Former Sun CEO says Apple's Jobs threatened to sue

The former chief executive of Sun Microsystems writes on his personal blog that Apple CEO Steve Jobs once threatened to sue the company in 2003.

The former chief executive of Sun Microsystems writes on his personal blog that Apple CEO Steve Jobs once threatened to sue the company in 2003.

  • Office Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office Monopoly

    Daniel Eran DilgerOffice Wars 1 - Claris and the Origins of Apple’s iWork Office Wars 2 - Microsoft’s Outrageous Office ProfitsOffice Wars 3 - How Microsoft Got Its Office MonopolyMicrosoft’s Office monopoly gives the company more revenues and delivers nearly as much profit as its Windows software. How did it gain such a powerful position in productivity applications? The history of Office is rooted in decisions Apple made in the 80s with the Lisa and Macintosh, and also has an interesting correlation to Apple’s iPhone strategy today.The Origins of Office.While Microsoft has overwhelming power in desktop productivity applications today, it entered the market late. In the early 80s, Microsoft principally sold language software and struggled to license copies of AT&T’s Unix under the name Xenix. In 1981, Microsoft teamed up with IBM to license a copycat version of CP/M as the DOS for IBM’s new PC. Microsoft didn’t really get started in applications until Steve Jobs approached the company that same year with a proposal to develop for Apple’s new Macintosh.Entrusted with prototype Mac hardware and inside access to Apple’s development tools, Microsoft made an agreement with Apple in 1981 not to ship any mouse-based products of its own until a year after Apple introduced the Mac. In exchange, Apple promised to give Microsoft a rare opportunity to enter the competitive desktop applications market using its entirely new Mac platform as a launching pad.[SCO, Linux, and Microsoft in the History of OS: 1970s][SCO, Linux, and Microsoft in the History of OS: 1980s]Software Sells Systems!Prior to the Mac, Apple had released the Lisa as its first graphical desktop computer. Since developing new graphical apps for the Lisa was very different and required special training, Apple delivered its own complete productivity suite for the Lisa. It planned to open up the Lisa platform to third party development at some point after the initial launch, but the immediate focus had been to deliver a unique set of applications to demonstrate the power of Lisa’s new graphical interface.Recalling the software focus of the Lisa development team, reader Jim Hoyt emailed me several months ago in response to “Why Apple Bounced Back,? an article crediting Apple’s recent internal software development efforts with a large role in the company’s turnaround over the last decade. Hoyt wrote, “In 1979, John Couch, the soon-to-be head of the Lisa project, was in charge of all software at Apple Computer. He commissioned this poster: Software Sells Systems.? I’ve been meaning to publish the otherwise long since lost to history poster, so here it is, belatedly. Thanks Jim![Why Apple Bounced Back]Apple Delivers Lisa Suite Seven Years Ahead of Microsoft Office.The poster’s premise was obvious: the Lisa wasn’t going to sell itself; it needed practical software applications to usher in the future of the graphical desktop. Apple developed an entire suite of seven productivity applications that shipped with the Lisa system in 1983, including word processing, spreadsheet, database, drawing, graphing, project management, and terminal emulation programs. It was seven years later before Microsoft would first package its Word, Excel, and PowerPoint applications together as Office 1.0 in 1990. In his February 1983 review of the Lisa for Byte magazine, Gregg Williams concluded: “As you can tell, I am very impressed with the Lisa. I also admire Apple for deciding to make the system without being unduly influenced by cost or marketing constraints. The Lisa couldn’t have been developed without such a deep commitment, and no other company I can think of could afford such a project or would be interested in doing it this way (the Lisa project reportedly cost over $50 million and used more than 200 person-years of effort!). In terms of the actual, as opposed to symbolic, effect it will have on both the microcomputer and the larger-computer market, the Lisa system is the most important development in computers in the last five years, easily outplacing IBM’s introduction of the Personal Computer in August, 1981.?A year later, Lisa ended up being replaced by the much less expensive Macintosh, which delivered much of the Lisa’s functionality at a quarter of the price. However, the Mac did not include the Lisa’s expensive megabyte of RAM, its hard drive, or its productivity application suite. The Mac only shipped with a word processor and painting tools.Why Apple didn’t port its Lisa applications to the Macintosh is a confounding riddle, because it had more than a half decade of opportunity to do so. The main reason for this was a paranoid fear of alienating outside developers, along with jitters related to IBM’s rapid poaching of the desktop computing world after the arrival of its PC in 1981.[“The Lisa Computer System? Reprinted from Byte, issue 2/1983] [The Lisa, Apple's First GUI-Based Computer System - VAW][How Apple Keyboards Lost a Logo and Windows PCs Gained One]Apple’s Lisa vs the Third Party Mac Platform: 1980 - 1984.Competition inside Apple between the Lisa development group and the Macintosh team led to a different software strategy for the Mac. Since the smaller Mac group didn’t have the resources to develop a full suite of applications in advance of its launch, it planned to leverage third party development in the same way as the Apple II had.Sales of Apple II computers had exploded in 1979 with the release of Dan Bricklin’s VisiCalc spreadsheet software. That success was a large reason why IBM decided to get involved in the microcomputer business with the PC in the first place. It wasn’t until 1984 that Apple began making lots of money selling AppleWorks, its word processing, spreadsheet, and database package for the Apple II. It continued to sell the software with only limited updates well into the early 90s.Apple management failed to see the potential for delivering its own suite of Mac applications as it had on the Lisa, and as it very profitably would later do for the Apple II. Instead, it became increasingly enamored with the idea of partnering with third party software developers and delegating away the work--and the profits--of creating its own Mac software. Motivated by fears of inhibiting a third party software industry like the one that had grown up around the IBM PC, Apple intentionally stifled its own internal software development efforts and later spun them off into the Siberian gulag of Claris. That move would prove to be a devastatingly expensive mistake that would nearly destroy Apple over the next decade.Incidentally, three of the most important products Apple would release during that decade of decline were software products: the profitable AppleWorks for the Apple II in 1984.the free 1987 HyperCard for the Mac.the free 1991 QuickTime for the Mac.[HyperCard: Apple and the Origins of the Web][1990-1995: Planting Software Seeds][QuickTime: The Secret Weapon Inside iTunes]A Fearsome Future VisiOn for the PC: 1981 - 1983.Another contributing reason for Apple’s rush to embrace third party developers on the Macintosh may have been related to the fear of VisiCorp’s new mouse-driven VisiOn graphical desktop environment. VisiOn originally appeared on the Apple III in November of 1981, but the complete commercial failure of that new machine after the delivery of IBM’s PC prompted VisiCorp to announce moving its support to the PC in 1982, with a promised release target of mid-1983. Apple was still scrambling to release the Lisa and the Mac, both of which had slipped repeatedly.While clumsy, slow, and expensive--the base VisiOn software and a mouse cost $790, each application cost between $250 and $400, and it required a $5000 hard drive upgrade on top of a $2000 PC--VisiOn was backed by the legendary VisiCorp, the company that had helped launch the Apple II to fame with VisiCalc. VisiOn also tapped into IBM’s “up is down? PC, which despite its high price and low level of performance and innovation, had cut deeply into Apple’s business expansion plans, almost entirely due to IBM’s reputation and its monopoly position in business computing. After witnessing its first big failure with the Apple III, and then seeing a tepid response to the $9,995 Lisa in 1983, Apple was no doubt very concerned about IBM’s PC being converted into an ugly frankenstein Mac knockoff with that $7,500 VisiOn upgrade bolted on, cheered on by a press giddy at the prospect of being bamboozled by IBM’s overpriced and under delivering PC.The only way to compete with the threat of such a graphical system for the PC would be to deliver the new Macintosh as quickly as possible at a much lower cost with lots of applications from a variety of third party developers. Fortunately for Apple, VisiOn also slipped several months and wasn't delivered until the end of 1983. Right up until it completely fizzled, the press hailed VisiOn as a promising competitor to Apple’s Lisa and the forthcoming Macintosh.By 1983, VisiCorp had fallen apart; its star development manager Mitch Kapor had left to found Lotus Development. Kapor’s new spreadsheet product, Lotus 1-2-3 for the DOS PC, destroyed the remains of VisiCorp and its VisiOn.[VisiCorp Visi On - Toasty Tech][1980-1985: 8-bit Platforms]Frying Pan to the Fire: Apple Runs to the Arms of Microsoft: 1981.Finding developers willing to commit to investing in Apple’s next new platform was difficult after the failure of the Apple III and the wildly successful launch of the PC. Apple later found that its developer relations would suffer at the release of the “no other software needed? Lisa. For the Mac, Apple decided to copy the PC model by directing the majority of its efforts into courting third party developers and downplaying its own software releases, which were only intended to serve as basic placeholders. Even so, many PC developers planned to take a ‘wait and see’ approach to supporting the Macintosh.Hoping to prime an early and explosive business success for the Macintosh in the same way VisiCalc had launched sales of the Apple II, Steve Jobs made plans with Microsoft to deliver a graphical Mac interface for its struggling Multiplan--a VisiCalc spreadsheet clone--and a new Chart application.Microsoft had also secretly begun another Mac app initially called MultiTool Word, based on the Bravo word processor developed by Xerox PARC’s Charles Simonyi and Richard Brodie; Microsoft hired both in 1981. The company didn’t tell Apple about its new word processor project because the Mac team had already started developing a word processor for the Mac called MacWrite.[A Rich Neighbor Named Xerox - Folklore.org][An Office User Interface Blog - Microsoft’s Jensen Harris]Apple’s Problematic Partnership with Microsoft: 1981 - 1985Next to IBM, Apple was among the first companies to realize that getting into a business partnership with Microsoft was a really bad idea. Throughout 1983, Microsoft employees began intense discussions with Apple about how the Mac system software worked internally, involving issues unrelated to desktop application development. The reasons for this became obvious when Microsoft made a surprise pre-announcement at the Comdex trade show in November 1983 of a clone of Apple’s Mac environment for the PC called Windows, along with the release of a text-based Word for DOS using a mouse. Apple had previously worried about VisiCalc’s independent VisiOn appearing for the PC, but now its own partner had taken its internally developed graphical desktop work to deliver a competing product on IBM’s platform. Microsoft had discovered a loophole that allowed it to ignore its exclusive agreement with Apple because the contract had tied the year-long waiting period to the Mac’s planned ship date in 1982; that contract date wasn’t updated as the project slipped into 1984.It turned out that Word for DOS wasn’t very popular, since DOS PC users didn’t see much benefit from only using a mouse with a single application. It also turned out that Microsoft couldn’t deliver on its promise to ship Windows 1.0 by early 1984; it wasn’t actually available until 1985, and even then was a complete joke of a product and fully unusable. However, the problems Apple would suffer for trusting Microsoft were only just getting started. Windows 1.0 wasn’t much to look at, but it did offer an advancement beyond the neanderthal text interface of Word for DOS. Apple also had reason to worry when it found Microsoft was directly collaborating with IBM in 1985 to deliver a new DOS replacement called OS/2. [1990-1995: The Race to Deliver The Next New Platform][Mac Office, $150 Million, and the Story Nobody Covered]Apple Grows Dependent upon Third Party Software: 1985 - 1990.Apple’s partnership with Microsoft continued to worsen. Microsoft finally shipped its spreadsheet for the Mac in 1985, but threatened to also release it for the PC as well, prompting Apple CEO John Sculley to sign away rights to a variety of Mac system software details to Microsoft in 1985 in exchange for exclusive Mac development of the graphical Multiplan for two years. Microsoft’s Multiplan and Chart applications for the Macintosh were among the strongest software features Apple touted in its 1984 advertising. (Click to view full size).A very young Bill Gates appeared next to Mitch Kapor of Lotus Development in Apple’s Mac ads to observe, “To create a new standard takes somethings that’s not just a little bit different. It takes something that captures people's imaginations. Macintosh meets that standard.? Were he not trying to sell Windows Mobile today, he might say the same of the iPhone!Sculley had been arrogantly dismissive of Bill Gates’ July 1985 suggestion that Apple work quickly to broadly license its Mac technology to Northern Telecom, Motorola, and AT&T. Instead, Apple sought to retain control of the unique Mac desktop as a way to sell its hardware.At the same time, Apple grew increasingly reliant upon Microsoft to deliver updates to its applications for the Mac, and worried about threatening any of its third party Mac developers with its own internal application software efforts.However, in 1984 Apple had released AppleWorks for the Apple II. That program rapidly became the top selling software title of any computer platform, despite Apple’s minimal efforts to market it. It was nearly an embarrassment for Apple, which wanted to push the graphical new Macintosh, not a text-based 8-bit program. By 1987, Apple had spun off its own apps--including AppleWorks, MacWrite, MacDraw, and MacPaint--into the Claris subsidiary. Claris went on to profitably develop and acquire a suite of Mac productivity apps, but operated at an arms’ length distance from Apple. By 1990, Sculley realized the vast profit potential in application software. Apple had two solid platforms: the Apple II and the Mac. The company’s minimal efforts to market any software for them was clearly a huge mistake. Sculley subsequently decided to retain Claris as part of Apple rather than spinning it off, but that late decision shattered the subsidiary because its employees and managers had been given the expectation that a Claris IPO would make them rich. Many left in disgust.