I took an interest in this release because I used to own a small retail store and I know first-hand how painful Windows POS software can be. Point-of-Sale the Macintosh Way Lightspeed is clearly inspired by the iTunes interface and incorporates the familiar left-hand source/navigation list with the details screen on the right, and even a cover flow view of your products. The design choice is meant to connect the POS with the perceived elegance and sophistication of the Mac platform that motivated retailers to choose to purchase a Mac for their shop in the first place. If a boutique owner is buying a (relatively) expensive iMac to be on display in your store, this software will match the look that they are trying to create with their aluminum, black and glass hardware. And just as you would expect, there is an iPhone web app for Lightspeed that lets you check in on how your shop is doing even when you manage to get away. What's New in 3.0 The big changes in version 3.0 are a new interface for the front counter to pick products and build orders, a button mode that is optimized for touchscreens, and better multi-site support. The new interface lets you build a list of products for an order and then “park” that order in the sidebar if you need to switch to another customer, or just to wait for the customer to make up their mind. A greater number of features are available directly from the POS interface and the sidebar is customizable to match the way your store works. The button mode is there for retail locations where a touch interface would work well. You can buy an iMac customized with a touch sensitive screen by TrollTouch or another vendor and eliminate the (visible) keyboard and mouse on the counter. All these interfaces leverage key Apple technologies like Core Animation to make a really beautiful and polished piece of software. The multi-site support allows for cross-store sales and returns, and gift cards that can be used at any store. The system will also push inventory descriptions and SKU numbers from a central site to the other stores so you can reduce duplicate administration efforts. Another small, but significant, change is the added support for debit cards and PIN pads. The fees to accept these cards are often cheaper for retailers and a great convenience to customers. I saw a demo running at the Macworld booth with a fancy Hypercom pad with custom graphics displayed on the pad, just one more detail that helps create a very slick look for your retail store. The final release date for Lightspeed 3.0 has not been set, but we should see it ship in the first quarter of 2009. A Whole New Web Store While Lightspeed 3.0 is still several weeks away, Web Store 2.0 should be ready much sooner in conjunction with a planned 2.8 release of Lightspeed. Web Store 2.0 has been rebuilt from the ground up to use an SQL backend with PHP. The speed improvements over the previous flatfile-based approach are significant. The biggest change is in the customer-facing web interface. The web interface has nods to the desktop POS software with drag and drop for products to the shopping cart, a number of animations, and a very sophisticated look. All the buzzwords are covered and the feature list has been greatly expanded to cover wish lists, cross-sell suggestions, online account management, order history, real-time credit card processing, real-time shipping calculations, and more. The demo I got at the Lightspeed booth was really impressive. You can build a great looking web store right from the inventory you've already entered in the desktop POS software. You can choose to have Xsilva host your web store or you can use your own web hosting company as long as they provide MySQL, PHP5, and the required libraries. Xsilva wanted to make it really clear that they are not trying to lock anyone in to their hosting service, but they did want to make it easy for their customer to get online with SSL certificates and all that is needed to launch a site. Build Your Retail Empire with Lightspeed Lightspeed pricing starts at $749 and the Web Store license is an additional $899. The upgrade to Web Store 2.0 will be free for users that have a support and upgrades subscription. If you are looking for new POS software, then Lightspeed is an excellent choice for the Mac user. If you already run Lightspeed, then the 3.0 upgrade will be interesting if you use it for front-counter sales or for multiple locations. For those people running Web Store, the new 2.0 version is just head and shoulders above the previous 1.x releases. You'll love what you can do with your online presence and the sophisticated look that Xsilva gives you right out of the box. If you have decided to run your store on the Mac platform, then you will certainly appreciate how Lightspeed works in a familiar way and supports the aesthetic of Apple's carefully designed hardware. �� Concentric Hosted IT Solutions and Web Hosting Click here to save cost on your IT demands
Parallels 4.0 Gets Major Update, Can Do Windows 7

Good news today for those of you who want to try out Microsoft's latest attempt at an operating system without leaving the comfort of your Mac. A recent update to Mac virtualization program Parallels Desktop 4.0 (4.0.3810) introduces experimental support for Windows 7. Apple faithful will also note that the new update additionally brings support for Snow Leopard as both primary and guest operating system. You may remember that in comparing Parallels to VMware Fusion 2.0, we favored the latter fairly decisively. This doesn't change my own opinion, but developers and others looking specifically to be able to run as many different types of virtual environments as possible might disagree. The update contains a long list of improvements, of which new OS support is only a small part. Other new features include support for Apple remote disks, a silent start mode for Coherence, and direct dragging of Windows files to Mac apps in the Dock. Parallels also now claims increased battery life on portable Macs, owing to improvements in CPU usage. Finally, a number of speed-oriented improvements were also introduced, including DirextX 9.0 with Shaders Model 2 support, Intel SSE4 support for better media playback, and faster suspend and resume of virtual machines. Note that VMware Fusion 2.0 does not yet support either Microsoft's Windows 7 or Apple's Snow Leopard, which are both still in closed developer beta. Look for support from Fusion soon, though, now that the gauntlet has been thrown by Paralells. Parallels is available for $79.99, or $49.99 if you're upgrading from an existing version. �� Concentric Hosted IT Solutions and Web Hosting Click here to save cost on your IT demands
Parallels Desktop 4.0 for Mac Now Available

Virtualization software has come a long way since the days of Virtual PC on PPC Macs. Microsoft's Windows-enabling program was more of a parlor trick than fully functional software. These days, Parallels Desktop, version 4.0 of which is available today for purchase, makes running a virtual machine more of a pleasure and less of a chore. Earlier this fall, VMWare Fusion, the primary competitor of Parallels, released version 2.0 of their software. VMWare's updated product added DirectX 9.0c and Mac OS X Leopard Server support, features which gave it a significant edge over the 3.0 release of Parallels. Parallels Desktop 4.0 evens the field, introducing both DirectX 9 and OpenGL 2.1 support, and the ability to run OS X Leopard Server. Other new features include: Built-in iPhone access for starting, stopping and managing your virtual machine from your handheld Clips, a new proprietary screenshot sharing tool that lets you share captures between operating systems with a single click Simultaneous device mounting in both Windows and OS X, so that manual switching of things like USB sticks and other removable storage devices Multi-core processors and up to 8GB of RAM are now supported, with up to 256MB of video RAM possible 64-bit computing support Hypervisor adaptive resource management optimizes performance automatically based on your usage PowerSaver improved battery management with battery status monitor in Windows VM An SDK for developing third-party software compatible with Parallels, which could result in some interesting cross-platform applications The above list makes the 4.0 release of Parallels a very wise purchase for those who need Windows functionality in a virtualized environment. Overall performance is reported to be 50% better than in the last version 3 build, narrowing the gap between virtualized and partitioned Boot Camp Windows installations. Parallels Desktop 4.0 is available now for $79.99. A Premium version adds a software bundle valued at $160 for $99.99, and owners of Parallels 3 can upgrade for $39.99.

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