[Office Wars 1 - Claris and the Origins of Apple’s iWork]Microsoft Becomes an Applications Company: 1985 - 1989.At the same time, Microsoft’s graphical Multiplan for the Mac--which ended up being combined with the Chart app and renamed as Excel in 1985--became a huge seller for Microsoft. In contrast, the textual DOS version--which retained the Multiplan name--couldn’t compete with the top selling Lotus 1-2-3 on the PC side.Two years later in 1987, Microsoft’s deal with Sculley expired and the company released Excel 2.0 for the PC, along with Windows 2.0, which copied more of the Mac desktop, including the basic ability to display overlapping windows. No OEMs shipped Windows 2.0 on their PCs, but anyone buying the new Excel got a copy of Windows and a taste of the graphical Mac environment, albeit with Microsoft’s garish colors and its horrific MDI-style interface.Apple Sues to Stop Graphical Copycats, But Only On the PC: 1985 - 1988.While a number of companies delivered graphical environments in the pattern of VisiOn for various computer systems of the time, Apple was only threatened by those that promised to deliver the Mac look on the PC.For example, Apple ignored Berkeley Systems’ mouse-based, windowing GEOS environment, offered initially for the Commodore 64 and later Apple’s own Apple II systems.However, when CP/M maker Digital Research introduced its GEM/1 for the DOS PC, Apple sued and won an injunction that forced the company to remove certain features Apple had originally developed for the Mac, the most obvious of which was its use of graphics regions to draw sophisticated overlapping windows. At the same time, GEM/1 was also being sold for the 1985 Atari ST, but Apple completely ignored that product, enabling Atari to deliver a system so similar to the Mac it was commonly called the Jackintosh, after Atari CEO Jack Trammell. Apple also ignored overlapping windows in the 1985 Commodore Amiga, and a similar graphical desktop in the 1987 RISC OS developed by Acorn Computers. Apple was certainly aware of the British Acorn’s RISC OS, as the two companies had partnered to form ARM in order to develop a new generation of RISC based processors powering Acorn’s RISC PC and later, the Newton. Those same ARM processors now power iPods, the iPhone, and the vast majority of all mobile devices. [Origins: Why the iPhone is ARM, and isn't Symbian]However, Apple went ballistic upon the release of Microsoft’s Windows 2.0 in 1987. One reason was that Microsoft was pointedly using the product as a way to move its Mac applications to IBM’s PC, a move Apple correctly feared would quickly erode the unique value of the Macintosh. Additionally, Microsoft was also describing Windows as the basis of a new interface for IBM’s promised OS/2. Apple was livid that the trusted partner it had launched into the applications business would immediately sell it out and migrate those same applications to directly benefit its main hardware competitor. Despite the fairly insignificant sales of Windows 2.0, Sculley’s Apple sued Microsoft in 1988 over the use of Mac software details it had taken from Apple in its 1985 agreement. It also sued HP over a Windows 2.0 add on pack called NewWave, which supplied additional Mac-like features to the PC. Meanwhile, sales of Excel on the PC gradually began to grow and Microsoft worked increasingly hard to replace its Mac partner and then destroy it, using Windows as a tool to port its Mac applications to the PC instead. [Apple's Billion Dollar Patent Bluster: Patent vs. Copyright]Apple Loses Jobs, Opportunities: 1986 - 1988.In 1986--as Apple’s panic over Microsoft moving its Mac apps to the IBM PC was just getting started--Steve Jobs’ plans to rapidly move the Macintosh into the business and server arena were getting shot down by the more conservative minded Sculley. Apple’s board feared that increased investment in the Macintosh might spread the company too thin.[Steve Jobs and 20 Years of Apple Servers]Jobs subsequently left Apple in frustration to form NeXT, Inc, and develop his own ideas for business oriented workstations. Sculley replaced him with Jean Luis Gassée, who shared Sculley’s vision for dabbling in impractical technology ventures like the Newton and keeping Mac models configured for high end markets.Apple continued to make outstanding profits from increasing sales of the Mac and continued sales of the Apple II, but the company had made a grave mistake in ignoring and avoiding the software business. Even worse, it was now dependent upon a rival company to maintain key software titles for the Mac.Apple was also losing key engineering talent to Jobs’ NeXT, which by 1988 was delivering the first release of what Apple itself should have been working on: its next generation of hardware and software. [Newton Lessons for Apple's New Platform][Why OS X is on the iPhone, but not the PC: The History of NeXT]Sculley’s Apple Bungles Office Applications.While Sculley’s Apple fought Microsoft’s Windows in the courts, it did little to effectively compete in the marketplace, either with the Mac as a platform or in the applications arena to take on what would become the Microsoft Office suite in 1990. To deliver Office, Microsoft simply paired Word and Excel with PowerPoint, a Mac presentation application Microsoft acquired in 1987. Had Apple simply ported its Lisa applications to the Mac, it would have had a head start of several years to develop and refine its own applications suite, and could have maintained them as unique to the Mac without giving away its crown jewels to Microsoft in 1985. After ten years of trying, even Microsoft could eventually deliver a good enough copy of the Mac with Windows 95 in late 1995. After that, Microsoft pulled the plug on Office development for the Mac and didn’t release another update until 1998.[Office Wars 1 - Claris and the Origins of Apple’s iWork]Apple’s Squandered Opportunity in Software Sales.The bizarre thing was that Apple was making money selling AppleWorks on autopilot, and continued to do so from 1984 into the early 1990s. Additionally, the new ClarisWorks for the Mac easily captured the top spot in Mac software sales from Microsoft’s Works within its debut year in 1991. Even so, Apple did little to capitalize upon the discovery that software would indeed sell systems, just as Couch had foreseen back in 1979. Apple had a printing press for creating money, but simply left it idling while Microsoft delivered low innovation software titles and raked in millions of dollars in Mac software revenues. Sculley’s Apple essentially sat back and granted Microsoft full opportunity to clean out its entire business model without a fight, hoping that the law would rush in to correct the inequities at some point in the near future. Instead, the court deliberated for a tech eternity until 1994, and then threw out Sculley’s “look and feel? lawsuit, largely on the basis that Sculley had earlier granted Microsoft limited rights to Mac ideas back in 1985 in his desperate bid to keep Microsoft as a Mac developer. The bitter irony was that between 1985 and 1995, Microsoft needed the Mac at least as much as Apple needed Microsoft. Even in 1997, Steve Jobs could get Microsoft to agree to a half decade of continued development of Office for the Mac by simply adding Internet Explorer to the Mac desktop. Jobs turned down the hardball demand that Apple kill QuickTime, and even got a public relations coup out of the deal by having Microsoft announce a $150 million investment in Apple.Sculley’s penny wise, pound foolish conservative greed destroyed Apple and directly transferred the vast potential wealth of value Apple had originated at great expense for its 1983 Lisa graphical office suite to Microsoft, which subsequently ran with it and deserted the company. [Mac Office, $150 Million, and the Story Nobody Covered][Apple’s NeXT Server Offensive on Microsoft]Microsoft Betrays IBM and Uses Office Against OS/2.Apple wasn’t the only partner Microsoft exploited, turned on, and then tried to drive out of business. The earliest and most obvious example was IBM, which had launched Microsoft into significance as a reseller of DOS. Microsoft betrayed IBM in the development of OS/2, first by pulling out of the operating system partnership, then by canceling Office for OS/2 after shipping an initial version for it in 1992. IBM later bought up Lotus and worked to compete against Microsoft’s growing influence with Office. Microsoft responded by using its new monopoly positions to punish IBM in various moves documented in the Microsoft monopoly trial. That story follows in Office Wars 4. Using the Office Monopoly Against NeXT.Jobs carried lessons learned from watching the implosion of Apple under Sculley to NeXT. His initial goal for NeXT was to build a software platform. However, nobody was shipping hardware up to the task of running an advanced operating system, so NeXT began following the business model of Apple, selling new hardware with advanced software.While Jobs had found it challenging to find software partners for the Mac at Apple, the task was even more difficult at NeXT, which Apple had forced into the ultra high end of the workstation market using a non-compete agreement. NeXTSTEP pioneered advanced rapid development frameworks to make it easier for third parties to deliver software for the new system. When Jobs discovered that Lotus was working to deliver a new spreadsheet paradigm for OS/2, he gave the Lotus team a NeXT system and got involved in refining the software to show off the features of his new platform. In contrast, Microsoft used the productivity applications monopoly it had been handed by Apple to impede adoption of NeXT. When asked about writing software for NeXTSTEP, Microsoft’s Bill Gates famously fumed, “Develop for it? I'll piss on it.? Gates also announced plans to immediately deliver his own advanced operating system with object oriented development frameworks called Cairo, which turned out to be a vaporware lie Microsoft repeated from 1991 until NeXT was acquired by Apple in 1997.[1990-1995: Microsoft's Yellow Road to Cairo]Microsoft’s Murderous Partnerships.Microsoft helped to ensure that neither NeXT nor OS/2 could acquire a broad enough computing platform to drive a self-sustaining software business. Apple was able to maintain a struggling niche platform on the Mac, but fears of stepping on third party developers’ toes actively prevented the company from actually building on that potential until the late 90s. Ironically, Microsoft did just that, by developing its solo PC platform with Windows and then using it to destroy third party developers it viewed as competitors. By tying its Windows and Office products together, Microsoft could strangle its own former partners--the top developers of MS-DOS applications--including WordPerfect, Lotus’ 1-2-3, database and developer products from Ashton-Tate and Borland, and really every major developer on the PC that in any way challenged Microsoft.Microsoft’s coldly calculated murder of every rival DOS application developer and later many of its Windows developers, from Novell to IBM and Sun to Netscape, is an oddly public fact treated as a taboo secret by Windows Enthusiasts, who avoid all mention of it as they talk about how Apple “can’t work with partners? in the rich, supportive way Microsoft supposedly has. Any competition between Apple and third party developers--even with shareware programs--is paraded through the insufferable blogs of ZDNet and the pages of IDG’s InfoWorld/PCWorld/Computerworld and described as unconscionable conduct. This is from writers who all witnessed first hand Microsoft’s massacres of any and all “partners? the company decided no longer suited its fancy. Have these wags all been brainwashed, or are they just lying for money? As a side note, the Office Wars and Microsoft’s monopoly position in applications provide interesting insight into how Apple is deploying its iPhone software strategy, which the next article will examine.What do you think? I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast! Submit to Reddit or Slashdot, or consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!

  • Former Sun CEO Claiming Steve Jobs Threatened To Sue Over Patents Too

    Former Sun CEO Jonathan Schwartz is laying claim that the current Apple CEO, Steve Jobs, threatened action against his company in 2003, in regard to desktop OS technologies, according to Apple Insider.Back in 2003, Schwartz said that Jobs contacted him personally "to let me know the graphical effects [in Sun's Project Looking Glass project] were 'stepping all over Apple's [Intellectual Property].'"  If Sun had opted to release it for commercial purposes, Jobs was reportedly going to sue for infringement.Schwartz went on to say that Sun opted not to launch the product, but it was not because of Jobs' accusation.  In place of that particular project, Sun decided not to launch the Linux desktop UI shell as it came to the conclusion that there wouldn't be a place for a competitor to the Windows desktop amongst businesses.Image courtesy of enterprisenetworkandservers.com

  • BBC's Bill Thompson Hates Being Fingered As a Fraud

    Daniel Eran DilgerIn response to the article "BBC Prints Irresponsible Rubbish on Apple," Bill Thompson wrote me explaining that he didn't like being called out on his errors. However, he failed to explain how he was accurate in his rambling diatribe assailing Apple as equal to Microsoft in anticompetitive, market monopolizing behavior.Instead, Thompson referred to me--in the plural--as "excitable Apple Zealots," as he republished my article in his blog with more of his own comments. “I don't want to sign up to your forum, however nice your art projects may be,? he wrote me in an email. “I'll be posting this on my blog shortly, but you may like to post it too.?According to readers, Thompson commonly doesn't post the comments they leave on his blog. At his main pulpit, there's not even a pretense of allowing readers feedback. As reader Thomas Olson noted, "What irks even more about the swill he [Bill Thompson] publishes on the BBC website, is that there is no place for public feedback, so us common folk can call BS on his rant in real time for the world to witness. BBC is still a delusional, vertical content gatekeeper, who believes they're somehow 'in tune' because they happen to have a website."Thompson is Still Wrong.I wrote Thompson back, noting that "while I don't agree in key areas, I do admire and respect your willingness to debate, and I don't intend my criticism to to come across as a personal attack."I'm not advocating an "easy ride" for other companies, including Apple. What I stated was that Thompson provided no proof for his wild assertion that Apple was as bad as Microsoft. I indicated the history of Microsoft's troubles with the EU dated back into the 90s, and even earlier in the US. Microsoft has been found guilty repeatedly, internationally; Apple has not. That should factor into Thompson's "just as bad" rhetoric.It's great that Thompson doesn't share the BBC's position on iPlayer, but my article was as much castigating the BBC as it was his article specifically. Thompson didn't even make the headline. So when I talk about the problems of the BBC, he can't take it personally. However, using the BBC as his mouthpiece, and the BBC using him as a way to deliver the message that Microsoft's problems are really common and nothing out of the ordinary and that Apple is doing deceptive, anticompetitive things... are both still examples of hypocrisy. It's a bit like hearing from FOX News that other countries terrorize their citizens and propagandize fascism.The iPod Changes That Break the Third Party Apps.Apple doesn't publish a third party API for the iPod's file system details, nor does it describe the iPod as an open platform. Windows does, yet Microsoft breaks third parties' software to establish its own dominance in new markets. This happened with Office apps, web browsers, media players, developer tools, etc. This is not the same thing as Apple being popular with the iPod. Pretending there is an open market and yet running it as a monopoly is not the same thing as selling a unique, closed product that may be popular.If BMW refined their vehicles in a way that required aftermarket car stereo companies to adapt their products to fit its new cars, you'd have a situation similar to Apple's iPod change for Linux. However, if one company owned the entire market for all vehicles on the road, and decided to destroy the market for car stereos and take that over itself, you'd have Microsoft. There is no similarity here.This Depends On How You See Lock-In.Thompson wrote, "This depends on how you see lock-in: if I can't play music I buy from iTMS, something I'm encouraged to do at many points in my use of iTunes, on any other player, or use any other jukebox than ITunes with my iPod, then once I've made my initial choice to have an iPod I am in an Apple ecoystem that I can only extract myself from with some effort. It's not absolute - IBM mainframe users also had a choice back in the 70's. It just wasn't a realistic chouce. [sic]"Wrong again. You can play purchased music by burning a CD, or directly using iTunes Plus non-DRM music. The problem with DRM is a issue of the music labels, not an iTunes lock in issue. Thompson is again repeating a myth. Jobs railed against DRM, then fought for weak restrictions to appease labels, and is now pushing labels to make music downloads as easy to use as CDs with DRM-free downloads.Thompson doesn't understand what's involved, and ended up making false comparisons. What other source for open music is there? WMA is locked down Windows-only tight (like the BBC's iPlayer), MP3 music is only available from indie labels. You can't get open music downloads from any of the big labels representing popular music apart from EMI's iTunes Plus. By repeating false information, Thompson only serves to cloud reality and turn back the clock.[Top Myths of 2006 - Myth 4: The iTunes Monopoly Myth]I Am Not A Crook!Thompson wrote, "I don't like being accused of being a liar, and that sort of comment undermines any other points you may be trying to make." Well then, he shouldn't represent himself as an expert, while publishing web rumors he doesn't really understand. It's not my fault he is misrepresenting the truth. That's what a lie is. If the truth "undermines points I make," doesn't he understand that lying undermines points he may be trying to make?In weeping over being called on his false comment, Thompson neglected to answer the fact that purchased tracks from iTunes can be effortlessly burned to CD for use on other players, following the most liberal and open fair use rights in the industry. Incidentally, feigning outrage is no way to answer criticism unless your position is indefensibly wrong.What about the supposed iPod accessory lock-in? Apple's dock connector isn't an ISO standard, but there isn't an ISO standard for a connector that pairs USB, Firewire, audio and video on the same cable. At the same time, the dock connector cable is standardized and documented, it does not change with every model, and there is no DRM on it that prevents anyone from building compatible cables. So he's wrong, there's no lock in involved.The Ringtones Monopoly.Thompson suggested I was being hypocritical for noting that "Apple sells ringtones and doesn't support homebrew attempts to copy ringtones to the iPhone. Yes, this is unfortunate. Users shouldn't face limitations from using their own song clips, and they shouldn't have to pay extra to carve out a ringtone from songs they purchased or already own. However, this isn't entirely Apple's decision because it has to answer to the labels. It's also not illegal, and it has nothing to do with anticompetitive monopoly dominance of the music industry."A contradiction? I agree that ringtones are an unnecessarily complex legal issue, and that customers are being held up by the labels' overbearing demands. But Thompson calling Apple's move anticompetitive or an establishment of a monopoly is uninformed sensationalism. Apple's ringtone prices are a fraction of any other providers, and while Apple did cave to their demands over preventing users from easily copying over their own, it did so to win a more significant battle to open up music, not to limit the market or establish more control.Thompson misrepresented ringtones as being something similar to Internet Explorer or Windows Media Player, as if Apple is muscling into a new market to dominate it using an existing monopoly. The assertion is silly and uninformed. Apple doesn't make significant profits on its music sales, including ringtones. Further, Apple isn't in the ringtone making business, and has no obligation to facilitate this for users, just as it has no good reason to lose a fight with movie studios over the overbearing laws that prevent legal ripping of DVDs.[Apple's iTunes Ringtones and the Complex World of Copyright Law]Bundling, Price Fixing, and Monopoly Tying.Thompson can criticize Apple's business model, but calling it a way to expand market dominance is an error of simpleton logic. It's really the opposite: an opportunity for rivals to compete against the iPhone by offering a nicer way to play "My Humps" when their phones ring. So far, the US ringtone industry revolves around $2.50 - $3.00 clips that expire after several months.Thompson suggested I forward this defense to Microsoft for its Windows Media Player bundling. How does he not understand this? Apple competes against other mobile makers and other mobile providers in an open market. Microsoft does not compete in an open market. It holds a monopoly in PC operating systems acquired illegally using anticompetitive and anti-consumer tactics. It is now using its monopolies to expand into new markets. Apple is not. Apple has not created a monopoly in MP3 players any more than Symbian has a monopoly in mobile phone software. There is a functioning market for both; so if Apple does something consumers don't like--such as charging 99 cents for a ringtone, competitors can go elsewhere... but they'll have to pay $3 for one that expires after a year from Verizon, or roll their own solution. Or set their iPhone to vibrate.Windows Media Player does not compete in an open market; it's tied to a monopoly product that exercises complete control over the PC desktop. There are no options for most users. Linux isn't a viable option for the majority of desktop users because of the Office monopoly and file incompatibilities, and the exclusive OEM contracts with PC makers Microsoft uses to support its Windows monopoly.Ringtones are a consumer feature, not a significant, competitive industrial market being threatened with monopolistic takeover, as is the case with media playback and servers, or web browsing and servers, or office productivity application software. Fantasies of Cheap Cables and iTunes on Linux.Thompson wrote, "just as I can go into Game and buy a cheaper third party Xbox cable or controller that has not been authorised by Microsoft so I expect to be able to buy less expensive iPod accessories and if I can't then I see an indication of an attitude towards the market that worries me."But that's wrong; you can buy iPod accessories at any price from a variety of vendors, even no name ones. Compare the price of Xbox cables to what Apple itself sells, then go find even cheaper stuff. There's no monopoly position in iPod accessories because there is no real barrier for competition, as there very much is on the Windows PC desktop. Again, cable manufacturing isn't similar to the media broadcasting industry or the office software market.He suggests freeware alternatives to iTunes might solve world peace or help one achieve Nirvana, but that's irrelevant. Apple doesn't owe anyone a free ride because there is not a free market around "iPod player jukebox software," just as there is no free market surrounding "engines in BMWs" or other component parts of products. I can't go buy a new BMW with whatever third party engine I want, even if I think I want one that does things that BMW's wouldn't offer.In contrast, Microsoft claimed all along that Windows was an open platform, and PCs were sold as an open market for software. That's very different. If Microsoft faced real competition on the desktop, it could bundle anything it wanted to. But it does not, so it can’t.You can't say, 'if Microsoft can't bundle WMP, that must mean Apple can't offer iTunes either;" it's a false comparison because Apple didn't kill off competitors with twenty years of backstabbing and anticompetitive practices, and does not operate a monopoly. You can buy alternatives to the iPod from Creative, Sony, Microsoft, HP, SanDisk and lots of others. You can not effectively buy commercial alternatives to Windows due a variety of barriers in the market.Thompson Advocates Real Network's DRM.Defending his comment that "when it comes to music downloads it [Apple] is just as bad as Microsoft on servers," Thompson wrote, "the behaviour towards Real was appalling and remains indefensible. They [Apple] broke Harmony [Real's Helix DRM] because they could and because they wanted to lock competitors out - what other spin can you put on it?"There is no open market for selling iPod DRM content. Apple said some silly things in the Real squabble ("tactics of a hacker" was particularly stupid) but Real had no right to sell DRM music for the iPod. Apple only forced them to sell open content, and anyone can still sell open content that plays on the iPod, as eMusic does. Defending Real's DRM is just another example of Thompson not getting it.Paul Thurrott is similarly upset that Apple can't be forced to license Windows Media DRM, allowing Microsoft a free ride on the iPod in its efforts to spread its own viciously anti-consumer media software platform. Apple doesn't have to serve the whims of two companies that failed in the marketplace because they tried to exploit consumers and found that their user base ran off to greener pastures.The EU Courts and IP.The EU certainly should fix the problems of the music business in its countries, and demand fair use provisions from music and media providers as I noted. However, trying to spin the complex situation off as proof that Apple is anything like Microsoft is not only disingenuous, it's an outright lie. Using a bunch of half-baked, ignorant web rumors to support a position that Apple should just allow anything and everything is also dishonest.Thompson maintains that's not what he said, writing, "I want Apple to play fair (get the joke?), to be open about interfaces and file structures and to compete in an open market for music players and jukeboxes, because I actually think we will all benefit and even Apple will end up making better, sharper products and making more money."It's fine to criticize Apple over an open source ideology, but Thompson needs to accurately represent himself as a Cory Doctorow waving a communism flag; don't pretend to be defending free markets and attacking monopolization while at the same time insisting that Apple hand away all of its intellectual property to competitors and write anti-iTunes software for the community. Thompson pretends to celebrate the success of an innovative company whilst inciting a communist revolution against it, using the jingoism of busting the trust of monopoly powers that don’t exist. What do you think? I really like to hear from readers. Comment in the Forum or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast! Submit to Reddit or Slashdot, or consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!

  • Apple Media Plan Hits Your Cable Company Where it Hurts

    Big change in TV distribution is in the wind, if the Wall Street Journal's reporting on Apple's “all you can eat” iTunes television plan is true. According to the WSJ, CBS and Disney are considering allowing their entire television lineup to be sold on a single-fee, all-access subscription basis. Consumers will love this, but many traditional cable companies will probably feel as though Apple shoved coal in their stockings. Apple's subscription strategy makes the most sense when viewed alongside the introduction of a larger screen iPod device. Some will buy the “iPod Tablet” because it's new and exciting, but at an average of $25 or more per season per show, iTunes as it currently exists won't be replacing your cable company anytime soon. However, with a network-wide subscription service, the balance changes. More devices means the same content in more places for the same monthly fee. Your Apple TV becomes the digital hub Steve always imagined it to be and, hopefully, gets upgraded by Apple to handle it's new role as a set-top box. Your iPod Tablet becomes your TV anywhere device; not as good as your home TV, but much better than your iPhone. Back in June, I wrote how cable companies and Apple were on a collision course, and the WSJ's article only reinforces the points I made then. It's not just cable companies of course; DirecTV, AT&T Uverse and other traditional media distribution companies will feel just as threatened. Cable companies, though, are the most established in the field and have the most to lose. Combined free HD over-the-air local broadcasts and a iTunes network subscription for premium content, and Apple really starts looking like a spoiler to Comcast and the like. Cable companies bundle content to increase revenue. Subscribers can't pick and choose channels a la carte. If you want ESPN, you often have to pay for Disney and ABC Family. To be fair, the networks, not the media distribution companies, are sometimes the ones forcing these packages down our throats. Want SyFy? Then NBC/Universal can make the cable company carry other owned stations such as MSNBC and Bravo. The cost of the additional channels is passed along to the consumer. Pricing a few shows from the same network on iTunes today, I find it's often cheaper to just buy the next tier with your provider rather than subscribe “per show” via iTunes. Apple's new plan changes these traditional rules. According the the WSJ article, networks actually make more money by removing the cable company middleman. It's the cable providers and local affiliates that are left hurting. Not only do the traditional cable companies lose subscriber money, but they also lose their fringe revenue sources. All of a sudden people aren't renting expensive DVR. They also lose lucrative “On Demand,” opportunities as well as local advertising dollars as consumers downgrade their channel lineup or drop their subscription altogether. Is it any surprise that Comcast wants to buy NBC/Universal? Do they see where Apple is going? Probably. The value isn't in the pipe providing content, but the content itself. Time shifting and place shifting are empowering consumers and raising expectations. Hulu, Boxee, Slingbox, iTunes, and Netflix allow us to watch our TV shows practically anywhere. Live sports is one area Apple hasn't quite figured out, but it's only a matter of time. Considering Steve Job's relationship with Disney, which owns ESPN, I expect some innovative method of providing live content to the forthcoming tablet. Apple pushed the music industry hard to allow digital distribution — and won. First, they got a majority of labels to provide content to iTunes, and then convinced them to drop the DRM. Does Apple have the muscle to push the TV industry while fighting local franchise authorities? Even with Steve Jobs on the board of Disney, I think Apple bit off more than they can chew. Expect the hardest pushback from companies that provide both TV and internet service. Some will even employ internet bandwidth restrictions or tactics that violate the principles of net neutrality. They'll also claim that since Apple isn't a Multiple System Operator as defined by the FCC, Apple is an unfair competitor. Unlike cable companies, Apple isn't bound by “Must Carry” rules, and the cable companies will cry foul. Who will win? In reality, the networks and the cable companies are already at war, Apple just decided to choose sides. I want Apple to win so I can ditch the cable company, but I think the deck is stacked against the Mac maker, and the backlash of any small victories will prevent other networks from signing on. Only the Ghost of Christmas Future knows the outcome.

  • 10 Years After Y2K -- Stories From the IT Battlegrounds

    "This really could have screwed up our lives, and you know, a whole bunch of little geeks saved us." - Paul Saffo. Director of the Institute for the Future in Menlo Park, California, in an interview with American RadioWorks It was a fear fest of epic proportions. Magazine headlines predicted that the end of the world would shortly befall us. They told harrowing tales of feral computer systems going awry the minute the clock struck midnight on January 1st, 2000--planes would fall from the sky, power grids would fail, the global economy would crash, nuclear power plants would go into meltdown mode, lines of communication would be cut, and the contents of bank accounts would vanish."I cannot be optimistic...It's clear we can't solve the whole problem, so we have to allow some systems to die so mission-critical systems can work... Pay attention to the things that are vulnerable in your life and make contingency plans.... Don't panic, but don't spend too much time sleeping, either." - Senator Robert Bennett, then-Chairman of the Senate's Special Committee on the Year 2000 Problem, Y2K Citizens Action GuideThe cause of all this excitement was the purported Y2K bug. In response to dealing with computers that were about as capable as the iPhone, programmers prided themselves on being thrifty with their code to ensure it didn’t stress memory or capacity. One way to do this was to skip putting a “19” in front of the year and use only the last two numerals. And why not? These programs would be long retired by the time 2000 rolled around. However, not only were many expired programs, operating systems, and applications still chugging away as 2000 crept around the corner, they were also running critical systems like power grids, government agencies and financial systems, hospitals and airports, elevators and public transportation. And so, the race was on to fix the code before the bug bit. Often the fix was a simple patch, but in some cases, programmers struggled to figure out what little time bombs lurked in ancient and undocumented code. Around the world, attempts to squash the bug are estimated to have cost over $300 billion.Mac users were mostly immune as the system software was programmed to accept dates as far into the future as 29940. Assuming third-party applications didn’t go nuts, Macs would be fine. Apple happily pointed this out by airing a commercial during the 1999 Superbowl featuring the poster boy for naughty computers, Space Odyssey’s HAL.At the time, Apple's "acting chief executive" Steve Jobs had issued a statement saying: "HAL is the perfect spokesperson to address the Y2K issues because he lives in the year 2001 and speaks from experience. Plus, HAL is the foremost expert on things that can go wrong with computers." As the big day drew closer, gas masks, radiation kits, safes and water purification systems were hawked in magazine ads and late night commercials. People even began to horde survival supplies. An October 15, 1998 story in the New York Times shared the results of a poll stating that “10 percent of the nation's top executives are stockpiling canned goods, buying generators and even purchasing handguns.” Ominous quotes from experts seemed to indicate that life as we knew it might cease to exist for awhile."Suddenly, those individuals who have insisted that they will be withdrawing all their cash from the bank before the end of the year do not seem quite so misguided. The prospect of the millennium bug eating your savings may be more than just the nightmare of overactive imaginations. At a meeting in Washington recently, delegates were stunned to hear Henry Kissinger announce that he intended to withdraw all his money from the bank as 2000 nears."- The Times, London, March 20th, 1999But 1/1/2000 arrived and nothing dire happened. Perhaps enough code was fixed in time, perhaps the whole thing was insanely overhyped. Probably both. Even those who were on the frontlines of Y2K lunacy disagree about what might have happened. This is how they remember it.What's All the Fuss About?I'd like you to do me a favor. Get a steaming mug of coffee, herbal tea, or whatever beverage puts you in that relaxed, contemplative mood. Now close your eyes and drift back in time with me to early Spring of the year 1998. William Jefferson Clinton occupies the Oval Office, Dale Earnhardt still dominates NASCAR, Denver dethroned Green Bay in the Super Bowl, the U.S. unemployment rate is 4.3%, and the federal budget is enjoying a rare $70 billion surplus. Life is, all things considered, good. Fade in on a second floor conference room of the John Wesley Powell federal building on Sunrise Valley Drive in Reston, Virginia, headquarters for the U.S. Geological Survey. Around the table sit a half dozen (mostly) somber business casually-dressed technical types. The urgent mission that has brought them together is a discussion of the threat posed by and mitigation strategies for the impending Y2K disaster, looming a scant twenty months into a forbidding future.Speculation has been rampant, even this far from the target date.  Voices of doom permeate the airwaves, print, and cyberspace.  Aircraft will tumble, willy-nilly, from the skies. Trains will crash headlong into one another at high speed. Satellites will cease to communicate. Bank accounts will be drained.  Personal information will be lost forever, or exposed for all to see.  Twenty-four times, at the top of every hour, on average a little over 4% of the world's computers will freeze up or begin to spit out random nonsense as midnight processes along its inexorable westward path. The damage, the carnage, the impact on humanity will be horrifying. Society's misguided reliance on doped silicon semiconductors will lead to our downfall. All is lost. Cash in your 401(k) now and spend it all on Friends laserdiscs before Y2K drags us clawing and screaming into the slavering jaws of oblivion.One by one, the grim-faced custodians of the information systems that help guard our nation against a plethora of natural hazards--flood, volcanoes, earthquakes, invasive species, and more--give their candid assessments of the situation. The prognoses are poor. There is no cost-effective way to dodge the Y2K demon. Large-scale models are being created to simulate the event and ameliorate the consequences to whatever degree possible, but no one really knows what will happen on that fateful day. As we go around the table, administrators of the agency's thousands of Windows NT4 and 3.1 machines shake their ashen-countenanced heads at the terrifying uncertainty presented by this technological monster. Finally, it is my turn to report. I’m the Y2K coordinator for the Telecommunications Services Branch of the Office of Program Support at USGS HQI am reading ;Login: magazine and don't hear my name called the first time. They try again, with more stridency. I look up, eyebrows raised questioningly. "Please give the Y2K status for the Telecommunications Services Branch," the facilitator commands. I clear my throat. "We have two Sun 4500 clusters and about 250 Data General AViiON workstations. All of them are running some flavor of UNIX, whose designers intelligently provided the date function 32 bits to work with while Bill Gates was still mucking about in prep school. At 03:14:07 UTC on Tuesday, 19 January 2038, when this issue has some relevance to TSB, I will be long retired and quite possibly dead. I really don't see any good reason to make a fuss over it at this point. End of report."And that, dear children, is how I got excused/banned from all future meetings.Robert G. Ferrell is still an Information Systems Security Professional for the US Government and, ironically, now writes the /dev/random column for ;Login: magazine.A High Stress Non EventI was one of the senior network engineers at Long Beach Memorial hospital in Los Angeles. We had five hospitals in our circle of responsibilities. Long Beach which was the home site, Orange Coast, Anaheim, Saddleback and Miller's Children's Hospital. Plus there were many small offices, labs and remote sites that "kinda of sort of" fell under our roof.There was a very chaotic assortment of very old software and new software with a lot of it falling between the two extremes. One of our oldest applications was the surgery scheduling software which ran on even then "old" Netware 3.1 servers using Btrieve. This was akin to a "made in the garage" application and was not well supported even in the best of times. This was not the best of times.We had new software down in Radiology where they were using high speed networks to digitize and read x-rays etc remotely. Not to mention all the odd appliances like routers, switches, print servers, neonatal data transponders, wireless, security systems and so on. And I'm not even counting all the COBOL applications that had been custom written by long past employees or consultants, DOS, Visual Basic apps, home brew Access Databases and yes, the rogue server or two. Or three…or four.In a word, messy.We spent over a year and a lot of effort trying to identify problem apps and put fixes in place either from the vendors or hacking it ourselves in the case of the unsupported applications. The idea was make this as much of a non-event as we could.When it came time for the actual roll over, all IT staff were required to be on site, not on call, be ON SITE which really tweaked more than a few spouses. In my department, we had our own itty bitty party and we got to see the fireworks from the Queen Mary from a parking structure. Right after 9PM we got a call from a sister facility back east saying one of their business scheduling apps died on the stroke of midnight. We used this same application, as did many other facilities, and we got calls as each time zone rolled over. Since it was a business app, I did not have anything to do with it. I was much more worried about my servers and network hardware. Happily midnight came and went and all my stuff was running fine. There were some instances where the date got jacked up but the firmware still ran even though the log files were nuts insisting it was 1961 or other silly things like that.In the end, Y2K was a high stress non-event for most of the IT staff at all our facilities. Mike Sweeney is now a Network Security Manager at an undisclosed location.Beanie Babies And Tulip Wars(Note: Mac|Life changed two names in the story below to protect the ignorant)Prior to joining True North at the end of 1998 (now InterPublic Group), which is the largest ad agency in the world, I was the CIO of Fallon McElligott, a much smaller ad agency. Fallon's CFO, Mr. X, and I began the "Y2K is like the Tulip Craze of the 1600s" war. My argument was that Y2K was just an end of the millennia mania, much like the Beanie Babies at the current time and the Dutch Tulipmania of 1633. All hype and not much reality. I argued that Beanie Babies were as worthless as the Dutch Tulip bulbs and in the same vein, Y2K would come and go with as many or as little problems as every other year. Mr. X, being a member of the bow-tie wearing, afraid of everything crowd, thought that Y2K would cause everything from elevator stoppages to airplanes falling out of the sky. I remember asking if he was related to Chicken Little. I was summarily let go from Fallon, only to "fail up" to being named the CIO of the world's largest ad agency.There I fell in with a much more enlightened crowd -- at least at the level of Management Executive Committee, or MEC (which was comprised of the CEO, the CEOs of the 14 major holding companies, the CFO, Chief Legal Officer, and myself). When I came on board at True North, the Y2K plan was like any other. We had the requisite letter-to-the vendors campaign (asking what they were doing), review of all software and OS configurations, and review of our Unix mainframe code.Because we were an ad agency, many of the thousands of computers were Macintoshes. No problems there. Many were PCs, and Microsoft was already addressing any patches there. That left outside vendors, physical plants, and our Unix mainframe. A quick call to the mainframe guys told me the one thing I needed to know -- if there was going to be a glitch, they'd catch it the day after, patch it, and we'd be back billing just fine. Besides, if someone doesn't get a bill for a couple of days, it wouldn't kill us.An hour or two of research on my part found that:1.    International monetary float would not be affected -- no international financial downside to any Y2K problems2.    Nobody would be billing the first few days after the 1st of the year anyway -- no world-wide downside to any Y2K problems3.    Our ad system (the system that runs ads on more TVs, print, and radio than you'd ever expect worldwide) was always pre-bought anyway, and I was assured by all TV stations that "every ad would run, even if we have to manually push a button" -- no client problems there, even if Y2K did go crazy.In short, if we could bill, and we could put client product out the door -- who cared what else would happen? Well, that was the logic that the MEC shared with me.Then I started to meet the IT team. Our CTO wannabe, Mr, Z, was convinced, much like Mr. X back at Fallon, that the sky was going to fall down."Microsoft is going to have more holes than Swiss Cheese" he would run around saying. Our EDS contractor thought that his letter campaign would help any liabilities (at $150 an hour on his part). Our security guys thought that someone would find some date-based loophole to break into our systems. Our physical security guys wanted signs on all elevators saying "do not enter on 12/31/99 unless you want to be here for awhile." My own IT-CFO (my budget was in the high tens of millions) thought that every billing system we had would fail. I had found Mr. X’s missing flock of Chicken Littles.To ease everyone's nerves, I promised not to do anything "radical" until we convened my own CIO's council, made up of all of the holding company CIOs and the national CIOs. Over 100 people. We all met in Chicago at the beginning of 1999. Think over 100 Chicken Littles. Squawking in 40 to 50 languages that the sky was going to fall.I couldn't believe it.It took me until June to convince my own IT staff to transfer the EDS $150 per hour letter-writer to the legal side of the house so I could fire him.I had to permanently assign my CTO wannabe to the Unix mainframe programmers (after taking them out for a great Steak and Wine dinner in NYC and promising that I'd make it up to them) so that he could randomly test any code with dates in it. We purposely set up the tests for twice a month because there were really only about a dozen or so places where a date could be entered. We figured that would keep him busy until at least December 15th and they only had to deal with him twice a month.I even had to acquiesce (because of the rabid IT leadership complainers) to sending out an "international testing task force" to review all of the Y2K binders in each country and at each of the major holding companies. A wry note here -- I noticed in the travel bills that no one went to countries like Canada, Mexico, Bolivia, Congo or Ethiopia for testing. Of course the UK, France, Italy, Australia, Japan, Brazil and China; i.e., the "fun" places were visited.In short, I slashed the Y2K budget as much as possible. I would have killed it all had I been given the chance.By August the IT betting pool had me being "canned for short sited Y2K stupidity" at 2-1 odds.By October they upped the odds to 4-1. I took the bet.By November my CTO wannabe was writing "an official memoranda for posterity" and sending it to the head of HR and Legal that I should be canned for "Y2K Ostrich-like behavior". And he had additional signatures. The odds were now 6-1 against my making it to December 1st. However, our security analyst stopped staring at the sky and he convinced our IT CFO (who liked the "savings compared to our peers"), telephony, and physical plant staff to do the same.December 1st rolled around and the CEO and I had dinner on that night just for laughs (and to show support that leadership wasn't falling for any of the complaints). December 15th rolled around and the odds makers were now betting "for" me. I hedged my bet just in case.December 31st I held a party at my house in Chicago for anyone in IT leadership who wanted to attend. My CTO was at our HQ's call center "just in case." At "minutes after midnight" in every country in the world, I would get a phone call saying "all is fine". I told the CEO that by the time it hit Chicago, if I was still sober, I'd call him. About the time the fireworks on Lake Michigan died off, I called the CEO. I was semi-sober. He wasn't even close.When we got back to work I shipped everyone who had complained about my Y2K attitude a little "Clucky the Chicken" Beanie Baby and a Tulip Bulb (paid for by the big payoff on the bet I wouldn't be canned). Most didn't get the joke.Every December when I plant my Tulip bulbs here in California, I can't help but laugh.Dorian J. Cougias is now the founder and Lead Analyst of Network Frontiers and is the co-creator of the Unified Compliance Framework.NEXT: More Stories from IT BattlegroundsTiny Parachutes for SaleWhat really stands out in my mind about Y2K all these years later was the overriding unreasonable expectation of what could happen rather than what actually happened. Starting in about 1998 there were suddenly so many people who knew nothing about programming and next to nothing about technology explaining frantically why the Y2K bug was important and that programmers like myself really needed to pay attention to it. We were aware, thank you. I remember working on Y2K issues in 1981 for a product that was off the market long before 2000.I equated it to being in an airplane in bumpy weather. It’s then you wonder how good the pilot is. If you start screaming, “I wonder if the pilot knows about this” I’ll bet you could sell parachutes (even tiny ones that don’t work will help people overcome the fear you instilled). There was a lot of money made on Y2K, some of it was put to good use.But what everyone missed during the whole Y2K debacle is that your life depends on programmers honesty, intelligence and diligence. Yes, your life. That was true in 1999, it’s still true and everyone still misses the point.Geoffrey Feldman is now a software developer and senior problem solver at Seabase Consulting.We Learned NothingWe were hearing that Y2K was the end of the world, computers would crash, critical systems would fail, planes would fall out of the sky and we’d swiftly devolve to, at best, a pre-industrial age lifestyle. The newspapers were filled with stories about how people were building bomb shelters and stocking up on water and canned goods.And then Y2k happened but there was no meltdown because we fixed the issues beforehand. There were some minor problems around the world, passwords that thought they were expired, programs that figured their licensing period was up -- but no major issues. It made some people wonder if the superbug that they first created and then they fixed was worth all that money. Some people point to it as a problem that didn't exist. It existed, and we did a good job of fixing it.  At the time I was dealing with Y2K planning for several years at IBM as a Development Manager and Certified IT Architect, focusing on their products and customers’ systems. IBM was taking Y2K quite seriously as far back as 1995. We had a local conversion center with more than 1,000 professionals working with IBM mainframe systems to solve the customers Y2K problem.I saw many IT executives inflating their budgets, under the umbrella of preparing for Y2K issues. This was the only time that I remember when IT executives were strongly encouraged to spend money. Suddenly there was a way to get the hardware and software you needed or wanted if you used Y2K to justify it. And as anxiety levels ramped up once the general public started hearing about Y2K you could justify buying almost anything by chanting those magic three letters.There was definitely a lot of cynicism after the fact, and some of it was justified.The whole thing reminded me about how important computers had become in our daily lives and how a small problem could have really big consequences. It sharpened my focus on doing quality work. Overall though, we really learned nothing because only failure teaches. It was one of the only times in recent memory that the world has come together and spent a ton of money and time to prevent disaster. We can't seem to do this now with other impending crises like dangerous economic bubbles, resource scarcity and climate change. I guess it’s because those deadlines can’t be clearly marked on a calendar.Ulf Mattsson is now the CTO at Protegrity.Got an interesting or funny Y2K story? Drop it in the comments below.

  • The Seduction of AT&T

    This week was Apple's World Wide Developers Conference (WWDC), the biggest news from which seemed to be the beta version of Safari (Apple's web browser) for Windows. Why the heck would Apple even produce such a product? Readers and pundits alike have been wondering ad nauseam. I know why. There are two theories being widely floated: 1) this is a challenge to Microsoft, and; 2) this is a strategic platform for Apple to offer its own web-based application suite. To a certain extent both may be correct, but I think there is a lot more to this story, which is sorely missing context in those many explanations. Let's start with that context, which is Apple's WWDC, an event sorely lacking in both substance and controversy if we ignore this Safari story. Mac OS X 10.5 still isn't ready to ship. The iPhone is coming in a couple weeks but Apple is so far only hinting at opening the product to third-party developers. In other words, Steve Jobs had bupkus when it comes to creating press this week UNLESS he throws Safari for Windows into the mix. Apple had to come up with something and this version of Safari, which reviewers have found to be buggy and definitely not ready for primetime, was it. Maybe Apple intended to do a Safari for Windows or not, but I'm guessing they had a version running in the lab as an exercise in Intel compatibility. When Steve realized that he had so little to hype, this alpha code suddenly became a beta "product." This isn't to say that Safari for Windows wasn't always intended to be a product, but its current state of development strongly suggests that it wouldn't have been in Steve's presentation if he had much else to show. Microsoft is not threatened by the announcement of Safari for Windows. Bill Gates isn't pissed off that Apple has challenged him. Gates is worried about Firefox, not Safari, and even Firefox is just a minor annoyance or else Microsoft would be doing a better job of competing with it. Beyond garnering some press, Safari for Windows is about AT&T. Steve Jobs is the best salesperson in the entire universe, but he doesn't like to waste his time. That means that, having seduced AT&T (nee Cingular), Steve will try to sell them more and more stuff until they have bought everything he has. He will invent stuff specifically to sell to AT&T as long as it acts as a bridge to yet more stuff he wants to sell them. Steve wants AT&T to see him not just as the answer to their prayers, but as the answer to their EVERY prayer. What could AT&T be praying for? Plenty of things, but the most obvious theme I see is how to compete with Verizon, Comcast, and all the national cell phone providers. With Verizon, AT&T has to defend its decision to stick with a copper broadband infrastructure instead of the more expensive optical fiber Verizon has picked. With Comcast, AT&T has to defend its copper plant against Comcast's copper plant, which is about to gain a LOT more bandwidth thanks to new modems using more advanced modulation techniques. And against the other mobile operators, AT&T has to defend its decision not to go full 3G with the iPhone. Are you noticing a trend here? AT&T is facing a potential bandwidth crisis when it comes to customer perception and it is logical to assume that Apple helped create that crisis. After all, the iPhone could easily have been made to work with 3G. Since AT&T HAS a 3G network, the decision not to use it was probably complicated and some of that complication may have come from Steve Jobs saying, "We don't need it. The iPhone will be insanely great with G2.5, thanks." Here is the complex package of goods Apple is trying to sell to AT&T: There's the iPhone, of course, but there is also the Apple TV as a potential set-top box. Three hundred dollars for a set-top box? You have to be crazy! Not so crazy. Compared to not spending the kind of money Verizon is spending on fiber, Apple TVs are cheap even if AT&T gives them away. Remember that $400 rebate you used to be able to get on a new PC by signing up for two years of MSN? That didn't appear to make sense, either, yet it ran for years. For Apple TV to be successful as an IPTV set-top box, Apple has to convince us that we really want to download our video, NOT stream it. Not incidentally, this is also the key to iTunes' long-term success. Downloading makes much more efficient use of network resources, works fine on a copper wiring plant, and fits our emerging TiVoesque world view. Steve will tell us that we are busy dynamic people who really ought to plan our viewing. And enough of us will believe him to make AT&T's copper video service a credible success. Beyond downloading video and audio, Apple's other technique for limiting AT&T's bandwidth hit, while simultaneously locking in the company as a customer for years and years, is building clever software services. The more processing that can be done in the data center the less data that will have to be carried between that center and the device. So AT&T will need a broad array of web services to offer its customers, most of whom will be using Windows computers, not Macs, which brings us back again to Safari for Windows -- a product Apple had no choice but to build. This move isn't about taking down Microsoft, it isn't about making Macintosh computers the dominant computing platform, it IS about performing a massive cashectomy on AT&T. But to Apple's credit the company doesn't want anyone to see this as theft, but rather as a technical triumph, simply because when AT&T's exclusive is over in five years, Apple will want to do similar deals with all of AT&T's competitors. Next week we'll have more on the iPhone, what it is and isn't and why. But before then, last week's column on the Whistlebox video-response application generated a lot of reader comments, many of them negative and some even nasty. Just to save you the trouble of reading them all, here is the gist: "Bob, you are lazy and/or stupid. Whistlebox is nothing new. There are plenty of products available right now that can do all Whistlebox claims and more. And even if there weren't, it would take at most a few days to build one, NOT two man-years. We are disappointed in you, Bob." Wrong, wrong, wrong. Of course there are Whistlebox competitors. User-generated video has been around since the days of CU-SeeMe. What the folks at Whistlebox have done isn't invent a technology so much as DEVELOP it. The distinction is clear: it is easy to cobble together a demo or prototype but altogether something else to build a tested production system that is easy to use and scales well. It would be close to impossible to ship in a few days or weeks a tested, refined application that DOES NOTHING (has a functioning interface but no underlying application engine), much less a tested, refined application like Whistlebox that actually does something. Anyone who claims otherwise has never shipped a product. Whistlebox was designed and built for the business and advertising markets to be integrated by non-computer scientists and used by non-nerds. But it isn't just the usability that matters, it is the reporting and management tools that give the application value for business customers. Whistlebox isn't the first such application and won't be the last, but it is the first I have seen that is offered in a form that can be easily used by organizations of all sizes and levels of technical sophistication. That's what makes it unique so far. None of the other applications offered up by readers as examples of prior art can do this. None of them are turnkey. This lack of turnkey capability in those other products may be seen as an advantage, not a disadvantage, by my geekier readers. Yes, YOU can customize the heck out of them. But can your Mom? Still, I was appalled by the nasty tone of many comments. Anonymity makes it so easy to criticize. At some point this column will probably have a video version. Then it is a short jump to video responses using a service like Whistlebox. When that happens, I wonder how many readers will be as critical on video as they are today in text? I can't wait.

  • Thoughts From Steve Jobs on Flash

    Steven P. Jobs, Apple's chief executive, posted a 1,700-word note on Apple's site explaining his thoughts on Adobe Flash and the iPhone operating system.

  • What We're Reading: Inside the Minds of Steve Jobs and Mark Zuckerberg

    Our daily roundup of Web morsels includes a play about Apple's chief, a Facebook engineer's take on working for Mark Zuckerberg and Google's criticism of its own pages' failure to do well in search results.

  • The Complete History of the Macworld Expo

    For anyone who attended the very first Macworld San Francisco and then skipped the next 24, this year’s event might seem awfully similar to that very first show. Hot on the heels of the runaway success of the Mac and its own successful launch, Macworld magazine tapped event coordinator Peggy Kilburn in 1985 to develop a conference that “will bring (attendees) in contact with the people who best understand the far-reaching effects the Macintosh will have in business, schools and at home.” It was held in Feb. 21-23 and Steve Jobs didn’t even step foot in Brooks Hall, let alone address the crowd. Similarly, this year’s event won’t take place until February--abandoning its traditional January time slot held since 1986--and Jobs won’t be attending. But there’s something fitting about Macworld returning to its roots for its 25th anniversary. Before Steve turned it into his personal showcase and the Apple booth had to be draped in black curtains, Macworld was a place for fans and professionals to share ideas free from the prying eyes of PC users, where product announcements were welcome but not necessary, and the keynote was the least interesting part of the show. Macworld Expo the 1980s - The decade of the Mac Macworld Expo San Francisco 1985: When the doors closed on the first Macworld, which shared exhibit space with a boat show double-booked for the same weekend, more than 10,000 attendees had walked through its doors, and the bad taste from the Super Bowl XIX “Lemmings” ad was all but washed away. Hot items for the fledgling Macintosh included the Lotus Jazz office suite (but surprisingly, not Macintosh Office), MacPrompter for scrolling text, and a slew of video and imaging apps that leveraged the Mac’s powerful graphics capabilities. Macworld Expo Boston 1985-86: While Apple kept a decidedly muted presence at the first two Macworld Boston Expos, the east-coast show quickly became cemented on the calendar of Apple fans and developers. With more than 500,000 Macs in circulation and the resignation of Steve Jobs fresh on their minds, attendees had more than enough to talk about at that first event, held Aug. 21-23, 1985, at the Bayside Exposition Center, and touted as a chance to see “all of the elements of the Macintosh Office. ... The 512K Macintosh, the LaserWriter, and AppleTalk, as well as Jazz from Lotus, are just a few of the products you’ll get to see.” MWE SF 1986: After observing such a successful inaugural show, Apple CEO John Sculley--who reportedly credited Macworld for reinvigorating Apple after a disappointing end to 1984--took full advantage of the second annual expo, which expanded to the Civic Auditorium to accommodate larger crowds. While not quite worthy of Stevenote status, Apple’s less-than-charismatic leader unveiled the SCSI-equipped, 8MHz Macintosh Plus and pricey LaserWriter Plus during his keynote presentation. MWE SF 1987: A heavy focus on desktop communications and networking brought the long-awaited AppleShare file server software and AppleTalk PC Card, and delivered effortless, cross-platform file sharing long before IBM developed its own solution. A major component of the floundering Macintosh Office, AppleShare survived long after Apple’s desktop publishing suite was sent to the junkyard. MWE Boston 1987: Apple landed in Boston ready to show off HyperCard and script language HyperTalk, one of the first apps to utilize the hotlinking hypermedia concept that would become the cornerstone of the World Wide Web. Also making their debut were MultiFinder 5.0, the AppleFax modem and ImageWriter LQ.MWE SF 1988: With some 350 exhibitors and 25,000 attendees, MacWorld kicked off its fourth annual San Francisco show with an emphasis on the Mac’s business capabilities. In his keynote speech, Sculley stressed Apple's commitment to networking and connectivity advancements, and introduced the zippy Laserwriter II family, with up to 8 pages per minute of printing power. MWE Boston 1988: Apple CEO John Sculley may have landed in Boston to show off the Apple Scanner, but the buzz on the trade floor was all about the Macintosh II, as developers showed off an array of drawing, writing and CAD tools to leverage the power of Apple’s newest Mac.MWE SF 1989: Breaking a pattern of adding an “X” to Macs fitted with a Motorola 68030 processor (maybe Sculley didn’t want to announce the Mac SEx to a raucous convention crowd), Apple used its biggest stage to release the SE/30 upgrade, a Mac that would be as popular as it was long-lasting. Among the show favorites was the streamlined Claris MacWrite II, one of the last times a Claris product would be among the show favorites. MWE Boston 1989: For the fifth anniversary of the Macworld Expo, Sculley opted to keep the anticipated Macintosh Portable (which would make its debut a month later, on Sept. 20) under wraps, and instead showcased the Mac’s educational possibilities with the Visual Almanac, an interactive multimedia demonstration kit for the classroom that utilized Apple’s groundbreaking HyperCard.NEXT: Macworld Expo: The 1990's Macworld Expo the 1990's - On the brink MWE SF 1990: The 40MHz Macintosh IIfx made a big splash at the first Macworld of the 90s, despite its six-figure price tag. One of the reasons for all that speed was the launch of a Mac-only graphics-editing program by a little company named Adobe, which generated quite a bit of interest on its own. MWE Boston 1990: HyperCard 2.0 was all the rage at the subdued summer Macworld, but even Apple’s own booth had a hard time competing with the DTS’ dogcow buttons inscribed with her famous catchphrase, “Moof!” MWE SF 1991: Developed to optimize the 68000 line of Macs, the slick, streamlined System 7 was the co-star of Macworld, sharing the limelight with Apple’s new multimedia app. Sculley’s keynote was its usual shade of dull, save the impressive QuickTime tour of Ben & Jerry’s Vermont factory, which roused the crowd from its slumber. Also unveiled were a series of networking products, including the Macintosh LC Ethernet card. MWE Boston 1991: While PowerBook rumors were flying and many Mac users were getting their first glimpse at System 7, the trade floor was still buzzing about a bombshell announcement just weeks earlier. Industry rivals Apple and IBM (and Motorola) put aside their differences and entered into a unique partnership that would eventually produce the microchip that would power the Mac for more than a decade. Macworld Expo Tokyo 1991-1992: Just because Apple didn’t bother to release any new products (although CEO John Sculley did cut the ribbon on opening day) doesn’t mean Macworld Tokyo had a hard time filling the Makuhari Messe convention center when it opened its doors on Feb. 13, 1991. A rabid overseas fanbase was eager to get their hands on the latest and greatest in Mac apps and accessories, and Apple embraced its new audience with open arms. MWE SF 1992: Continuing the theme of the prior year’s conference, Macworld 1992 featured hundreds of new applications using QuickTime and an astute prediction from Sculley: “I believe pervasive networking will be the driving force of the information industry during the 1990s.” The Mac may have been this crowd’s “ideal multimedia machine,” but an ex-Apple employee’s latest OS was making some noise up the road as the NeXTWORLD Expo opened its doors to those who wanted to think slightly differenter. MWE Boston 1992: After a successful PowerBook launch the prior October, Apple used Macworld Boston to upgrade its best-selling model with more RAM and a lower price point, setting the stage for a series of dockable PowerBook Duos that would be released in the fall. MWE SF 1993: Held entirely at its now-permanent Moscone Center home, Sculley used his final Macworld San Francisco keynote to unveil a host of imaging products, including ColorSync, LaserWriter Pro workgroup printers, StyleWriter II personal printer, Apple Color Printer and Apple Color OneScanner. Making all those projects that much easier were the Apple Adjustable Keyboard and ADB Mouse II, Apple’s first teardrop-shaped clicker. MWE Boston 1993: The best product Steve Jobs didn’t have a hand in, Sculley finally rolled out the Newton MessagePad at Macworld Boston, more than a year after publicly demonstrating its prototype. Unlike anything on the market, Newton was a bold device with a brilliant interface that ought to have been as popular as the iPhone. Instead, only a few hundred thousand were sold over its four-and-a-half-year reign. MWE Tokyo 1993: Apple’s first product launch outside the United States brought a slew of new hardware, including the Macintosh Color Classic, Macintosh LC III, Macintosh Centris 610 and 650, Macintosh Quadra 800, PowerBook 165c, and the LaserWriter Select 300 and 310 laser printers. All those new products paid off, as the expo attracted nearly 100,000 attendees in just its third year. MWE SF 1994: With more than 70,000 attendees on hand to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Mac, the sprawling Apple booth didn’t disappoint. Visitors were met with a slew of new products, including a walking tour of its online service, eWorld, along with the recently released Macintosh TV and Powerbook Duo 270c. But buzz on the floor was mostly surrounding the upcoming PowerPC transition, which promised faster, more powerful Macs for the next decade. MWE Boston 1994: The critical, if not commercial, success of Newton brought some 70,000 attendees to the following year’s Macworld Boston, forcing Apple to set up its booth across the street from the World Trade Center. It was worth the trip, as new Power Macs showed off the capabilities of the first PowerPC chips and System 7.5 introduced users to Stickies, WindowShade and the Control Strip. MWE Tokyo 1994: Instead of showing off OS 7.5 for umpteenth time or adding another PowerPC model to its Power Mac line, Apple took the wraps off the QuickTake 100 digital camera. Designed in association with Kodak, the QuickTake looked more like a pair of binoculars than a camera but made an instant splash with the expo crowd. Also introduced was Color StyleWriter printer, to make sure all those photos looked their best. MWE SF 1995: As expected, the chip transition was in full swing, with PowerPC Power Macs drawing attention at the expo, but the most excitement centered around Power Computing, the first company to take advantage of Apple’s licensing program. MWE Boston 1995: Trying to steal some of the thunder from the forthcoming Windows 95 release, Apple demoed Copland in all its buggy, crashy glory on brand-new AppleVision displays. Be thankful it failed; if not, Steve might never have come back. MWE Tokyo 1995: Apple welcomed a new clone manufacturer to its ranks, Japan-based Pioneer Electronic, and proudly took the wraps off the active-matrix PowerBook 5300c, which thankfully didn’t explode on the stage. The same can’t be said about the Singapore plant that was manufacturing them. MWE SF 1996: Sinking revenue and executive board shake-ups cast a dark shadow over Macworld’s 12th annual event, which saw a continued push away from Apple’s proprietary platform with the release of the PC compatibility card, capable of turning any Power Mac into a dual micro-processor system capable of running Windows 95. MWE Boston 1996: The first U.S. keynote by CEO Gil Amelio made some attendees long for John Sculley, but the 20 percent across-the-board price cut on the Performa line was certainly welcome, as was the Performa 6400’s new InstaTower case. Before dousing the Copland project with a giant bucket of cold water, Gil got the crowd riled up by declaring Apple was “transitioning from a dialogue that has centered on survival to a dialogue that’s going to center on excitement.” We think the excitement he was referring to had something to do with the imminent launch of the first issue of MacAddict magazine. That, or the return of Steve Jobs, we’re not sure. MWE Tokyo 1996: CEO Gil Amelio announced the fruits of its partnership with Bandai in the form of a gaming console based on Apple’s Pippin technology. Officially called Pippin Atmark, the device was supposed to combine the best parts of each company into a super-computer-video-game-machine, and if you had stopped by Apple’s booth, it certainly seemed that way. Sadly, we know how the story ended. MWE SF 1997: Steve Jobs’ first appearance on a Macworld stage was preceded by a lengthy, rambling Gil Amelio, whose three-hour, teleprompter-plagued speech may have inspired Jobs to take over speaking duties. Amelio was supposed to rev up the crowd by showing the stunning Twentieth Anniversary Mac and outlining Apple’s NeXT-based OS strategy, but botched the whole thing up, effectively ruining Steve’s big moment. MWE Boston 1997: As late as July 2, Amelio was planning to deliver the keynote address at Macworld Boston, so when he was abruptly forced out July 5, all eyes turned to the new kid on the block. The excitement was palpable when the lights finally dimmed, and when Steve stepped out on stage to a 30-second standing ovation, a new era in Apple had clearly begun. And then he announced a partnership with Microsoft, drawing boos. MWE Tokyo 1997: Before Steve killed the project later in the year, Apple teamed with Fujifim for its last attempt at a digital camera, the QuickTake 200, which used removable cards to store pictures but was lost in a sea of cheaper, smaller entries. Also introduced at the show were the Power Macintosh 4400, 7300, 8600 and 9600, and the Powerbook 3400c, which immediately assumed the short-lived position of the world’s fastest laptop. MWE SF 1998: Just months before the iMac would turn the industry on its head, iCEO Steve’s first full Macworld San Francisco keynote brought no new products, but still had the crowd in awe with a surprise “one more thing” announcement: Apple’s profitable again. Macworld Expo New York 1998: Making the move south to the Big Apple could have been disastrous for Macworld, but diehard Mac fans would have jumped a motorcycle onto a speeding train to catch a glimpse of the iMac. Attendance dipped noticeably from the prior year’s Boston show, but enough shows up to give Macworld East a permanent new home in New York City’s Jacob K. Javits Convention Center.MWE Tokyo 1998: The Macworld Tokyo crowd cheered politely for the debut of the first Japanese-language Think Different ad, but went absolutely wild when Steve Jobs appeared on stage (via a taped message). He didn’t show off any new products, but assured the audience that Apple wouldn’t be leaving them out of their new OS strategy: “Apple is committed to having the best kanji (Chinese characters) systems in the world, and we're pouring even more into R&D toward that end.” MWE SF 1999: A rainbow of iMacs greeted visitors to Apple’s booth, but all eyes were on “the world’s most open-minded personal computer,” a sleek tower dressed in blue and white with a hinged door for easy access to its G3 processor. And the color-coordinated Apple Studio Displays weren’t too shabby either. MWE New York 1999: Say hello to the iBook. But first, say hello to Noah Wyle, star of “Pirates of Silicon Valley,” who fooled the crowd momentarily with his nearly-spot-on Steve Jobs impersonation (though he forgot to unscrew the cap to his water bottle). After a demo of the imminent OS 9, the real Steve unveiled Apple’s newest laptop, a candy-colored clamshell book that had a handle and looked strangely like a potty seat. MWE Tokyo 1999: Steve’s first keynote at Macworld Toyko was basically a rewrite of January’s Macworld San Francisco presentation, with the exception of an untimely crash of the Power Mac G3 during Microsoft’s Internet Explorer demo. But all anyone really cared about were iMacs. NEXT: Macworld Expo: The 2000's Macworld Expo the 2000's - Apple's return MWE SF 2000: With the renaissance in full swing, Steve announced Apple’s next-generation operating system in earnest at the first Macworld of the new millennium. With “state-of-the-art plumbing,” “killer graphics” and a 12-month, “gentle migration,” Steve introduced the masses to the blue-tinged world of Aqua of the Dock and kept his promise: A public beta was in our hands by September. MWE New York 2000: Indigo, Ruby, Sage and Snow iMacs, dual-processor Power Macs, optical mice, translucent keyboards, iMovie 2, and 15-, 17- and 22-inch displays. None stood a chance against the star-crossed star of the show, the jaw-dropping Power Mac G4 Cube. Everyone wanted to take one home, but strangely, few people actually did. MWE Tokyo 2000: After an quiet debut in 1999, Steve pulled out all the stops in 2000, unveiling brand-new portables and Power Macs, including the iBook Special Edition and Pismo PowerBook. Steve also made good on his ’98 vow to include the highest-quality Japanese fonts in OS X. MWE SF 2001: One of Jobs’ shining moments (even by his standards), the 2001 Stevenote featured a shipping date for Mac OS X, two more pieces of the digital hub (iDVD and iTunes), SuperDrive-equipped graphite Power Mac G4s, and the piece de resistance, the “mega-wide,” one-inch thick Titanium Power Mac G4. Suddenly, all was right-side up with the world (including the Apple logo on the case). MWE New York 2001: A preview of Mac OS X Puma (and a few lengthy third-party demos) brought scarcely any new features, but faster iMacs and Quicksilver Power Macs promised an all-around zippier experience. MWE Tokyo 2001: The final aesthetic flourish for the iMac brought the trippy Flower Power and Blue Dalmatian patterns and added CD-RW drives to accompany iTunes 1.1 Joining the art-deco all-in-ones were new Power Mac G4 Cubes, which also added the elusive CD-RW drives. MWE SF 2002: A 14-inch iBook joined the wildly popular 12-inch “ice-book” family and iPhoto rounded out Apple’s digital hub vision, but the show-stopper was the flat-panel iMac G4, an overdue update that was well worth the wait. Part-computer, part-sculpture, the “Sunflower” iMac firmly cemented the Stevenote as the greatest show on earth. MWE New York 2002: A notably lackluster presentation eliminated Apple’s free e-mail in favor of a paid service and delivered a rehash of the Jaguar demo Steve gave two months earlier at WWDC. No killer new products to speak of, but iSync, iCal and iTunes 3 made their debut, along with solid-state iPods (with Windows support) and 17-inch iMacs, but attendees couldn’t help but notice the spring was missing from Steve’s step.MWE Tokyo 2002: Steve crammed another 5 gigabytes into the diminutive iPod music player as the Macworld Tokyo expo was moved to the more spacious Big Sight convention center for Apple’s last overseas splash. Turned out the switch was prophetic, as Steve took the wraps off the stunning 23-inch Cinema HD display, Apple’s largest to date. MWE SF 2003: Final Cut Express, Airport Extreme, iLife, Keynote and Safari would have been enough for most company’s trade shows, but not Apple. After nearly two hours of nonstop announcements, Steve saved the best for last: The largest (17-inch) and smallest (12-inch) PowerBooks ever, dressed to the nines in classy aluminum. MWE New York 2003: After Steve bailed on his annual keynote to protest IDG’s plan to move to the expo back to Boston the following year, the show, now known as Macworld CreativePro Conference & Expo, found itself in a tailspin. Apple fulfilled its commitment to exhibit--and even announced the availability of Soundtrack as a standalone product--but the thrill was most definitely gone.MWE Tokyo 2003: On the heels of the east-coast shake-up, Apple abruptly pulled out of the Japan show, too, and IDG cancelled the event altogether. MWE SF 2004: A somewhat disappointing keynote delivered Garageband and way too much John Mayer, but still finished on a high note as Steve unveiled the product no one knew they needed: a smaller iPod in a rainbow of flavors. MWE Boston 2004-2005: A pair of intimate Boston expos closed the book on Macworld East for good, as IDG vowed to focus its efforts on the sole remaining show in San Francisco. MWE SF 2005: Also known as the keynote that brought down ThinkSecret, Steve took to the Moscone stage in 1995 looking to capitalize on all the attention Apple was getting. Along with a new iLife and a surprise successor to the defunct AppleWorks, two low-priced products sought to dispel the notion of Apple as a high-priced niche company: the $99 iPod shuffle and $499 Mac mini. MWE SF 2006: Apple kicked off the Intel transition by fitting its two most popular Macs with Core Duo processors. Little was changed from the new iMac aside from its new brain, but the PowerBook underwent a series of tweaks and refinements, including the retirement of its famous name “because we’re kind of done with Power and we want Mac in the name of our products.” MWE SF 2007: The last great Macworld keynote ever. Nuff said. MWE SF 2008: With the near-impossible task of following the launch of the iPhone, Steve took the stage for his last Macworld San Francisco keynote with a bag full of assorted treats--cheaper Apple TVs, iTunes movie rentals, iPod touch and iPhone software updates, Time Capsule--and one big trick. Steve’s lasting image as the master of Macworld ceremonies: sliding the Macbook Air out its plain manila envelope. MWE SF 2009: Apple’s final Macworld appearance was preceded by letter from Steve explaining his “nutritional problem” and “decision to have Phil deliver the Macworld keynote,” so attendees were prepared for a lackluster event. Apple surprised some with the new 8-hour, 17-inch Mac Book Pro, iLife ’09 and iWork ’09, but it just wasn’t the same without the man who made it all happen. Macworld Expo elsewhere Building off the success of U.S. shows, a number of expos around the globe tried to capitalize on the Macworld name, to limited success: 1989: Macworld Canada 1991: Macworld Mexico, Hong Kong, Stockholm and New Zealand 1992: Macworld Barcelona, Paris (cancelled due to popularity of Apple Expo) 1994: Macworld Expo Summit (Washington, D.C.) 1996: Macworld Taiwan 2004: Macworld UK 2005: Macworld on Tour (only schedule date, in Kissimmee, Fla., cancelled)

  • Rumor Has It: January Event “Confirmed,” More on the Tablet

    I'm really sorry. I do realize these tablet rumors are becoming tiresome, but you know, don't you, that they're going to get a lot worse in the coming weeks as we approach January 26 and Apple's not-yet-officially-confirmed-but-unofficially-will-definitely-happen media event? The latest tidbits come from Fox News' Clayton Morris and (somewhat unexpectedly given how he should know better) an ex-Apple, ex-Google China senior executive. Let's get started… Fox's Clayton Morris writes that he's been talking with his very own private mole inside Apple HQ about the as-yet unconfirmed media event (first reported by the Financial Times) and has this to offer us: While nothing official has been handed down from the notoriously tight-lipped company, my source took the Financial Times report one step further by saying this event will focus on the mobility space, meaning we'll see something related to the iPhone/Touch product line. Could this be the announcement of the mythical Apple tablet we've been hearing so much about? Well if it isn't, if El Jobso doesn't announce a tablet, if, instead, the whole event is nothing more than a high-profile sales pitch for a slightly-higher-capacity iPod shuffle, I'll be torn between shedding bitter tears, or laughing myself sick. Maybe both. “Focus on the mobility space,” eh? How charmingly vague. You have to wonder why these “sources” are always so…unhelpful. I mean, a real, genuine, worthwhile secret mole should be leaking specific, valuable information, right? That's what moles are supposed to do, it's in the job description. But when it comes to Apple's moles, this just doesn't happen, does it? Instead, they offer infuriatingly nebulous non-information that seems, if nothing else, perfectly suited to further fuelling speculation, rather than offering, y'know, facts. I think of these sources as the tech community's version of spirit mediums who, after (rolling eyes) 'miraculously' connecting with the dearly departed, then bafflingly waste that rare and wonderful chance at communication by playing an odd game of Guess Who? “Focus on the mobility space” might as well be “I see a man with thinning hair whose name begins with something sounding like Ste…” I have a modest theory; these “sources” are tasked with providing fuzzy details to media hacks. It's all part of a precise marketing strategy, pioneered by Jobs, designed to get the flames of the rumor mill burning brightly. It probably saves a fortune on actual advertising. A Little Less Vague Also fanning the flames today is a report by Engadget's Richard Lai who writes that former Google China president Kai-fu Lee has claimed privileged insider-knowledge of the mythical tablet. Lee's comments appear on Lee's microblogging site and, translated by GadgetMix, read in part: The Apple Tablet looks like a bigger iPhone that sports an awesome UI packed in a beautiful 10.1-inch screen. The tablet combines the functions of both netbook and kindle, an ebook reader. It has virtual keyboard for text entry and a webcam for video conferencing Lai adds: We've heard a lot of this same noise before: sub-$1000 price, an iPhone-like appearance, 10.1-inch multitouch screen, video conferencing, cellular connectivity, 3D graphics and virtual keyboard. What really got our attention is Lee's link with Foxconn — the Apple OEM is one of the main contributors to Lee's post-Google investment venture, Innovation Works, so there's a good chance that Lee's spoken to someone overlooking the manufacturing of a certain Apple device. Kai-fu Lee also adds in his blog that “Steve Jobs will be introducing this product in January,” lending credence to Clayton Morris' sepulchral source at Cupertino. Well, that's it — another day, another round of rumors. Make of them what you will. As far as I can see, we don't know anything more now than we did when we reached for our hot lava java this morning, but, please, don't shoot the messenger. At least this specumor (I'm enjoying my portmanteau's; this one's a cross between speculation and rumor) is bolstered by what appears to be sort-of-credible evidence. Honestly, though, January 26 can't arrive fast enough. I'm thoroughly sick of all this guessjecture. UPDATE: Looks like my modest theory is correct, if Fake Steve is to be trusted.

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